Oorlog in Oekraïne #915 de boel zit vast !

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:00 schreef BlaZ het volgende:

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Dat is wel erg naïef, het is toch al lang duidelijk dat dergelijke onderdelen gewoon via alle landen tussen Turkije en China inclusief voorgenoemden zelf ingevoerd kan worden.

De Kyivpost berichtte overigens dat Rusland 40 Kh101 per maand kan produceren. Dat zou betekenen dat er een aanval zoals zopas elke 1,5 maand kan plaatsvinden. Het is dus ook niet dat ze dergelijke raketten in overschot hebben.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:09 schreef Ulx het volgende:
[ twitter ]

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:05 schreef BlaZ het volgende:

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Ja, dan zet je toch gewoon een noodaggregaat aan.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:00 schreef BlaZ het volgende:
Dat is wel erg naïef, het is toch al lang duidelijk dat dergelijke onderdelen gewoon via alle landen tussen Turkije en China inclusief voorgenoemden zelf ingevoerd kan worden.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:05 schreef BlaZ het volgende:

[..]
Ja, dan zet je toch gewoon een noodaggregaat aan.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:13 schreef Solstice1 het volgende:

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Mwah, er liep ook zo'n route via Nederland en dan door de Baltische staten. Of je ooit alles kunt pakken weet ik niet, maar het lijkt er toch wel op dat je het nodige uit kunt vinden als je er tijd en geld insteekt wat betreft het ontlopen van sancties. Als Nieuwsuur zo'n operatie op kan rollen dan moet een overheidsdienst dat in principe ook kunnen.

Daarbij, de douane-beambten gaven ook aan dat er wel sancties uitgerold werden maar het geld voor de benodigde mankracht niet geleverd werd. Da's een kwestie van politieke wil.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:13 schreef Solstice1 het volgende:

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Mwah, er liep ook zo'n route via Nederland en dan door de Baltische staten. Of je ooit alles kunt pakken weet ik niet, maar het lijkt er toch wel op dat je het nodige uit kunt vinden als je er tijd en geld insteekt wat betreft het ontlopen van sancties. Als Nieuwsuur zo'n operatie op kan rollen dan moet een overheidsdienst dat in principe ook kunnen.

Daarbij, de douane-beambten gaven ook aan dat er wel sancties uitgerold werden maar het geld voor de benodigde mankracht niet geleverd werd. Da's een kwestie van politieke wil.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 18:28 schreef xpompompomx het volgende:
BIEM

Massive Explosion As MT-LB Kamikaze Vehicle Hit By Drone

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An attempt by the Russians to make a passage through a mine field using a MT-LB full of explosives near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk region. End of video shows it being full of mines and aircraft bombs. Large explosion.

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Op zondag 31 december 2023 12:30 schreef Ulx het volgende:
[ twitter ]

Made in India.

_{*kuch* BRICS *kuch*}

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India has not sent any artillery ammunition to Ukraine: MEA

India has been maintaining that the conflict in Ukraine must be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy.

India on Thursday trashed reports that claimed spotting certain Indian-origin artillery shells in Ukraine, and categorically asserted that it has not sent any ammunition to that country.

External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said New Delhi has neither sent nor exported any artillery ammunition to Ukraine.”We have also seen some media reports in this regard. We can categorically say that we have not sent any of this artillery ammunition to Ukraine,” he said at a media briefing.

Jaiswal’s remarks came in response to a question on reports about Indian-made artillery shells being spotted in Ukraine.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 19:10 schreef AchJa het volgende:

[..]
[..]
First Post

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 07:53 schreef Delenlill het volgende:

https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)gun_at_an_fpv_drone/
Russian soldier throws his gun at an fpv drone

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:19 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Ik zie berichten dat Valery Gerasimov is opgeblazen.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 19:24 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Ok. Dat kan.

Blijkbaar raken ze granaten kwijt.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 19:23 schreef BEFEM het volgende:
Dat sluit elkaar niet uit toch?

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:19 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Ik zie berichten dat Valery Gerasimov is opgeblazen. Nog wel allemaal tamtam, dus pin me er niet op vast.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:19 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Ik zie berichten dat Valery Gerasimov is opgeblazen. Nog wel allemaal tamtam, dus pin me er niet op vast.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:34 schreef Ulx het volgende:

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Gebruik even een zoekfunctie.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:33 schreef Discombobulate het volgende:
Gerasimov was overigens ander half jaar geleden ook al oogeblazen en had shraphnel in z'n been. Bleek niets van waar te zijn.

