Oorlog in Oekraïne #335 Ik haat Putin

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 17:42 schreef superniger het volgende:
Tomb Raider gaat Putin slopen.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 17:41 schreef superniger het volgende:

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Wij kopen voor 1 miljard per dag Russische gas.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 17:22 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Wat moet die daar nou weer dan?

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 17:42 schreef superniger het volgende:
Tomb Raider gaat Putin slopen.

[ twitter ]

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“It’s one thing to pursue a policy of weakening Putin, quite another to say it out loud. We have to find a way for Putin to achieve a political solution, so perhaps it is not wise to state this,” said one senior European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 18:02 schreef capricia het volgende:
"Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame

With his strategy to “weaken” Russia, the U.S. president may be turning the Ukraine war into a global one."
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https://foreignpolicy.com(...)e-war-biden-endgame/

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 18:02 schreef capricia het volgende:
"Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame


With his strategy to “weaken” Russia, the U.S. president may be turning the Ukraine war into a global one."
[..]
https://foreignpolicy.com(...)e-war-biden-endgame/

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 01:20 schreef Salina het volgende:

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Eens. Dmitri Dienstplichtigov is ook gewoon een mens met een moeder, familie of gezin.
En vergeet zijn vriendjes Sergej Soldatov en Kamil Kanonnenvoerovishvili niet.

Liefst zo weinig mogelijk slachtoffers. Civiel en militair. Oorlog is ruk.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 13:15 schreef trein2000 het volgende:
Die tijdlijn van Rob de Wijk weer. Het westen dit, het westen dat. Verzwakking van Rusland mag geen doel zijn…

Echt, wat zit daar toch achter joh.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 18:19 schreef slashdotter3 het volgende:
https://www.telegraaf.nl/(...)gen-ik-schrok-onwijs

Deze Nederlanders staan op de Russische lijst met buitenlandse huurlingen: 'Ik schrok onwijs'

Tenminste vijf anderen op de lijst zijn wel naar het Oekraïne geweest om te vechten. De meesten zijn weer terug. Zoals Adnane uit Amsterdam. „Ik schrok onwijs toen ik hoorde dat mijn gegevens op de lijst staan en dat Joyce op televisie is geweest. Ik weet niet wat dat gaat doen in het buitenland. En je hoort dat de Russische geheime dienst in het buitenland tot veel in staat is.”

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 17:22 schreef Aether het volgende:

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https://www.dontfundwar.com/directory

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Assessing the Risk of Nuclear War: We Don't Have a Clue

Putin regularly threatens with the use of nuclear weapons if an existential threat arises to Russia.

His remarks show that arms supplies to Ukraine by the US/NATO and attacks on targets in Russia could constitute such existential threats.

These threats are extensively discussed and evaluated in the media.

The superficiality and sometimes absurdity of those analyzes strike me, all kinds of non-sensical claims are made, but not substantiated.

The reason that this philosophizing about the nuclear risk is so vague is that politicians and military leaders are ultimately unable to say much meaningful about it. The humiliating reality is that we really don't have a clue.

In this article I will discuss this issue in more detail based on several 'statements' that I make about this:

1. The probability of Putin deploying nuclear weapons cannot be estimated in practical terms, that is impossible. But the likelihood of such a deployment is real: from Putin's perspective, such a deployment may be rational.

When assessing threats, soldiers make a distinction between capabilities (which Russia has) and intentions (which Putin seems to have), i.e. the willingness to deploy them.

I deliberately use the word probability and not risk. That is a matter of definition. With probability it is about likelihood; with risk it is about the 'combination' of probability and its consequences.

The probability of Putin deploying a nuclear weapon may be limited, but the consequences will be very serious, and the risk should therefore be assessed as high (just because of the consequences).

What Putin decides (his willingness to deploy nuclear weapons; I assume that he has a decisive vote) depends on several factors, which we have no insight into, such as: Putin's estimates of the risks associated with such a deployment (e.g. yes/no nuclear retaliation); the actual definition of existential threats to Russia/Putin; the influence of other 'forces' on the decision; the course of the war; the (power) position of Putin in Russia, but also, for example, the psychological 'condition' of Putin himself.

