Oorlog in Oekraïne #394 Kh-38DD

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:06 schreef sp3c het volgende:
hoeveel produceren ze per maand volgens die site dan?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:10 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Staat er niet bij,

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:10 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Staat er niet bij, denk niet dat ze dat vrijgeven zomaar. Maar wetende dat je in 2014 bedenkt dat je in 2022 massaal oorlog gaat voeren, zullen er dan veel of weinig opdrachten tot produceren van wapensystemen zijn?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:20 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Maar ik kan zo zomaar nog 8000 dingen bedenken, die je redelijkerwijs beter af had kunnen tikken qua deze oorlog, als je in 2014 weet dat je in 2022 los gaat.

En da's ook allemaal niet gebeurt.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:05 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Gewoon even op Russia klikken en dan kijken bij selfpropelled artillery
[ afbeelding ]

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:26 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Hoe bedoel je?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:29 schreef J.B. het volgende:

[..]
De vraag is wat dit waard is. Volgens diezelfde website hebben ze ruim 8000 T-72 tanks, maar desondanks moeten ze inmiddels wel de T-62 uit de mottenballen halen

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:30 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Het Russische leger wist een dag van te voren niet eens dat ze Oekraine binnen zouden vallen.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:30 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Ehmmmm,

Als je in 2014 weet dat je in 2022 los wil gaan, zou je eens wat kunnen doen aan die corruptie, zodat je aan het begin van de oorlog niet maar 100 smartbombs hebt, bv.

Meer voorbeelden?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:33 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:
Ja ok wat meer?

Het punt is toch hoeveel artillery ze hebben?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:35 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Het punt is dat: "Ja, ze zijn ze stug blijven produceren, omdat ze wisten dat ze in 2022 los gingen!" een nogal onhoudbaar argument is.

Je kunt waslijsten maken vol met wat rus allemaal beter had kunnen doen, met die kennis, en blijkbaar allemaal niet gedaan heeft.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:00 schreef Korenfok het volgende:

[..]
wat vind jij van het contrast verschil.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:38 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Ik snap je punt niet. Zeg gewoon wat je bedoelt

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:38 schreef Repentless het volgende:

[..]
Weinig, eerlijk gezegd. De inhoud lijkt me belangrijker dan de vorm.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:30 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Ehmmmm,

Als je in 2014 weet dat je in 2022 los wil gaan, zou je eens wat kunnen doen aan die corruptie, zodat je aan het begin van de oorlog niet maar 100 smartbombs hebt, bv.

Meer voorbeelden?

SPOILER

Om spoilers te kunnen lezen moet je zijn ingelogd. Je moet je daarvoor eerst gratis Registreren. Ook kun je spoilers niet lezen als je een ban hebt.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:39 schreef Isdatzo het volgende:

[..]
Dat je uit je nek zwamt.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:10 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Staat er niet bij, denk niet dat ze dat vrijgeven zomaar. Maar wetende dat je in 2014 bedenkt dat je in 2022 massaal oorlog gaat voeren, zullen er dan veel of weinig opdrachten tot produceren van wapensystemen zijn?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:50 schreef Wantie het volgende:

[..]
Denk niet dat Rusland überhaupt had verwacht dat ze in de huidige verwikkeld zouden raken.
Een snelle speciale operatie van hooguit enkele weken zou genoeg moeten zijn om Kyiv op zijn knieën te krijgen.
Dat pakte iets anders uit.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:46 schreef BEFEM het volgende:
Zijn er eigenlijk nog zwaardere wapens die de NAVO kan sturen op vliegtuigen en MBT na?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:53 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Tuurlijk. The sky is the limit.

Een land based Tomahawk Cruise missile launcher misschien?

[ afbeelding ]

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:42 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Het komt cartoonesk over.

Lekker over de intercom met elkaar gaan lopen blaten.

Het zegt wat over hoe paranoia al het volk is wat daar zit.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:50 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Ik laat alleen cijfers zien uit een betrouwbare bron.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:56 schreef Isdatzo het volgende:

[..]
Cijfers die je uitspraken geenszins ondersteunen.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:53 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Hoe kom je daar nou bij, iedereen weet nu wel dat 2014 het jaar was dat ook is bedacht de Donbass te pakken.
Daar is jaren naar toe gewerkt door de Russen.
Het superweapons programma

quote:

Het uitspelen van de EU door de gasprijs op te pompen en de voorraden niet te vullen in 2021

quote:

De enorme pieken in wapensystemen uitgaves in 2015/2016.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:58 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Ja praat maar complete poep,
Ik liet het je net zien toch?

