Oorlog in Oekra�ne #815 The Big Bang?

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 13:25 schreef Hyperdude het volgende:

[..]
Trap er niet in.
[..]
https://tass.com/economy/1642853

Je weet dat het ernstig is als het Kremlin het tegenovergestelde beweert.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 13:25 schreef Hyperdude het volgende:

[..]
Trap er niet in.
[..]
https://tass.com/economy/1642853

Het kremlin zegt het.

Nou, dat moet het natuurlijk wel waar zijn!

Die smerige Engelssprekende rat van een Dmitry Peskov voert overigens overal het woord over namens het Kremlin.

Hopelijk voert ie binnenkort 'ns het woord over open ramen.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 13:25 schreef Hyperdude het volgende:

[..]
Trap er niet in.
[..]
https://tass.com/economy/1642853

Ik weet zeker dat die 0,6% GDP niet gecorrigeerd is voor inflatie.

https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)ier_commits_suicide/
Another abandoned Russian soldier commits suicide, location and date unknown

Russen trainen het aanleggen van een tourniquet met plastic zakken over hun hoofd

https://old.reddit.com/r/(...)_apply_a_tourniquet/

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 13:41 schreef slashdotter3 het volgende:
https://www.reddit.com/r/(...)ier_commits_suicide/
Another abandoned Russian soldier commits suicide, location and date unknown

Mist hij nou de eerste 3 schoten? Wat een pure ellende deze oorlog, man man.

Zelfs de orcs die het opnemen vinden het oude rommel.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 14:09 schreef ExTec het volgende:
Zelfs de orcs die het opnemen vinden het oude rommel.

[ twitter ]

Zo oud als mammoetstront, een mooie opmerking.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 07:21 schreef Starhopper het volgende:

[..]
Dat was ook het eerste wat ik dacht. Maar bij de Russen kan je alles verwachten Dat de Russen hun lijken samenpersen in een kuubskist vind ik niet eens zo ongeloofwaardig

Nja je haalt er niks meer herkenbaars uit.

Heb fotos en memes van dit blokje in een Russische telegram groep gepleurt met de opmerking.

Blijf thuis, Poetin geeft niks om jullie..
Als je dood gaat eindig je als rubix cubus.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 14:09 schreef ExTec het volgende:
Zelfs de orcs die het opnemen vinden het oude rommel.

[ twitter ]

Ik herken die dingen geen eens welk model is dat?

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 14:19 schreef theguyver het volgende:

[..]
Ik herken die dingen geen eens welk model is dat?

T-54 of T-55?

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 14:31 schreef Ulx het volgende:

[..]
T-54/55

Oekra�ne had er een van tijdens de start van de oorlog nu zijn er meen ik 3 werkzaam.

Ziet er akelig uit voor die overlevende

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 15:22 schreef Slayage het volgende:
Ziet er akelig uit voor die overlevende [ twitter ]

Zeer tijdelijk overlevende zo te zien.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 15:22 schreef Slayage het volgende:
Ziet er akelig uit voor die overlevende [ twitter ]

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 14:09 schreef ExTec het volgende:
Zelfs de orcs die het opnemen vinden het oude rommel.

[ twitter ]

Dit zijn niet eens meer WW2 tanks

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 15:41 schreef Ulx het volgende:

[..]
Ontworpen in 1946.

Ik heb het even opgezocht, maar ik zou echt bij god niet weten welke tanks hier voorbij komen.

Heb een spotters guide nodig.

Deze oorlog is de natte droom van iedere jaren 80 republikein in de VS en de huidige garde MAGAs zijn pro-Rusland. Bizar.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 15:41 schreef Ulx het volgende:

[..]
Ontworpen in 1946.

Toen was WW2 al over, dus het zijn idd geen WW2 tanks

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 15:48 schreef Harmankardon het volgende:
Deze oorlog is de natte droom van iedere jaren 80 republikein in de VS en de huidige garde MAGAs zijn pro-Rusland. Bizar.

Haha inderdaad 🤣

https://nos.nl/artikel/24(...)oodsoorzaak-onbekend

'plotseling gestorven'

Andere ministers van het kabinet Loek die hem voorgingen in het 'plotseling overlijden' waren 65 en 43 jaar, en nog allemaal in kort tijdsbestek ook.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 16:30 schreef TLC het volgende:
https://nos.nl/artikel/24(...)oodsoorzaak-onbekend

'plotseling gestorven'

Andere ministers van het kabinet Loek die hem voorgingen in het 'plotseling overlijden' waren 65 en 43 jaar, en nog allemaal in kort tijdsbestek ook.

Blijft toch lastig de vinger te leggen op wie wel en wie niet wordt omgelegd, of beter gezegd; waarom wel en waarom niet.

Er informatief stuk: https://www.ft.com/content/c5ce76df-9b1b-4dfc-a619-07da1d40cbd3

quote:

Xi Jinping warned Vladimir Putin against nuclear attack in Ukraine
Chinese officials privately take credit for convincing Russian leader to back down from veiled atomic threats

Deterring Putin from using such a weapon has been central to China’s campaign to repair damaged ties with Europe, said a senior adviser to the Chinese government. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has placed Moscow and its ally Beijing at odds with much of the continent.

Putin was left disappointed after Xi’s visit failed to yield any tangible wins for Russia, such as approval for the long-awaited Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, western security officials said. The condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons in their joint communiqu� was almost certainly added at China’s behest, the officials added.

But the war is threatening to scupper China’s efforts to drive a wedge between Europe and the US, according to the senior Chinese government adviser.

A Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine or one of its European allies would risk turning the continent against China, the adviser said, while sustained pressure from Beijing to prevent such an act might help improve relations with the continent.

Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said that “Russia has never and will never have China’s approval for using nuclear weapons”. If Russia used nuclear weapons against Ukraine, “China will further distance itself from Russia”, he added.

The US, UK, and France, Nato’s three nuclear powers, told the Kremlin they would strike its forces with conventional weapons if it used tactical nuclear arms. In the wake of the warnings, Putin abandoned his rhetoric and did not mention tactical nuclear weapons publicly for several months.

Ik neem toch aan dat als die nucleaire installatie vannacht gepland de lucht in gaat dat er vandaag wel vanuit de US nog wat publieke waarschuwingen zouden komen aan het adres van Rusland

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 16:35 schreef Ronald-Koeman het volgende:

[..]
Blijft toch lastig de vinger te leggen op wie wel en wie niet wordt omgelegd, of beter gezegd; waarom wel en waarom niet.

Deze had kritiek geuit op Putin's oorlog in Oekraine stond in een tweet eerder vandaag hier.

Ivan Timofeev: Why Russians increasingly believe the West wants to destroy their country
Published: 5 Jul 2023 | 14:54 GMT
There will be no going back to the pre-2022 state of affairs. The US-led bloc has pushed Moscow too far

Ivan Timofeev: Why Russians increasingly believe the West wants to destroy their country
� Getty Images/Pavel_Chag
By Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club Programme Director & one of Russia’s leading foreign policy experts.

There is an increasingly widespread view in Russia that the goal of the US – and the "collective West" it leads – is to achieve a “final solution” to the "Russian question." The goals are believed to be defeating Russia, wrecking its military potential, restructuring its statehood, reshaping its identity and possibly eliminating it as a state, in its current form.

For a long time, this view remained on the periphery of foreign policy thinking. However, much has changed in the past year and a half. Today, this perception of the West's goals has gone mainstream. Indeed, it seems quite rational, when placed into the proper context.

Meanwhile, Russia itself is pursuing a similar sort of policy towards the Ukrainian state, the existence of which in its former form and borders is perceived in Moscow as a key security challenge.

The historical experience of the last century shows that inflicting total defeat on an enemy and then rebuilding its statehood is the rule rather than the exception in foreign policy practice. There is an important difference to the conflicts of the 18th and 19th centuries, when military defeat of the enemy was seen as a way of extracting concessions from it, but not of rebuilding its very foundations.

What caused the Wagner mutiny and what does it mean for Russia and its opponents?READ MORE What caused the Wagner mutiny and what does it mean for Russia and its opponents?
The experiences of the 20th and 21st centuries are not always linear, but their repetition is obvious. Germany's defeat in the First World War led to a palpable reshaping of its statehood, determined more by internal contradictions, which grew from the military loss.