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Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov (Russian: Валерий Васильевич Герасимов, IPA: [vɐˈlʲerʲɪj vɐˈsʲilʲjɪvʲɪtɕ ɡʲɪˈrasʲɪməf]; born 8 September 1955, died 4 January 2024 in Ukraine) was a Russian army general serving as the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defence.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:50 schreef AchJa het volgende:
Wiki zegt dat hij dood is, dan moet het wel waar zijn...
[..]

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:48 schreef Ulx het volgende:

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Hij heeft het over Vitaly Gerasimov.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 17:36 schreef StateOfMind het volgende:

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Vorig jaar:

Russian state TV host claims Ukraine's allies are reduced to eating squirrels because they are spending all their money on military aid

https://www.businessinsid(...)ional=true&r=US&IR=T

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:52 schreef xpompompomx het volgende:
🙏

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 20:19 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Ik zie berichten dat Valery Gerasimov is opgeblazen. Nog wel allemaal tamtam, dus pin me er niet op vast.

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The War in Ukraine Is Not a Stalemate

Last Year’s Counteroffensive Failed—but the West Can Prevent a Russian Victory This Year

Since the failure of offensives in 2023 by both Ukraine and Russia, a narrative is coalescing that the war in Ukraine has reached a stalemate. The perception of an indefinite but static conflict is causing a sense of fatigue in the capitals of Ukraine’s partners: if neither side is likely to make substantial progress, the status quo appears stable, demanding little urgent policy attention.

This perception of stalemate, however, is deeply flawed. Both Moscow and Kyiv are in a race to rebuild offensive combat power. In a conflict of this scale, that process will take time. While the first half of 2024 may bring few changes in control of Ukrainian territory, the materiel, personnel training, and casualties that each side accrues in the next few months will determine the long-term trajectory of the conflict. The West in fact faces a crucial choice right now: support Ukraine so that its leaders can defend their territory and prepare for a 2025 offensive or cede an irrecoverable advantage to Russia.

Uncertainty about the long-term provision of aid to Ukraine risks not only giving Russia advantages on the battlefield but also emboldening Moscow further. It has already undermined the goal to push Russia to the negotiating table because the Kremlin now believes it can outlast the West’s will. Unless clear commitments are made in early 2024, the Kremlin’s resolve will only harden.

What the United States and Europe do over the next six months will determine one of two futures. In one, Ukraine can build up its forces to renew offensive operations and degrade Russian military strength to the degree that Kyiv can enter negotiations with the leverage to impose a lasting peace. In the other, a shortage of supplies and trained personnel will mire Ukraine in an attritional struggle that will leave it exhausted and facing eventual subjugation.

Ukraine’s international partners must remember that the first outcome is desirable not only to Ukrainians. It is necessary to protect the international norm that states do not change their borders by force. A mobilized and emboldened Russia would pose a sustained threat to NATO, requiring the United States to indefinitely underwrite deterrence in Europe. That would constrain the United States’ capacity to project force in the Indo-Pacific and substantially increase the danger of conflict over Taiwan. The West can choose which direction history takes. But first it must acknowledge the gravity of the decision it currently faces.

TIME DEFICIT

If the Ukrainian military’s 2023 offensive had gone according to plan, its forces would have punched through Russia’s so-called Surovikin Line in Zaporizhzhia Province and liberated Melitopol, severing the roads connecting Russia to Crimea. Combined with Ukrainian naval operations, that would have put Crimea under siege. This objective was ambitious but achievable. The foremost reason it failed was that the Ukrainian units assigned to lead the offensive had insufficient time to train and prepare.

In July 2022, the United Kingdom, alongside other Ukrainian partners, established Operation Interflex to train Ukrainian troops. At the time, Ukraine desperately needed more units to hold defensive positions, so Interflex set the training program at five weeks, prioritizing skills vital to defensive operations. That five-week regimen still exists, but the mission has fundamentally changed.

During World War II, the British military considered 22 weeks the minimum time necessary to prepare a soldier for infantry combat. After this initial period, soldiers would be assigned to units and take part in collective training in battalions. Even before May 2023, it was evident that Ukraine’s troops were undertrained for offensive operations and had barely had time to learn how to operate newly donated equipment. But as Russian forces strengthened their defensive positions, the offensive could not be delayed.