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:59 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:
Het geheugen verliest snel.
Wie herinnert zich 2018 nog? Toen werd superoruzhie aangekondigd.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 22:03 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Er valt wel wat af te dingen op die website.

Totaal aantal tanks wat rus heeft, wat redelijkerwijs nog zonder al te veel moeite aan de gang te krijgen valt is rond de 4000. Schattingen variëren van 2500 tot aan 4K. En da's incl wat nu al aan puin is geschoten. Dan komt 8000 T72's bv al niet geloofwaardig over. Ja, ze zullen ze wel hebben, ergens op een steppe als 1 brok roest. Maar denk dat wat echt inzetbaar is, boeiender is dan wat er op papier bestaat.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 22:03 schreef Wantie het volgende:

[..]
Fijn.

Wat heeft dat wapen opgeleverd in de strijd in Oekraïne?

quote:

The ‘super weapons’

Sarmat

The inclusion of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (NATO reporting name SS-X-29 or SS-X-30) in Putin’s speech in 2018 was no surprise to analysts. The super-heavy, liquid-fuelled ICBM has been under development by the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau since 2009. The Sarmat is expected to replace the Soviet-era RS-36M Voevoda (SS-18 ‘Satan’) in the Uzhurskaya and Dombarovskaya divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation (RVSN).77 Successful launch tests were carried out in 2020 and by February 2021 preparations were under way for flight tests78 at the Severo-Yenisei test site. According to the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergey Karakaev, the new missile should enter service in 2022 with the 62nd Missile Division based at Uzhur (Krasnoyarsk region), where the construction of new facilities to house the missile is under way.79

The Sarmat should perform much the same functions as the RS-36M it is envisaged to replace. It will be much larger than other Russian ICBMs, such as the RS-24 Yars (SS-29), as well as their US counterparts. It should be capable of carrying a range of different payloads, including a mixture of re-entry vehicles and decoys to overcome ballistic missile defences. The most notable differences between the Sarmat and its predecessors are its claimed long range (reportedly up to 18,000 km) and its ability to attack via a fractional orbit to approach targets, raising the possibility of it being able to approach the US via the South Pole, thereby bypassing existing missile detection and defence systems. The Sarmat may also carry the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) in the future.80

Avangard

The Avangard missile system combines the old and the new: the old in the form of a Soviet-era RS18A (SS-19 ‘Stiletto’) ICBM, and the new in the form of the Yu-71 HGV. The Avangard system emerged after the Soviet-era Albatross research project to develop an HGV was resurrected following the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. After a number of unsuccessful tests during the 2010s, several successful tests took place over the course of 2015–16. The most recent test took place in December 2018 after President Putin’s ‘super weapons’ announcement in March of that year.81 The first two Avangard systems were placed on active duty at the end of 2019.82 Russian officials have also expressed the hope that enough Avangard systems will be produced to fully equip two missile regiments (approximately 18–20 missiles in total) by the end of the GPV 2027 state armament programme.83

The novelty of the Avangard lies in the fact that it does not, like conventional ICBM re-entry vehicles, follow a ballistic trajectory outside the earth’s atmosphere for the majority of its flight. Instead, the HGV spends most of its journey travelling at high speed in the upper atmosphere. While the hypersonic aspect of the Avangard is often emphasized by commentators, it does not in fact travel as fast as a conventional ballistic missile. The operational utility of the system is instead derived from its ability to manoeuvre while in the atmosphere, enabling it to evade interception by existing missile defence systems.

Poseidon

The existence of the Poseidon nuclear-armed, unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) was first revealed publicly in November 2015, when broad details became available after photographs were taken of programme schematics in a Ministry of Defence meeting. Initially known as the ‘Oceanic Multipurpose System Status-6’ – or simply as ‘Status-6’ – it was characterized as a large, autonomous (i.e. crewless) and fast (i.e. with a reported speed of around 70 knots) nuclear-tipped torpedo. After the system was renamed as the Poseidon in 2018 by a public poll, Putin and other defence officials steadily revealed more information about both the system and its intended role. According to Putin, the Poseidon is a multipurpose UUV that ‘can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, which enables them to engage various targets, including aircraft [carrier] groups, coastal fortifications and infrastructure’.84 It is also powered by a miniature nuclear reactor, giving it an unlimited range (in practical terms).85 The Poseidon is also reported to be capable of diving to depths of up to 1 km, rendering it safe from existing manned submarines.