Germany’s surrender after the Second World War had far more radical consequences. The country was divided, stripped of its foreign policy autonomy and almost completely rebuilt. Military defeat and subsequent occupation also led to the reformatting of the other large powers, Japan and Italy. The Soviet Union, as a victorious country, was a key player in resolving the "German question." The USSR was also active in establishing socialist regimes in countries liberated from the Nazi occupation.

The subsequent Cold War made this redrawing more difficult. Every attempt was met with resistance from the West. Sometimes the battle ended in a draw, as in Korea. Sometimes the Soviet Union got the upper hand – it helped to inflict a painful defeat on the US in Vietnam, for example. In other situations, the US was successful, for example in supporting anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave Washington a free hand. Despite Moscow’s rhetoric that the Cold War had ended in victory for both sides, the reality was different.

Many of the former socialist countries were quickly integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures with the active help of new local elites and broad public support. Russia itself loudly proclaimed a desire to return to the 'civilized world.' The US-led collective West was given carte blanche to reshape a vast area, which they not unreasonably saw as a result of their bloodless victory over the Soviet Union.

SCO nations adopt New Delhi Declaration, with focus on multilateralism and fighting terrorREAD MORE SCO nations adopt New Delhi Declaration, with focus on multilateralism and fighting terror
In the absence of a counterweight, the US carried out several military interventions, which also resulted in a complete restructuring of the target states. Yugoslavia fell apart. Iraq was occupied, its leader executed and its system of government transformed. There were also failures. In Afghanistan, a quick victory turned into a stubborn guerrilla war and subsequent humiliating withdrawal. A military intervention in Iran did not take place, although it was planned. North Korea became a nuclear power, dramatically reducing the likelihood of external invasion. Successful US interventions provoked Moscow's displeasure, but this did not translate into real action until a certain point. Domestically, large-scale Western investment, close humanitarian cooperation and Russian society's interest in the West were encouraged, or at least not condemned, until the late 2010s.

At the same time, two trends led to sustained and growing irritation from the Russian authorities. The first was the increasingly visible attempts by Western countries to bypass the state and engage in direct dialogue with the Russian public. This paradigm pitted a "good" civil society against a "bad" government. Moscow's growing and understandable annoyance was triggered by the notion that Russia had a "regime." It hinted, or even directly stated, that the West somehow contrasted civil society with the government and did not see them as part of the same political community. The more conscious and demonstrative this approach was on the part of Western states, the more it was resisted in Moscow.

In the West, such an approach was attributed to the perceived shortcomings of democracy in Russia, which only added to the irritation.

Love triangles aren’t an option: Can Russia and India stay friendly without upsetting their Chinese and American partners?READ MORE Love triangles aren’t an option: Can Russia and India stay friendly without upsetting their Chinese and American partners?
The Russian authorities clearly did not want to depend on external assessments of their state-building. All the more so as the denominator of such assessments was increasingly set not only by the mature democracies, but also by the Eastern European and Baltic countries with their bouquet of historical grievances and complexes. The experience of 'color revolutions' in the post-Soviet space only reinforced Moscow's fears. In Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, public protests received full moral, political and even material support from Western countries, while the authorities were often demonized.

Revolutionary changes of power, even for the sake of democratization and development, were legitimately perceived in Moscow as a challenge. There was a strong consensus within the Russian elite that state-building should and could only take place through its own efforts. Any form of outside involvement was unacceptable. This consensus began to take shape in the mid-1990s, and by the end of Vladimir Putin's first term it had become a clear policy point.

The second trend that had a significant impact on changing Russian attitudes was related to US and EU policy in the post-Soviet space. Russia has swallowed the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into Western structures, probably seeing them as toxic assets for itself. Contrary to the common stereotype in the West, which ascribes to Moscow a desire to recreate the USSR, the real goals were far from imperial ambitions.

Russia was not interested in taking on another huge imperial burden, feeding local elites and buying the loyalty of the population. It was quite happy with the neutrality of the former Soviet republics and even with cooperation with the US in the post-Soviet space, provided that such cooperation was on an equal footing. In the early 2000s, Moscow did not object to the American military presence in Central Asia and then helped supply the Western grouping in Afghanistan for a long time. But Moscow was categorically uncomfortable with the prospect of Western projects without Russian participation. Against the background of Vladimir Putin's active diplomacy to build constructive relations with the US and the EU on all fronts, the hope remained that the area of the ex-USSR would remain a neutral field of cooperation.

“People came up to me crying and said, ‘we have nothing’”: LPR residents on the horrors of wartimeREAD MORE “People came up to me crying and said, ‘we have nothing’”: LPR residents on the horrors of wartime
But it gradually became clear that there would be less and less inclusiveness towards Russia. The aforementioned 'color revolutions' were yet another wake-up call. The growing concerns of the Russian leadership were discussed, but each time they were politely dismissed by Western partners. Apparently, the West simply did not see the need to take Russia's interests into account. After the 1990s collapse of the economy, a massive brain drain, a series of internal conflicts, rampant crime, corruption, capital flight, the transition – which had begun under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev – to the status of a commodity appendage, a falling birth rate, alcoholism and an excessively high death rate, Russia was hardly perceived as a serious contender.

The local interests of some post-Soviet elites, who gained political capital by selling the "Russian threat" to the West, also played a role.

Underestimating the Russian leadership's will to restore statehood and avoid a zero-sum game in the post-Soviet space was a major miscalculation. With each new crisis, the West failed to take into account the real possibility of worst-case scenarios in which Russia would assert its interests by force, leading to a counteroffensive against attempts to reformat the post-Soviet states. The first serious crisis was the five-day war with Georgia, in which the Russian side not only responded violently to an attack on a peacekeeping contingent, but also recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The West had the foresight to realize the Georgian leadership had made major mistakes and to defuse the crisis with Russia. But the price was the precedent of a de facto revision of borders.

Moscow quickly responded to another Ukrainian revolution in 2013-2014 with the "Crimean Spring," and then with support for the resistance in Donbass. The Minsk agreements left open the possibility of a relatively easy solution to the crisis. However, Russia's tough and decisive line had already caused alarm in the West.

Zelensky's zugzwang: Ukraine's ‘blitzkrieg’ strategy has failed, so where does that leave its much-hyped counteroffensive?READ MORE Zelensky's zugzwang: Ukraine's ‘blitzkrieg’ strategy has failed, so where does that leave its much-hyped counteroffensive?
As a result, the US-led bloc chose a path of containment and opposition to Moscow. Western-Russian relations in the post-Soviet space, and in Ukraine in particular, finally turned into a full-on rivalry, and the Minsk agreements were later openly described by some Western leaders as having been merely a maneuver to prepare for a new fight. Russian support for the Syrian government has shown that Moscow is willing to obstruct 'social engineering' outside the post-Soviet space as well.

Despite the expectation of a new crisis, the scenario of a full-scale military operation against Ukraine was considered unlikely by many, including in Russia itself. Moscow was deeply embedded in the Western-oriented global economy. Trade interdependence with the EU remained high. There was no rejection of Western values in Russia, although certain social phenomena and movements were criticized as an affront to traditional values. For Moscow, the key issue remained the security of its western borders. Apparently, the Russian authorities assumed the inevitability of a gradual militarization of both Ukraine and NATO's eastern flank, followed by a military crisis at an inconvenient moment. Neo-Nazism in Ukraine was not widespread and did not enjoy widespread popular support, but the Kiev authorities' tolerance of radical movements was strongly resented in Russia.

The decision to launch a pre-emptive military operation was a turning point that radically raised the stakes of the rivalry. The ensuing military conflict has largely undone the legacy of the post-Soviet period.

Sergey Karaganov: Here’s why Russia has to consider launching a nuclear strike on Western Europe READ MORE Sergey Karaganov: Here’s why Russia has to consider launching a nuclear strike on Western Europe
There will be no return to the reality of 2021. It is clear that Russia will do everything it can to protect the new territorial status quo and to undermine Ukraine's military potential as much as possible. It is also clear that the West will do everything it can to undermine Russia and, if the circumstances are right, will also use any internal problems to its advantage.

The question remains as to how the current crisis will end.

There is currently no political solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in sight. The sustainability of any peace agreement, even if reached, is highly questionable. The West fears an abrupt military escalation and a war with Russia that could quickly turn into a nuclear exchange. However, NATO's gradual direct military involvement in the conflict cannot be ruled out.

