NWS Nieuws & Achtergronden
Discussieer hier diepgaander over de actualiteiten.
'Verkiezingen' in Russische vazalstaten leiden nooit tot een ongewenste uitkomst.quote:Op vrijdag 25 februari 2022 13:45 schreef -_Guitarist_- het volgende:
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En dan na de volgende verkiezingen dit hele riedeltje opnieuw?
Ik ben ook geen GL-er maar het spreekt wel voor je als je je fouten kan toegeven. Nu hopen dat er ook echt wat gebeurt en het niet bij louter woorden blijft.quote:Op vrijdag 25 februari 2022 13:44 schreef Zorro het volgende:
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Inderdaad. Dus GL stemmers: stem op een andere partij de volgende keer!
Denk je dat er verkiezingen komen? Wordt gewoon Belarus 2.0.quote:
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En dan na de volgende verkiezingen dit hele riedeltje opnieuw?
Nu nog boter bij de vis. Groen Links wilde niet voldoen aan de 2% eis, geen vast budget en veel meer invloed voor de EU-praatclub binnen de Navo.quote:Op vrijdag 25 februari 2022 13:44 schreef HowardRoark het volgende:
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Klasse dat hij dat gewoon toegeeft. Zo hoort het.
Terecht. Had die peuterspeelzaal zich maar niet moeten willen aansluiten bij de NAVO. Dit is de schuld van *draait wiel rond*....D66.quote:Op vrijdag 25 februari 2022 13:35 schreef westwoodblvd het volgende:
Korte resumé van de wapenfeiten van het Russische leger:
- woonwijken bestookt met raketten;
- aanval op een peuterspeelzaal in Sumy;
- aanval op een weeshuis in Kyiv;
- aanval op een ziekenhuis in Donetsk
Opgeblazen gevoel of winderigheid? Zo opgelost met Rennie!
ik ook.quote:
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Blijkbaar, linkje of dm? Ben benieuwd.
Officieel en Officieus zijn twee verschillende dingenquote:
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Ja maar dan is het gewoon niet officieel bezet maar toch wel
Dat weet Lavrov ook.
Yep. We kunnen in ieder geval concluderen dat hij zelf duidelijk behoorlijk angstig is als het om zijn gezondheid gaat...quote:
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Zij is zo bang om ziek te worden dat hij een voetbalveld afstand tussen hem en iedereen houdt, niet echt het gedrag van een topfit persoon.
Tails tell tales
Oekraine is geen Wit-Rusland.quote:
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Ik weet niet of nu al praten de beste optie is. Kijk naar Wit-Rusland, dat gaat al 20 jaar gebukt onder Loekasjenko. 20 jaar is lang hoor, deze oorlog duurt pas 2 dagen, je wil een dergelijk scenario echt wel vermijden.
quote:1/ sharing from a friend with a background in us intelligence
My take so far:
Russia is fighting a 1970s era war against a small but early 2000s era enemy.
2/
What I mean by 1970s: limited precision strikes, followed immediately multiple lines of armored advance (3 as Soviet doctrine commands, plus a 4th from the separatists who appear to be fighting alone).
3/
Offensive. Advances conducted by easiest routes possible - roadways - with avoidance of set battles en lieu of encirclements. Air assaults via helo/paratroopers to seize key C2 sites. Air Dominance if possible but not planned. This is Deep Strike War.
4/
What I mean by early 2000s:
Widely distributed high-value small arms and light weapons, dispersed command. Defensive/occupying. Population center control and casualty consciousness.
5/
Air Superiority as ultimate goal with total annihilating of enemy C2 AND force composition prior to any ground movement. This is Air-Land war a la 73 Easting.
6/
What does this mean?
Russia, despite its overwhelming size and inevitability of their goals in this situation, is incredibly out of date. Within the first 6hrs they stopped precision strikes (likely out of munitions) and began ground movement into contested air territory.
7/
Their deep strike air assault attempts thus far have been repulsed at Kyiv’s main airport, as well as in Mariupol and Odessa. Air dominance is still not even ensured nor were precision strikes fully successful in eliminating anti-air capabilities, also hindering their air aslt
8/ Their air-to-ground attacks have already diverted to unguided bombs in large part. Ukraine, despite the hopelessness of their fight, are outfighting the Russians who claimed 2 days to total victory.
9/Is this intended?
I don’t think this is doctrinal carryover, but rather capability-dictated-doctrine. In other words, this likely a financial/industrialization issue.
10/ They lack the volume of precision guided missiles/etc to decapitate, so they were forced to commit to an air assault before achieving even air dominance.
11/ Their ground troops are surprisingly mired on the outskirts of every city as they struggle to capture them, largely due to advanced anti-tank capabilities.
12/ Does the doctrine fit reality?
From a capabilities perspective, there was little choice. From an objectives perspective, no. Defenders in cities are forcing the Russians to siege them out, which is counter to deep strike’s method.
13/ Modern army sizes are not capable of siege anymore especially in open terrain — millions of combatants on either side of single cities in Stalingrad/Moscow during WW2; hundreds of thousands across the entire theatre in Ukraine today.
