OOR Oorlog en Defensie
Oorlogen en conflicten - zoals Rusland-Oekraïne - en andere internationale (militaire) conflicten kun je hier bespreken, evenals alles op het gebied van defensie, zoals materiaal, missies, selectieprocedures, collega's etc.
Een tactische analyse van de laatste dagen dan maar? Het front beweegt weinig de laatste dagen maar onze Finse vriend blijft de kaart voortdurend updaten. In het noord-oosten en zuid-oosten lijkt er steeds meer Oekraïense weerstand te verdwijnen. Het front schuift beetje bij beetje op.
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Precies. Ik geloof wel dat de cijfers zo ongeveer kloppen zeker aangezien de Russen nooit zo om verliezen geven zolang ze hun doel maar bereiken met een overmacht.quote:Op zaterdag 5 maart 2022 20:13 schreef BlaZ het volgende:
[..]
Dat kan prima.
Did soort overzichten zijn echter vrij nutteloos zonder ook de Oekraïnse verliezen in ogenschouw te nemen.
Hetgeen vaak vergeten wordt is dat Oekraïne ook gewoon een flink leger heeft.
300+ vliegtuigen
Duizenden tanks
Het is niet mogelijk zo'n leger uit te schakelen zonder verliezen te leiden. Dit is geen VS vs Irak scenario.
De vergelijking met de VS-Irak gaat sowieso niet op. Na een zeer lange tijd zware bombardementen op de Iraakse troepen waren die zo gedemoraliseerd dat die zich massaal overgaven of vluchte. Bovendien hadden ze steun van de bevolking. Die steun van het volk werd naderhand wel moeilijker.
Hier lopen de Russen die mij niet zo gemotiveerd lijken tegen een leger dat zich niet gewonnen wil geven. Ze zijn niet welkom bij de bevolking en hebben de complete wereld tegen zich.
Volgens Mart de Kruif moeten de meest gemotiveerde troepen nog ingezet worden. Verder zal de moraal wellicht wat verbeterd worden door geboekte overwinningen.quote:Op zaterdag 5 maart 2022 21:33 schreef Cherni het volgende:
[..]
Precies. Ik geloof wel dat de cijfers zo ongeveer kloppen zeker aangezien de Russen nooit zo om verliezen geven zolang ze hun doel maar bereiken met een overmacht.
De vergelijking met de VS-Irak gaat sowieso niet op. Na een zeer lange tijd zware bombardementen op de Iraakse troepen waren die zo gedemoraliseerd dat die zich massaal overgaven of vluchte. Bovendien hadden ze steun van de bevolking. Die steun van het volk werd naderhand wel moeilijker.
Hier lopen de Russen die mij niet zo gemotiveerd lijken tegen een leger dat zich niet gewonnen wil geven. Ze zijn niet welkom bij de bevolking en hebben de complete wereld tegen zich.
We zien trouwens nauwelijks POW's aan beide kanten tot nu toe. Dat vind ik ook wel opvallend.
How Russia’s Conquest of Ukraine Went Sideways
It’s more than logistics. At the tactical level, Russia’s military has been woefully inadequate.
The war in Ukraine is not going Russia’s way.
That is not to say the Ukrainians are winning (they aren’t), nor is it to say Russian defeat is inevitable (it isn’t). But by any objective measure, the war in Ukraine is going worse for the Russians and better for the Ukrainians. According to purportedly captured plans, what was intended to be a 15-day blitz to seize control of Ukraine has turned into an uncoordinated and stalled series of unsustainable losses, both in equipment and personnel, and a directionless strategy without a readily apparent or achievable end state.
First and foremost, the Russians seem unclear on what their strategic level objectives are. They may have truly believed their own rhetoric about Ukrainians welcoming the Russian army, or perhaps they assumed Ukrainians would passively accept Russian dominance. But without one of those assumptions coming to fruition, the planned thunder run to Kyiv and other eastern population centers doesn’t seem like a complete plan. Further, neither of those assumptions should have been considered valid at the time and now, in hindsight, they both seem fanciful. It remains unclear what Russia believes the end state of the conflict is. If they seize Kyiv, that likely doesn’t result in an end of hostilities. If they continue to try to conquer all of Ukraine, that will add to their personnel and material losses. If they succeed in conquering all of Ukraine, that will require a constant military presence under threat of enduring insurgent violence.
At the operational level, assuming a quick seizure of Kyiv was the primary goal of the initial invasion forces, Russia seems to have diluted its combat power by trying to attack Ukraine through multiple independent axes. Arguably, the Crimean and Donbas axes are mutually supporting and have achieved some level of link-up in the vicinity of Mariupol, but this southern/southeastern front is a separate and distinct effort from what seems to be the main effort of seizing Kyiv, which is not supported by the fourth Kharkiv axis. The Russians seem to have believed they would be able to immediately flood and capture multiple major cities and therefore coerce a surrender, a plan that works only in a frictionless environment without the need to react to real time events. It’s as if the Russians forgot the warnings of both Von Moltke the Elder and Mike Tyson. So instead of quick victory on multiple fronts, the Russians have two bogged-down axes and two slowed axes, all with diminished combat power.