The prospect of domestic unrest in Russia is widely discussed in Western media and analyzed. So far, such views have clearly not been reflected in official positions. But the transition from musings in the analysts’ community and populist statements by individual politicians to an official position may only be a matter of time. Turmoil in a major nuclear power carries great risks. But in the West they may be perceived as less serious than a direct military confrontation. Meanwhile, an internal political explosion could put Russia out of business for a long time and force it to try to reformat its entire system. In such a development, the preservation of Russia's statehood and sovereignty will once again become the main stakes of any conflict.

Ukraine's statehood is also at stake. It is very likely to emerge from the current crisis with diminished capacity, truncated borders and total dependence on external forces.

The US is in a better position. It has been able to discipline its allies against the backdrop of the crisis and does have risks to its own status. However, it has already entered into a rivalry with China and finds itself in a situation of double deterrence. A Russian victory in Ukraine, together a strengthening of relations between Moscow and Beijing, would be a major strategic challenge for the US.

Bron: RT

Grappig is, dat het westen Rusland nu graag kapot ziet gaan.

Nog niet zo lang geleden was het enige wat boeiend was aan Rusland hun dashboard filmpjes.

quote:

Overzicht Nederlandse steun

Nederland heeft Oekra�ne tot nu toe voor zo'n 1,9 miljard euro aan militaire steun gegeven. Minister Ollongren van Defensie meldt aan de Tweede Kamer dat het onder meer gaat om wapens, munitie, voertuigen, bruggen, brandstoffen, medische goederen en uitrusting om mijnen op te ruimen.

De Europese Vredesfaciliteit, een fonds van de Europese Unie om operaties en steunmaatregelen te financieren, compenseert een deel van de kosten.

In de Kamerbrief van Ollongren staat een overzicht van welke systemen zijn geleverd, in welke aantallen en welke waarde die hebben.

NOS

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:03 schreef theguyver het volgende:
Ivan Timofeev: Why Russians increasingly believe the West wants to destroy their country
Published: 5 Jul 2023 | 14:54 GMT
There will be no going back to the pre-2022 state of affairs. The US-led bloc has pushed Moscow too far

Ivan Timofeev: Why Russians increasingly believe the West wants to destroy their country
� Getty Images/Pavel_Chag
By Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club Programme Director & one of Russia’s leading foreign policy experts.

There is an increasingly widespread view in Russia that the goal of the US – and the "collective West" it leads – is to achieve a “final solution” to the "Russian question." The goals are believed to be defeating Russia, wrecking its military potential, restructuring its statehood, reshaping its identity and possibly eliminating it as a state, in its current form.

For a long time, this view remained on the periphery of foreign policy thinking. However, much has changed in the past year and a half. Today, this perception of the West's goals has gone mainstream. Indeed, it seems quite rational, when placed into the proper context.

Meanwhile, Russia itself is pursuing a similar sort of policy towards the Ukrainian state, the existence of which in its former form and borders is perceived in Moscow as a key security challenge.

The historical experience of the last century shows that inflicting total defeat on an enemy and then rebuilding its statehood is the rule rather than the exception in foreign policy practice. There is an important difference to the conflicts of the 18th and 19th centuries, when military defeat of the enemy was seen as a way of extracting concessions from it, but not of rebuilding its very foundations.

What caused the Wagner mutiny and what does it mean for Russia and its opponents?READ MORE What caused the Wagner mutiny and what does it mean for Russia and its opponents?
The experiences of the 20th and 21st centuries are not always linear, but their repetition is obvious. Germany's defeat in the First World War led to a palpable reshaping of its statehood, determined more by internal contradictions, which grew from the military loss.

Germany’s surrender after the Second World War had far more radical consequences. The country was divided, stripped of its foreign policy autonomy and almost completely rebuilt. Military defeat and subsequent occupation also led to the reformatting of the other large powers, Japan and Italy. The Soviet Union, as a victorious country, was a key player in resolving the "German question." The USSR was also active in establishing socialist regimes in countries liberated from the Nazi occupation.

The subsequent Cold War made this redrawing more difficult. Every attempt was met with resistance from the West. Sometimes the battle ended in a draw, as in Korea. Sometimes the Soviet Union got the upper hand – it helped to inflict a painful defeat on the US in Vietnam, for example. In other situations, the US was successful, for example in supporting anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave Washington a free hand. Despite Moscow’s rhetoric that the Cold War had ended in victory for both sides, the reality was different.

Many of the former socialist countries were quickly integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures with the active help of new local elites and broad public support. Russia itself loudly proclaimed a desire to return to the 'civilized world.' The US-led collective West was given carte blanche to reshape a vast area, which they not unreasonably saw as a result of their bloodless victory over the Soviet Union.

SCO nations adopt New Delhi Declaration, with focus on multilateralism and fighting terrorREAD MORE SCO nations adopt New Delhi Declaration, with focus on multilateralism and fighting terror
In the absence of a counterweight, the US carried out several military interventions, which also resulted in a complete restructuring of the target states. Yugoslavia fell apart. Iraq was occupied, its leader executed and its system of government transformed. There were also failures. In Afghanistan, a quick victory turned into a stubborn guerrilla war and subsequent humiliating withdrawal. A military intervention in Iran did not take place, although it was planned. North Korea became a nuclear power, dramatically reducing the likelihood of external invasion. Successful US interventions provoked Moscow's displeasure, but this did not translate into real action until a certain point. Domestically, large-scale Western investment, close humanitarian cooperation and Russian society's interest in the West were encouraged, or at least not condemned, until the late 2010s.

At the same time, two trends led to sustained and growing irritation from the Russian authorities. The first was the increasingly visible attempts by Western countries to bypass the state and engage in direct dialogue with the Russian public. This paradigm pitted a "good" civil society against a "bad" government. Moscow's growing and understandable annoyance was triggered by the notion that Russia had a "regime." It hinted, or even directly stated, that the West somehow contrasted civil society with the government and did not see them as part of the same political community. The more conscious and demonstrative this approach was on the part of Western states, the more it was resisted in Moscow.

In the West, such an approach was attributed to the perceived shortcomings of democracy in Russia, which only added to the irritation.

Love triangles aren’t an option: Can Russia and India stay friendly without upsetting their Chinese and American partners?READ MORE Love triangles aren’t an option: Can Russia and India stay friendly without upsetting their Chinese and American partners?
The Russian authorities clearly did not want to depend on external assessments of their state-building. All the more so as the denominator of such assessments was increasingly set not only by the mature democracies, but also by the Eastern European and Baltic countries with their bouquet of historical grievances and complexes. The experience of 'color revolutions' in the post-Soviet space only reinforced Moscow's fears. In Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, public protests received full moral, political and even material support from Western countries, while the authorities were often demonized.

Revolutionary changes of power, even for the sake of democratization and development, were legitimately perceived in Moscow as a challenge. There was a strong consensus within the Russian elite that state-building should and could only take place through its own efforts. Any form of outside involvement was unacceptable. This consensus began to take shape in the mid-1990s, and by the end of Vladimir Putin's first term it had become a clear policy point.

The second trend that had a significant impact on changing Russian attitudes was related to US and EU policy in the post-Soviet space. Russia has swallowed the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into Western structures, probably seeing them as toxic assets for itself. Contrary to the common stereotype in the West, which ascribes to Moscow a desire to recreate the USSR, the real goals were far from imperial ambitions.

Russia was not interested in taking on another huge imperial burden, feeding local elites and buying the loyalty of the population. It was quite happy with the neutrality of the former Soviet republics and even with cooperation with the US in the post-Soviet space, provided that such cooperation was on an equal footing. In the early 2000s, Moscow did not object to the American military presence in Central Asia and then helped supply the Western grouping in Afghanistan for a long time. But Moscow was categorically uncomfortable with the prospect of Western projects without Russian participation. Against the background of Vladimir Putin's active diplomacy to build constructive relations with the US and the EU on all fronts, the hope remained that the area of the ex-USSR would remain a neutral field of cooperation.

