[Centraal] Crisis in Syrië #292 Remember, no Russian

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:09 schreef firefly3 het volgende:

[..]

Met Iron beam kunnen ze met lasers dingen uit de lucht schieten.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:27 schreef sp3c het volgende:

[..]

ze kregen geen klop van Hezbollah, ze konden gaan en staan waar ze wilden in Libanon

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:30 schreef Intellectueel het volgende:

[..]

Nonsense. De Israëliërs konden niet meer dan een aantal kilometers oprukken in Zuid-Libanon. Lees het door Israel-geïnitieerde Winograd-report of elk ander post-oorlog analyse.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:28 schreef vigen98 het volgende:

[..]

Ze kregen wel harde klappen hoor Het was zeker geen succes voor Israël als je dat wilt zeggen

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:28 schreef vigen98 het volgende:

[..]

Ze kregen wel harde klappen hoor Het was zeker geen succes voor Israël als je dat wilt zeggen

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:36 schreef sp3c het volgende:
tot de Litani, wat ook de bedoeling was

dat het zolang duurde had meer te maken met de besluiteloosheid van de top (militair en politiek) dan met de slagkracht van Hezbolla

quote:

The IDF never reached the Litani river and failed to surround Hizbullah forces in South Lebanon. Instead the Israeli government on August 13, accepted a ceasefire in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. When the ceasefire commenced the following day IDF found itself in control of 16 different pockets or sectors in South Lebanon, often isolated from each other and from Israeli territory. IDF expressed a desire to withdraw from these positions as quickly as possible, as soon as a ceasefire agreement was in place. Hizbullah remained in control of both Bint Jbeil and Ayta ash-Sha'b, close to the border, while IDF soldiers were operating well to the north of both these towns.

quote:

Israel sent the elite of its regular forces, the Golani infantry brigade and the Paratroopers brigade to Bint Jbeil. The IDF enjoyed a tremendous superiority both in numbers and firepower as well as absolute air superiority. The over 5,000 IDF soldiers laying a siege around the town were faced by little more than 100 Hizbullah fighters. The IDF failed to conquer the town or to make any other tangible operational achievements. According to Kober the Israeli withdrawal was "correctly interpreted by Hizballah as a great victory for the organization.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:02 schreef Intellectueel het volgende:

[..]

Haha.

Haha.

Haha.

Israel kreeg klop van Hezbollah in 2006. Het vliegt nog steeds in 4de-generatie gevechtsvliegtuigen, terwijl Rusland 5de-generatie gevechtsvliegtuigen ontwikkeld. Rusland heeft geen kind aan Israel in een conventionele oorlog.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:39 schreef sp3c het volgende:
ja ze draaiden zichzelf een beetje de nek om, daar hadden ze Hezbollah niet voor nodig ... was Hezbollah ook niet toe in staat

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 12:28 schreef Richestorags het volgende:

[..]

Wat je bijna doet afvragen wat het werkelijke doel was van Amerika. Iedereen had zelf wel kunnen bedenken dat 75 gasten ondanks hun hightech wapens en training onmiddelijk gevangen zouden worden. Waarmee die Amerikaanse wapens weer in handen vallen van groepen zoals Al-Nusra.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:44 schreef WammesWaggel het volgende:

[..]

Dat is natuurlijk onzin, Rusland heeft niet de middelen om een conventionele oorlog tegen Israël te vechten en te winnen mits Israël een thuiswedstrijd speelt.
Tegen Turkije zou Rusland het al moeilijk krijgen.

Het gebrek aan ervaring van de piloten en tankvliegtuigen breekt ze gewoon op.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:57 schreef Intellectueel het volgende:

[..]