14/ Unguided munitions used on defended civilian areas will result in high casualties and possible insurgency.
15/ What can we learn from this?
Russia is utterly incapable. Ukrainians resisted hybrid warfare and forced conventional conflict. Their doctrine does not fit modern warfare’s objectives. This is likely due to their limited material capabilities.
16/ The internal damage to Russia will not be worth it, and their poor showing will do more to embolden their regional counterparts rather than cow them. The longer Ukraine survives the worse it looks and the more damaging it will be from a game-theoretic regional view.
17/ This is the modern equivalent of the Winter War and will likely encourage Finland and Sweden to join NATO, and unnerve the Serbs as to the veracity of Russian support.
18/ End game:
Russia wins in a week or so but continues to face an insurgency, more virulent the longer the active phase of war goes on. Ukraine is forced to sign a Versailles style dearmament treaty and is forced into a Belarus-style vassal state situation.
19/ Zelensky waits in exile but is likely assassinated in an obscured fashion but that will take a few years. Russia becomes increasingly ostracized and isolated until Putin’s death, especially within their region. The US steps up covert armament of Taiwan.
20/ Long term:
The fucking French conventional army would mop the floor with Russia by the look of this. The Russians cannot fight a modern war and their bullying capability is limited, and would be ineffective against NATO’s air power alone -
21/ something easily deployed from distance, though I’d expect more NATO allocation of forces near Russia after this anyways.
22/ This is a death-spasm, the fever breaking, and Russia’s decline is pretty much locked looking at this, simply from seeing how they fight. A US-Russian war would look like Iraq ‘91, both by overwhelming asymmetry and by multilateral coalition backing.
23/ Another thought addendum:
Russians are currently trying to hold the airport after they took it briefly, but they do not control it.
24/ Great insight in this event alone:
Deep Strike doctrine focuses on overwhelming an enemy across every front but with relatively limited concentration, and awaits for one of many avenues to break through so that then they can double down on any successes.
Enemy capability is hindered by rear actions and strikes to reduce their logistics and C2, increasing odds of small successes to capitalize on.
What happens when you don’t find any successes and your rear actions fail? That’s quite a slog of a fight, and while Soviet size armies were capable of working through it anyways, modern Russia can’t nearly as easily.
~25/ That all said, who knows how much man power Russia has committed thus far vs Ukrainian man power — if we are seeing only 30% of Russia’s force thus deployed, maybe there’s a lot more on the table.
26/ Alternatively, can Russia afford to deploy more than 30% of 90% of its active force (current in western theatre) anywhere ever? Leaves one awfully defenseless…
27/ if they fully commit to Ukraine and NATO decides to strike at Kaliningrad / Japan the Kuril Islands / China upper Manchuria / Georgia Abkhazia / etc etc etc. Truly an animal backed into a corner.
28/ Deep War theory is famously successful in tabletop exercises due to an odds game (rolling a dice for each battle front means that more battle fronts = more chance of success, and a strategy of using even small successes further encourages this game-reality miss match)
Ik las dat ook Kenya de banden met Rusland wil verbreken.quote:
Goed dat deze landen ook van zich laten horen.
Jij hebt een teringhekel aan Nederland of niet?quote:
[..]
Nederlandse leger op weg...
[ afbeelding ]
GroenLinks zit niet in de regering, dus die kunnen geen boter bij de vis doen.quote:
[..]
Nu nog boter bij de vis. Groen Links wilde niet voldoen aan de 2% eis, geen vast budget en veel meer invloed voor de EU-praatclub binnen de Navo.
Precies. Maar vooral goed dat ie zich zo scherp uitlaat imo. Dat ie Pools is zal ook wel meespelen lijkt me.quote:Op vrijdag 25 februari 2022 13:47 schreef Tyranoesauroes het volgende:
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Hier ben ik wel mee eens. Putin denkt nu ook echt "EU? EU
Misschien willen ze dat extra budget steken in diversity officers, tanks in regenboogkleuren spuiten en zo.quote:
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Ik ben ook geen GL-er maar het spreekt wel voor je als je je fouten kan toegeven. Nu hopen dat er ook echt wat gebeurt en het niet bij louter woorden blijft.
spoiler?quote:
[ twitter ]
1/ sharing from a friend with a background in us intelligence
My take so far:
Russia is fighting a 1970s era war against a small but early 2000s era enemy.
2/
What I mean by 1970s: limited precision strikes, followed immediately multiple lines of armored advance (3 as Soviet doctrine commands, plus a 4th from the separatists who appear to be fighting alone).
3/
Offensive. Advances conducted by easiest routes possible - roadways - with avoidance of set battles en lieu of encirclements. Air assaults via helo/paratroopers to seize key C2 sites. Air Dominance if possible but not planned. This is Deep Strike War.
4/
What I mean by early 2000s:
Widely distributed high-value small arms and light weapons, dispersed command. Defensive/occupying. Population center control and casualty consciousness.
5/
Air Superiority as ultimate goal with total annihilating of enemy C2 AND force composition prior to any ground movement. This is Air-Land war a la 73 Easting.
6/
What does this mean?
