NWS Nieuws & Achtergronden
Discussieer hier diepgaander over de actualiteiten.
En door:
Twitter: Latest updates | Volodymyr Zelensky | Ukraine gov | Ministry of Defence UK | Illia Ponomarenko | Kamil Galeev | Christo Grozev | Ukraine Weapons Tracker | KyivPost | NEXTA | BNO News | WorldOnAlert | Shaun Walker | Michael Kofman | Michael A. Horowitz | Nathan Ruser | Rob Lee | TpyxaNews | Dmitri | UkrInform | Thomas C. Theiner
Newssites: Geenstijl | Nu.nl | Al Jazeera | BBC News | Washington Post | NY Times | Guardian | Pravda | Oryxspioenkop
Russie-desk
Wikipedia: 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine | Russo-Ukrainian War | Current Events
Daily Summary: MilitaryLand
Maps: Deepstate | ScribbleMaps | Liveuamap | FlightRadar24 | UKRdaily
Reddit: Ukraine | UkraineConflict | Worldnews | WorldNews Live | UkraineWarReports | CombatFootage | CredibleDefense | LessCredibleDefence
Quora: Ukraine | Battle for Ukraine | Truth About Russia | Russian Bear | Roland Bartetzko
Youtube: Crux | Zolkin Volodymyr |1420 | Perun | Caspian Report | Task and Purpose | Jake Broe | Joe Blogs
Filmpjes: Tiktok | Funker530 | Russoldat | Fok memes en spotprenten
Handig: Mooi overzicht van de oorlogsmisdadigers
Twitter: Latest updates | Volodymyr Zelensky | Ukraine gov | Ministry of Defence UK | Illia Ponomarenko | Kamil Galeev | Christo Grozev | Ukraine Weapons Tracker | KyivPost | NEXTA | BNO News | WorldOnAlert | Shaun Walker | Michael Kofman | Michael A. Horowitz | Nathan Ruser | Rob Lee | TpyxaNews | Dmitri | UkrInform | Thomas C. Theiner
Newssites: Geenstijl | Nu.nl | Al Jazeera | BBC News | Washington Post | NY Times | Guardian | Pravda | Oryxspioenkop
Russie-desk
Wikipedia: 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine | Russo-Ukrainian War | Current Events
Daily Summary: MilitaryLand
Maps: Deepstate | ScribbleMaps | Liveuamap | FlightRadar24 | UKRdaily
Reddit: Ukraine | UkraineConflict | Worldnews | WorldNews Live | UkraineWarReports | CombatFootage | CredibleDefense | LessCredibleDefence
Quora: Ukraine | Battle for Ukraine | Truth About Russia | Russian Bear | Roland Bartetzko
Youtube: Crux | Zolkin Volodymyr |1420 | Perun | Caspian Report | Task and Purpose | Jake Broe | Joe Blogs
Filmpjes: Tiktok | Funker530 | Russoldat | Fok memes en spotprenten
Handig: Mooi overzicht van de oorlogsmisdadigers
SPOILEROm spoilers te kunnen lezen moet je zijn ingelogd. Je moet je daarvoor eerst gratis Registreren. Ook kun je spoilers niet lezen als je een ban hebt.
quote:Op zondag 11 januari 2026 21:27 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:
@:Achja
[ x ]
Mits dit verhaal een beetje waarheid bevat, bestaat dat wapen met ultrasoon geluid oid?
Ja, dat soort non lethal wapens bestaat wel degelijkquote:
@:Achja
[ x ]
Mits dit verhaal een beetje waarheid bevat, bestaat dat wapen met ultrasoon geluid oid?
The End Times are wild
Dit kan waar zijn?quote:Op zondag 11 januari 2026 21:39 schreef LXIV het volgende:
[..]
Ja, dat soort non lethal wapens bestaat wel degelijk
"Fifty years ago the Leningrad street taught me a rule - if a fight is inevitable, you have to throw the first punch."