“People came up to me crying and said, ‘we have nothing’”: LPR residents on the horrors of wartimeREAD MORE “People came up to me crying and said, ‘we have nothing’”: LPR residents on the horrors of wartime
But it gradually became clear that there would be less and less inclusiveness towards Russia. The aforementioned 'color revolutions' were yet another wake-up call. The growing concerns of the Russian leadership were discussed, but each time they were politely dismissed by Western partners. Apparently, the West simply did not see the need to take Russia's interests into account. After the 1990s collapse of the economy, a massive brain drain, a series of internal conflicts, rampant crime, corruption, capital flight, the transition – which had begun under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev – to the status of a commodity appendage, a falling birth rate, alcoholism and an excessively high death rate, Russia was hardly perceived as a serious contender.

The local interests of some post-Soviet elites, who gained political capital by selling the "Russian threat" to the West, also played a role.

Underestimating the Russian leadership's will to restore statehood and avoid a zero-sum game in the post-Soviet space was a major miscalculation. With each new crisis, the West failed to take into account the real possibility of worst-case scenarios in which Russia would assert its interests by force, leading to a counteroffensive against attempts to reformat the post-Soviet states. The first serious crisis was the five-day war with Georgia, in which the Russian side not only responded violently to an attack on a peacekeeping contingent, but also recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The West had the foresight to realize the Georgian leadership had made major mistakes and to defuse the crisis with Russia. But the price was the precedent of a de facto revision of borders.

Moscow quickly responded to another Ukrainian revolution in 2013-2014 with the "Crimean Spring," and then with support for the resistance in Donbass. The Minsk agreements left open the possibility of a relatively easy solution to the crisis. However, Russia's tough and decisive line had already caused alarm in the West.

Zelensky's zugzwang: Ukraine's ‘blitzkrieg’ strategy has failed, so where does that leave its much-hyped counteroffensive?READ MORE Zelensky's zugzwang: Ukraine's ‘blitzkrieg’ strategy has failed, so where does that leave its much-hyped counteroffensive?
As a result, the US-led bloc chose a path of containment and opposition to Moscow. Western-Russian relations in the post-Soviet space, and in Ukraine in particular, finally turned into a full-on rivalry, and the Minsk agreements were later openly described by some Western leaders as having been merely a maneuver to prepare for a new fight. Russian support for the Syrian government has shown that Moscow is willing to obstruct 'social engineering' outside the post-Soviet space as well.

Despite the expectation of a new crisis, the scenario of a full-scale military operation against Ukraine was considered unlikely by many, including in Russia itself. Moscow was deeply embedded in the Western-oriented global economy. Trade interdependence with the EU remained high. There was no rejection of Western values in Russia, although certain social phenomena and movements were criticized as an affront to traditional values. For Moscow, the key issue remained the security of its western borders. Apparently, the Russian authorities assumed the inevitability of a gradual militarization of both Ukraine and NATO's eastern flank, followed by a military crisis at an inconvenient moment. Neo-Nazism in Ukraine was not widespread and did not enjoy widespread popular support, but the Kiev authorities' tolerance of radical movements was strongly resented in Russia.

The decision to launch a pre-emptive military operation was a turning point that radically raised the stakes of the rivalry. The ensuing military conflict has largely undone the legacy of the post-Soviet period.

Sergey Karaganov: Here’s why Russia has to consider launching a nuclear strike on Western Europe READ MORE Sergey Karaganov: Here’s why Russia has to consider launching a nuclear strike on Western Europe
There will be no return to the reality of 2021. It is clear that Russia will do everything it can to protect the new territorial status quo and to undermine Ukraine's military potential as much as possible. It is also clear that the West will do everything it can to undermine Russia and, if the circumstances are right, will also use any internal problems to its advantage.

The question remains as to how the current crisis will end.

There is currently no political solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in sight. The sustainability of any peace agreement, even if reached, is highly questionable. The West fears an abrupt military escalation and a war with Russia that could quickly turn into a nuclear exchange. However, NATO's gradual direct military involvement in the conflict cannot be ruled out.

The prospect of domestic unrest in Russia is widely discussed in Western media and analyzed. So far, such views have clearly not been reflected in official positions. But the transition from musings in the analysts’ community and populist statements by individual politicians to an official position may only be a matter of time. Turmoil in a major nuclear power carries great risks. But in the West they may be perceived as less serious than a direct military confrontation. Meanwhile, an internal political explosion could put Russia out of business for a long time and force it to try to reformat its entire system. In such a development, the preservation of Russia's statehood and sovereignty will once again become the main stakes of any conflict.

Ukraine's statehood is also at stake. It is very likely to emerge from the current crisis with diminished capacity, truncated borders and total dependence on external forces.

The US is in a better position. It has been able to discipline its allies against the backdrop of the crisis and does have risks to its own status. However, it has already entered into a rivalry with China and finds itself in a situation of double deterrence. A Russian victory in Ukraine, together a strengthening of relations between Moscow and Beijing, would be a major strategic challenge for the US.

Bron: RT

Grappig is, dat het westen Rusland nu graag kapot ziet gaan.

Nog niet zo lang geleden was het enige wat boeiend was aan Rusland hun dashboard filmpjes.

Veel het eigen straatje aan het schoonvegen, wijzen naar het Westen en wat ik tussen de regels doorlees is dat ze echt in hun broek schijten dat ze aan het einde van de rit een Duitsland-achtige boetedoening en transformatie (moeten) ondergaan

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:03 schreef theguyver het volgende:
Nog niet zo lang geleden was het enige wat boeiend was aan Rusland hun dashboard filmpjes.

ja die ongelukken in de sneeuw met grote vrachtwagens

verder wilde ik er niet komen of zijn

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 07:44 schreef bleiblei het volgende:

Doe niet zo hypocriet. Je weet het dondersgoed. Je post op dit niveau al ruim een jaar in dit topic. Op de periode na dat je niet mocht posten. In dit schijnheilige boontje gedoe moet je niet trappen, @:mascara-klodder , Za loopt hier vanaf dag 1 in dit topic mee en voornamelijk dubieuze onzin te posten

Hoe kom je aan deze info?

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 15:48 schreef Harmankardon het volgende:
Deze oorlog is de natte droom van iedere jaren 80 republikein in de VS en de huidige garde MAGAs zijn pro-Rusland. Bizar.

Zo'n 90% van al die complottheorie�n komen uit Rusland. Met als doel wantrouwen in de westerse machthebbers en maatschappij en Putin als de ultieme verlosser.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:52 schreef Za het volgende:

[..]
Hoe kom je aan deze info?

Waar blijft die dikke biem nou en de noeks van Amerika?

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 16:37 schreef byah het volgende:
Ik neem toch aan dat als die nucleaire installatie vannacht gepland de lucht in gaat dat er vandaag wel vanuit de US nog wat publieke waarschuwingen zouden komen aan het adres van Rusland

Biden zou dat melden, maar een uur later was die dat vergeten.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:00 schreef TheJanitor het volgende:

Waar blijft die dikke biem nou en de noeks van Amerika?

Je kunt geen dagen of maanden en grouppe gaan zeuren over 1 post.

De post met die pallets is eerder iets om terecht over te vallen. Ontoelaatbaar.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:29 schreef Ronald-Koeman het volgende:
ze aan het einde van de rit een Duitsland-achtige boetedoening en transformatie (moeten) ondergaan

Ik twijfel of Calimero Rusland zich dat eigenlijk kan voorstellen…

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:03 schreef theguyver het volgende:
." The goals are believed to be defeating Russia, wrecking its military potential''

Lijkt me een goed plan

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:01 schreef Lospedrosa het volgende:

[..]
Biden zou dat melden, maar een uur later was die dat vergeten.

Rutte heeft daar ook selectief last van.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:21 schreef Slayage het volgende:
[ twitter ]

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:52 schreef Za het volgende:

[..]
Hoe kom je aan deze info?

FSU

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:03 schreef theguyver het volgende:
Ivan Timofeev: Why Russians increasingly believe the West wants to destroy their country
Published: 5 Jul 2023 | 14:54 GMT
There will be no going back to the pre-2022 state of affairs. The US-led bloc has pushed Moscow too far

Ivan Timofeev: Why Russians increasingly believe the West wants to destroy their country
� Getty Images/Pavel_Chag
By Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club Programme Director & one of Russia’s leading foreign policy experts.

There is an increasingly widespread view in Russia that the goal of the US – and the "collective West" it leads – is to achieve a “final solution” to the "Russian question." The goals are believed to be defeating Russia, wrecking its military potential, restructuring its statehood, reshaping its identity and possibly eliminating it as a state, in its current form.