Tegen Turkije moeilijk? Hoe lastig zou het zijn voor Rusland om al snel in de oorlog met de Turken 'air supremacy' te creëren? Turkije heeft geen noemenswaardige luchtdoelafweergeschut-systemen, noch staat het qua kwaliteit en kwantiteit m.b.t. haar gevechtsvliegtuigen gelijk aan de Russen. De Turken zouden relatief snel in de oorlog hun luchtruim verliezen, en zijn bovendien niet in staat om Russische kruis- en ballistische raketten te onderscheppen. Aan de andere kant kunnen de Russen oprukken onder de protectie van haar Antey-2500 systemen.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 14:36 schreef W.H.I.S.T.L.E het volgende:

[..]

Daarvoor zijn ze toch lid van de NAVO.
Ze hoeven het zelf niet te ontwikkelen of te kopen.Daarom hebben ze het ook niet gedaan, anders zouden ze het zeker ontwikkeld of gekocht hebben.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 14:36 schreef W.H.I.S.T.L.E het volgende:

[..]

Daarvoor zijn ze toch lid van de NAVO.
Ze hoeven het zelf niet te ontwikkelen of te kopen.Daarom hebben ze het ook niet gedaan, anders zouden ze het zeker ontwikkeld of gekocht hebben.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 14:39 schreef Richestorags het volgende:

[..]

Daar hebben ze weinig aan als de vliegtuigen al boven hun land zijn.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 13:37 schreef Intellectueel het volgende:

[..]

Het was een complete fiasco voor de IDF. De Winograd-commissie moest na de oorlog in opdracht van de Israëlische regering onderzoek doen naar de oorlog, en kwam met een aantal schokkende conclusies:

- Compete bataljons die zich terugtrokken na het spotten van 5-10 Hezbollah soldaten.
- Bevoorradingsvrachtwagens die uit angst weigerden Libanon te betreden.
- Complete divisies die hun opmars staakten omdat een soldaten gewond was.
- Soldaten die in geen enkele instantie zelf het initiatief namen.
- Een gebrek aan opofferingsgezindheid in de Israëlische samenleving, die in al haar vrijheid en hedonistische levensstijl niet meer bereid is om grote verliezen te accepteren.
- Het stationeren van speciale divisies van de IDF in de Palestijnse gebieden, waar men vooral te maken heeft met 14-jarige stenengooiers en gefrustreerde gezinnen, de moraal van de IDF-soldaten niet ten goede is gekomen. De discrepantie tussen die realiteit en de realiteit aan het echte front is te groot, en zorgt enkel voor desillusie.
- Etc.

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 14:57 schreef Gabrunal_2013 het volgende:

[..]

Klopt, Isael was vergeten hoe het een conventionele oorlog moest voeren. Men had last van IED's, antitankwapens, men kon slecht combined optreden (coordineren) er ware tevens veel militaire slachtoffers te betreuren wat de publieke opinie snel deed omzwaaien. hezbollah had zich met steun van Iran en Syrie juist enorm versterkt en kon gemakkelijk met guerilla tactieken de IDF de baas. Ook de IAF kon weinig uitrichten. De raketinstallaties waren te mobiel en er waren geen goede targets, de C2 van Hezbollah bleef eenvoudig in tact... Een zeer smadelijke nederlaag voor Israel. Een belangrijke reden voor isael ook om nu de as Iran-syrie-hezbollah te willen verbreken. isael heeft blijkbaar liever een door Isis geleide terreurstaat als buurman ,dan de Perzische arm in Libanon.

quote:

Moreover, and more significant, Hezbollah's fighters proved to be dedicated and disciplined. Using intelligence assets to pinpoint Israeli infantry penetrations, they proved the equal of Israel's best fighting units. In some cases, Israeli units were defeated on the field of battle, forced into sudden retreats or forced to rely on air cover to save elements from being overrun. Even toward the end of the war, on August 9, the IDF announced that 15 of its reserve soldiers were killed and 40 wounded in fighting in the villages of Marjayoun, Khiam and Kila - a stunning casualty rate for a marginal piece of real estate.