There can be endless speculation about this, which is interesting, but at best only provides limited certainty or useful insight.

To dismiss the probability by arguing that it is merely Putin's rhetoric is a dangerous assumption. Our limited imagination and our own views (in this case about the use of nuclear weapons) are not a useful reference.

2. The consequences of the deployment of a nuclear weapon by Russia are very serious and is definitely a major game changer.

When it comes to the consequences of this, it is important to specify those consequences in more detail.

It is important to distinguish, among other things, between the type of nuclear weapon (tactical or strategic), the location of deployment (in Ukraine, whether or not on a military and/or civilian target, on a target that lies in the NATO treaty area, etc. etc.), the yield (explosive power), the number of casualties (military and/or civil casualties), the type of delivery system (a missile, grenade, mine, ICBM, SLBM, etc.), but also the weather conditions (for example, the wind direction/force largely determines which area will be contaminated with nuclear fallout, the mushroom cloud will end up somewhere).

Two extremes: (1) the deployment of a strategic nuclear weapon, with a high yield on a civilian target (Washington), and (2) the deployment of a 'small' tactical nuclear missile in an uninhabited area, as a demonstration of Putin's willingness to escalate, and an attempt to intimidate (e.g. to discourage arms transfers and attacks on Russian territory).

Russian nuclear doctrine provides for such a 'defensive' deployment option; Russia considers tactical nuclear war (more) manageable.

To get a better idea where we are talking about, the explosion of a large amount of ammonium nitrate stored at the Port of Beirut in the capital city of Lebanon in 2020 had the power of a small nuclear explosion (see photo below and video). This video shows the explosion of a strategic nuclear weapon.

If that 'small' explosion takes place in an uninhabited area (or in the Black Sea for example), you could say that it is not that bad. However, that is not the point of this deployment. The point is that with such a deployment the nuclear threshold has been crossed, and then the war takes on a completely different perspective. Further nuclear escalation is then a realistic possibility.

Both Russia and the US still have a significant arsenal when it comes to those weapons (I'm leaving out the capabilities of France and the UK, so as not to unnecessarily complicate the discussion), inclusive capabilities to escalate to the highest level, in which case there is talk of MAD (here is (also) meant Mutual Assured Destruction).

What this war also shows is that escalation, certainly in the initial phase of the conflict (which can take a long time), takes place 'automatically'. At least one side often has a reason for deploying heavier or more weapons or increasing the geographic scope of the war. In this war, both sides have the conventional capabilities to do so. Because it concerns great powers, that willingness is also great, because there is a lot at stake for them.

Such an escalation 'logic' also applies to the deployment of nuclear weapons. An additional problem is that precisely those decisions (whether to escalate with nuclear weapons) are taken under increasing time pressure in those circumstances, because certain nuclear weapons/systems quickly reach their target. Then no more analysis and evaluation take place, but decision protocols take over.

In short, regardless of what nuclear weapon is initially deployed, the consequences, partly because of the escalation risk, are very great.

So the risk (defined as a combination of probability and consequences) is high even with a small probability. This is a reason not to dismiss these threats simply as rhetoric and boasting, that would be naive and irresponsible.

There is sometimes talk of military science, which suggests a certain logic and competences, but when it comes to the situation now and this issue, it is mostly guess work.

It should also be noted that the situation is now completely different from that during the Cold War, in which risks were still not properly assessed, but could be estimated better. What also makes the situation more dangerous is that it is now (since 1991) a multipolar world, with more players (such as China and the UK, who want to manifest themselves). This complicates risk analyzes (also for Putin) and produces 'unexpected' behavior. On the one hand, this can lead to reticence, but also to overreactions.

3. The US/NATO may well be surprised by a nuclear deployment by Russia.

The US monitors the activities of Russia's nuclear forces on a daily basis. They are under a magnifying glass. Among other things, the readiness of nuclear facilities, movements of units and their state of readiness are examined. So far there seems to be no notable activity. However, this concerns strategic nuclear capabilities, not tactical ones. A tactical nuclear missile or mine, for example, can certainly be transported unseen. They are small ones that fit in a delivery van.