For a long time, this view remained on the periphery of foreign policy thinking. However, much has changed in the past year and a half. Today, this perception of the West's goals has gone mainstream. Indeed, it seems quite rational, when placed into the proper context.

Meanwhile, Russia itself is pursuing a similar sort of policy towards the Ukrainian state, the existence of which in its former form and borders is perceived in Moscow as a key security challenge.

The historical experience of the last century shows that inflicting total defeat on an enemy and then rebuilding its statehood is the rule rather than the exception in foreign policy practice. There is an important difference to the conflicts of the 18th and 19th centuries, when military defeat of the enemy was seen as a way of extracting concessions from it, but not of rebuilding its very foundations.

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The experiences of the 20th and 21st centuries are not always linear, but their repetition is obvious. Germany's defeat in the First World War led to a palpable reshaping of its statehood, determined more by internal contradictions, which grew from the military loss.

Germany’s surrender after the Second World War had far more radical consequences. The country was divided, stripped of its foreign policy autonomy and almost completely rebuilt. Military defeat and subsequent occupation also led to the reformatting of the other large powers, Japan and Italy. The Soviet Union, as a victorious country, was a key player in resolving the "German question." The USSR was also active in establishing socialist regimes in countries liberated from the Nazi occupation.

The subsequent Cold War made this redrawing more difficult. Every attempt was met with resistance from the West. Sometimes the battle ended in a draw, as in Korea. Sometimes the Soviet Union got the upper hand – it helped to inflict a painful defeat on the US in Vietnam, for example. In other situations, the US was successful, for example in supporting anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave Washington a free hand. Despite Moscow’s rhetoric that the Cold War had ended in victory for both sides, the reality was different.

Many of the former socialist countries were quickly integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures with the active help of new local elites and broad public support. Russia itself loudly proclaimed a desire to return to the 'civilized world.' The US-led collective West was given carte blanche to reshape a vast area, which they not unreasonably saw as a result of their bloodless victory over the Soviet Union.

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In the absence of a counterweight, the US carried out several military interventions, which also resulted in a complete restructuring of the target states. Yugoslavia fell apart. Iraq was occupied, its leader executed and its system of government transformed. There were also failures. In Afghanistan, a quick victory turned into a stubborn guerrilla war and subsequent humiliating withdrawal. A military intervention in Iran did not take place, although it was planned. North Korea became a nuclear power, dramatically reducing the likelihood of external invasion. Successful US interventions provoked Moscow's displeasure, but this did not translate into real action until a certain point. Domestically, large-scale Western investment, close humanitarian cooperation and Russian society's interest in the West were encouraged, or at least not condemned, until the late 2010s.

At the same time, two trends led to sustained and growing irritation from the Russian authorities. The first was the increasingly visible attempts by Western countries to bypass the state and engage in direct dialogue with the Russian public. This paradigm pitted a "good" civil society against a "bad" government. Moscow's growing and understandable annoyance was triggered by the notion that Russia had a "regime." It hinted, or even directly stated, that the West somehow contrasted civil society with the government and did not see them as part of the same political community. The more conscious and demonstrative this approach was on the part of Western states, the more it was resisted in Moscow.

In the West, such an approach was attributed to the perceived shortcomings of democracy in Russia, which only added to the irritation.

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The Russian authorities clearly did not want to depend on external assessments of their state-building. All the more so as the denominator of such assessments was increasingly set not only by the mature democracies, but also by the Eastern European and Baltic countries with their bouquet of historical grievances and complexes. The experience of 'color revolutions' in the post-Soviet space only reinforced Moscow's fears. In Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, public protests received full moral, political and even material support from Western countries, while the authorities were often demonized.

Revolutionary changes of power, even for the sake of democratization and development, were legitimately perceived in Moscow as a challenge. There was a strong consensus within the Russian elite that state-building should and could only take place through its own efforts. Any form of outside involvement was unacceptable. This consensus began to take shape in the mid-1990s, and by the end of Vladimir Putin's first term it had become a clear policy point.

The second trend that had a significant impact on changing Russian attitudes was related to US and EU policy in the post-Soviet space. Russia has swallowed the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into Western structures, probably seeing them as toxic assets for itself. Contrary to the common stereotype in the West, which ascribes to Moscow a desire to recreate the USSR, the real goals were far from imperial ambitions.

Russia was not interested in taking on another huge imperial burden, feeding local elites and buying the loyalty of the population. It was quite happy with the neutrality of the former Soviet republics and even with cooperation with the US in the post-Soviet space, provided that such cooperation was on an equal footing. In the early 2000s, Moscow did not object to the American military presence in Central Asia and then helped supply the Western grouping in Afghanistan for a long time. But Moscow was categorically uncomfortable with the prospect of Western projects without Russian participation. Against the background of Vladimir Putin's active diplomacy to build constructive relations with the US and the EU on all fronts, the hope remained that the area of the ex-USSR would remain a neutral field of cooperation.

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But it gradually became clear that there would be less and less inclusiveness towards Russia. The aforementioned 'color revolutions' were yet another wake-up call. The growing concerns of the Russian leadership were discussed, but each time they were politely dismissed by Western partners. Apparently, the West simply did not see the need to take Russia's interests into account. After the 1990s collapse of the economy, a massive brain drain, a series of internal conflicts, rampant crime, corruption, capital flight, the transition – which had begun under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev – to the status of a commodity appendage, a falling birth rate, alcoholism and an excessively high death rate, Russia was hardly perceived as a serious contender.

The local interests of some post-Soviet elites, who gained political capital by selling the "Russian threat" to the West, also played a role.

Underestimating the Russian leadership's will to restore statehood and avoid a zero-sum game in the post-Soviet space was a major miscalculation. With each new crisis, the West failed to take into account the real possibility of worst-case scenarios in which Russia would assert its interests by force, leading to a counteroffensive against attempts to reformat the post-Soviet states. The first serious crisis was the five-day war with Georgia, in which the Russian side not only responded violently to an attack on a peacekeeping contingent, but also recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The West had the foresight to realize the Georgian leadership had made major mistakes and to defuse the crisis with Russia. But the price was the precedent of a de facto revision of borders.

Moscow quickly responded to another Ukrainian revolution in 2013-2014 with the "Crimean Spring," and then with support for the resistance in Donbass. The Minsk agreements left open the possibility of a relatively easy solution to the crisis. However, Russia's tough and decisive line had already caused alarm in the West.

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As a result, the US-led bloc chose a path of containment and opposition to Moscow. Western-Russian relations in the post-Soviet space, and in Ukraine in particular, finally turned into a full-on rivalry, and the Minsk agreements were later openly described by some Western leaders as having been merely a maneuver to prepare for a new fight. Russian support for the Syrian government has shown that Moscow is willing to obstruct 'social engineering' outside the post-Soviet space as well.

Despite the expectation of a new crisis, the scenario of a full-scale military operation against Ukraine was considered unlikely by many, including in Russia itself. Moscow was deeply embedded in the Western-oriented global economy. Trade interdependence with the EU remained high. There was no rejection of Western values in Russia, although certain social phenomena and movements were criticized as an affront to traditional values. For Moscow, the key issue remained the security of its western borders. Apparently, the Russian authorities assumed the inevitability of a gradual militarization of both Ukraine and NATO's eastern flank, followed by a military crisis at an inconvenient moment. Neo-Nazism in Ukraine was not widespread and did not enjoy widespread popular support, but the Kiev authorities' tolerance of radical movements was strongly resented in Russia.

The decision to launch a pre-emptive military operation was a turning point that radically raised the stakes of the rivalry. The ensuing military conflict has largely undone the legacy of the post-Soviet period.

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There will be no return to the reality of 2021. It is clear that Russia will do everything it can to protect the new territorial status quo and to undermine Ukraine's military potential as much as possible. It is also clear that the West will do everything it can to undermine Russia and, if the circumstances are right, will also use any internal problems to its advantage.

The question remains as to how the current crisis will end.

There is currently no political solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in sight. The sustainability of any peace agreement, even if reached, is highly questionable. The West fears an abrupt military escalation and a war with Russia that could quickly turn into a nuclear exchange. However, NATO's gradual direct military involvement in the conflict cannot be ruled out.

