Ik kan me van vorig jaar nog herinneren dat er advertenties waren van dat je in door Rusland bezet gebied de bewaking zou doen.
En 2 weken geleden nog een tweet van mannen die voor artillery waren getraind maar nu ingezet worden als kanonnenvoer om Ukraine te bestormen.
1/ The Russian military has a culture of institutional lying, from fake medical exercises to false battlefield reports. Russian bloggers have admitted that pervasive lying to mobilised soldiers is severely damaging their morale and undermining their willingness to fight
2/ I've previously discussed the issue of lying in the Russian military (see thread below). It appears to result from a deep-seated attitude that accepts deceit and fakery as normal operational practice, rather than a self-defeating form of corruption.
3/ In an interesting exchange between two Russian military bloggers on Telegram, Vladlen Tatarsky writes:
"Many people write about the problems of the mobilised, but delicately leave out one very sensitive issue: many mobilised people do not want to fight.
4/ Let's be clear, I'm not talking about all the mobilised, I'm talking about many. So many that it has become a problem.
In 90% of cases this happens in regiments and battalions that are made up entirely of mobilized men.
5/ There is one reason for such behaviour: people were simply deceived. They were told that they were not going to any war, but that they would guard something. Of course, there are more reasons, but this is the main one in my opinion.
6/ I wonder if this problem will also be solved by humanitarian workers and deputies [of the State Duma]."
Writing in response to Tatarsky, the blogger 'Unofficial Bezsonov "Z"' agrees and says:
7/ "Many cunning officers ("the real") who train the mobilised on the 'mainland', before being sent to the front, in order not to strain their brains and to avoid any problems and resentment from the mobiks, …
8/ …simply deceive them by telling them that they will guard the corn in the distant rear. They are taught to shoot, but not prepared mentally. As a result, they arrive, for example, in the Donetsk People's Republic, join one of the corps units and problems begin.
9/ Unlike 'real' officers, our officers know how to put a firm end to acts of disobedience, but this hampers combat operations. These problems should be solved in the rear but alas, not always."
10/ Recent video petitions recorded by mobilised soldiers have highlighted this issue. The one below, presented by the invaluable @wartranslated, describes exactly the scenario mentioned by 'Unofficial Bezsonov "Z"'.
11/ However, 'Unofficial Bezsonov "Z"' has a point when he criticises the naivety of the mobilised:
12/ "On the other hand men who have been mobilised are no longer children and should understand that going to war involves a great probability of direct participation in military operations. And the excuse that "we have been promised otherwise" looks weak."
13/ Given the nature of the Russian state, it's probably safest to assume at the outset that its representatives aren't telling the truth. The mobiks have certainly learned that the hard way. /end