The robust Hezbollah defense was also taking its toll on Israeli armor. When Israel finally agreed to a ceasefire and began its withdrawal from the border area, it left behind upwards of 40 armored vehicles, nearly all of them destroyed by expertly deployed AT-3 "Sagger" anti-tank missiles - which is the NATO name for the Russian-made vehicle- or man-deployed, wire-guided, second-generation 9M14 Malyutka - or "Little Baby".

With a range of 3 kilometers, the Sagger proved enormously successful in taking on Israeli tanks, a fact that must have given Israeli armor commanders fits, in large part because the Sagger missile deployed by Hezbollah is an older version (developed and deployed in 1973) of a more modern version that is more easily hidden and deployed and has a larger warhead. If the IDF could not protect its armor against the 1973 "second generation" version, IDF commanders must now be wondering how it can possibly protect itself against a version that is more modern, more sophisticated, and more deadly.

Prior to the implementation of the ceasefire, the Israeli political establishment decided that it would "clear drop" Israeli paratroopers in key areas along the Litani River. The decision was apparently made to convince the international community that the rules of engagement for a UN force should extend from the Litani south. Such a claim could not be made unless Israel could credibly claim to have cleared that part of Lebanon to the Litani.

A significant number of Israeli forces were airlifted into key areas just south of the Litani to accomplish this goal. The decision might well have led to a disaster. Most of the Israeli forces airlifted to these sites were immediately surrounded by Hezbollah units and may well have been decisively mauled had a ceasefire not gone into effect. The political decision angered retired IDF officers, one of whom accused Olmert of "spinning the military" - using the military for public relations purposes.

Perhaps the most telling sign of Israel's military failure comes in counting the dead and wounded. Israel now claims that it killed about 400-500 Hezbollah fighters, while its own losses were significantly less. But a more precise accounting shows that Israeli and Hezbollah casualties were nearly even. It is impossible for Shi'ites (and Hezbollah) not to allow an honorable burial for its martyrs, so in this case it is simply a matter of counting funerals. Fewer than 180 funerals have been held for Hezbollah fighters - nearly equal to the number killed on the Israeli side. That number may be revised upward: our most recent information from Lebanon says the number of Shi'ite martyr funerals in the south can now be precisely tabulated at 184.

But by any accounting - whether in rockets, armored vehicles or numbers of dead and wounded - Hezbollah's fight against Israel must be accorded a decisive military and political victory. Even if it were otherwise (and it is clearly not), the full impact of Hezbollah's war with Israel over a period of 34 days in July and August has caused a political earthquake in the region.

Hezbollah's military defeat of Israel was decisive, but its political defeat of the United States - which unquestioningly sided with Israel during the conflict and refused to bring it to an end - was catastrophic and has had a lasting impact on US prestige in the region.

twitter:

HDNER twitterde op dinsdag 22-09-2015 om 10:25:08 YPG not a terrorist organization for US, spokesman says http://t.co/Yy227nFlul http://t.co/ggjVFgpqKy reageer retweet

quote:

Iran’s embassy in the Mezze district of Damascus is a striking-looking building – the facade covered in elaborately decorated turquoise tiles that would look at home in Isfahan or Tabriz. Its roof bristles with communications antennae and it is guarded by machine-gun-toting security men and a high, earth-filled blast barrier that juts awkwardly into the busy main road outside.

The embassy is the most visible sign of the Islamic Republic’s presence in Syria. Its economic, political and military backing for President Bashar al-Assad has been crucial for the last four-and-a-half years. And it looks like becoming more so – both in shaping events on the ground and, perhaps, in international efforts to end the conflict. “The Syrian regime is increasingly dependent on Iran,” says a senior western diplomat. “Its footprint is growing.”

Iran’s fundamental view of the crisis, ambassador Mohammed Reza Shaybani explains in his elegant third-floor office, is that foreigners must not intervene. “We have to respect Syria’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he told the Guardian. “Iran does not interfere in Syrian domestic affairs. Our relations are historical and strategic. Our role is limited to consultation with the Syrian government for the sake of combating terrorism.”