Of course, massing power along a single axis would be useful only if the Russian army were able to effectively move along that avenue. Currently the infamous “40-mile convoy” is the world’s longest parking lot as many reported logistical failures have halted its ability to move. There are widespread reports of Russian units having run out of fuel and Russian soldiers having only having crossed into Ukraine with only three days of rations on hand. One would assume that the plan to resupply these forces existed, at least in an aspirational way, but that the friction of operations has rendered those poorly conceived logistical plans ineffective.
Russian failures are not limited, however, to logistics. At the tactical level, the Russian army seems to have lost the ability to do the basic tasks well. From regular maintenance to discipline in security and tactical formations, videos coming from the conflict are rife with examples of Russian soldiers lacking the lowest level skills required for survival and mobility, let alone the complexities of combined arms maneuver. Operationally, they have lacked synchronization and have often allowed early successes to be squandered by culminating too soon or through a failure to exploit those successes. The initial air assault seizure of Antonov Airfield by the Russian air forces on the first day of the war, already poorly conceived through a daylight infiltration that lost several aircraft, was wasted by a failure to flow in follow-on forces. Subsequent fighting over the airfield has tied down and destroyed several Russian elements rather than truly opening a major hub for operations against Kyiv.
Of course, Russia’s problems have a compounding nature. Vehicles out of fuel on the road to Kyiv become easy targets. Destroyed vehicles become obstacles to further resupply of fuel and food. Hungry soldiers desert their vehicles looking for food. And on and on it goes.
In contrast, the Ukrainians have proven far more effective and fiercer than most observers estimated prior to the conflict. They have been fighting an effective campaign of distributed resistance while massing tactical effects at key locations. They have integrated and adapted new weapons systems to exploit Russian vulnerabilities, and the forces the Ukrainians have relied on to exploit these Russian weaknesses have also had a disproportionately high payoff. Teams of special operations forces (SOF) have conducted mobile attacks against bogged-down Russian armor and vehicles. Territorial defense units have been mobilized to defend their local cities and countryside. These are examples of forces that are neither expensive nor require a massive logistics tail compared with the lumbering mechanized formations of the Russian battalion tactical groups. While Russian logistics have been unable to figure out how to move fuel, water, ammunition, food and vehicle parts, Ukrainian supply lines seem streamlined to push Javelins, NLAWs and Stingers to forward elements.
The Ukrainians have also exploited Russia’s inability to achieve air superiority. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs) continue to take down Russian fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft at a rate that will become unsustainable for the Russian military. The Ukrainian air force is still flying, and Ukrainian Bayraktar drones are maintaining consistent strikes against Russian forces on the ground.
While the Russians have been bedeviled by logistics difficulties and Ukrainian-fired Javelins, they have yet to face a true popular insurgency. Videos from within Russian occupied towns show protests and verbal confrontations between Ukrainians and Russian forces, but it probably won’t be long until those hurled insults change to hurled Molotov cocktails. The already stressed supply lines, growing longer and more vulnerable as Russian forces push further into the country, have yet to face a threat like the roadside bombs that plagued U.S. convoys in two wars. If history is a guide, the American experience in Iraq, and the shared American and Russian experiences in Afghanistan are instructive; fighting one’s way into a country is one thing, but trying to maintain control of a country is when most casualties can occur.
Things are still going to get worse for the Ukrainians. The Russians, having failed in their planned lightning attack to “liberate” Ukraine and growing frustrated with setbacks, have already started resorting to tactics more in line with their previous military endeavors in Chechnya, Syria and elsewhere. Mass fires, without care or concern for target discrimination or civilian deaths, are becoming common and will most likely be the primary means by which Russian forces attempt to seize population centers. We also don’t have a good grasp of the toll this is taking on the Ukrainian military, but it would stand to reason they are paying a higher proportionate cost in manpower compared with the Russian losses, all while the Russians are making progress, albeit slowly. There may come a breaking point at which the Ukrainian military can no longer hold, and they may have thrown their best forces to conduct stay-behind resistance activities too soon into the fight
Western support has been and will continue to be essential to any hope the Ukrainians have to hold out. Maintaining open supply lines and a constant flow of lethal and nonlethal aid to the Ukrainians should be the focus. Well-intentioned suggestions, including from elected U.S. officials, of providing the Ukrainian air force with U.S. or other NATO-manufactured aircraft are likely an unhelpful distraction; we do not need to complicate Ukrainian logistics by giving them aircraft they are not trained on or adding a whole new maintenance and supply problem to sustain these aircraft. Western powers should continue to focus their efforts on providing the weapons systems that have proven most effective and which can replace organic Ukrainian equipment losses. Further, this support doesn’t need to be trumpeted; yes, it will be obvious to the Russians where the Javelins are coming from. But if Thucydides was right, and in this case Putin is at war for honor, broadcasting Russian deaths to boost U.S. support may further entrench him in his commitment to the war and might be counterproductive to the Western goal of ending the war.
