Oorlog in Oekraïne #1308 RIP schaduw vloot en De Krim

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:08 schreef TLC het volgende:
De "verkiezingen" komen er weer aan !

https://nos.nl/artikel/26(...)op-naar-verkiezingen

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:22 schreef RotatoR het volgende:

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Schijnt dat er na de verkiezingen een grote mobilisatie van kannonenvoer komt.

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Op zondag 12 juli 2026 23:16 schreef skysherrif het volgende:
Als Zelensky het waagt Fedorov te vervangen word ik net zo anti zelensky als de gemiddelde pro Rus.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:33 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:33 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:37 schreef vul_maar_in het volgende:
Reeds geplaatst en netjes vertaald. Wij lezen geen Cyrillisch schrift.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:41 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Het was nochthans exact dezelfde tweet (had die van @:Skysherrif op eoa manier gemist), dus dat "Cyrillisch schrift" bezwaar lijkt me niet correct. Of ga je die van Sky nu ook verwijderen?

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:45 schreef vul_maar_in het volgende:

My bad, ik zag het dan verkeerd maar alsnog dubbel.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:33 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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edit:Niet te lezen.

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TENSIONS SIMMERED barely below the surface at a war-council meeting in early July. Ukraine’s military leaders had mostly good news for their president. Middle- and long-range drone operations were seeing continued successes. A campaign to isolate Russian-occupied Crimea was running ahead of schedule. But as Power Point slides were shown to the testosterone-filled room, the generals griped about missile and ammunition procurement. The focus of their criticism, Mykhailo Fedorov, the 35-year-old tech-savvy defence minister who is known—and occasionally mocked—for his Silicon Valley style presentations, responded in kind. If it wasn’t for his emergency drone-purchasing decisions at the beginning of the year, which required borrowing money earmarked for salaries, there would be no Crimean operation to speak of. A witness to the proceedings describes “two different co-ordinate systems” in a clinch: “No common language, even if holding back from direct conflict.”
Mr Fedorov, known to colleagues simply as “Misha”, arrived at the defence ministry in January with expectations riding high. The youngest member of Volodymyr Zelensky’s team, he came with a reputation as an effective, technologically minded reformer. As digital-transformation minister, he had implemented Diia, a highly regarded app that put state services and digital passports on smartphones. After Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, he helped drive the development of Ukraine’s “drone army,” introducing market mechanisms to boost production of everything from small battlefield drones to larger bomber and interceptor drones. To his supporters, Mr Fedorov’s presence at the defence ministry offered hope the army could be modernised—and taught to imagine victory once again.
The war is also intensely personal. A native of currently occupied lands in southern Ukraine, Mr Fedorov has relatives who were directly caught up in the fighting. Before his appointment, he was almost alone among senior officials in believing Mr Putin could and should be defeated on the battlefield. He was convinced he could reform the hardware of war in the same way he had reformed software of the government. The generals were, however, always far less certain.
His first six months in the job were characterised by hyperactivity and a pugnacity that put many noses out of joint. From the start, he ordered an audit of the defence ministry and army brigades that uncovered overspending of 300bn-hyrivna ($6.6bn). He subjected ministry officials to lie detectors; those who refused or failed were dismissed. And he moved some procurement to an open-tender system, which he says cut the cost of 155mm artillery shells by 16% almost immediately. At the same time his deep differences with the more traditionalist military leaders, especially its commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrsky, have rarely been far from view. It is widely known the minister angled for the general’s removal, but failed to win the president’s approval or find another way of doing it.
Mr Fedorov’s first big reform package only began to be implemented in June, after months of haranguing and waiting for sign-offs. On paper, it tackles the most urgent manpower problems. A new deal for frontline infantry will raise monthly pay from roughly $2,500 to $7,000 and even higher; introduce fixed contracts of six, ten, 14 and 24 months; and begin limited demobilisation for the longest-serving soldiers by the end of 2026. There will also be more money for recruiting foreigners. Most controversially, intermediary companies will receive a $7,000 signing fee for each soldier they enlist. One target is for foreigners to eventually provide 20-50% of new recruits. The estimated 300,000 Ukrainians listed as absent without leave will also be given a 100-day window in which to return to the army without punishment. Previously, those caught were forced into so-called reserve battalions, then sent to the hottest spots on the frontline where the chances of surviving were slim.