Shaybani, urbane and articulate in both Arabic and English, is keen to emphasise Tehran’s constructive posture in the wake of July’s landmark nuclear agreement – its ticket to international respectability after of years of sanctions and isolation.

“We provide advice to the Syrian government and the Syrian army,” he says. “It is natural that that requires us to see reality on the ground. The military advisers need to have a clear understanding of the situation on the battlefield. That does not mean that we have a lot of troops in Syria; we do not have a direct role in the fighting.”

Hard facts are elusive, but most analysts agree that Iran’s direct military presence is indeed fairly modest. It is led by the elite Quds force of the Islamic revolutionary guards corps (IRGC) and thought to number in the hundreds. Still, dozens of its men, including at least seven senior officers, have been killed in Syria since 2012. Iran also works with Hezbollah, its close Lebanese Shia ally, and with units of Shia fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. General Qassem Suleimani, the famous Quds force commander, visited the Idlib area in June amid talks of a counter-offensive against advancing anti-Assad rebels.

Outside the Damascus embassy the Iranians keep a lower profile than the Russians, who have a naval base near Latakia and a more visible role boosted by the arrival of new equipment and personnel. IRGC advisers, who are occasionally spotted near the frontlines, shun publicity. Fit-looking Iranians in civilian clothes are sometimes seen crossing the Lebanese border, handing over their passports en masse without being required to leave their vehicles – a sure sign of their discreet VIP status.

“The Iranians are there – and they are not there,” quips a Sunni businessman from Homs. “They are a ghostly presence.” Speculation about their activities is rife. But the consensus among many Syrians and foreign experts is that their role is extremely important – though very shadowy.

“We know quite a lot about what the Iranians do in specific places – we see weapons, equipment and intercepts – but we still don’t have an understanding of what they do in institutional terms,” says Emile Hokayem of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “The question is to what extent they are involved in planning and command and control.”

Iran has certainly provided a financial lifeline to Assad since the 2011 uprising, releasing billions of dollars of loans and credit for imports of oil and other commodities. Another important contribution was setting up the national defence forces (NDF), locally-based militia units outside the regular army, which have acquired a reputation for profiteering and brutality. But in recent months Iran is said to have stopped paying NDF personnel, adding to the growing strain on the Assad regime – admitted by the president in an unusually frank speech in July.

The Damascus rumour mill suggests some senior Syrian officials are unhappy with the Iranian role – but that their dependence on Tehran means they have to grin and bear it.

Relations go back to Syrian backing for the 1979 Islamic revolution – and Hafez al-Assad’s support for Iran during the grinding eight-year war with Iraq. Still, at the personal level, Russians are more comfortable allies for a relentlessly secular regime – their vodka toasts easier to stomach than the dour religiosity of the Iranians, laughs a well-connected foreign observer.

And on one view, Moscow’s increasingly active role reflects in part its own unease at Tehran’s growing influence in Syria and an effort to obtain greater leverage over Assad.

It is a measure of Tehran’s clout that Iranian officials, with Hezbollah representatives, have in recent weeks been directly conducting ceasefire negotiations over the strategic town of Zabadani, near the Lebanese border – as they did last year over the siege of Homs in central Syria. The rebel fighters in Zabadani are from Ahrar al-Sham, a big Sunni Islamist group that is backed by the Turks and is trying to appeal to western countries.

Further north, in Idlib province, its men are besieging the two Shia villages of Foua and Kafraya. The Iranians demanded a Sunni-Shia population exchange and want to resettle the Shia around the Sayyida Zeinab shrine – revered by Shia everywhere – in Damascus. To suspicious Syrians that sounds like a plan for replicating Hezbollah’s stronghold in the southern suburbs of Beirut – and making sectarian cleansing an explicit element in the war.

Faysal Itani, of the Atlantic Council, said: “Iran’s handling of the Zabadani crisis indicates a shift in its Syria strategy, in which it either negotiates on behalf of or ignores Assad and his inner circle, securing its interests directly rather than by proxy.”

