Israël, Libanon/Gaza, oorlog #56

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 16:37 schreef B4CO het volgende:
is ergens die hele resolutie online?

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 16:37 schreef B4CO het volgende:
is ergens die hele resolutie online?

quote:

UNITED NATIONS -- Following is the full text of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on the Israel-Hezbollah war:

"The Security Council,

"PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its president on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June, 2000, of 19 October, 2004, of 4 May 2005, of 23 January 2006 and of 30 July 2006;

"PP2. Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hezbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons;

"PP3. Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers;

"PP4: Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel;

"PP5. Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese prime minister and the commitment of the government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a UN force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon;

"PP6. Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest;

"PP7. Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area;

"PP8. Welcoming the unanimous decision by the government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in south Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from UNIFIL as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties;

"PP9. Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict;

"PP10. Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

"OP1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

"OP2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

"OP3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon;

"OP4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

"OP5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

"OP6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbors, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

"OP7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

"OP8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

-- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
-- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
-- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;
-- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;
-- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;
-- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

"OP9. Invites the secretary general to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to be actively involved;

"OP10. Requests the secretary general to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within 30 days;

"OP11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

a. Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
b. Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
c. Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
d. Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
e. Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
f. Assist the government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

"OP12. Acting in support of a request from the government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

"OP13. Requests the secretary general urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, urges member states to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and expresses its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

"OP14. Calls upon the government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and requests UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the government of Lebanon at its request;

"OP15. Decides further that all states shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft;

(a) the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, and;
(b) the provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above, except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorized by the government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

"OP16. Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

"OP17. Requests the secretary general to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

"OP18. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

"OP19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 16:46 schreef B4CO het volgende:
ergens een link naar die resolutie, voor in de OP

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 17:07 schreef CeeJee het volgende:

Problematisch aan de resolutie is dat ze Hezbollah niet bij naam noemt als de te ontwapenen partij.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 17:33 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:

[..]

Ik vind er weinig problematisch aan eigenlijk

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 17:46 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:

Hezbollah hoeft helemaal niet ontwapend te worden . Zou het wel ontwapend worden dan heb je geen 'vredesmacht' nodig toch.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 18:45 schreef lionsguy18 het volgende:
Wat een laffe resolutie.

quote:

WASHINGTON -- For anyone who still thinks the Israeli-Lebanon war is just a border scuffle, one Middle East expert shouts a dire warning:

"As soon as a cease fire occurs, the ‘Hezbollah Blitzkrieg' will crumble the ‘Lebanese Republic of Weimar' and install its own ‘Khumeinist Republic' on the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The consequences of such a development are far beyond imagination for the region and the world. Hezbollah would have paved the way for Iran to create the mother of all world threats since Hitler."

So cautions Professor Walid Phares, author of "Future Jihad," a visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels, and a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C.

In an exclusive interview with NewsMax, the Lebanese-born Phares likens the current Hezbollah offensive in Lebanon to a "putsch" -- with the convoluted aims of reestablishing a pro-Syrian-Iranian regime in Lebanon, reconstructing a third wing to the Tehran-Damascus axis, reanimating the Arab-Israeli conflict, rejuvenating Syrian dominance, isolating Jordan, reaching out to Hamas, crumbling Iraq, and unleashing Iran's nuclear programs.

The author also sees half-measures and premature truces as catalysts to even bloodier future conflicts:

"If Israel takes 40 kilometers [into the southern belly of Lebanon] and sits, Hezbollah and its allies will take the rest of the country and eliminate the Cedars Revolution [the Lebanese Democracy movement]. That is a certainty. Then the two camps will clash in a wider war in few more months."

As a corollary, however, the expert advises that if Israel gets even more aggressive and moves instead through the Bekaa (a fertile valley in Lebanon and Syria, located about 19 miles east of Beirut), it would shut down the Syrian-Lebanese borders (a major supply line for war materials flowing to Hezbollah).

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 12:12 schreef damian5700 het volgende:

[..]

Dat is ook het hypocriete aan Hezbollah. Om die gevangen geeft zij geen moer, maar al die ophef over in Israëlische gevangenissen terroristische misdadigers wel. Met een beetje karakter zou Nasrallah natuurlijk een paar katushja's op Damascus moeten laten vuren. Maarja, daar ontbreekt het natuurlijk aan...

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 19:43 schreef Godslasteraar het volgende:

[..]

Ik vraag me toch al af of al die jongemensen bv hier op fok, maar ook in het algemeen, niet vreselijk hun tijd verspillen aan dit onbenullige gedoe. Wat schiet je ermee op, wat wordt je er nu zelf beter van? En dat geldt ook voor de grote mensen: let it be .. let it be ......