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Hoe bedoel je dezelfde?quote:
[..]
En ook altijd directe dezelfde taggen. Doe maar niet.
Hij zit toch bij defensie?
Jij in een appartementent met laptop in Letland.
Ik bedoel waarom zou ik jou taggen dan?
Wat zijn dit steeds van rare vragen?
Vakman pur sang
Op
Beetje te muricastronk bullshit verhaal.quote:
[..]
De rest van het verhaal vind ik wat overdreven..
Maar deze propoganda werkt natuurlijk geweldig in deze landen waar ze ook geloven in Maria en voodoo
Vakman pur sang
Dat soort wapens zijn irritant. Niet schadelijk. Handig voor crowd control ofzo.quote:
[..]
Ja, dat soort non lethal wapens bestaat wel degelijk
Geluid manipuleren is nou niet iets van afgelopen 10 jaar ofzo, doet de mensheid al heel lang. En mocht er een magische frequentie zijn die schadelijk is, was dat allang gemeengoed.
Schadelijk over de as van volume vereist al snel veel electrisch voormogen -> is je contraptie al snel niet draagbaar meer.
This is the key philosophical stance you’ve taken, and it’s internally consistent.
Kijk, daar ga je weer.quote:
This is the key philosophical stance you’ve taken, and it’s internally consistent.
Bijzonder.quote:
[..]
De rest van het verhaal vind ik wat overdreven..
Ben benieuwd hoe het in elkaar steekt.
Zolang het niet duidelijk is zullen andere grote wereldleiders zoals Poetin, Xi, Lula, etc etc ook met aangepaste maatregelen leven zoals continu veranderende veiligheidsmaatregelen, rouleren van plek.
Maar ik denk dat zelfs een Starmer moet oppassen.
"Fifty years ago the Leningrad street taught me a rule - if a fight is inevitable, you have to throw the first punch."
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
https://militaryland.net/article/opinion-syrskyi-needs-to-resign/
Opinion: Syrskyi Needs to Resign
In February, it will mark two years since General Oleksandr Syrskyi took over Ukraine’s defense forces, replacing Valery Zaluzhny as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On the eve of Russian forces being sighted in Svyatohirsk near the key city of Slovyansk, and with further advances toward Zaporizhzhia, it is time to say what many think: Syirskyi needs to go.
One Lost Battle After Another
If we look at the map when Syrskyi was appointed commander, we can see the front line was far from where it is now. Heavy battles raged for Avdiivka, Ukrainian forces held two well-fortified towns in the south—Vuhledar and Krasnohorivka—the enemy had not advanced even a meter in the Toretsk direction, and battles were fought for Serebryansky forest.
You can read our Invasion Day 665 summary article covering the frontline situation in December 2024—one month before Syrskyi’s appointment as commander-in-chief, when plans to replace Zaluzhnyi were already underway.
The situation was not easy; it never has been since February 2022. Yet President Zelenskyy decided on a bold move: to dismiss Zaluzhny and his entire staff. Many experienced commanders were removed from their positions. People like Zabrodsky, Myrnohradsky, and Shaptala, who were the future of the Ukrainian Army, are now in reserve. Almost 20 experienced leaders—officers in the General Staff, commanders of separate branches—all were dismissed. Furthermore, Syrskyi dismissed several brigade commanders, which led to confusion on the front, resulting in botched rotations and the loss of several positions.
Manpower Is the Key
What matters most, however, is the casualty ratio, not how much territory was lost. Syrskyi’s leadership has effectively crippled the defense forces. His rigid approach, which resembles Soviet doctrine, has led to hundreds of unnecessary casualties. He fights the enemy by force, not by mind.