The prospect of domestic unrest in Russia is widely discussed in Western media and analyzed. So far, such views have clearly not been reflected in official positions. But the transition from musings in the analysts’ community and populist statements by individual politicians to an official position may only be a matter of time. Turmoil in a major nuclear power carries great risks. But in the West they may be perceived as less serious than a direct military confrontation. Meanwhile, an internal political explosion could put Russia out of business for a long time and force it to try to reformat its entire system. In such a development, the preservation of Russia's statehood and sovereignty will once again become the main stakes of any conflict.

Ukraine's statehood is also at stake. It is very likely to emerge from the current crisis with diminished capacity, truncated borders and total dependence on external forces.

The US is in a better position. It has been able to discipline its allies against the backdrop of the crisis and does have risks to its own status. However, it has already entered into a rivalry with China and finds itself in a situation of double deterrence. A Russian victory in Ukraine, together a strengthening of relations between Moscow and Beijing, would be a major strategic challenge for the US.

Bron: RT

Grappig is, dat het westen Rusland nu graag kapot ziet gaan.

Nog niet zo lang geleden was het enige wat boeiend was aan Rusland hun dashboard filmpjes.

Voor de oorlog waren veel mensen toch wel gematigd positief over Rusland. Veel Russische rappers hadden miljoenen views op youtube bijvoorbeeld en waren ook hier soms populair. Kende ook wel wat mensen die Rusland bezocht hadden, of gingen bezoeken.

Oftwel, naar mijn idee was het imago van Rusland langzaamaan aan het verbeteren. Jammer dat ze dat allemaal weggegooid hebben nu. En voor wat precies is volgens mij niemand duidelijk.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:29 schreef Pleun2011 het volgende:

FSU

Jullie zijn een soort clubje?

Deze info is gewoon prive, dus onmogelijk.

Hoe kom je aan deze info?

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:30 schreef Eyjafjallajoekull het volgende:

[..]
Voor de oorlog waren veel mensen toch wel gematigd positief over Rusland. Veel Russische rappers hadden miljoenen views op youtube bijvoorbeeld en waren ook hier soms populair. Kende ook wel wat mensen die Rusland bezocht hadden, of gingen bezoeken.

Oftwel, naar mijn idee was het imago van Rusland langzaamaan aan het verbeteren. Jammer dat ze dat allemaal weggegooid hebben nu. En voor wat precies is volgens mij niemand duidelijk.

Rusland is nog steeds populair bij een bepaald slag Nederlanders, ik denk dat je wel weet wie dat zijn.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:36 schreef Za het volgende:

[..]
Jullie zijn een soort clubje?

Deze info is gewoon prive, dus onmogelijk.

Hoe kom je aan deze info?

Het is een VVO'tje.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:36 schreef Za het volgende:

[..]
Jullie zijn een soort clubje?

Deze info is gewoon prive, dus onmogelijk.

Hoe kom je aan deze info?

CIA/WEF

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:37 schreef Hathor het volgende:

[..]
Rusland is nog steeds populair bij een bepaald slag Nederlanders, ik denk dat je wel weet wie dat zijn.

Weet niet of ze nou echt van Rusland als land houden, of gewoon de conservatieve waarden willen die ze daar zogenaamd aanhouden.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:39 schreef Delenlill het volgende:

Je kan gewoon zien wanneer iemand gebanned is. De grafiek in hun profiel gaat omlaag. Tenminste ik neem aan dat dat is door bans. Je bent iets van 5 keer gebanned als ik het bij het juiste eind heb.

Nee.
Ik post soms een paar dagen niet als ik het druk heb. Ik ben niet 5 keer gebanned.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:48 schreef xpompompomx het volgende:

[..]
CIA/WEF

Ik kreeg het via mijn maat Rutte.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:49 schreef Eyjafjallajoekull het volgende:

[..]
Weet niet of ze nou echt van Rusland als land houden, of gewoon de conservatieve waarden willen die ze daar zogenaamd aanhouden.

Of ze houden nergens van, maar zijn gewoon slecht en past Rusland er daarom goed bij.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:03 schreef theguyver het volgende:
Grappig is, dat het westen Rusland nu graag kapot ziet gaan.

Volgens RT.

Wat mij betreft mag Rusland idd kapot gaan, maar dat hebben ze aan hun eigen gedrag te danken.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:48 schreef xpompompomx het volgende:

CIA/WEF

Ik vind het fijn dat jullie elkaar gevonden hebben.
Het is mooi wanneer zulke vriendschappen ontstaan.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 17:52 schreef Za het volgende:

[..]
Hoe kom je aan deze info?

We hebben de Russisch inlichtingendienst gehacked.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:37 schreef Hathor het volgende:

[..]
Rusland is nog steeds populair bij een bepaald slag Nederlanders, ik denk dat je wel weet wie dat zijn.

Als wereldbewoner heb ik niets tegen mensen, wel tegen degene die de zogenaamde leiding willen nemen. Putin, Biden, Kim, Assad etc.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:54 schreef etuiedelapiel het volgende:

[..]
Als wereldbewoner heb ik niets tegen mensen, wel tegen degene die de zogenaamde leiding willen nemen. Putin, Biden, Kim, Assad etc.

Wie hoort er niet in het rijtje thuis?

Dat voortdurende onderlinge gekissebis en alle off-topicshit begint me behoorlijk te vervelen.
Het is een slowchat geworden waarin men mee bezig is met gore, grote biems, met eigen en andermans ego's.
Met NWS heeft het nog maar heel weinig te maken.

Haha, proberen de Russen in 1 keer de balans gelijk te trekken met die aantallen getroffen gebouwen

quote:

At least 1 dead and more than 40 injured from Ukrainian shelling in Donetsk, Russian state media reports

One man has died and the number of people injured has risen to 41 — which includes two children — after Ukrainian shelling in the Makiivka district in the eastern Donetsk region, according to Russian state media TASS.

Those affected are receiving medical assistance, TASS added, and reported damage to the following:

40 apartment buildings
12 educational institutions
13 kindergartens
Four sports institutions
13 social facilities
Two fire stations
Nine medical institutions

CNN

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 19:04 schreef OllieA het volgende:
Dat voortdurende onderlinge gekissebis en alle off-topicshit begint me behoorlijk te vervelen.
Het is een slowchat geworden waarin men mee bezig is met gore, grote biems, met eigen en andermans ego's.
Met NWS heeft het nog maar heel weinig te maken.

Tjah zolang bepaalde lui van BNW elke keer hier komen irriteren met hun onzin kan je verwachten dat men cynisch gaat worden.

Niet dat je (geheel) ongelijk hebt overigens.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:16 schreef voetbalmanager2 het volgende:

[..]
Lijkt me een goed plan

Is het ook..
Hele land mag van mij part afglijden naar een Noord Korea!
En daar zijn ze momenteel zelf hard mee bezig.

Alleen wel grappig dat ze naar westen wijzen maar zelf kunnen ze ten allertijden gewoon weg gaan uit Oekra�ne.

Door er te blijven maken ze zichzelf kapot.. alleen dat snapt de gemiddelde Rus gewoon niet.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 19:04 schreef OllieA het volgende:
Dat voortdurende onderlinge gekissebis en alle off-topicshit begint me behoorlijk te vervelen.
Het is een slowchat geworden waarin men mee bezig is met gore, grote biems, met eigen en andermans ego's.
Met NWS heeft het nog maar heel weinig te maken.

Overdrijven is ook een vak. Misschien is de liveblog van een of andere krant geschikter voor je. Al een keer eerder tegen je gezegd maar je draagt zelf geen ene moer bij maar wil wel om de zoveel tijd commentaar leveren op dat er zogenaamd geen nieuws wordt gepost, dat er doden en inslagen van raketten voorbijkomen? Er is genoeg met NWS te maken dat gepost wordt.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:52 schreef Papierversnipperaar het volgende:

[..]
Volgens RT.

Wat mij betreft mag Rusland idd kapot gaan, maar dat hebben ze aan hun eigen gedrag te danken.

Ik zei ook NU sinds ze Oekra�ne binnen vielen en echt elke Geneva convention regel gebruiken als richtlijn om zoveel mogelijk misdaden te begaan lijkt het wel.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 19:16 schreef theguyver het volgende:

[..]
Is het ook..
Hele land mag van mij part afglijden naar een Noord Korea!
En daar zijn ze momenteel zelf hard mee bezig.

Alleen wel grappig dat ze naar westen wijzen maar zelf kunnen ze ten allertijden gewoon weg gaan uit Oekra�ne.