This matter is far from decided. The Russians will adapt and likely overcome many of the problems that have plagued them early on. Conversely, the Ukrainians will have casualties in their best-trained forces and will be mobilizing less prepared fighters in the defense of their country. There are any number of possible outcomes to this conflict, ranging from complete Russian conquest and subjugation of Ukraine to complete withdrawal of Russian forces in defeat, and everything in between. But it seems likely, regardless of the outcome, that it will get worse for the population of Ukraine, and it is unlikely that there will be any resolution in the short term.
It’s more than logistics. At the tactical level, Russia’s military has been woefully inadequate.
The war in Ukraine is not going Russia’s way.
That is not to say the Ukrainians are winning (they aren’t), nor is it to say Russian defeat is inevitable (it isn’t). But by any objective measure, the war in Ukraine is going worse for the Russians and better for the Ukrainians. According to purportedly captured plans, what was intended to be a 15-day blitz to seize control of Ukraine has turned into an uncoordinated and stalled series of unsustainable losses, both in equipment and personnel, and a directionless strategy without a readily apparent or achievable end state.
First and foremost, the Russians seem unclear on what their strategic level objectives are. They may have truly believed their own rhetoric about Ukrainians welcoming the Russian army, or perhaps they assumed Ukrainians would passively accept Russian dominance. But without one of those assumptions coming to fruition, the planned thunder run to Kyiv and other eastern population centers doesn’t seem like a complete plan. Further, neither of those assumptions should have been considered valid at the time and now, in hindsight, they both seem fanciful. It remains unclear what Russia believes the end state of the conflict is. If they seize Kyiv, that likely doesn’t result in an end of hostilities. If they continue to try to conquer all of Ukraine, that will add to their personnel and material losses. If they succeed in conquering all of Ukraine, that will require a constant military presence under threat of enduring insurgent violence.
At the operational level, assuming a quick seizure of Kyiv was the primary goal of the initial invasion forces, Russia seems to have diluted its combat power by trying to attack Ukraine through multiple independent axes. Arguably, the Crimean and Donbas axes are mutually supporting and have achieved some level of link-up in the vicinity of Mariupol, but this southern/southeastern front is a separate and distinct effort from what seems to be the main effort of seizing Kyiv, which is not supported by the fourth Kharkiv axis. The Russians seem to have believed they would be able to immediately flood and capture multiple major cities and therefore coerce a surrender, a plan that works only in a frictionless environment without the need to react to real time events. It’s as if the Russians forgot the warnings of both Von Moltke the Elder and Mike Tyson. So instead of quick victory on multiple fronts, the Russians have two bogged-down axes and two slowed axes, all with diminished combat power.
Of course, massing power along a single axis would be useful only if the Russian army were able to effectively move along that avenue. Currently the infamous “40-mile convoy” is the world’s longest parking lot as many reported logistical failures have halted its ability to move. There are widespread reports of Russian units having run out of fuel and Russian soldiers having only having crossed into Ukraine with only three days of rations on hand. One would assume that the plan to resupply these forces existed, at least in an aspirational way, but that the friction of operations has rendered those poorly conceived logistical plans ineffective.
Russian failures are not limited, however, to logistics. At the tactical level, the Russian army seems to have lost the ability to do the basic tasks well. From regular maintenance to discipline in security and tactical formations, videos coming from the conflict are rife with examples of Russian soldiers lacking the lowest level skills required for survival and mobility, let alone the complexities of combined arms maneuver. Operationally, they have lacked synchronization and have often allowed early successes to be squandered by culminating too soon or through a failure to exploit those successes. The initial air assault seizure of Antonov Airfield by the Russian air forces on the first day of the war, already poorly conceived through a daylight infiltration that lost several aircraft, was wasted by a failure to flow in follow-on forces. Subsequent fighting over the airfield has tied down and destroyed several Russian elements rather than truly opening a major hub for operations against Kyiv.
Of course, Russia’s problems have a compounding nature. Vehicles out of fuel on the road to Kyiv become easy targets. Destroyed vehicles become obstacles to further resupply of fuel and food. Hungry soldiers desert their vehicles looking for food. And on and on it goes.