His predecessor Zaluzhny understood the fundamental fact that he was fighting an unequal war, that Russia has, compared to Ukraine, virtually unlimited manpower reserves. He fought only battles he could win, carefully planned each step, and withdrew when the fight was not worth it. He valued the lives of Ukrainian soldiers. His successor, Oleksandr Syrskyi, does exactly the opposite. He sends units to recover lost positions against fortified enemy defenses, does not withdraw troops until they are almost encircled, and rewards those who accomplish his goals even when the unit was rendered combat-ineffective during the operation.
Even before his appointment as commander-in-chief, when he led the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group responsible for the Bakhmut area, several brigades lost their combat capability under his command. He only managed to delay the inevitable: the loss of Bakhmut. The battles for Bakhmut, Klishchivka, Soledar, and Kurdyumivka gave rise to the idea of Syrskyi as a commander who does not count the losses—the butcher.
His approach, which he continues to apply to this day, has resulted in crippled defense forces that are no longer able to conduct offensive operations and what worse, unable to field enough troops to occupy defensive positions.
The Presidential Ear
While the official reason for Zaluzhny’s dismissal was the failed summer offensive in 2023, that was only a secondary reason. Zelenskyy favored Syrskyi, often visited him at the front, and listened to him. Together, they sidelined Zaluzhny. Not only was Zaluzhny forced to launch the offensive under pressure from Zelenskyy and Western partners, but Zelenskyy also allowed Syrskyi to use elements of the 9th Army Corps for the defense of Bakhmut, which weakened offensive potential.
The dismissal of Syrskyi would also be a loss for Zelenskyy, and that is the only reason why Syrskyi is still in charge. It is no longer about military affairs—he stays purely for political reasons.
Loyalty Above All
Syrskyi’s approach to command has been widely criticized among Ukrainian defenders. He not only fails to value the lives of soldiers but micromanages troops, which leads to confusion, lost positions, and loss of life. Already last summer, MilitaryLand wrote about how Syrskyi micromanages troops and ignore losses.
In 2025, Syrskyi created a new type of force: Assault Troops. These units are directly subordinated to Syrskyi; they are not part of corps formations or operational commands. Assault units have replaced the role of Air Assault Troops, which have been demoted to better infantry. There is no doubt that Assault Troops include highly effective combat units, such as the 33rd and 225th Assault Regiments, but their success stems from the preferential treatment they receive.
Meanwhile, many of Ukraine’s mechanized brigades, especially those formed before the full-scale invasion, are now severely depleted. Some operate at just 30 percent of their intended manpower, such as the 30th Mechanized Brigade and 72nd Mechanized Brigade. Some mechanized brigades do not even have a single main battle tank at their disposal. Ukrainian Territorial Defense forces are in even more dire condition.
Despite this fact, Syrskyi continues to expand his assault forces, which have priority for mobilized soldiers and Western equipment.
Kursk as the Only Success?
The Kursk operation caught Russian forces off guard. The first days of the operation, executed by Air Assault Forces and Assault Troops of the Ground Forces, caused panic among the Russians, and Ukrainian forces were able to advance deep into Russian territory and capture prisoners. However, the moment the enemy managed to stabilize the situation and call in reinforcements was the moment Ukrainian forces should have withdrawn to preserve manpower and equipment. Instead, drunk on fame, Syrskyi insisted on holding ground at all costs. His decision led to hundreds of casualties, hundreds of lost equipment pieces, in an operation that in the end did not bring the desired result—to weaken Russian forces in the Donbas and stabilize the front.
The enemy continued to advance in the Donbas, and Ukrainian defenders soon missed the forces that had been withdrawn from the front line in the east and committed to Kursk. His decision to hold Kursk as long as possible allowed Russian forces to approach Pokrovsk and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast—something unthinkable when Syrskyi took over the Ukrainian Army.