Door er te blijven maken ze zichzelf kapot.. alleen dat snapt de gemiddelde Rus gewoon niet.

Eerst had ik zoiets dat ze ook maar slachtoffer van propaganda waren. Maar nu duizenden van hun kameraden niet meer heel thuis komen of gewoon verdwenen zijn. Er moet toch op zijn minst een bel gaan rinkelen.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:51 schreef MatthijsDJ het volgende:

[..]
Ik kreeg het via mijn maat Rutte.

Hunter Biden schijnt het ook te weten.

quote:

Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 19:04 schreef OllieA het volgende:
Dat voortdurende onderlinge gekissebis en alle off-topicshit begint me behoorlijk te vervelen.
Het is een slowchat geworden waarin men mee bezig is met gore, grote biems, met eigen en andermans ego's.
Met NWS heeft het nog maar heel weinig te maken.

Gaaf toch?

https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/(...)voor-nucleair-gevaar

Aanval op kerncentrale
Jonge Oekra�ners vluchten niet voor nucleair gevaar: 'Bezorgder om raketten'

Oekra�ne waarschuwt opnieuw voor Russische aanvallen rondom de kerncentrale van Zaporizja. Maar ondanks de risico's willen jonge Oekra�ners niet evacueren. "Zonder directe levensbedreiging gaan mensen niet zomaar weg." RTL Nieuws sprak met twee jonge Oekra�ners over de gevaren.

Rusland zou de kerncentrale van Zaporizja, in het oosten van Oekra�ne, aankomende nachten aanvallen. Tenminste, dat zeggen Oekra�ense inlichtingendiensten. Omgekeerd beschuldigt Rusland juist Oekra�ne ervan vannacht een aanval te willen uitvoeren. De berichten zijn niet onafhankelijk te bevestigen.

"Als er iets gebeurt, ben ik meteen weg", zegt Vasyl Doesjnj (24) die in de stad Zaporizja woont, ongeveer 50 kilometer ten noorden van de kerncentrale. "Maar ik ga niet van tevoren al in paniek raken."

Vasyl woont in Zaporizja sinds het begin van de Russische invasie. Hij is activist, vrijwilliger en werkt als mentor voor een jeugdvereniging. "Sinds het begin van de oorlog is het merendeel van de Oekra�ense jongeren stressbestendiger en sterker geworden", zegt Vasyl.

In Zaporizja, waar voor de oorlog ruim 700.000 mensen woonden, vinden regelmatig oefeningen plaats voor evacuatie in het geval van een kernramp. Hulpverleners, medische professionals, maar ook gewone burgers kunnen deze trainingen volgen.

Meer drone-aanslagen
Mensen weten dat er gevaar dreigt, maar staan niet ieder moment van de dag stil bij de nucleaire dreiging. "We zijn hier eerder bezorgd dat een Russische raket ons huis raakt en dat kinderen slachtoffer worden van droneaanvallen", zegt Vasyl. "Meer nog dan we bezorgd zijn om een tragedie die een aanslag op de kerncentrale kan veroorzaken."

De risico's op een atoomramp zijn sinds het begin van de oorlog wel iets afgenomen. Een jaar geleden was er nog sprake van mogelijke radioactieve straling tot ver over de Oekra�ense grenzen in het geval van een aanslag, nu zijn eerder de indirecte gevolgen voelbaar voor de rest van Europa. In dit kader leggen we uit waarom het risico nu minder groot is:

Wat zijn de risico's?
Al sinds het begin van de oorlog in Oekra�ne is de veiligheid van de kerncentrale van Zaporizja in gevaar. Al snel hadden de Russen vorig jaar de kerncentrale, de grootste van Europa, bezet. Deze opereert nog altijd minimaal, deels met Oekra�ens personeel. Wel staan alle zes kernreactoren uit. Daardoor is het risico op een grote kernramp afgenomen.

Een van de grootste risico's rondom de kerncentrale is het wegvallen van de koeling van de reactoren, zegt Mark van Bourgondi�n van de Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming (ANVS). De reactoren staan wel uit, maar sommige radioactieve stoffen blijven nog jaren warm. "Als de reactoren niet gekoeld worden en de temperatuur oploopt, kan het omhulsel van de splijtstof barsten of smelten. En dan kan de radioactieve stof in de reactoren vrijkomen", legt Van Bourgondi�n uit.

Het andere grote risico is als de koeling wegvalt �n als het gebouw van de kerncentrale wordt beschadigd. "Dat betekent dat de gelekte stoffen ook in de buitenlucht kunnen komen." In dat geval zou de impact voor de omgeving tot vijf keer groter zijn dan wanneer de stoffen alleen in het gebouw vrijkomen, aldus Van Bourgondi�n. "Het gebied zo'n 5 tot 10 kilometer rondom de centrale moet dan ge�vacueerd worden en inwoners tot 100 kilometer in de windrichting vanaf het gebouw moeten schuilen. Dat betekent de ramen en deuren gesloten houden."

Europa merkt indirecte gevolgen
Volgens de ANVS is de kans op een incident bij de centrale van Zaporizja groter dan vorig jaar. Omdat er regelmatig geschoten wordt, vallen stroomnetwerken vaker uit. Ook namen de risico's toe sinds vorige maand de Kachovka-dam, in de Dnipro-rivier die aan de centrale grenst, doorbrak.

Hoewel de kans groter is, zijn de mogelijke gevolgen van een kernongeval juist kleiner geworden. Van Bourgondi�n: "Omdat de reactoren uitstaan, zijn de makkelijk te verspreiden stoffen, zoals jodium, zo goed als verdwenen. In West-Europa zullen we geen gevolgen van de vrijgekomen straling ondervinden." Wel zullen de indirecte gevolgen van zo'n ramp de grenzen van Oekra�ne overgaan: zo kunnen we in Europa bijvoorbeeld tekorten ervaren als een deel van de landbouw in Oekra�ne wordt aangetast door radioactief materiaal.

Ook de familie en vrienden van Dasja Panto (23) willen Zaporizja niet verlaten. "Niemand wil zomaar voor een lange tijd zijn woning en baan in de steek laten", vertelt ze via WhatsApp. Sommige kennissen van Dasja besloten wel voor een korte tijd de stad te ontvluchten. Maar de meeste vrienden blijven in Zaporizja.

Voor de opa van Dasja was het een ander verhaal. Hij woonde tot voor kort in Nikopol, een stadje aan de andere kant van de Dnipro, tegenover de kerncentrale van Zaporizja. Hij is voor zijn veiligheid een maand geleden naar Kyiv verhuisd. Dasja en haar man wonen ook in de buurt van de hoofdstad.

Evacuatie-trainingen
De Oekra�ense autoriteiten hebben onlangs een nieuwe 'nucleaire' sirene ge�ntroduceerd. Die gaat af bij atoomgevaar en heeft een andere klank dan het reguliere luchtalarm van raketaanvallen. Dasja vertelt dat zij en haar familieleden de nucleaire sirene nog niet hebben gehoord. Maar elke dag klinkt het wel het reguliere luchtalarm. "Om eerlijk te zijn klinken alle sirenes even verschrikkelijk, maar gek genoeg zijn we er gewend aan geraakt."

"Veel mensen weigeren om de stad te verlaten zonder een directe levensbedreiging", zegt Vasyl uit Zaporizja. Toch zijn er ook mensen die bezwijken onder de paniek. "Velen hebben al angstig hun koffers gepakt voor het geval dat... We hopen natuurlijk dat we thuis kunnen blijven, en dat die koffers niet nodig zijn."

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:30 schreef Eyjafjallajoekull het volgende:

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Voor de oorlog waren veel mensen toch wel gematigd positief over Rusland. Veel Russische rappers hadden miljoenen views op youtube bijvoorbeeld en waren ook hier soms populair. Kende ook wel wat mensen die Rusland bezocht hadden, of gingen bezoeken.

Oftwel, naar mijn idee was het imago van Rusland langzaamaan aan het verbeteren. Jammer dat ze dat allemaal weggegooid hebben nu. En voor wat precies is volgens mij niemand duidelijk.

Mwa, dat is wel een beetje de kritiek van het artikel op de Westerse approach: de civil society werd wel omarmd door het Westen terwijl de Russische overheid als ondeugdelijk werd weggezet, en dat het Westen een wig tussen die twee probeerde te drijven.