In contrast, the Ukrainians have proven far more effective and fiercer than most observers estimated prior to the conflict. They have been fighting an effective campaign of distributed resistance while massing tactical effects at key locations. They have integrated and adapted new weapons systems to exploit Russian vulnerabilities, and the forces the Ukrainians have relied on to exploit these Russian weaknesses have also had a disproportionately high payoff. Teams of special operations forces (SOF) have conducted mobile attacks against bogged-down Russian armor and vehicles. Territorial defense units have been mobilized to defend their local cities and countryside. These are examples of forces that are neither expensive nor require a massive logistics tail compared with the lumbering mechanized formations of the Russian battalion tactical groups. While Russian logistics have been unable to figure out how to move fuel, water, ammunition, food and vehicle parts, Ukrainian supply lines seem streamlined to push Javelins, NLAWs and Stingers to forward elements.
The Ukrainians have also exploited Russia’s inability to achieve air superiority. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs) continue to take down Russian fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft at a rate that will become unsustainable for the Russian military. The Ukrainian air force is still flying, and Ukrainian Bayraktar drones are maintaining consistent strikes against Russian forces on the ground.
While the Russians have been bedeviled by logistics difficulties and Ukrainian-fired Javelins, they have yet to face a true popular insurgency. Videos from within Russian occupied towns show protests and verbal confrontations between Ukrainians and Russian forces, but it probably won’t be long until those hurled insults change to hurled Molotov cocktails. The already stressed supply lines, growing longer and more vulnerable as Russian forces push further into the country, have yet to face a threat like the roadside bombs that plagued U.S. convoys in two wars. If history is a guide, the American experience in Iraq, and the shared American and Russian experiences in Afghanistan are instructive; fighting one’s way into a country is one thing, but trying to maintain control of a country is when most casualties can occur.
Things are still going to get worse for the Ukrainians. The Russians, having failed in their planned lightning attack to “liberate” Ukraine and growing frustrated with setbacks, have already started resorting to tactics more in line with their previous military endeavors in Chechnya, Syria and elsewhere. Mass fires, without care or concern for target discrimination or civilian deaths, are becoming common and will most likely be the primary means by which Russian forces attempt to seize population centers. We also don’t have a good grasp of the toll this is taking on the Ukrainian military, but it would stand to reason they are paying a higher proportionate cost in manpower compared with the Russian losses, all while the Russians are making progress, albeit slowly. There may come a breaking point at which the Ukrainian military can no longer hold, and they may have thrown their best forces to conduct stay-behind resistance activities too soon into the fight
Western support has been and will continue to be essential to any hope the Ukrainians have to hold out. Maintaining open supply lines and a constant flow of lethal and nonlethal aid to the Ukrainians should be the focus. Well-intentioned suggestions, including from elected U.S. officials, of providing the Ukrainian air force with U.S. or other NATO-manufactured aircraft are likely an unhelpful distraction; we do not need to complicate Ukrainian logistics by giving them aircraft they are not trained on or adding a whole new maintenance and supply problem to sustain these aircraft. Western powers should continue to focus their efforts on providing the weapons systems that have proven most effective and which can replace organic Ukrainian equipment losses. Further, this support doesn’t need to be trumpeted; yes, it will be obvious to the Russians where the Javelins are coming from. But if Thucydides was right, and in this case Putin is at war for honor, broadcasting Russian deaths to boost U.S. support may further entrench him in his commitment to the war and might be counterproductive to the Western goal of ending the war.
This matter is far from decided. The Russians will adapt and likely overcome many of the problems that have plagued them early on. Conversely, the Ukrainians will have casualties in their best-trained forces and will be mobilizing less prepared fighters in the defense of their country. There are any number of possible outcomes to this conflict, ranging from complete Russian conquest and subjugation of Ukraine to complete withdrawal of Russian forces in defeat, and everything in between. But it seems likely, regardless of the outcome, that it will get worse for the population of Ukraine, and it is unlikely that there will be any resolution in the short term.
Aardige analyse wel. Ik kan me gewoon niet voorstellen dat Poetin zijn troepen terugtrekt dus het begint steeds meer op een oorlog tot het bittere einde te worden. Hoog tijd dus om als westen zoveel mogelijk anti-raketwapens en luchtafweergeschut etc. te gaan sturen want daar komt het grootste gevaar vandaan.quote:
How Russia’s Conquest of Ukraine Went Sideways
It’s more than logistics. At the tactical level, Russia’s military has been woefully inadequate.
The war in Ukraine is not going Russia’s way.
That is not to say the Ukrainians are winning (they aren’t), nor is it to say Russian defeat is inevitable (it isn’t). But by any objective measure, the war in Ukraine is going worse for the Russians and better for the Ukrainians. According to purportedly captured plans, what was intended to be a 15-day blitz to seize control of Ukraine has turned into an uncoordinated and stalled series of unsustainable losses, both in equipment and personnel, and a directionless strategy without a readily apparent or achievable end state.