Unable to Find Compromise
What also differs Syrskyi and Zaluzhny is the ability to find compromise, to find common ground. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Zaluzhny knew that one of the key things that would lead to victory was unity. He was able to sit with all leaders of volunteer units and convince them to join the Army. The Ukrainian Volunteer Corps (DUK), which had several volunteer battalions under its command, formed the 67th Mechanized Brigade. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists volunteer units (OUN) joined the 71st Jaeger Brigade. The Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA-UNSO) had its own units as well.
When the commander of the 1st Assault Battalion, Dmytro Kutsiubailo, was killed and a funeral was held in Kyiv, Zaluzhny knelt at his funeral, just like any other Ukrainian civilian.
Syrskyi, on the other hand, requires strict discipline from commanders. When he took the helm, he disbanded the core of the 67th Mechanized Brigade, which was composed of volunteers, because they dared to question his orders. Instead of finding compromise, he decided to disband them and effectively destroyed a unit that was formed by volunteers.
He visits only front-line units that have shown loyalty, that accomplish tasks without question. Units that question orders or propose different solutions are often met with punitive measures. In many cases, this begins with an internal audit of the brigade and ends with the dismissal of its commander.
Syrskyis Replacement
There are multiple candidates rumored as Syrskyi’s replacement. Any future candidate for commander-in-chief depends on whether Zelenskyy stays in office, with elections expected once peace is signed. The leading candidate, favored by both the military and the public, is the commander of the Joint Task Force, Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi. As commander of the Joint Task Force, Drapatyi demonstrated his high capabilities during the recent counterattack near Kupyansk—one of the few operations that did not involve head-on assaults against fortified positions, but instead bypassed Russian defenses. His difficulty is that he has a conscience and is unable to fight the rotten system on his own. He is a capable commander, but needs space and the trust of those above him.
Another candidate is the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi. He is praised for his work and innovations with the 3rd Assault Brigade and now the 3rd Army Corps. He represents fresh thinking that might help the army shed its Soviet heritage.
The third candidate is Chief of the General Staff and former Marine commander Lieutenant General Andriy Hnatov. He has a big advantage compared to other candidates in that Zelenskyy likes and trusts him.
The fourth candidate is the commander of the 1st Azov Corps, Colonel Denis Prokopenko. Unlike the other candidates, Prokopenko comes from the National Guard, so his appointment would be somewhat surprising. But during wartime, movement between the Armed Forces and National Guard is nothing unusual. Prokopenko is a respected and capable commander who does his job without fanfare.
Whatever your opinion on Syrskyi may be, it is important to understand that behind every localized counterattack, every glorified assault that makes no sense from a military standpoint, are dozens of Ukrainian casualties. Ukraine cannot survive this for long.
[ Bericht 0% gewijzigd door skysherrif op 11-01-2026 23:00:49 ]
Opinion: Syrskyi Needs to Resign
In February, it will mark two years since General Oleksandr Syrskyi took over Ukraine’s defense forces, replacing Valery Zaluzhny as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On the eve of Russian forces being sighted in Svyatohirsk near the key city of Slovyansk, and with further advances toward Zaporizhzhia, it is time to say what many think: Syirskyi needs to go.
One Lost Battle After Another
If we look at the map when Syrskyi was appointed commander, we can see the front line was far from where it is now. Heavy battles raged for Avdiivka, Ukrainian forces held two well-fortified towns in the south—Vuhledar and Krasnohorivka—the enemy had not advanced even a meter in the Toretsk direction, and battles were fought for Serebryansky forest.
You can read our Invasion Day 665 summary article covering the frontline situation in December 2024—one month before Syrskyi’s appointment as commander-in-chief, when plans to replace Zaluzhnyi were already underway.
The situation was not easy; it never has been since February 2022. Yet President Zelenskyy decided on a bold move: to dismiss Zaluzhny and his entire staff. Many experienced commanders were removed from their positions. People like Zabrodsky, Myrnohradsky, and Shaptala, who were the future of the Ukrainian Army, are now in reserve. Almost 20 experienced leaders—officers in the General Staff, commanders of separate branches—all were dismissed. Furthermore, Syrskyi dismissed several brigade commanders, which led to confusion on the front, resulting in botched rotations and the loss of several positions.