Ukrainian personnel also had too little opportunity to train collectively. The number of troops deployed is not the only thing that matters in war: the potency of an army’s manpower is a function of how well small units coordinate, even while dispersed across a broad area. Ukraine’s geography demands especially skilled coordination because tree lines prevent units from being able to see one another. The threat of artillery further drives dispersion, so that companies are often spread over nearly two miles of front. The terrain in Zaporizhzhia particularly encourages commanders to fight with isolated companies. In this geographic context, a capacity to synchronize activity beyond each unit’s line of sight is needed so units can support one another and exploit each other’s gains.

Collective training in the Ukrainian military has rarely taken place above the company level, however, and the need to staff new units has also left most short of experienced officers. Over the course of the war, the number of active Ukrainian troops has quintupled with no significant rise in the number of trained staff officers. In a theater that requires Ukrainian officers to synchronize widely dispersed maneuvers with artillery fire, drone orbits, and the effects of electronic warfare, a shortage of field-grade officers means an inability to stitch together large-scale operations.

During the 2023 offensive, Ukrainian operations were largely fought by pairs of companies under the close management of an understaffed brigade command post. The result was that while Ukrainian soldiers often succeeded in taking enemy positions, they were rarely able to exploit the breaches they made or to quickly reinforce their gains. Instead, they had to stop and plan, giving Russian forces time to reset. If the Ukrainian military cannot expand the scale at which it operates, this experience risks being repeated. Delivering the proper training, however, will need time.

WHEN THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE

Reforms in Ukrainian troops’ training are necessary for more effective offensive operations. But better training would not diminish Kyiv’s need for materiel. The Ukrainian military is likely to face significant equipment shortages over the coming year: at the height of its 2023 offensive, Ukraine was firing up to 7,000 artillery rounds per day, accounting for up to 80 percent of Russia’s combat losses. By the end of 2023, however, Ukrainian forces were firing closer to 2,000 rounds per day. Russia’s artillery capacity, meanwhile, has turned a corner, with Russian forces now firing up around 10,000 rounds per day. Unless Ukraine can again create localized conditions of artillery superiority, any new offensive operations will result in unsustainable losses of Ukrainian troops.

Indeed, without achieving such areas of localized artillery superiority, Ukraine will struggle to blunt Russian attacks. Russia currently fields about 340,000 troops in southern Ukraine. For much of the war, those troops’ offensive potential was limited by logistical constraints. But Russia was also hobbled by the high level of casualties inflicted by Ukraine—up to 1,000 dead and wounded per day during the heaviest periods of fighting. Incurring so many casualties forced Russia to send undertrained personnel to the frontline. While that did not stop Moscow from attempting offensive maneuvers, it limited their effectiveness.

The challenge for Ukraine is that even while it maintains a defensive posture, it must continue to mount localized offensives. If Russia sustains fewer losses, the capabilities of its forces in the field will improve. Diminishing pressure on the frontlines would offer Russia other advantages, too. Moscow would be able to divert experienced troops to train recruits, potentially allowing it to open new offensive axes in the second half of 2024. Russian forces could also concentrate on sectors where they can establish a more favorable battlefield geometry and inflict heavier losses on Ukraine. If Ukraine leaves large sections of the front quiet, Russian forces may also be able to significantly expand their fortifications, making any future Ukrainian offensive operations harder to carry out. Even while it holds a defensive posture, the Ukrainian military must seek to maximize Russia’s rate of attrition.

WHICH COMES FIRST?

It is essential that Kyiv and its partners establish a realistic shared understanding of what materiel and training can be provided, and when. Over the past two years, Kyiv’s Western allies wasted the time advantages they did have, squandering much of 2022 and 2023 basking in the euphoria of Russia’s early setbacks and imagining that they could avoid a protracted conflict. Rather than seeking to expand industrial capacity in NATO member states, Kyiv’s friends mainly sourced munitions from national stockpiles and the international market and channeled them to Ukraine.

Now these stockpiles of munitions are running low. To continue to achieve localized artillery superiority, Ukraine will need about 2.4 million rounds of ammunition per year. But Ukraine’s international partners, including the United States, will struggle to provide half that in 2024.