Mr Fedorov’s critics in the army accept he has improved drone procurement and digitalisation. But they argue his lack of military experience leaves him unqualified to plan a war. The more charitable say his flagship reforms amount to a “PR repackaging” of work that was already under way. The defence minister is the equivalent of a football “goalhanger”, says one senior general, seizing others’ ideas and credit when the efforts were collective. Some liken him to a modern day Robert McNamara, the late American defence secretary who discovered the managerial methods he had honed running Ford did not transfer well to the Pentagon. They criticise his gamification reforms, which, they argue, encourage battleground “kills” over less sexy but no less important operations like monitoring an important road. “To reform something you have to understand how it works,” says another Ukrainian general. “Would you really sit in an aeroplane if you saw that the pilot was a shopkeeper?”
Mr Fedorov’s team says there is always resistance, at first, to change. Andriy Hrytseniuk, head of Brave1, a government military-technology hub, has watched him from close quarters since 2019. He says the minister has always been a “dreamer” and suggests the army will eventually learn to understand him. “When we introduced the Diia app, every classical state official said it would be impossible. Now it has become an inseparable part of life.” Mr Fedorov admits that many in the army are sceptical of his plans, and says he has made some mistakes in selling his changes. A lot of work has gone on behind the scenes without huge fanfare, he continues: “Sit the generals across from me—and if they listen to me and understand what I’ve done, they’ll become my supporters.”
The minister does have followers within the armed forces, especially among younger officers and units that rely heavily on technology. Oleksandr “Flint” Nastenko, the commander of Code 9.2, one of the most effective assault units in the army, says Mr Fedorov deserves credit for shifting resources to the technology that saves soldiers’ lives. “The truth is we have grown stale and need to change.”
Yet even those sympathetic to Mr Fedorov’s intentions wonder if he will be allowed to stay in post long enough to see his ideas through. “Right now, he has the position, but he doesn’t have full political support from the president,” says Maryna Bezrukova, who was head of the armed forces’ independent procurement agency before being ousted in early 2025. A senior intelligence source says Mr Fedorov stands little chance in any serious confrontation with the generals. “Syrsky is experienced, knows the system much better than Misha, and will outfox him.” It is possible the defence minister has already picked one fight too many. On June 5th, Trukha, one of the country’s most popular social-media publications with 3m subscribers, posted a cryptic message promising an investigation into corruption in drone deals supposedly overseen by the minister. That publication has yet to materialise, but is already widely interpreted as a political attack on Mr Fedorov. He denies any wrongdoing.
Mr Fedorov’s future depends on Mr Zelensky, his political patron and a man with whom he shares a taste for brave decisions, PR and stubbornness. The two are close—the defence minister also acts as the president’s main elections manager—but that does not make his position secure. On July 12th, Mr Fedorov’s name was one of three floated for the newly vacant prime minister’s post. In usual circumstances that would count as a promotion; here it would be read as a defeat for his project. So far, the defence minister appears to have held his ground. “When I began in the job, the president told me to act according to my conscience,” Mr Fedorov said a few days before news of the potential reshuffle. “Plenty of people are yapping at me, and yes it worries me, but what can I do? I don’t want to leave this post knowing that I ever bent to suit anyone.”

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 21:01 schreef skysherrif het volgende:
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Zelensky eyes replacing Defense Minister Fedorov, source says

President Volodymyr Zelensky is considering replacing Mykhailo Fedorov as defense minister, a senior Ukrainian official familiar with the matter told the Kyiv Independent.

It is unclear whether Fedorov will get a new position within the Ukrainian government or who would replace him as defense minister.

"Fedorov and the President spoke alone; no one else heard them: That's why I don't know, and neither do the others," one Ukrainian official said.

Fedorov is viewed as one of the most trusted political figures in Ukraine, according to recent polling. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll conducted in May 2026 found 50% of respondents trust Fedorov, while 21% did not.

A decision to replace a popular figure widely seen as competent would likely prove controversial with both Ukrainian politicians and wider Ukrainian society.