The first Poseidon weapons will be carried and launched by the K-329 Belgorod nuclear-powered submarine, currently under construction at Russia’s vast Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk that specializes in the construction of nuclear-powered submarines. The Belgorod was scheduled to begin sea trials in 2021.86 Further vessels are expected to be built over the course of the decade, with the Northern and Pacific Fleets each envisaged to eventually receive two vessels capable of launching the Poseidon.87

The Poseidon may be capable of performing several functions beyond assuring a nuclear second-strike capability. According to Dara Massicot and Edward Geist, alternative roles might include serving as a test bed for nuclear-powered UUV technologies, enabling the Russian navy to develop systems that could ‘easily outrun the fastest manned submarines and stay at sea for months or even years’.88 If sufficient advances are made in the development of artificial intelligence (AI) or underwater communications, the Poseidon has the potential to ‘inaugurate an ominous new era of autonomous undersea warfare’.89

Burevestnik

Of the four strategic systems unveiled by Putin in 2018, the least is known about the 9M730 Burevestnik [Petrel] (SSC-X-9 ‘Skyfall’) ground-launched, nuclear-powered cruise missile. When Putin publicly revealed the programme in 2018, he stated that the novelty and operational utility of the Burevestnik is in its unlimited (in practical terms) range, which would enable the missile to evade any adversary’s air defence systems. The missile might also be much more difficult to detect, principally because its unlimited range would permit it to fly at low altitudes throughout its journey.90 By contrast, the range of other, conventionally-powered, cruise missiles – such as those included in both the US-made Tomahawk and Russian-made Kalibr families of missiles, which are powered by turbojets or turbofans – is curtailed, the longer that they fly at low altitudes.

If Russia has successfully developed a nuclear-powered cruise missile, it will be the first of its kind in the world.
The technical barriers to attaining such a capability are, however, considerable. If Russia has successfully developed a nuclear-powered cruise missile, it will be the first of its kind in the world. Because of the considerable engineering challenges associated with building a miniaturized nuclear propulsion unit, it is possible that serious obstacles have been encountered since the suspected accident at the Nyonoksa naval missile test range in August 2019.91

Kinzhal

The 9-S-7760 Kinzhal [Dagger] air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) was the only sub-strategic system unveiled by Putin in 2018. It is a modified variant of the 9M723 Iskander ground-launched ballistic missile, but is launched by the MiG-31K missile carrier – a modified version of the MiG-31 Foxhound interceptor. The MiG-31K is used to launch the missile at high (i.e. supersonic) speed, thereby boosting the speed of the Kinzhal. The Kinzhal, therefore, like the Iskander, follows an aero-ballistic flight profile. According to Putin, the Kinzhal eventually reaches a speed of Mach 10 and is capable of manoeuvring throughout all phases of its flight trajectory.92 It is reported to possess a range of around 2,000 km from the point of release from the MiG-31K. It has also been reported that the Kinzhal will be launched from the supersonic Tu-22M3M Backfire bomber that is under development and, further in the future, the Su-57 Felon fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

The Kinzhal differs from the strategic systems described above both in range and in likely mission. As a theatre weapon, it is capable of being fitted with both nuclear and conventional warheads, and therefore of being used in a broader range of missions. Russian media reports have suggested that the Kinzhal would be used for anti-ship missions, as well as strikes on US ballistic missile defence facilities. It is also plausible that it was designed to attack time-sensitive or other high-value targets at intermediate range without violating the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (which prohibited the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles). Several recently-published journal articles by Russian military scholars have mentioned other possible roles for the Kinzhal. These include non-nuclear strategic deterrence (as well as ‘signalling’ missions before the nuclear threshold is crossed),93 or serving as a tool to disrupt multi-domain operations by the enemy through pre-emptive strikes at the infrastructure critical for such operations (e.g. airfields).94

Tsirkon

The 3M22 Tsirkon [Zircon] (SS-N-33) ship-launched hypersonic anti-ship missile was not mentioned by Putin in his 2018 address to the Federal Assembly, although details of the programme were revealed soon afterwards. As with the Kinzhal, it is likely that the Tsirkon is a dual-capable system that is designed to strike high-value targets on land and at sea, such as carrier air groups. Available information suggests that it is a hypersonic missile, but at the ‘low hypersonic’ end of the speed range, with the highest announced speed being Mach 9.95 The Tsirkon is reported to be capable of hitting targets at a range of 500–1,000 km, although tests have so far been confined to distances of 450 km against land and sea surface targets, with reported top speeds of around Mach 7.