Manpower Is the Key
What matters most, however, is the casualty ratio, not how much territory was lost. Syrskyi’s leadership has effectively crippled the defense forces. His rigid approach, which resembles Soviet doctrine, has led to hundreds of unnecessary casualties. He fights the enemy by force, not by mind.
His predecessor Zaluzhny understood the fundamental fact that he was fighting an unequal war, that Russia has, compared to Ukraine, virtually unlimited manpower reserves. He fought only battles he could win, carefully planned each step, and withdrew when the fight was not worth it. He valued the lives of Ukrainian soldiers. His successor, Oleksandr Syrskyi, does exactly the opposite. He sends units to recover lost positions against fortified enemy defenses, does not withdraw troops until they are almost encircled, and rewards those who accomplish his goals even when the unit was rendered combat-ineffective during the operation.
Even before his appointment as commander-in-chief, when he led the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group responsible for the Bakhmut area, several brigades lost their combat capability under his command. He only managed to delay the inevitable: the loss of Bakhmut. The battles for Bakhmut, Klishchivka, Soledar, and Kurdyumivka gave rise to the idea of Syrskyi as a commander who does not count the losses—the butcher.
His approach, which he continues to apply to this day, has resulted in crippled defense forces that are no longer able to conduct offensive operations and what worse, unable to field enough troops to occupy defensive positions.
The Presidential Ear
While the official reason for Zaluzhny’s dismissal was the failed summer offensive in 2023, that was only a secondary reason. Zelenskyy favored Syrskyi, often visited him at the front, and listened to him. Together, they sidelined Zaluzhny. Not only was Zaluzhny forced to launch the offensive under pressure from Zelenskyy and Western partners, but Zelenskyy also allowed Syrskyi to use elements of the 9th Army Corps for the defense of Bakhmut, which weakened offensive potential.
The dismissal of Syrskyi would also be a loss for Zelenskyy, and that is the only reason why Syrskyi is still in charge. It is no longer about military affairs—he stays purely for political reasons.
Loyalty Above All
Syrskyi’s approach to command has been widely criticized among Ukrainian defenders. He not only fails to value the lives of soldiers but micromanages troops, which leads to confusion, lost positions, and loss of life. Already last summer, MilitaryLand wrote about how Syrskyi micromanages troops and ignore losses.
In 2025, Syrskyi created a new type of force: Assault Troops. These units are directly subordinated to Syrskyi; they are not part of corps formations or operational commands. Assault units have replaced the role of Air Assault Troops, which have been demoted to better infantry. There is no doubt that Assault Troops include highly effective combat units, such as the 33rd and 225th Assault Regiments, but their success stems from the preferential treatment they receive.
Meanwhile, many of Ukraine’s mechanized brigades, especially those formed before the full-scale invasion, are now severely depleted. Some operate at just 30 percent of their intended manpower, such as the 30th Mechanized Brigade and 72nd Mechanized Brigade. Some mechanized brigades do not even have a single main battle tank at their disposal. Ukrainian Territorial Defense forces are in even more dire condition.
Despite this fact, Syrskyi continues to expand his assault forces, which have priority for mobilized soldiers and Western equipment.
Kursk as the Only Success?
The Kursk operation caught Russian forces off guard. The first days of the operation, executed by Air Assault Forces and Assault Troops of the Ground Forces, caused panic among the Russians, and Ukrainian forces were able to advance deep into Russian territory and capture prisoners. However, the moment the enemy managed to stabilize the situation and call in reinforcements was the moment Ukrainian forces should have withdrawn to preserve manpower and equipment. Instead, drunk on fame, Syrskyi insisted on holding ground at all costs. His decision led to hundreds of casualties, hundreds of lost equipment pieces, in an operation that in the end did not bring the desired result—to weaken Russian forces in the Donbas and stabilize the front.
