This chapter has sought to respond to the dilemma inherent in the provision of
humanitarian aid in complex emergencies in general and more specifically
regarding Angola. As the attempt to interrogate the political use of aid as part of
peace-building initiatives has illustrated, there are no quick or easy answers to
these challenges. The issues are complex and demand a differentiated approach,
which takes particular conflict structures and situations into account.
In Angola, thus far, neither humanitarian actors nor donors have questioned
their policies, not even under wider aspects of primum non-nocere. This may be
explained by the belief that Angola’s civil conflict is not perceived as a war where
humanitarian aid fuels the war economy. Both conflict participants possess other
means to grease their war machines. Over the next six years it is estimated that
the government of Angola will receive approximately US $1,4 billion to US $2,7
billion per annum from the oil industry, excluding signature bonuses or other
once-off payments.117 The resources available to UNITA through diamonds are
much less, but remain significant. Since the Angolan government is under
immense pressure from its highly indebted economy, foreign development and
humanitarian assistance organisations are welcomed to take over sectors that the
government has abandoned. Thus, one can argue that aid enhances the government’s
financial situation insofar as basic social services are taken over by aid
agencies. However, to speak of aid as an essential resource of the Angolan conflict
would be stretching the point. It remains appropriate to speak of an instrumentalisation
of aid, especially in the context of ‘negotiated access’, where
humanitarian assistance has become a bargaining chip for both sides.118
Wittingly or unwittingly, humanitarian actors have played a critical role in the
privatisation of the Angolan state and its de-linkage from society. Neither humanitarian
actors nor the donor community question the existing structures within
Angola. Humanitarian actors mainly abstain from a critical approach for security
reasons and the fear of governmental harassment. Their attitude also partly
reflects the logic of relief activities, which is derived from a natural disaster
model that pays little attention to social or political factors. The international
community placed Angola high on the donor agenda but concentrated mainly on
curing symptoms and not the underlying causes.
Undoubtedly, humanitarian assistance has saved and still saves many lives.
But, without a coordinated and sustained initiative to place the whole complexity
of Angola’s crisis within the political agenda, humanitarian assistance
remains a fig leaf covering the absence of political action.
Angola is trapped in a humanitarian tragedy that is partially caused by the war
but also has been perpetuated by a weak and dysfunctional state. These dysfunctions
cannot only be blamed on 25 years of warfare. Within any future peace-building
initiative a comprehensive and holistic approach has to be developed, tackling
the institutional weaknesses of the Angolan state. The ruling elite has to reassume
authority over the responsibilities it has divested. One of the main objectives must
134 Angola’s war economy
be to re-establish responsiveness between ruling elite and society. This is not only
fundamental for success in the humanitarian and developmental fields but also for
envisaged processes of peace and democratisation in the future. As the former US
President Dwight D. Eisenhower noted, “Food can be a powerful instrument for all
the free world in building a durable peace”. But one has to address causes and not
only symptoms.