Ukraine’s shortage of artillery shells gets the most attention. But its resource limitations are by no means confined to ammunition. To regenerate offensive capacity and defend itself against Russian attacks, Ukraine will need approximately 1,800 replacement artillery barrels per year. The handful of barrel machines in Europe cannot meet this demand. The numerous fleets of vehicles gifted to Kyiv over the past two years also need a reliable supply of spare parts. Air defense interceptors will be a persistent requirement, too: Russia is now producing over 100 cruise and ballistic missiles and 300 attack drones per month. To contain the damage from these weapons, Ukraine will need resupplies of Western air-defense systems. If Western countries do not increase their capacity to produce these systems, Russia will gain the upper hand.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, fearing that U.S. support will end with the upcoming American presidential election, has declared that all Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia must be liberated by October 2024. This is not achievable, given the materiel available to Ukraine or the time that its military needs to properly train its troops. But it is not reasonable for Kyiv’s Western allies to demand that Ukraine’s generals create a detailed longer-term plan before they commit to offering new support. Without being sure of what equipment they can rely on receiving, Ukraine’s military leaders cannot determine what kind of operations they can mount, and when. In short, preparing for the next phase of the war has become a chicken-and-egg problem between Kyiv and Washington.

VALUE FOR MONEY

A realistic plan would involve resourcing Kyiv to maintain a defensive posture throughout most of 2024 while units are trained and equipped to mount offensive operations in 2025. Beyond the certainty this plan would offer Ukraine’s generals, it would also signal to the Kremlin that it cannot count on winning a years-long war of attrition against an increasingly thinly resourced Ukraine. A U.S. commitment to supporting Ukraine through 2024 would also shift European allies’ incentives toward investing more deeply in increasing the capacity of their weapons industries, reducing the burden on the United States through 2025.

Western leaders must emphasize that longer-term investment in manufacturing capacity is both affordable and ultimately benefits Ukraine’s allies. The total defense budgets of the 54 countries supporting Ukraine well exceed $100 billion per month. By contrast, current support for Ukraine costs those states less than $6 billion monthly.

The biggest barriers to ensuring that Ukraine does not lose the war are political. Funding Ukraine has often been framed as merely giving money to Kyiv. This is, however, deeply misleading. Much of the aid that Ukraine will need constitutes an investment by its partners in their own domestic defense manufacturing and will be spent at home. A significant proportion of aid to Ukraine will eventually be recovered by the recipient in taxes while boosting manufacturing jobs across NATO’s member countries. At a time of economic strain, such investment should be widely welcomed by publics in countries supporting Kyiv.

It has also often been suggested that U.S. support for Ukraine comes at the expense of the American military’s readiness to deter China. But if China sees that the United States is unable to sustain a military effort, whether in Europe or Asia, deterrence is eroded, so expanding manufacturing to meet Ukraine’s needs is vital.

The United States has a treaty obligation to come to the defense of its European allies. Europe’s defense production does not match Russia’s, especially as Russia has moved to a war footing. In time, U.S. leaders must push Europe to reduce its dependence on the United States so that the U.S. military can prioritize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. But this must be a managed transition. If that transition comes at the cost of Ukraine’s defeat, the United States risks having to support a Europe unable to defend its eastern flank while China simultaneously escalates tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

DECISION POINT

Some leaders in Western capitals now argue that it is time to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. This line of thinking, however, misses both the extent of Russia’s goals and what the Kremlin would realistically offer. Moscow is not interested in simply seizing some Ukrainian territory: Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that he wants to change the logic of the international system.

If the United States asks its partners to make concessions to Russia to obtain a token cease-fire, two things will likely happen. First, Russia will persistently breach the cease-fire, as it did with all iterations of the 2015 Minsk agreements, while rebuilding its military to finish the task of occupying Kyiv. Second, Russia will argue to its allies that the United States can be beaten through perseverance. This will likely lead many U.S. security partners to seek an insurance policy, reducing the United States’ influence around the world.

Russia does not want a direct conflict with NATO, but the Kremlin is increasingly looking to expand the scope of its indirect confrontations with the West. Since Yevgeny Prigozhin halted his June 2023 mutiny, Russia has only doubled down on its ambition to compete with the West globally. In fact, Prigozhin’s failed rebellion may have advanced these ambitions: the remnants of his force have now been reorganized into an “expeditionary corps” under the direct control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. Since the summer of 2023, Russia has been engaging extensively with governments in western and central Africa, promising them military support in exchange for the expulsion of Western forces and economic interests.