Unconfirmed reports – emanating from unidentified Israeli security officials – say that the Iranians have committed “hundreds” of IRGC personnel to the battle for Zabadani.

Ordinary Syrians fret about wider Iranian influence: Damascenes gossip about land confiscated in Mezze to build a big Iranian housing project as well as a new embassy closer to the city centre; about Iranians buying up prime real estate, often anonymously. Last year 35% of all Syrian imports came from Iran. Now many government tenders are open only to Iranians.

“Syria has been sold to the Iranians,” complains a resident of one of the capital’s better neighbourhoods. “They control everything.” Prejudice and paranoia make for a toxic argument that is promoted energetically by the Syrian opposition. Some even describe Syria as “Iranian-occupied” – a wild exaggeration.

Still, even some Assad loyalists are clearly worried. “Iranians could really control everything because they hold all the keys,” says a respected lawyer, insisting on anonymity. “But they would be in direct conflict with the Saudis and the Americans and the international community if they were more overt. So they apply pressure quietly and acquire more cards to play. But yes, they have their own people here.”

Members of Syria’s small Shia Muslim community – as distinct from the Assad family’s Alawite sect – warn that it is important to distinguish between Iran’s national and strategic interests and its role as the spiritual centre of the Shia faith. But the distinction feels lost in al-Ameen, the Shia quarter of the old city of Damascus – whose alleyways are plastered with posters commemorating the dead of fighting units with resonant religious names like Fatemiyoun, Zaynabiyoun or the Sayyida Ruqayya Martyrs Brigade.

Alarm about a Shia Ashoura procession at the (Sunni) Umayyad Mosque is overblown, insists Shia journalist Maher Ashqar, but he admits ruefully that sectarian tensions are rising. “Iran’s role in Syria is important and growing, but it is exaggerated. Syrians are suspicious of it – but they are also suspicious of al-Qaida. Iran does have a national agenda but many here believe it is helping the Shia.”

The Iranians radiate growing confidence internationally but they will not persuade anti-Assad Syrians of their good intentions or the sincerity of their professed belief in non-intervention. “The more the Iranians speak about Syria’s sovereignty the more they violate it,” argues Ibrahim Hamidi, a highly-regarded Syrian journalist with the London-based al-Hayat newspaper. “The more they talk about national identity the more they promote sub-identities. The more they talk about fighting Isis, the more they provoke it. Whatever the Iranians say, they do the opposite. The Iranians are trying to play the same role in Syria as Syria used to play in Lebanon: they create their own clients and they hold the balance between different centres of power. Now the Iranians are trying to create their own parallel regime – with their militias, businessmen and properties, and social engineering.”

Still, Iran does not always get its way. It was, for example, prepared to release prisoners in the Zabadani talks but that was apparently vetoed by the Syrians. Its recent four-point peace plan, put forward by Javad Zarif, the foreign minister and hero of the marathon nuclear negotiations, was also rejected by Damascus because it called for internationally supervised elections – something Assad was not prepared to contemplate. “The Iranians are playing a key role, even a vital one,” says Hokayem of the IISS, “but they are not calling the shots.”

Ambassador Shaybani offers no detail of what Tehran will propose if diplomacy does gather momentum. But on one point he is crystal clear: “Bashar al-Assad is the choice of the Syrian people and it is up to them to elect who they wish. No one has the right to say that he must leave: the Libyan experience shows what happens after the volcano that erupted when Gaddafi was removed. In the current situation there can be no replacement until terrorism has been defeated in Syria.”

quote:

Op dinsdag 22 september 2015 15:50 schreef Mani89 het volgende:

twitter:

HDNER twitterde op dinsdag 22-09-2015 om 10:25:08 YPG not a terrorist organization for US, spokesman says http://t.co/Yy227nFlul http://t.co/ggjVFgpqKy reageer retweet