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 18:20 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:

Kijk hoe lang unifil er al zit met talloze doden. Ok het is heel beperkt wat ze de laatste jaren doen maar toch.

hezbollah mag van mij bewapend blijven. oa juist omdat het Libaneze leger niet sterk genoeg is om verzet te plegen tegen Israel mocht dat nodig zijn.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:30 schreef Overlast het volgende:

[..]

Onvoorstelbaar. Definieer "mocht dat nodig zijn". Ik wilde iets cynisch gaan schrijven maar ik ben bang dat de boodschap je dan ontgaat. Kort en bondig dan maar. Israel heeft zich teruggetrokken uit zuid-Libanon, daarop heeft hezbollah zich doen gelden door het ontvoeren van soldaten en afschieten van raketten. Israel heeft geen enkele aanleiding gegeven voor deze provocaties.

Het innemen van delen van Libanon is juist een reactie op deze aanvallen van hezbollah. Is een gewapend hezbollah dan niet ook een gevaar voor Libanon?

"Verzet plegen wanneer nodig is"... Vertel me, op welke manier heeft Israel verzet nodig gemaakt? Op welke manier hebben ze de aanvallen van hezbollah over zich afgeroepen? Anders dan het tonen van zwakte door zich eenzijdig terug te trekken. En kom niet aan met sheba farms, want dan zijn we snel uitgepraat.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:33 schreef dancemacabre het volgende:

[..]

omdat ze in een democratie leven waar het zelfs goed toeven is voor Arabieren en Joods zijn, dat helpt hen ook niet.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 18:20 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:

Kijk hoe lang unifil er al zit met talloze doden. Ok het is heel beperkt wat ze de laatste jaren doen maar toch.

quote:

hezbollah mag van mij bewapend blijven. oa juist omdat het Libaneze leger niet sterk genoeg is om verzet te plegen tegen Israel mocht dat nodig zijn.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:43 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:


Je bekijkt het conflict veels te beperkt , overlast,

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:49 schreef sp3c het volgende:

[..]

28 jaar en 257 doden in verschillende sterkten

quote:

worden maar wat mij betreft mag de gewapende tak wel geintegreerd worden in de Libanese strijdkrachten

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:49 schreef Overlast het volgende:

[..]

Goed antwoord.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:52 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:

[..]

ja sorry ik kan wel weer dagenlang in conclaaf gaan zoals 20 topics geleden maar je zit in dit conflict met het probleem dat mensen veelal het maar van 1 kant bekijken, zich niet kunnen inleven in de andere kant, of de neutrale mens daar. De gedachtwijzen en de geschiedenis gemakshalve maar buiten beschouwing laten etc etc.
Dat maakt het saai, zinloos en vermoeiend.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:50 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:

[..]

ja ik had t pas gelezen. ok het is niet talloos maar ik vind het niet niks.

quote:

[..]

lijkt mij een slecht plan waar Libanon alleen maar de dupe van kan worden. Men krijgt toegang tot nog meer wapens en je kan het een moeilijk meer van het ander onderscheiden etc.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 20:58 schreef Overlast het volgende:

Een compleet nietszeggend antwoord met nietszeggende termen als "gedachtwijzen" en "de neutrale mens".

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 22:09 schreef BabeWatcher het volgende:
Hezbollah is gecapituleerd, Israël heeft gewonnen. Nu snel een VN-vredesmacht en de Beekavallei terug naar Syrië en dan is deze crisis ook weer opgelost.

quote:

Op zaterdag 12 augustus 2006 21:02 schreef PLAE@ het volgende:

[..]

gedachtenwijzen = hoe een christen in Libanon op dit moment redeneerd. Die ziet Hezbollah nu niet automatische als slecht en Israel als 'goed' . Ik neem echter aan dat je neit eens weet dat er daar Christenen wonen

neutrale mens= bijvoorbeeld zo'n Christen in Libanon die niet duidelijk tot 1 van beide partijen behoord. Of een gewoon gezin in het Zuiden van Libanon dat niks met de Hezbollah te maken wil hebben. Alleen als die niet gevlucht zijn en nog in hun huis zitten omdat ze helaas geen gevulde bankrekening hebben en een auto die ze even voltanken waarna ze naar het noorden crossen waar ze echter niks hebben om heen te gaan.
In dit topic is de tendens dat het dan maar hun eigen schuld is als ze dood zijn na een bombardement.

en ik had t gewoon over 3/4 van de mensen die hier reageren. Niet specifiek over jou