The United States and its European allies face a choice. They can either make an immediate plan to bolster the training they provide to the Ukrainian military, clarify to their publics and to Ukraine that the October 2024 deadline to liberate territory must be extended, and underwrite Ukraine’s materiel needs through 2025, or they can continue to falsely believe the war is in a stalemate, dithering and ceding the advantage to Russia. This would be a terrible mistake: in addition to expanding its partnerships in Africa, Russia is strengthening its collaboration with China, Iran, and North Korea. And if a loss in Ukraine ends up demonstrating that the West cannot meet a single challenge to the world’s security architecture, its adversaries will hardly believe it can deal with multiple crises at once.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 21:16 schreef AchJa het volgende:
@:extec, opgelet een long read...
[..]
Foreign Affairs/RUSI

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 21:09 schreef oheng het volgende:

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Neeeee dat is een enorme tegenslag voor Oekraïne.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 21:49 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Wil je insinueren dat Poetin een sukkeltje is? Dat iemand het beter kan?

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 21:16 schreef AchJa het volgende:
@:extec, opgelet een long read...
[..]
Foreign Affairs/RUSI

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 21:55 schreef ExTec het volgende:
Heb je er trouwens nog een mening, van meer dan 5 woorden, over of niet?

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 22:19 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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De take aways voor mij zijn toch wel het gebrek aan getrainde troepen, ook vwb op de gedoneerde wapensystemen. De tijd is gewoon te kort. Het gebrek aan getrainde officieren aan het front en het gebrek aan training op bataljonsniveau en hoger zodat het manoeuvregevecht volledig mislukt... Tel daar het gebrek aan vooral munitie en reservedelen bij op en je hebt een gigantisch probleem. In het verlengde daarvan is de productiecapaciteit van de NATO simpelweg ver beneden peil, als wij niet opschalen gaat het zeker mis en dan zie ik het somber in.

Ik vind het gewoon een prima verhaal.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 22:19 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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De take aways voor mij zijn toch wel het gebrek aan getrainde troepen, ook vwb op de gedoneerde wapensystemen. De tijd is gewoon te kort. Het gebrek aan getrainde officieren aan het front en het gebrek aan training op bataljonsniveau en hoger zodat het manoeuvregevecht volledig mislukt... Tel daar het gebrek aan vooral munitie en reservedelen bij op en je hebt een gigantisch probleem. In het verlengde daarvan is de productiecapaciteit van de NATO simpelweg ver beneden peil, als wij niet opschalen gaat het zeker mis en dan zie ik het somber in.

Ik vind het gewoon een prima verhaal.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 22:43 schreef BEFEM het volgende:

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Vanaf dag 1 van het offensief was er uberhaupt geen manouvregevecht mogelijk toch?

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 22:44 schreef Discombobulate het volgende:

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Volgens mij konden ze dat gewoon niet. Ondanks de training.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 22:46 schreef BEFEM het volgende:

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Alles lag vol met mijnen en bunkers. Hoe moet je dan manoeuvreren?

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 00:00 schreef Ulx het volgende:

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En Rusland mag ze buiten de eigen landsgrenzen gebruiken.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 21:16 schreef AchJa het volgende:
@:extec, opgelet een long read...
[..]
Foreign Affairs/RUSI

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 23:08 schreef Perrin het volgende:
Noord Korea levert meer ballistische raketten aan Rusland dan het Westen aan Oekraïne levert. Slappe hap, dat Westen.

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 00:30 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Als we meer luchtdoelraketten leveren kan Noord-Korea het gebruik analyseren om de eigen raketten te verbeteren.

Da's wel een dingetje: Kim heeft een prima oefenterrein gevonden.

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WSJ: Russia plans to buy ballistic missiles from Iran
Russia is planning to buy short-range ballistic missiles from Iran and has already begun receiving similar munitions from North Korea, the Wall Street Journal reported on Jan. 4, citing comments from unnamed U.S. officials.

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U.S. should send Ukraine munitions even past expiration date - Hodges
If some of the U.S. weapons are past their expiration date and are set to be destroyed, they should instead be donated to Ukraine as they have a good chance of still being effective on the battlefield.
That’s according to Ben Hodges, former US EUCOM Commanding General now serving as a NATO Senior Mentor for Logistics, who gave an exclusive comment to Ukrinform.