In summary, it can therefore be stated that the possibility of the deployment of a nuclear weapon by Russia is possible, can occur unseen when it comes to a tactical nuclear weapon, and can serve a rational purpose for Russia.

The fact that Putin is willing and able to do so cannot be ruled out. The probability of such a deployment may not be great (we hope), but this cannot be determined, but the risks associated with such a deployment, defined as "probability x consequences" are indeed.

We are now in uncharted waters, without an accurate map and a reliable compass (ill-informed and ill-advised politicians?). There has never been a direct confrontation between nuclear states, and there are many unknowns.

It is an illusion - and a misrepresentation - if politicians and military leaders give the impression that this issue is under control. That is certainly not the case. The problem is also that the US/NATO has no strategy and no clear picture of the end-state they are aiming for. This also makes a sound risk analysis impossible.

When it comes to this war, it's too much based on US/NATO opportunism. That is not acceptable. When it comes to the approach to a solution (which is not even defined), this is usually done based on a trial-and-error approach. This situation does not lend itself to such an ill-considered approach, obviously.

We know - and must assume - that arms supplies to Ukraine, economic sanctions (certainly in the long run) and attacks on Russian territory can (or will) pose an existential threat to Putin. We also know that this could result in the deployment of a nuclear weapon by Russia, and that there are great risks involved.

The US/NATO approach now is that we actually ignore this risk. Initial reticence (which was also not properly calibrated) has given way to a certain bravado from the US and NATO, it seems.

Hoping for the best is not a strategy.

How intangible and not very concrete the nuclear risks are, it is possible to say something about the (major) risks. Of course, you want to avoid risks, but if that is not possible, they must at least be managed based on realistic assessments. Giving in to nuclear blackmail is not an option, then we will end up in a bully world, still with nuclear risks.

When it comes to this issue, the "good" news is that for a devastating nuclear war, you need two sides. The solution may lie in the 'refusal' of the US (and NATO) to respond with a nuclear counterattack to a nuclear deployment by Russia. This means that the US must show great restraint and ignore Putin's nuclear attack in that sense (an 'automatic' nuclear response was protocol during the Cold War). Restraint seems like the best approach.

When Russia increased the readiness of its nuclear forces in February, the US has not responded with similar measures (which was protocol during the Cold War). The US has also suspended a test launch of a ballistic missile. Those are sensible measures.

Moreover, the US/NATO has a large conventional advantage, and tactical nuclear weapons are not necessary to subjugate/defeat Russia in a war. That conventional dominance can be exploited. The estimate also seems realistic that China will distance itself from Russia if that country deploys a nuclear weapon. Putin's disqualification is then complete.

These deliberations show that there is much more to say and discuss about the risks of nuclear war. We should not deceive ourselves into thinking or claiming that risks can be properly estimated or ignored.

How to deal with that nuclear threat is an extremely important - and tricky - discussion. There are many dilemmas.

The solution seems to lie in a high degree of nuclear restraint from the US, and to use Putin's energy and strength against him. A principle from judo. Then Putin should understand.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 18:13 schreef slashdotter3 het volgende:
Is de tank gevonden, dan wordt een projectiel afgevuurd dat in staat moet zijn om door zo'n 7 centimeter staal door te dringen. De hele operatie duurt slechts een paar seconden.

Russia's PTKM-1R Targets Ukraine Tanks I Jumping Mines That Rain Explosives Never Seen Before In War

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 18:02 schreef capricia het volgende:
"Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame

With his strategy to “weaken” Russia, the U.S. president may be turning the Ukraine war into a global one."
[..]
https://foreignpolicy.com(...)e-war-biden-endgame/

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 18:48 schreef Kriegel het volgende:
Dit soort uitspraken moet je uit Russische bron wel met een korrel zout nemen.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 19:21 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Overigens:

[ twitter ]

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 19:23 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Klopt, net als alle berichtgeving...

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 19:25 schreef Kriegel het volgende:
Oké.

Ik bedoelde dat de speciale operatie in een ruk en een scheet over zou zijn, Frits.

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Op zaterdag 30 april 2022 19:27 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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En hoe zou ik dat moeten destilleren uit een verhaal over een mijn, Frits.