The enemy continued to advance in the Donbas, and Ukrainian defenders soon missed the forces that had been withdrawn from the front line in the east and committed to Kursk. His decision to hold Kursk as long as possible allowed Russian forces to approach Pokrovsk and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast—something unthinkable when Syrskyi took over the Ukrainian Army.
Unable to Find Compromise
What also differs Syrskyi and Zaluzhny is the ability to find compromise, to find common ground. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Zaluzhny knew that one of the key things that would lead to victory was unity. He was able to sit with all leaders of volunteer units and convince them to join the Army. The Ukrainian Volunteer Corps (DUK), which had several volunteer battalions under its command, formed the 67th Mechanized Brigade. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists volunteer units (OUN) joined the 71st Jaeger Brigade. The Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA-UNSO) had its own units as well.
When the commander of the 1st Assault Battalion, Dmytro Kutsiubailo, was killed and a funeral was held in Kyiv, Zaluzhny knelt at his funeral, just like any other Ukrainian civilian.
Syrskyi, on the other hand, requires strict discipline from commanders. When he took the helm, he disbanded the core of the 67th Mechanized Brigade, which was composed of volunteers, because they dared to question his orders. Instead of finding compromise, he decided to disband them and effectively destroyed a unit that was formed by volunteers.
He visits only front-line units that have shown loyalty, that accomplish tasks without question. Units that question orders or propose different solutions are often met with punitive measures. In many cases, this begins with an internal audit of the brigade and ends with the dismissal of its commander.
Syrskyis Replacement
There are multiple candidates rumored as Syrskyi’s replacement. Any future candidate for commander-in-chief depends on whether Zelenskyy stays in office, with elections expected once peace is signed. The leading candidate, favored by both the military and the public, is the commander of the Joint Task Force, Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi. As commander of the Joint Task Force, Drapatyi demonstrated his high capabilities during the recent counterattack near Kupyansk—one of the few operations that did not involve head-on assaults against fortified positions, but instead bypassed Russian defenses. His difficulty is that he has a conscience and is unable to fight the rotten system on his own. He is a capable commander, but needs space and the trust of those above him.
Another candidate is the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi. He is praised for his work and innovations with the 3rd Assault Brigade and now the 3rd Army Corps. He represents fresh thinking that might help the army shed its Soviet heritage.
The third candidate is Chief of the General Staff and former Marine commander Lieutenant General Andriy Hnatov. He has a big advantage compared to other candidates in that Zelenskyy likes and trusts him.
The fourth candidate is the commander of the 1st Azov Corps, Colonel Denis Prokopenko. Unlike the other candidates, Prokopenko comes from the National Guard, so his appointment would be somewhat surprising. But during wartime, movement between the Armed Forces and National Guard is nothing unusual. Prokopenko is a respected and capable commander who does his job without fanfare.
Whatever your opinion on Syrskyi may be, it is important to understand that behind every localized counterattack, every glorified assault that makes no sense from a military standpoint, are dozens of Ukrainian casualties. Ukraine cannot survive this for long.
[ Bericht 0% gewijzigd door skysherrif op 11-01-2026 23:00:49 ]
@bianconeri vindt mij niet lief ofzo.quote:
Hoe bedoel je dezelfde?
Hij zit toch bij defensie?
Jij in een appartementent met laptop in Letland.
Ik bedoel waarom zou ik jou taggen dan?
Wat zijn dit steeds van rare vragen?
En hij reageert aldoor op mijn posts maar adviseert anderen om mij te negeren..quote:
[..]
@:Bianconeri vindt mij niet lief ofzo.
Ergens ook wel weer humor natuurlijk.
"Fifty years ago the Leningrad street taught me a rule - if a fight is inevitable, you have to throw the first punch."