First and foremost, the Russians seem unclear on what their strategic level objectives are. They may have truly believed their own rhetoric about Ukrainians welcoming the Russian army, or perhaps they assumed Ukrainians would passively accept Russian dominance. But without one of those assumptions coming to fruition, the planned thunder run to Kyiv and other eastern population centers doesn’t seem like a complete plan. Further, neither of those assumptions should have been considered valid at the time and now, in hindsight, they both seem fanciful. It remains unclear what Russia believes the end state of the conflict is. If they seize Kyiv, that likely doesn’t result in an end of hostilities. If they continue to try to conquer all of Ukraine, that will add to their personnel and material losses. If they succeed in conquering all of Ukraine, that will require a constant military presence under threat of enduring insurgent violence.
At the operational level, assuming a quick seizure of Kyiv was the primary goal of the initial invasion forces, Russia seems to have diluted its combat power by trying to attack Ukraine through multiple independent axes. Arguably, the Crimean and Donbas axes are mutually supporting and have achieved some level of link-up in the vicinity of Mariupol, but this southern/southeastern front is a separate and distinct effort from what seems to be the main effort of seizing Kyiv, which is not supported by the fourth Kharkiv axis. The Russians seem to have believed they would be able to immediately flood and capture multiple major cities and therefore coerce a surrender, a plan that works only in a frictionless environment without the need to react to real time events. It’s as if the Russians forgot the warnings of both Von Moltke the Elder and Mike Tyson. So instead of quick victory on multiple fronts, the Russians have two bogged-down axes and two slowed axes, all with diminished combat power.
Of course, massing power along a single axis would be useful only if the Russian army were able to effectively move along that avenue. Currently the infamous “40-mile convoy” is the world’s longest parking lot as many reported logistical failures have halted its ability to move. There are widespread reports of Russian units having run out of fuel and Russian soldiers having only having crossed into Ukraine with only three days of rations on hand. One would assume that the plan to resupply these forces existed, at least in an aspirational way, but that the friction of operations has rendered those poorly conceived logistical plans ineffective.
Russian failures are not limited, however, to logistics. At the tactical level, the Russian army seems to have lost the ability to do the basic tasks well. From regular maintenance to discipline in security and tactical formations, videos coming from the conflict are rife with examples of Russian soldiers lacking the lowest level skills required for survival and mobility, let alone the complexities of combined arms maneuver. Operationally, they have lacked synchronization and have often allowed early successes to be squandered by culminating too soon or through a failure to exploit those successes. The initial air assault seizure of Antonov Airfield by the Russian air forces on the first day of the war, already poorly conceived through a daylight infiltration that lost several aircraft, was wasted by a failure to flow in follow-on forces. Subsequent fighting over the airfield has tied down and destroyed several Russian elements rather than truly opening a major hub for operations against Kyiv.
Of course, Russia’s problems have a compounding nature. Vehicles out of fuel on the road to Kyiv become easy targets. Destroyed vehicles become obstacles to further resupply of fuel and food. Hungry soldiers desert their vehicles looking for food. And on and on it goes.
In contrast, the Ukrainians have proven far more effective and fiercer than most observers estimated prior to the conflict. They have been fighting an effective campaign of distributed resistance while massing tactical effects at key locations. They have integrated and adapted new weapons systems to exploit Russian vulnerabilities, and the forces the Ukrainians have relied on to exploit these Russian weaknesses have also had a disproportionately high payoff. Teams of special operations forces (SOF) have conducted mobile attacks against bogged-down Russian armor and vehicles. Territorial defense units have been mobilized to defend their local cities and countryside. These are examples of forces that are neither expensive nor require a massive logistics tail compared with the lumbering mechanized formations of the Russian battalion tactical groups. While Russian logistics have been unable to figure out how to move fuel, water, ammunition, food and vehicle parts, Ukrainian supply lines seem streamlined to push Javelins, NLAWs and Stingers to forward elements.
The Ukrainians have also exploited Russia’s inability to achieve air superiority. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs) continue to take down Russian fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft at a rate that will become unsustainable for the Russian military. The Ukrainian air force is still flying, and Ukrainian Bayraktar drones are maintaining consistent strikes against Russian forces on the ground.
While the Russians have been bedeviled by logistics difficulties and Ukrainian-fired Javelins, they have yet to face a true popular insurgency. Videos from within Russian occupied towns show protests and verbal confrontations between Ukrainians and Russian forces, but it probably won’t be long until those hurled insults change to hurled Molotov cocktails. The already stressed supply lines, growing longer and more vulnerable as Russian forces push further into the country, have yet to face a threat like the roadside bombs that plagued U.S. convoys in two wars. If history is a guide, the American experience in Iraq, and the shared American and Russian experiences in Afghanistan are instructive; fighting one’s way into a country is one thing, but trying to maintain control of a country is when most casualties can occur.