Developed by the Mashinostroyeniya NPO (design and engineering bureau), part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC (joint stock company), the Tsirkon is likely to comprise two elements. A solid fuel booster (possibly two-stage) is used for the first part of its flight, taking the missile from the point of launch to a high altitude (potentially exoatmospheric) from where it follows a semi-ballistic ‘skip-glide’ trajectory towards its target. Once the target is within range, a detachable warhead – perhaps with its own engine to maintain terminal speed – is used to destroy the target, either with a warhead or with kinetic energy. A similar two-stage concept is employed with the 3M54/3M54E anti-ship cruise missiles of the Kalibr family.96 In this respect, it is unlikely that the Tsirkon is a ‘pure’ hypersonic cruise missile (i.e. one that uses a scramjet for the entirety of its flight profile). Instead, it is more likely to be an aero-ballistic missile, like the Kinzhal. So far, the Tsirkon has only been tested in launches from the Admiral Gorshkov frigate.97 It has been suggested that the missile will be tested from Yasen M-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines in the future.98

What does the Russian military want to achieve with these weapons?

It is likely that each of the different ‘super weapons’ will have been designed to perform distinct functions. Precisely what those functions are, though, remains unclear.

The purpose of the four main strategic systems is perhaps easiest to divine. Maintaining strategic nuclear forces that can deliver assured retaliation – that would cause unacceptable damage to any adversary – is of paramount importance to policymakers in Moscow. As a result, considerable effort has been made in modernizing Russia’s strategic nuclear delivery systems over the past decade. The need to upgrade Russia’s strategic arsenal – both now and in the future – is motivated by two fears. First, that Russia’s Soviet-era weapons might not be able to guarantee penetration of emerging US missile defence systems that were, according to Putin, designed ‘primarily for countering strategic arms that follow ballistic trajectories’.99 Second, US efforts to develop long-range precision conventional weapons, such as the Prompt Global Strike programme, generated growing concern in Moscow over the survivability of Russia’s strategic arsenal.

The development of novel strategic systems is therefore seen as vital to ensuring Russia’s ability to penetrate current and future US missile defence systems (as well as those of other potential adversaries) and to guarantee a second-strike capability for the foreseeable future. The ‘super weapons’ revealed by Putin in 2018 are not first-strike weapons – with the sole exception of the Sarmat, which will replace the existing SS-18. The relatively wide range of systems under development suggests that Russian officials view a diverse range of capabilities as a crucial component of successful nuclear deterrence.

A second potential reason for developing new strategic systems might be that they could be traded away in future strategic arms negotiations. The extension of the New START Treaty in February 2021 (to February 2026) means that there is now a five-year window in which both sides can seek a better negotiating position for any prospective successor treaty. Some of the ‘super weapons’ – especially those that remain at the development stage and that have uncertain prospects for success, such as the Burevestnik or Poseidon – could therefore be sacrificed before they even enter service, if doing so would deliver concessions from the US in other areas.

The development of novel strategic systems is seen as vital to ensuring Russia’s ability to penetrate current and future US missile defence systems (as well as those of other potential adversaries) and to guarantee a second-strike capability for the foreseeable future.
While much of the political and military planning in Russia is focused on seeking a balance of power in strategic nuclear systems, the development of the two sub-strategic ‘super weapons’ is driven by a sense of inferiority in other areas. Fears that Russia might be vulnerable to a sudden and decisive US naval or aerospace blitzkrieg are surely important factors in explaining the emphasis on the development of theatre-level hypersonic missiles such as the Kinzhal and Tsirkon. Rather than developing these capabilities for passive purposes (e.g. to defend against carrier-based forces that might be threatening Russian territory), it is likely that they represent a step towards Moscow being able to threaten the territory of potential adversaries (i.e. the US and its NATO allies) with similar capabilities to those that Russian defence planners have long feared.