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Security guards zitten met een radarscherm in de tuin ofzo?quote:
@:Achja
[ x ]
Mits dit verhaal een beetje waarheid bevat, bestaat dat wapen met ultrasoon geluid oid?
En ja, @ExTec zegt het al geluid inzetten als wapen gebeurt al langer. Maar dat je bloedend inelkaar zakt lijkt me sterk overdreven.
https://pitchfork.com/the(...)ct-yourself-from-it/
https://xcancel.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/2006699700515221727#mquote:here are the Russia KIA we have for December
Total: 5724
Average per Day: 184.6
December was the highest KIA month we've ever seen by a wide margin.
Total For the Year: 48,869
Daily Average: 134
Daily Average since we started counting: 126.8
De minister van Binnenlandse zaken van Venezuela heeft aangegeven dat er zo'n 100 doden waren gevallen tijdens de aanval. Dat stuk dat er honderden zijn afgeslacht is in elk geval flink aangedikt, een hoop van de rest waarschijnlijk ook gok ik..quote:
@:Achja
[ x ]
Mits dit verhaal een beetje waarheid bevat, bestaat dat wapen met ultrasoon geluid oid?
SPOILEROm spoilers te kunnen lezen moet je zijn ingelogd. Je moet je daarvoor eerst gratis Registreren. Ook kun je spoilers niet lezen als je een ban hebt.
Vandaag is trouwens de mijlpaal van Operatie Barbarossa tot het einde van de 2e Werweld Oorlog behaald.
1418 dagen.
Wat een verschil.
1418 dagen.
Wat een verschil.
quote:
Vandaag is trouwens de mijlpaal van Operatie Barbarossa tot het einde van de 2e Werweld Oorlog behaald.
1418 dagen.
Wat een verschil.
Bekijk deze YouTube-videoquote:I asked Vladimir Putin: "What future are you planning for Russia?"
Er gaat niets boven lekker in de zon zitten in de achtertuin met een heel koud glas bier , als je al 72 jaar bent en nog gezond, laat ze maar lachen de sukkels
NOSquote:VK ontwikkelt een nieuwe ballistische raket voor Oekraïne
Het Verenigd Koninkrijk zegt nieuwe ballistische raketten te gaan ontwikkelen die de vuurkracht van Oekraïne zal vergroten om zich te verdedigen tegen Rusland. De zogenoemde Nightfall-raketten kunnen volgens de Britten vanaf voertuigen worden gelanceerd en meerdere raketten snel achter elkaar afvuren om vervolgens binnen enkele minuten terug te kunnen trekken.
"Dit stelt de Oekraïense strijdkrachten in staat belangrijke militaire doelen te raken voordat de Russische strijdkrachten kunnen reageren", schrijft de Britse regering in een persbericht. De nieuwe ballistische raket kan een kernkop van 200 kilo vervoeren over een afstand van meer dan 500 kilometer.
De minister van Defensie John Healey zegt dat de aanvallen op Oekraïne in de nacht van donderdag op vrijdag "eens te meer laten zien hoe Poetin denkt dat hij ongestraft kan handelen en burgergebieden kan aanvallen met geavanceerde wapens." Rusland voerde toen grootschalige aanvallen uit op Oekraïne. Vier mensen kwamen om en 22 raakten er gewond. Daarbij zei Rusland gebruik te hebben gemaakt van de hypersonische raket Oresjnik.
Healey: "Dit pikken we niet, en daarom zijn we vastbesloten om de Oekraïners te voorzien van geavanceerde wapens, zodat ze zich kunnen verzetten."
Het Nightfall-project is niet alleen bedoeld om Oekraïne te steunen, maar ook om de Britse defensie-industrie te stimuleren. Het project heeft een waarde van omgerekend ongeveer 31 miljoen euro. De bedoeling is dat binnen twaalf maanden drie raketten worden geleverd voor testlanceringen.
| Forum Opties | |
|---|---|
| Forumhop: | |
| Hop naar: | |