Things are still going to get worse for the Ukrainians. The Russians, having failed in their planned lightning attack to “liberate” Ukraine and growing frustrated with setbacks, have already started resorting to tactics more in line with their previous military endeavors in Chechnya, Syria and elsewhere. Mass fires, without care or concern for target discrimination or civilian deaths, are becoming common and will most likely be the primary means by which Russian forces attempt to seize population centers. We also don’t have a good grasp of the toll this is taking on the Ukrainian military, but it would stand to reason they are paying a higher proportionate cost in manpower compared with the Russian losses, all while the Russians are making progress, albeit slowly. There may come a breaking point at which the Ukrainian military can no longer hold, and they may have thrown their best forces to conduct stay-behind resistance activities too soon into the fight
Western support has been and will continue to be essential to any hope the Ukrainians have to hold out. Maintaining open supply lines and a constant flow of lethal and nonlethal aid to the Ukrainians should be the focus. Well-intentioned suggestions, including from elected U.S. officials, of providing the Ukrainian air force with U.S. or other NATO-manufactured aircraft are likely an unhelpful distraction; we do not need to complicate Ukrainian logistics by giving them aircraft they are not trained on or adding a whole new maintenance and supply problem to sustain these aircraft. Western powers should continue to focus their efforts on providing the weapons systems that have proven most effective and which can replace organic Ukrainian equipment losses. Further, this support doesn’t need to be trumpeted; yes, it will be obvious to the Russians where the Javelins are coming from. But if Thucydides was right, and in this case Putin is at war for honor, broadcasting Russian deaths to boost U.S. support may further entrench him in his commitment to the war and might be counterproductive to the Western goal of ending the war.
This matter is far from decided. The Russians will adapt and likely overcome many of the problems that have plagued them early on. Conversely, the Ukrainians will have casualties in their best-trained forces and will be mobilizing less prepared fighters in the defense of their country. There are any number of possible outcomes to this conflict, ranging from complete Russian conquest and subjugation of Ukraine to complete withdrawal of Russian forces in defeat, and everything in between. But it seems likely, regardless of the outcome, that it will get worse for the population of Ukraine, and it is unlikely that there will be any resolution in the short term.
We weten overigens niet hoeveel pantsereenheden de Russen (waar ze toch een behoorlijk gebied onder controle hebben) in het zuiden hebben klaarstaan. Ik zie daar toch wel de grootste doorbraak plaatsvinden.
UA gaat het ook niet winnen als Russia all-in gaat en dit nog gaat duren in lengte van vele weken of enkele maanden (bandbreedte weet ik niet). Het is te hopen in de tussentijd dat een deal soelas biedt, of -nog beter- dat Poetin gewisseld wordt en op die manier de-escalatie gaat plaatsvinden.quote:
[..]
Aardige analyse wel. Ik kan me gewoon niet voorstellen dat Poetin zijn troepen terugtrekt dus het begint steeds meer op een oorlog tot het bittere einde te worden. Hoog tijd dus om als westen zoveel mogelijk anti-raketwapens en luchtafweergeschut etc. te gaan sturen want daar komt het grootste gevaar vandaan.
We weten overigens niet hoeveel pantsereenheden de Russen (waar ze toch een behoorlijk gebied onder controle hebben) in het zuiden hebben klaarstaan. Ik zie daar toch wel de grootste doorbraak plaatsvinden.
Tijd is de grootste vriend voor UA omdat hoe langer het duurt, de situatie voor de Russen steeds penibeler wordt.
Wat is jouw analyse: kan het westen nog zwaardere wapens leveren?
"Fifty years ago the Leningrad street taught me a rule - if a fight is inevitable, you have to throw the first punch."
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Tweede Afghanistan incoming
"People that use Fiat currency as a store of value.
There is a name for it:
We call them Poor"
There is a name for it:
We call them Poor"
Juist die laatste vraag vind ik moeilijk te beantwoorden omdat ik minder van materieel afweet dan andere goede users hier en ik elke keer overal in de pers lees dat de levering van grotere wapens "oorlog" betekent.quote:Op zaterdag 5 maart 2022 22:10 schreef phpmystyle het volgende:
[..]
UA gaat het ook niet winnen als Russia all-in gaat en dit nog gaat duren in lengte van vele weken of enkele maanden (bandbreedte weet ik niet). Het is te hopen in de tussentijd dat een deal soelas biedt, of -nog beter- dat Poetin gewisseld wordt en op die manier de-escalatie gaat plaatsvinden.
Tijd is de grootste vriend voor UA omdat hoe langer het duurt, de situatie voor de Russen steeds penibeler wordt.
Wat is jouw analyse: kan het westen nog zwaardere wapens leveren?
Maar toch heb ik ergens het idee dat het Westen hier alsnog in betrokken gaat worden.
Ik denk ook niet dat zwaardere wapens een oplossing zijn.