“If some of these weapons are at or past their expiration date, there's a good chance that most of them still can be used. I say, let's give those to Ukrainian Armed Forces who have shown themselves to be very, very innovative and skillful and integrating any capability they receive into an effective weapon. Let's do that instead of destroying these things at home,” Hodges concluded.

He admitted, however, that “no one weapon or one platform that would change everything.”

“It's a combination of air land and sea power, but certainly, at the top of my list would be long-range precision strike capability out to a range of at least 300 kilometers. So we're talking about ATACMS and Taurus,” said the former EUCOM Commander.

With those weapons, he believes, Ukrainian forces could hit every square meter of Russian-occupied Ukraine, including in Crimea.

“No Russian headquarters, no Russian artillery, no Russian logistics would be safe. No Russian ship anywhere in Crimea would be safe. No Russian airbase. No Shahed launch point in occupied Ukraine would be safe,” Hodges stressed.

He also stressed that the most important contribution that the United States and Germany could make to Ukraine would be to say that “we want Ukraine to actually win this war, that is in our strategic interest that you Ukraine is successful.”

He added that this would open the gates for the material aid that Ukraine needs and send a strong signal to Russia that their hopes that the West is uncertain of further support to Ukraine would be shattered.

Russia may this way understand that their war of attrition strategy is going to fail, Ben Hodges stressed.

As Ukrinform reported earlier, U.S. National Security Council Coordinator John Kirby neither denied nor confirmed the reports that the government was set to destroy hundreds of “expired” weapons President Volodymyr Zelensky had asked for specifically. Kirby said at a briefing on Wednesday that the question should be referred to the Department of Defense.

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Poland says embargo on imports of Ukrainian products indefinite
The embargo on Ukrainian products will be indefinite - until a separate order to lift it.
Polish Minister of Agriculture Czesław Siekierski said this during a press conference on Thursday, Ukrinform reports, citing the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Poland.

The borders will not be opened, the embargo on Ukrainian products will be indefinite until it is lifted, Siekierski said after meeting with representatives of farmers' organizations in Poland.

According to him, he supports the implementation of the farmers' postulates, but it takes time. The minister emphasized that there is no reason to believe that what he had previously promised farmers will not be realized.

As Ukrinform reported, Polish farmers, despite assurances from the Polish government that their demands would be met, resumed the blockade of truck traffic near the Medyka-Shehyni checkpoint on January 4. The farmers are demanding subsidies for the purchase of corn, the preservation of the agricultural tax this year at the level of 2023, and the continuation of the possibility of obtaining loans to ensure liquidity.

Minister Siekierski had previously promised Polish farmers to fulfill their demands. However, they decided to resume the blockade, as they did not receive written assurances from the head of the Polish government, Donald Tusk, that he was ready to fulfill their demands.

On November 6, Polish carriers blocked truck traffic on the border with Ukraine at the Yahodyn-Dorohusk, Krakivets-Korczowa, and Rava-Ruska-Hrebenne checkpoints.

Later, Polish farmers joined them at the Shehyni-Medyka checkpoint, putting forward their own demands. Before the Christmas holidays, they suspended the protest, expecting the government to make concessions to fulfill their demands.

In May 2023, the European Commission banned imports of wheat, corn, rapeseed, and sunflower from Ukraine to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania at the insistence of these countries. The ban was extended until September 15, 2023. After that, the EU did not extend the temporary restrictions on Ukrainian grain.

The Polish government, led by Mateusz Morawiecki, had independently blocked imports of Ukrainian grain to the Polish market since September 15. But its transit through Poland is allowed.

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Ukraine Strikes Russian Command Post and Military Unit in Crimea
Explosions and air raid sirens were heard in Crimea on Thursday afternoon, and again in the evening.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) on Thursday struck a Russian command post near the occupied city of Sevastopol in the afternoon and then made a separate strike on a military unit in Crimea.

Details of the strike were still emerging at press time.

The AFU said it hit a Russian command post at about 3 p.m. local time.

Meanwhile, Russian sources said their air defenses knocked out ten guided missiles over occupied Sevastopol during the afternoon, with fragments of artillery shells crashing down around the area, AFP reported.