Speaking at the Academy of Military Science a year after Putin’s speech announcing the ‘super weapons’ programmes, the chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, made it clear that Russia was developing capabilities that would enable Russian forces to ‘seize and maintain the initiative […] destroy key decisive points of the enemy, such as C2 [command and control] nodes and launchers designed to strike Russia [and to] use surprise, decisiveness and continuity of action [using] hypersonic missile systems’. Gerasimov concluded his remarks by stating that ‘to answer a threat we need to create a threat’.100 These remarks demonstrate quite firmly that the new weapons are unlikely to be envisaged for use in a passive fashion. Instead, military planners are intent on developing capabilities that will enable Russia to strike early, fast, and with precision in any future military conflict. The possession of such a capability could, as Gerasimov stated earlier in 2017, ‘allow [Russia] to leave nuclear deterrence in favour of conventional deterrence’.101.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:53 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Hoe kom je daar nou bij, iedereen weet nu wel dat 2014 het jaar was dat ook is bedacht de Donbass te pakken.
Daar is jaren naar toe gewerkt door de Russen.
Het superweapons programma
Het uitspelen van de EU door de gasprijs op te pompen en de voorraden niet te vullen in 2021
De enorme pieken in wapensystemen uitgaves in 2015/2016.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 21:53 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Hoe kom je daar nou bij, iedereen weet nu wel dat 2014 het jaar was dat ook is bedacht de Donbass te pakken.
Daar is jaren naar toe gewerkt door de Russen.
Het superweapons programma
Het uitspelen van de EU door de gasprijs op te pompen en de voorraden niet te vullen in 2021
De enorme pieken in wapensystemen uitgaves in 2015/2016.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 22:04 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Dat klopt, maar dat geldt ook voor de tegenstander, zeker als je zulke grote voorraden hebt.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 22:08 schreef Papierversnipperaar het volgende:

[..]
En vergeet de verkiezing van Trump niet.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 22:12 schreef kanovinnie het volgende:

[..]
En nog lukt het niet

lol.gif

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 22:12 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Denk dat die tanks die de VS in de woestijn opslaat een stuk beter worden onderhouden, dan dat ze daar ook 70% van weg laten rotten.

Denk ook niet dat de motoren en night vision apparatuur daarvan gejat is, omdat de arme soldaat een extraatje wilde verdienen.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 22:50 schreef LitmanenAFCA het volgende:

[..]
Zoveel heeft de VS daar ook niet staan toch.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:00 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Meer dan 26.000 voertuigen. En deze in de woestijn is erg bekend, zullen er wel meer zijn.

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/sierra-army-depot
.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:04 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
[ afbeelding ]

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:07 schreef UitStraling het volgende:

[..]
Zag daar laatst een filmpje over, ongeveer dertig procent is nog bruikbaar en aan de gang te krijgen met onderdelen uitwisselen, heb je wel een jaar de tijd nodig en duizenden handige mannetjes die weten wat ze doen, en dan zit je uiteraard nog met oud spul.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:12 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Ja klopt maar binnen 1000km zie ik geen land die 20% van de aantallen heeft.
Polen komt in de buurt.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:13 schreef BEFEM het volgende:

[..]
De top 4 zijn allemaal buurlanden van Rusland.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:12 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Ja klopt maar binnen 1000km zie ik geen land die 20% van de aantallen heeft.
Polen komt in de buurt.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:00 schreef ExTec het volgende:

[..]
Meer dan 26.000 voertuigen. En deze in de woestijn is erg bekend, zullen er wel meer zijn.

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/sierra-army-depot
.

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 23:15 schreef UitStraling het volgende:

[..]
West-Europa, wij gingen liever op vakantie, vonden sociale ziektekostenverzekeringen uit, namen een tweede auto en er moest minimaal een opblaasbaar zwembad in de tuin dan dat we geld investeerden in defensie.

Daar hadden we de NAVO toch voor

quote:

Op woensdag 29 juni 2022 14:55 schreef Za het volgende:

[..]

Hij laat niet met zich sollen, accepteert niet dat er straks tienduizenden Amerikaanse militairen gelegerd zijn aan zijn landsgrenzen, en terecht.