Juist het mobiel zijn met makkelijk te gebruiken wapens levert Oekraïne een voordeel op.
In alle recente conflicten is te zien dat de bovenliggende partij het wint bij een "conventioneel" gevecht.
Het enige wat ik me voor kan stellen is dat ze meer drones krijgen + bewapening daarvoor.
Daar hebben ze immers al ervaring mee.
Juist het mobiel zijn met makkelijk te gebruiken wapens levert Oekraïne een voordeel op.
In alle recente conflicten is te zien dat de bovenliggende partij het wint bij een "conventioneel" gevecht.
Het enige wat ik me voor kan stellen is dat ze meer drones krijgen + bewapening daarvoor.
Daar hebben ze immers al ervaring mee.
Het oostfront begint ook wel zorgelijk te worden. Oekraïne zal toch echt moeten gaan terugvallen naar Dnipro anders wordt binnenkort het hele oostfront afgesnedenquote:
Analyse: Europa kan eigenlijk niets beginnen
https://www.nu.nl/spannin(...)we-al-betrokken.html
https://www.nu.nl/spannin(...)we-al-betrokken.html
Vakman pur sang
Schier mee oneens. DL, FR kunnen aardig wat, als meer landen volgen heb je een apparaat dat sterker is dan Rusland. Of je daadwerkelijk die krachtmeting wil praktiseren is een ander.quote:
Analyse: Europa kan eigenlijk niets beginnen
https://www.nu.nl/spannin(...)we-al-betrokken.html
"Fifty years ago the Leningrad street taught me a rule - if a fight is inevitable, you have to throw the first punch."
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
quote:
[..]
Schier mee oneens. DL, FR kunnen aardig wat, als meer landen volgen heb je een apparaat dat sterker is dan Rusland. Of je daadwerkelijk die krachtmeting wil praktiseren is een ander.
Luchtmacht wel toch?quote:s de NAVO in staat om direct met veel slagkracht te reageren in zo'n situatie?
De Wijk denkt van niet, althans niet de Europese landen die deel uitmaken van de NAVO. "We horen ferme taal vanuit Europa. Maar het probleem is: er zit niks achter. Er zit wel een geweldige economie achter, maar geen militaire macht. Dus als het escaleert, dan kunnen we niks. Dat maakt het risicovol. Bij de Amerikanen zit dat anders, alleen het probleem is dat de meeste Amerikaanse troepen niet in Europa zitten, maar in Amerika.
Om er binnen 24 uur 100duizenden troepen te krijgen is wel lastig denk ik, ook voor Fr en Du.
Vlg mij is het Duitse leger nog roestiger dan het Russische in de praktijk
Vakman pur sang
Volgens mij heeft DL een aardig gemoderniseerd park aan hardware, alleen qua volume wat zuinig voor zo'n groot en rijk land.quote:
[..]
[..]
Luchtmacht wel toch?
Om er binnen 24 uur 100duizenden troepen te krijgen is wel lastig denk ik, ook voor Fr en Du.
Vlg mij is het Duitse leger nog roestiger dan het Russische in de praktijk
En je hoeft ook niet binnen 24 uur 1,2 miljoen troepen paraat te hebben. Maar uit mijn hoofd hebben FR, DL, POL, en andere oostblok staten (die bereid zijn te leveren) wel 500k aan troepen.
"Fifty years ago the Leningrad street taught me a rule - if a fight is inevitable, you have to throw the first punch."
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
quote:
[..]
Volgens mij heeft DL een aardig gemoderniseerd park aan hardware, alleen qua volume wat zuinig voor zo'n groot en rijk land.
En je hoeft ook niet binnen 24 uur 1,2 miljoen troepen paraat te hebben. Maar uit mijn hoofd hebben FR, DL, POL, en andere oostblok staten (die bereid zijn te leveren) wel 500k aan troepen.
De schrijvers van het artikel zouden veel preciezer moeten weten wat de staat van defensie is dan ons.quote:Rob de Wijk, oprichter van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies en defensiespecialist Dick Zandee van Clingendael.
Toch apart dat ze zeggen dat Europa eigenlijk niets kan.
Vakman pur sang
Klopt, en zij zijn deskundiger dan ik. Laten we dat vooropstellen.quote:
[..]
[..]
De schrijvers van het artikel zouden veel preciezer moeten weten wat de staat van defensie is dan ons.
Toch apart dat ze zeggen dat Europa eigenlijk niets kan.
Maar het beeld van hun dat wij een totaal geimplodeerd legertje hebben deel ik simpelweg niet, afgezet tegen een tegenstander (de Russen) die erom bekend staan grote verliezen te lijden in oorlogen.
"Fifty years ago the Leningrad street taught me a rule - if a fight is inevitable, you have to throw the first punch."
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
“To forgive the terrorists is up to God, but to send them there is up to me.”