Explosions and air raid sirens were heard in Crimea again on Thursday evening.

The AFP had described “the sound of projectiles whooshing overhead” in the afternoon, and air raid sirens are overheard in videos shared by social media bloggers in Crimea.

President Volodymyr Zelensky said in his New Year's address that the AFU would bring Ukraine’s “wrath” against Russian forces in 2024, following the large-scale aerial bombardment on Ukrainian cities by Russian forces over the holidays, the largest cities since the beginning of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian air defense was mostly able to repel these attacks and launched a counterattack aimed at some of the sources of the missile strikes located in Russia’s Belgorad region.

On Telegram, Air Force Commander, Mykola Oleshchuk, on social media “conveyed his greetings to the invaders in Crimea, saying that he expects the same ‘epic report’ from Sevastopol and Yevpatoria on Jan. 4 from enemy propaganda mouthpieces,” that Moscow announced after similar Ukrainian attacks on Jan. 2.

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A Ukrainian Saboteur Traveled 900 Miles to A Snowy Russian Airfield And, In The Dead Of Night, Lit A Russian Sukhoi Fighter-Bomber On Fire
A Ukrainian agent slipped into Russia, traveled 900 miles to Chelyabinsk air base just north of Kazakhstan, sneaked onto the snow-covered tarmac under the cover of darkness and lit a fire on a Russian air force Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber.

It’s not the first act of sabotage by a Ukrainian agent inside Russia, but it might be the most daring. And it may have cost the Russian air force yet another of its increasingly endangered Su-34s.

The Ukrainian intelligence directorate claimed the twin-engine, two-seat Su-34 belonged to the 21st Composite Aviation Division, a known operator of the type. “The reasons for the plane catching fire are being clarified,” the directorate quipped.

The last time a Ukrainian agent sneaked onto a Russian airfield, near Pskov in October 2022, it was to blow up a Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopter. Pskov is 500 miles from the border with Ukraine.

Ukraine has other methods of striking Russian air bases from hundreds of miles away—drones and missiles—but direct sabotage might be the most embarrassing for the Russians. Where was air base security? The Russians know they’re at war, right?

It’s obvious why the Ukrainians would target Chelyabinsk and its Su-34s. The supersonic fighter-bombers are among the best in the Russian air force—and the most active along the 600-mile front line of Russia’s 23-month wider war on Ukraine.

Su-34s fly nearly daily missions lobbing 25-mile-range satellite-guided glide-bombs at Ukrainian positions. The powerful glide-bombs are “one of the biggest fears” among Ukrainian troops, according to Ukrainian soldier Olexandr Solon'ko.

Ukrainian forces are doing everything they can to shoot down every Su-34 they can. Rapidly repositioning long-range air-defenses in southern Ukraine last month, the Ukrainian air force shot down four Su-34s in the span of a week. If the sabotaged jet is a write-off, the Russians might be down to 125 or so Su-34s out of a pre-war fleet of no more than 150.

Ukraine’s sabotage campaign is effective but risky. More than a few Ukrainian saboteurs have been caught and killed. Perhaps most recently, Russian troops back in August reportedly intercepted a Ukrainian sabotage team sneaking across the border near Bryansk—and killed two of the saboteurs.

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Kremlin Plans to Equip Cruise Missiles with Cluster Munitions Ukrainian Partisans Say
The Ukrainian underground claims to have discovered documents showing the Russian Ministry of Defense plans to equip Kh-32 cruise missiles with cluster munitions.

Russia plans to equip Kh-32 missiles with cluster munitions, partisans from the National Resistance Center (NRC) claims.

The underground movement said that it received documents from the Dubna Machine-Building Plant in the Moscow region indicating that the Russian Ministry of Defense tasked engineers with modernizing cruise missiles with cluster munitions in October.

The NRC has not yet recorded cases of the Russians using cluster munitions, but calls on Ukrainians to promptly respond to air alarms, “because the enemy disregards international law and is ready to use more lethal weapons against the civilian population.”

On Dec. 19, Ukrainian partisans in the ATESH movement announced that they had confidential documents from the Dubna Machine-Building Plant, revealing problems cruise missile production problems in Russia.

The partisans found out that the plant failed to fulfill the annual state order.

“By Nov. 10, the plant was supposed to produce 80 missiles but actually produced only 61. According to a source in the plant's management, the state order was too large and exceeded the plant's capabilities by more than three times,” an ATESH movement partisan said.