"Fedorov hasn't even been in office for a year. He's not the worst defense minister. At least he's not just a money-grabber," one Ukrainian lawmaker from Zelensky's Servant of the People faction told the Kyiv Independent, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Fedorov's office declined to comment.

Fedorov's advisor, well-known Ukrainian influencer and fundraiser Serhii Sternenko, claimed that Fedorov was subjected to "information attacks" on Telegram after he confronted corrupt practices in the Defense Ministry.

"You can't even imagine what streams of funding have been cut off," Sternenko wrote in a post on X. "These offended passengers have networks of (Telegram) channels, influence in parliament and more. So you'll see a lot more dirt."

Fedorov’s wins and losses

A relatively young and popular figure in the Ukrainian government, Fedorov previously served as a deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation from 2019 to March 2023. On March 21, his brief was expanded to deputy prime minister for innovation, education, science, and technology, and on July 17, 2025, he was again promoted to first deputy prime minister, a title he held until he was tapped for the role of defense minister.

Fedorov's appointment as defense minister drew rare support from both Zelensky's party and the opposition. Some lawmakers from the opposition European Solidarity party previously described him as one of the few officials in Zelensky's team who maintained regular contact with the opposition.

If he maintains a seat in government, his reappointment, however, may face obstacles. One opposition lawmaker said Fedorov "stopped responding to lawmakers' messages" after taking office.

"It angered a lot of people," they told the Kyiv Independent. "The broader issue, I think, is that (Fedorov) has dragged out the mobilization reform for too long. And there is still no clarity on it."

"Lawmakers have very different expectations. Some want mobilization to stop, while others want fixed service terms and troop rotations. But it's simply impossible to deliver all of that at the same time."

On July 10, one parliamentary faction received a letter from Fedorov asking lawmakers to submit their proposals on mobilization.

"It seems he realized at some point that he needed to engage. The question is whether it's too late," the lawmaker said.

Despite the seemingly strained relations with some in parliament, Fedorov's efforts within the last six months have been praised by observers and military experts.

Shortly after he began his tenure, he successfully persuaded SpaceX CEO Elon Musk to deny Russia usage of the highly effective Starlink satellite communications system in February 2026.

Musk had originally activated the system in response to a direct request from Fedorov in February 2022, and the two had maintained a congenial relationship in the following years.

Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Rob Lee, described the Russian near-total loss of Starlink as "truly game changing" in comments to the Kyiv Independent in May, saying that the loss was incredibly damaging, both for Russian command and control and for their ability to operate long-range strike drones.

More recently, Fedorov launched Ukraine's "logistics lockdown" campaign on May 27, a highly effective operation targeting Russian logistics vehicles with loitering munitions and medium-range drones.

Fedorov also launched a series of controversial military reforms in June, which received a mixed response from both serving members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, veterans' groups, and civil society.

His tenure was also marred by conflict with Ukraine's controversial Commander-in-Chief, General Oleksandr Syrskyi.

Yuriy Hudymenko, a prominent veteran and head of the Public Anti-Corruption Council at the Defense Ministry, told NV news outlet the two men approach problems from "fundamentally different perspectives" in an interview on June 17.

"This is a conflict between a young technocrat and a general from a largely post-Soviet military school," Hudymenko said.

Figures close to Fedorov, such as Sternenko, heavily criticized parts of the Ukrainian military under Syrskyi's direct command, particularly the notorious 425th Assault Regiment, more commonly known by their nickname, "Skala," for engaging in unsophisticated "meat wave" style assaults which routinely result in extremely high casualties.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:25 schreef RotatoR het volgende:
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Oekraïne heeft straks Rafales, Gripens en F16's.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 21:07 schreef nietzman het volgende:

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En Mirage 2000 hebben ze ook al vliegen. Naast de oude Migs en Sukhois natuurlijk. Je kunt je afvragen hoe efficiënt het is om zoveel verschillende types te opereren maar hopelijk maken ze er het meeste van.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 21:04 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Zaluzhnyi had moeten blijven zitten, die was een stuk vooruitstrevender.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 21:05 schreef AchJa het volgende:

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Kyiv Independent

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155th Brigade Commander in Hiding After His Soldiers Are Detained on Suspicion of Kidnapping

The commander of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, Stanislav Luchanov, is being sought after several of his soldiers were detained on suspicion of kidnapping two civilian men from the Kyiv region.