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 19:44 schreef -XOR- het volgende:

[..]
Mwa, dat is wel een beetje de kritiek van het artikel op de Westerse approach: de civil society werd wel omarmd door het Westen terwijl de Russische overheid als ondeugdelijk werd weggezet, en dat het Westen een wig tussen die twee probeerde te drijven.

De werkelijkheid was dat ze in 1991 van communisme linea recta naar een kleptocratie overstapten. Net zoals in 1917, hadden ze een kans om iets te maken van hun samenleving, en die kans hebben ze zelf verkloot.

Voor de rest is deze hele oorlog te verklaren met dat rusland terug naar het verleden wil. Ze willen iets zijn wat ze niet kunnen zijn: een supermacht.

Russische fantasie versus keiharde realiteit.

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Could this be another Chernobyl?

Because the plant’s reactors have been cooled, no. If the reported explosives were to detonate, this would “open up a cold reactor, which would expose spent fuel to the air, which will spread some radiation,” Alberque told CNN.

“A plume will come off from the reactor where there will be radiation aerosolized,” he said. This would create a radiation zone where “you’ll have a higher chance of cancer over the next 40 years,” but will not recreate the sort of destruction seen after the meltdown of the active Chernobyl plant in 1986.

“The six reactors at ZNPP are not at all like the Chernobyl reactor and cannot, CAN NOT, have the same kind of accident,” Cheryl Rofer, a nuclear expert and former researcher at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, wrote in a blog.

“Chernobyl had a graphite moderator, and the building it was in was not the heavily reinforced concrete of the reactors at ZNPP. The ZNPP reactors have hard oxide fuel encased in metal, and are inside a stainless steel vessel. Chernobyl had no such vessel,” she added.

According to Alberque, the scale of the effects of any disaster at Zaporizhzhia would be more akin to that at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania in 1979, rather than Chernobyl (1986) – or even Fukushima (2011).

CNN

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 19:56 schreef oheng het volgende:

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De werkelijkheid was dat ze in 1991 van communisme linea recta naar een kleptocratie overstapten. Net zoals in 1917, hadden ze een kans om iets te maken van hun samenleving, en die kans hebben ze zelf verkloot.

Voor de rest is deze hele oorlog te verklaren met dat rusland terug naar het verleden wil. Ze willen iets zijn wat ze niet kunnen zijn: een supermacht.

Russische fantasie versus keiharde realiteit.

Het treurige is ook dat er daar zo weinig basis is voor een niet-autocratische samenleving. Alle eigen initiatief en zelforganisatievermogen is wel uitgeroeid daar. Het wordt een hele lange weg voor ze als ze ooit van hun dictatoriale kleptocraten afwillen.

Gaat niet goed, waar zijn onze jodiumpillen Rutte?

Maar ja net als bij die Russische boot.. regering en Navo doen niks alleen met handen in hun zakken toekijken.

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 20:07 schreef quirina het volgende:
Maar ja net als bij die Russische boot.. regering en Navo doen niks alleen met handen in hun zakken toekijken.

Wat moet navo precies doen?

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 19:56 schreef oheng het volgende:

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De werkelijkheid was dat ze in 1991 van communisme linea recta naar een kleptocratie overstapten. Net zoals in 1917, hadden ze een kans om iets te maken van hun samenleving, en die kans hebben ze zelf verkloot.

Dit is iets te kort door de bocht. De transitie van een totalitair communistische naar democratische vrijemarkt samenleving is niet eenvoudig en daar zijn ze inderdaad niet in geslaagd.

[ Bericht 5% gewijzigd door -XOR- op 05-07-2023 20:23:48 ]

Zo lek als een mandje.
Wie had dat gedacht

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 20:03 schreef quirina het volgende:

Spanning rond kerncentrale stijgt, Oekraïne en Rusland beschuldigen elkaar van plannen aanval

Gaat niet goed, waar zijn onze jodiumpillen Rutte?

Zouden ze die detectoren al niet hebben ter plekke?

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 18:11 schreef Aether het volgende:

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Ik twijfel of Calimero Rusland zich dat eigenlijk kan voorstellen…

Dat kunnen ze zich heel goed voorstellen. Sterker nog, onlangs nog in het nieuws dat veel gewone Russen die eerst niet voor de oorlog waren of er geen mening over hadden nu wel hopen dat Rusland de SMO oorlog wint. Waarom? Vanwege de consequenties die ze vrezen wanneer ze verliezen...

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 20:03 schreef quirina het volgende:

Spanning rond kerncentrale stijgt, Oekraïne en Rusland beschuldigen elkaar van plannen aanval

Gaat niet goed, waar zijn onze jodiumpillen Rutte?

Ik heb een hekel aan dit soort titels. Alsof deze beschuldigingen gelijke geloofwaardigheid hebben. We hebben al genoeg wappies die denken dat Oekra�ne zowel een kernramp wil veroorzaken in hun eigen land, als de mogelijkheid daartoe heeft in een centrale dat volstaat met al lang geleden gefilmd Russisch militair materieel.

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 20:45 schreef Confetti het volgende:
Als ze deze opblazen is het taboe ook wel weg. Oekraine heeft nog andere kerncentrales.

Ben wel benieuwd.

Geen stevige reactie kan leiden tot kerncentrales beschouwen als mogelijk doelwit. Wel interessant waar dat toe kan/gaat leiden

In hetzelfde stadje waar gister die munitieopslag werd geraakt. Dit keer blijkbaar een oliedepot te pakken:

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 20:52 schreef Glazenmaker het volgende:

Ik heb een hekel aan dit soort titels. Alsof deze beschuldigingen gelijke geloofwaardigheid hebben. We hebben al genoeg wappies die denken dat Oekra�ne zowel een kernramp wil veroorzaken in hun eigen land, als de mogelijkheid daartoe heeft in een centrale dat volstaat met al lang geleden gefilmd Russisch militair materieel.

Een aanval van buitenaf is onmogelijk, ondanks dat het vol staat met Russisch materieel en in Russische handen is?

Wat ik vreemd vind is de suggestie dat er in het land zelf rondom een kerncentrale zich geen detectoren bevinden en gestuurd zouden moeten worden. Er moet toch altijd monitoring plaatsvinden dunkt me?

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 20:52 schreef Glazenmaker het volgende:

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Ik heb een hekel aan dit soort titels. Alsof deze beschuldigingen gelijke geloofwaardigheid hebben. We hebben al genoeg wappies die denken dat Oekra�ne zowel een kernramp wil veroorzaken in hun eigen land, als de mogelijkheid daartoe heeft in een centrale dat volstaat met al lang geleden gefilmd Russisch militair materieel.

Teveel "both sides" inderdaad terwijl Russische beschuldigingen en claims altijd leugens of zelfs projectie zijn gebleken. Sowieso wordt er door veel media nog teveel serieus geluisterd naar wat Poetin, Peskov, Medvedev en Lavrov zeggen i.p.v. het te benoemen als wat het zijn: leugens.

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 21:00 schreef Ronald-Koeman het volgende:

Teveel "both sides" inderdaad terwijl Russische beschuldigingen en claims altijd leugens of zelfs projectie zijn gebleken. Sowieso wordt er door veel media nog teveel serieus geluisterd naar wat Poetin, Peskov, Medvedev en Lavrov zeggen i.p.v. het te benoemen als wat het zijn: leugens.

Eens. Ze blazen hun eigen bruggen en pijpleidingen op om anderen in een kwaad daglicht te stellen.

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Op woensdag 5 juli 2023 20:45 schreef Confetti het volgende:
Als ze deze opblazen is het taboe ook wel weg. Oekraine heeft nog andere kerncentrales.

Ik ga ervan uit dat op diplomatieke vlakken waar we niets van mee krijgen bobo’s van allerlei landen zich de blaren op de tong praten tegen ambassadeurs, met oligarchen en spreekbuizen van Poetin, en dat de vertegenwoordigers van de machtiger landen hieronder (USA, China, Japan, Israel o.a.) keiharde repercussies in het vooruitzicht stellen. (Bijv. Luchtsteun, buiten NATO om).
Niet voor niets dat de datum al vroeg bekend is gemaakt, Rusland krijgt keer op keer de boodschap dat met name de Amerikaanse spionagediensten tot 3 cijfers achter de komma weten waar ze mee bezig zijn.