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 10:23 schreef Ulx het volgende:
[ twitter ]

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 10:34 schreef Ulx het volgende:
[ twitter ]

Vervelend. Misschien gas kopen in Noorwegen?

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 01:48 schreef Joppiez het volgende:

[..]
Ben ik het 100% mee eens.
Voor de rest denk ik dat het westen inderdaad de fout maakt Oekraine niet genoeg te steunen. Wat mij betreft zijn er al meer dan genoeg signalen. Te veel politiel gesteggel en nog in een soort fase van ontkenning.

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Op donderdag 4 januari 2024 22:43 schreef BEFEM het volgende:
Vanaf dag 1 van het offensief was er uberhaupt geen manouvregevecht mogelijk toch?

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 10:39 schreef Straatcommando. het volgende:
Niet verder vertellen maar ik heb begrepen dat de tentakels van Moskou zelfs tot in onze postbezorging zijn doorgedrongen [ afbeelding ]

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 11:46 schreef AchJa het volgende:

[..]
Wat is dit?

Tweet uit 2017???

[ twitter ]

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 07:19 schreef Delenlill het volgende:
U.S. should send Ukraine munitions even past expiration date - Hodges
If some of the U.S. weapons are past their expiration date and are set to be destroyed, they should instead be donated to Ukraine as they have a good chance of still being effective on the battlefield.

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 07:24 schreef Delenlill het volgende:
https://www.ukrinform.net(...)ucts-indefinite.html
[..]
Daar wordt je ook een beetje moe van. Ik dacht dat het opgelost was. In elk geval grotendeels.

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 11:46 schreef AchJa het volgende:

[..]
Wat is dit?

Tweet uit 2017???

[ twitter ]

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 11:50 schreef slashdotter3 het volgende:

WTF... dit is zo logisch dat ik niet begrijp dat dit niet gelijk vanaf het begin is gedaan
Beter faulty ammo die misschien een afwijking dan helemaal geen ammo.
Tis toch idioot dat ze oude ammo gaan vernietigen ipv aan Ukraine geven?

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 11:41 schreef AchJa het volgende:

[..]
Toen (2022) hadden ze sowieso de middelen niet, daarbij zat men bij de start van de invasie ook in volledig baggerterrein waar ontplooien voor zowel de Russen als voor de Oekraieners sowieso niet mogelijk was.

Het was bij het geplande offensief van 2023 uiteraard wel de bedoeling dat het manoeuvregevecht zou worden gevoerd. Dat heeft men ook geprobeerd maar dat mislukte hopeloos vanwege genoemde redenen.

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 12:19 schreef BEFEM het volgende:

Ik bedoel het offensief van oekraine. Toen ze daar mee begonnen was alles al helemaal volgemijnd en verstevigd. Ook al heb je materiaal en training om 'het manouvreerbare gevecht' te doen, dan kan je dat toch helemaal niet in die situatie?

Net als voetbal, als er eentje verdedigt en de bus parkeert zal je nooit een open wedstrijd hebben, hoe goed de andere partij ook is.

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 12:43 schreef AchJa het volgende:

[..]
Ja, echter moet je ergens een doorbraak forceren en dat doe je dan met verbonden wapens met doorbraaktanks, mijnenploegen, artillerie, luchtdoelartillerie, luchtsteun en noem alles maar op. En als je dan een bres geslagen hebt dan pomp je daar je reserves in en ga je consolideren en uitbreken.

Het klinkt natuurlijk eenvoudiger dan het is maar dat is in grote lijnen wel de bedoeling... Maar daar moet je echt maanden en maanden voor trainen/oefenen.

Nog even los van de planning en voorbereiding... Daar gaat ook wel een stief kwartiertje overheen.

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Op vrijdag 5 januari 2024 12:54 schreef 3rr0r het volgende:

Was de kritiek op die kritiek ook niet dat 'het Westen' zelf nooit zo een doorbraak heeft gedaan? Dus zo dichtbemijnd, zonder behoorlijke luchtsteun vooraf en tijdens en vanwege drones een tegenstander die elke move ziet aankomen? Dus de lang getrainde Westerse militairen weten het goed maar hebben zelf nog nooit met de beperkte middelen en situatie die Oekraine had zoiets uitgevoerd.