This was reported to hromadske by two sources within Ukraine's Defense Forces and one source in law enforcement.

On the night of June 27–28, seven individuals reportedly entered the property of two brothers in the Kyiv region and took them to an unknown location.

Relatives of the missing men told hromadske that their whereabouts remain unknown.

The press service of the Kyiv Regional Police declined to comment on the investigation when contacted by hromadske.

According to hromadske's own law enforcement sources, police detained nine soldiers from the brigade on suspicion of kidnapping. Among those detained is a battalion commander from the 155th Brigade.

Luchanov took command of the 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade in February 2026. Before that, he served as chief of staff of the 425th Assault Regiment "Skelia."

In May, a video circulated on social media showing a soldier from the 155th Brigade beating another serviceman, who was sitting on the ground with his hands tied behind his back. Luchanov denied any involvement in the incident and said he condemned the assault.

Luchanov did not answer hromadske's phone calls.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 21:44 schreef skysherrif het volgende:
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President Donald Trump will support the passage of a bipartisan Russia sanctions package that was spearheaded by the late Sen. Lindsey Graham, a White House official told CNN on Monday.

The endorsement comes days after Graham’s unexpected death, likely further smoothing the path for a bill that the South Carolina senator spent years working to push across the finish line.

Graham and Democratic Sen. Richard Blumenthal previously indicated the administration was prepared to back the package, saying Friday that they reached an agreement following extensive negotiations. Yet it was unclear at the time whether Trump would directly support the bill, as the president had repeatedly panned the legislation and pushed for more direct discretion on imposing sanctions.

Senate Majority Leader John Thune earlier on Monday said the White House had been working closely with Graham on the measure, telling CNN that he has hopeful.

“It’ll take Democrats and Republicans here in the Senate to do that, but I’m hopeful we can make it happen,” he said.

Thune said that in Graham’s last days, the sanctions package was “the thing that he cared the most about in terms of an accomplishment, and it would certainly be an incredible legacy for him.”

ADVERTENTIE

In a separate interview, Blumenthal told CNN that he planned to speak with Thune on Monday afternoon about the final preparations and timing for the bill’s passage, including finding a new Republican to take Graham’s place as its lead sponsor.

The sanctions package would clear the way for Trump to impose heavy tariffs on imports from nations that buy Russian oil, uranium and natural gas, in an effort to further weaken Moscow amid its war with Ukraine.

“It should be seen as a fitting tribute to Sen. Graham to do it quickly in his memory,” Blumenthal said. “It’s exactly what we were talking about when I last spoke to him over the weekend.”

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 20:25 schreef RotatoR het volgende:
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Oekraïne heeft straks Rafales, Gripens en F16's.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 22:18 schreef skysherrif het volgende:

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Als Frankrijk serieus wil zijn in hun hulp mbt Gripens moeten ze ook technici leveren die die vloot kan onderhouden op de Oekraiense basissen.

Anders heb ik medelijden met de Oekraiense lui die Rafales, Gripens, F16s en hun eigen soviet meuk moeten onderhouden

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We zien hoe Russen bij tankstations vechten om jerrycans benzine en diesel stelen van staatsbedrijven, en we beleven er enig genoegen aan dat de straten langzaam leger worden.

Maar de grootste klap voor Rusland zal niet vallen bij personenauto's zelfs niet bij het vrachtvervoer.

De werkelijke impact, zo stelt de auteur, zal liggen bij het spoorwegnet, dat in veel afgelegen Russische regio's het belangrijkste vervoersmiddel is.
Tientallen jaren lang waren diesellocomotieven de enige betrouwbare manier om je tussen nederzettingen te verplaatsen.
Die zwart rokende dieselmotoren zullen uiteindelijk tot stilstand komen.