Vladimir Putin
Ik ben er wel van overtuigd dat de NAVO Rusland in de Oekraïne wel zou terugdringen uit de Oekraïne. Maar aangezien het geen vredesmissie zou worden is het de vraag als er behoorlijk wat militairen sneuvelen de publieke opinie dit gaat verwerken. Maar zonder de VS durf ik niet te voorspellen.quote:
[..]
Schier mee oneens. DL, FR kunnen aardig wat, als meer landen volgen heb je een apparaat dat sterker is dan Rusland. Of je daadwerkelijk die krachtmeting wil praktiseren is een ander.
In Afghanistan waren er 15.000 russiche doden, en dat leidde tot de val van de sovjet unie.quote:
Dit aantal gaat rusland in enkele weken al bereiken. En hun luchtmacht en heli's zijn voor die tijd al op, gezien het dagelijkse aantal slachtoffers. Ik zie alle bekende russische namen nu voorbij komen als KIA of POW. Vangst van vandaag:
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)a_killed_in_donetsk/
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)_famous_for_bombing/
Hoe het verder gaat:
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)eapons_to_the_local/
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)ussiaworkers_at_the/
Rusland begint in rap tempo instabiel te raken, en de mobilisatie van Oekraine begint op gang te komen. Ze hebben zelfs teveel rekruten, ik geloof dat aanmeldingen gesloten zijn.
Hier geloof ik een stuk of 20-30 voertuigen van de russische barbaren (kan het mis hebben, heb video niet bekeken, het zijn er teveel):
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)_outside_of_kharkiv/
Eh, deze d'r ook maar bij: https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)mstas_selfpropelled/
[ Bericht 5% gewijzigd door oheng op 06-03-2022 02:15:56 ]
Juist niet. Het is natuurlijk niet voor niets dat er plotseling 100 miljard is toegezegd.quote:
Volgens mij heeft DL een aardig gemoderniseerd park aan hardware, alleen qua volume wat zuinig voor zo'n groot en rijk land.
Dat mag, het is alleen wel zo.quote:
Maar het beeld van hun dat wij een totaal geimplodeerd legertje hebben deel ik simpelweg niet
Mart de Kruif zegt hetzelfde hier, in dit filmpje vanaf 6m30 dat de Russen veel sterker zijn met hun conventioneel leger, behalve dan tegen de Amerikanen en ook dus in steden. Outnumbered, outgunned, outranged.quote:
[..]
[..]
De schrijvers van het artikel zouden veel preciezer moeten weten wat de staat van defensie is dan ons.
Toch apart dat ze zeggen dat Europa eigenlijk niets kan.
https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2022/02/26/slag-om-kiev/
Ik begin je optimisme wel steeds meer steeds te delen. De Russen hebben niet de aantallen troepen die ze vroeger hadden om steden simpelweg met enorme verliezen te nemen. Elke stad uithongeren of belegeren kost veel tijd en tijd is in het voordeel van Oekraïne.quote:
[..]
In Afghanistan waren er 15.000 russiche doden, en dat leidde tot de val van de sovjet unie.
Dit aantal gaat rusland in enkele weken al bereiken. En hun luchtmacht en heli's zijn voor die tijd al op, gezien het dagelijkse aantal slachtoffers. Ik zie alle bekende russische namen nu voorbij komen als KIA of POW. Vangst van vandaag:
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)a_killed_in_donetsk/
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)_famous_for_bombing/
Hoe het verder gaat:
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)eapons_to_the_local/
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)ussiaworkers_at_the/
Rusland begint in rap tempo instabiel te raken, en de mobilisatie van Oekraine begint op gang te komen. Ze hebben zelfs teveel rekruten, ik geloof dat aanmeldingen gesloten zijn.
Hier geloof ik een stuk of 20-30 voertuigen van de russische barbaren (kan het mis hebben, heb video niet bekeken, het zijn er teveel):
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)_outside_of_kharkiv/
Eh, deze d'r ook maar bij: https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)mstas_selfpropelled/
Sumy ligt inmiddels kilometers achter de frontlijn maar wordt maar niet opgeruimd. Dat kost zo ontzettend veel troepen.
Wij leunen natuurlijk voor een groot deel wel op de Amerikanen, maar mocht het zover komen dat Europa gezamenlijk de strijd aan gaat met alleen Rusland dan denk ik wel dat we de bovenliggende partij zijn ja.quote:
[..]
Klopt, en zij zijn deskundiger dan ik. Laten we dat vooropstellen.
Maar het beeld van hun dat wij een totaal geimplodeerd legertje hebben deel ik simpelweg niet, afgezet tegen een tegenstander (de Russen) die erom bekend staan grote verliezen te lijden in oorlogen.
Alleen de vraag is hoe snel je zoiets logistiek geregeld krijgt, troepen opbouw kost meestal maanden.