Ze zullen geen steenkool, brandhout of stookolie meer vervoeren, en ook geen tankwagens meer brengen die nodig zijn om tankstations te bevoorraden.
De auteur betoogt dat uitgestrekte gebieden; waaronder Siberië, het Russische noorden en het Verre Oosten ; nauwelijks zijn aangesloten op aardgasnetwerken en sterk afhankelijk zijn van duizenden diesellocomotieven.
Zonder deze treinen zouden er geen verwarming, geen elektriciteit en geen betrouwbare aanvoer van essentiële goederen zijn.
Er is nog een probleem, dat vooral bekend is bij werknemers in de energiesector in afgelegen Russische nederzettingen: dieselcentrales.
Veel kleine steden, dorpen, gehuchten en zelfs militaire nederzettingen zijn voor hun elektriciteit afhankelijk van generatoren op diesel.
Jaren geleden werd dit beschouwd als de eenvoudigste en goedkoopste oplossing.
De auteur wijst ook op de strenge Russische winters, waarin extreme vorst gepaard gaat met zware sneeuwval die voortdurende sneeuwruiming vereist.
Het vermogen om dit te blijven doen hangt af van de opbouw van aanzienlijke brandstofreserves, die normaal gesproken tegen augustus zijn aangelegd.
Volgens de auteur zijn die reserves echter uitgeput om brandstoftekorten bij tankstations op te vangen.

De vele werknemers in de Russische olie- en gasindustrie, zo stelt de auteur, zouden zelf zonder verwarming, elektriciteit of werk kunnen komen te zitten, omdat veel van hun materieel niet op ruwe olie draait, maar op diesel – en in sommige gevallen op benzine.

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 22:18 schreef skysherrif het volgende:

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Als Frankrijk serieus wil zijn in hun hulp mbt Rafales** moeten ze ook technici leveren die die vloot kan onderhouden op de Oekraiense basissen.

Anders heb ik medelijden met de Oekraiense lui die Rafales, Gripens, F16s en hun eigen soviet meuk moeten onderhouden

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Op maandag 13 juli 2026 23:23 schreef michaelmoore het volgende:
https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1C8fgj6cuA/
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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 01:55 schreef Parafernalia het volgende:

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Klinkt te mooi om waar te zijn

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Rusland plaatst verffabrieken AkzoNobel onder staatstoezicht
Rusland heeft de Russische divisie van de Nederlandse verffabrikant AkzoNobel onder staatstoezicht gesteld. Het zou gaan om "tijdelijk toezicht" geplaatst, meldt AkzoNobel.

Dat betekent volgens de verffabrikant dat de fabrieken worden bestuurd door een entiteit van de Russische overheid. Dit zou niet betekenen dat AkzoNobel in Rusland wordt genationaliseerd. Maar tot nu toe blijken onder staatstoezicht gestelde buitenlandse bedrijven niet te worden teruggegeven.

AkzoNobel zegt het presidentiële decreet te bestuderen om een inschatting te kunnen maken van de gevolgen.
https://nos.nl/artikel/26(...)onder-staatstoezicht

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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 10:14 schreef ExTec het volgende:
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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 11:28 schreef BennieButtfuck het volgende:

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Wat mij betreft vandaag nog naar z'n mallemoer ermee.

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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 11:33 schreef over_hedge het volgende:
zitten die dingen niet meters onder de grond en is het nog niet zo makkelijk om die uit te schakelen

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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 11:37 schreef ExTec het volgende:

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Nee, je kunt ze zien op google maps.

Dat gezegd is makkelijk om je erop te verkijken. Op het kaartje ziet het er leuk als een mooi kruispunt uit, rijp voor een flamingo.

Totdat je je de schaal realiseert.

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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 11:38 schreef over_hedge het volgende:

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ah oke. Ik heb geen idee.

Maar heb met dit soort dingen vaak het idee van: Als het echt zo makkelijk was, dan had Oekraïne dat wel gedaan.

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Iedere Rus die schaakt, weet dat er een bepaald moment in het spel komt waarop je weet dat je verloren hebt en je je koning omdraait.

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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 11:28 schreef BennieButtfuck het volgende:

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Wat mij betreft vandaag nog naar z'n mallemoer ermee.

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Op dinsdag 14 juli 2026 10:14 schreef ExTec het volgende:
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