Russia, despite its overwhelming size and inevitability of their goals in this situation, is incredibly out of date. Within the first 6hrs they stopped precision strikes (likely out of munitions) and began ground movement into contested air territory.
7/
Their deep strike air assault attempts thus far have been repulsed at Kyiv’s main airport, as well as in Mariupol and Odessa. Air dominance is still not even ensured nor were precision strikes fully successful in eliminating anti-air capabilities, also hindering their air aslt
8/ Their air-to-ground attacks have already diverted to unguided bombs in large part. Ukraine, despite the hopelessness of their fight, are outfighting the Russians who claimed 2 days to total victory.
9/Is this intended?
I don’t think this is doctrinal carryover, but rather capability-dictated-doctrine. In other words, this likely a financial/industrialization issue.
10/ They lack the volume of precision guided missiles/etc to decapitate, so they were forced to commit to an air assault before achieving even air dominance.
11/ Their ground troops are surprisingly mired on the outskirts of every city as they struggle to capture them, largely due to advanced anti-tank capabilities.
12/ Does the doctrine fit reality?
From a capabilities perspective, there was little choice. From an objectives perspective, no. Defenders in cities are forcing the Russians to siege them out, which is counter to deep strike’s method.
13/ Modern army sizes are not capable of siege anymore especially in open terrain — millions of combatants on either side of single cities in Stalingrad/Moscow during WW2; hundreds of thousands across the entire theatre in Ukraine today.
14/ Unguided munitions used on defended civilian areas will result in high casualties and possible insurgency.
15/ What can we learn from this?
Russia is utterly incapable. Ukrainians resisted hybrid warfare and forced conventional conflict. Their doctrine does not fit modern warfare’s objectives. This is likely due to their limited material capabilities.
16/ The internal damage to Russia will not be worth it, and their poor showing will do more to embolden their regional counterparts rather than cow them. The longer Ukraine survives the worse it looks and the more damaging it will be from a game-theoretic regional view.
17/ This is the modern equivalent of the Winter War and will likely encourage Finland and Sweden to join NATO, and unnerve the Serbs as to the veracity of Russian support.
18/ End game:
Russia wins in a week or so but continues to face an insurgency, more virulent the longer the active phase of war goes on. Ukraine is forced to sign a Versailles style dearmament treaty and is forced into a Belarus-style vassal state situation.
19/ Zelensky waits in exile but is likely assassinated in an obscured fashion but that will take a few years. Russia becomes increasingly ostracized and isolated until Putin’s death, especially within their region. The US steps up covert armament of Taiwan.
20/ Long term:
The fucking French conventional army would mop the floor with Russia by the look of this. The Russians cannot fight a modern war and their bullying capability is limited, and would be ineffective against NATO’s air power alone -
21/ something easily deployed from distance, though I’d expect more NATO allocation of forces near Russia after this anyways.
22/ This is a death-spasm, the fever breaking, and Russia’s decline is pretty much locked looking at this, simply from seeing how they fight. A US-Russian war would look like Iraq ‘91, both by overwhelming asymmetry and by multilateral coalition backing.
23/ Another thought addendum:
Russians are currently trying to hold the airport after they took it briefly, but they do not control it.
24/ Great insight in this event alone:
Deep Strike doctrine focuses on overwhelming an enemy across every front but with relatively limited concentration, and awaits for one of many avenues to break through so that then they can double down on any successes.
Enemy capability is hindered by rear actions and strikes to reduce their logistics and C2, increasing odds of small successes to capitalize on.
What happens when you don’t find any successes and your rear actions fail? That’s quite a slog of a fight, and while Soviet size armies were capable of working through it anyways, modern Russia can’t nearly as easily.
~25/ That all said, who knows how much man power Russia has committed thus far vs Ukrainian man power — if we are seeing only 30% of Russia’s force thus deployed, maybe there’s a lot more on the table.
26/ Alternatively, can Russia afford to deploy more than 30% of 90% of its active force (current in western theatre) anywhere ever? Leaves one awfully defenseless…
27/ if they fully commit to Ukraine and NATO decides to strike at Kaliningrad / Japan the Kuril Islands / China upper Manchuria / Georgia Abkhazia / etc etc etc. Truly an animal backed into a corner.
28/ Deep War theory is famously successful in tabletop exercises due to an odds game (rolling a dice for each battle front means that more battle fronts = more chance of success, and a strategy of using even small successes further encourages this game-reality miss match)
1/ sharing from a friend with a background in us intelligence
My take so far:
Russia is fighting a 1970s era war against a small but early 2000s era enemy.
2/
What I mean by 1970s: limited precision strikes, followed immediately multiple lines of armored advance (3 as Soviet doctrine commands, plus a 4th from the separatists who appear to be fighting alone).
3/
Offensive. Advances conducted by easiest routes possible - roadways - with avoidance of set battles en lieu of encirclements. Air assaults via helo/paratroopers to seize key C2 sites. Air Dominance if possible but not planned. This is Deep Strike War.
4/
What I mean by early 2000s:
Widely distributed high-value small arms and light weapons, dispersed command. Defensive/occupying. Population center control and casualty consciousness.
5/
Air Superiority as ultimate goal with total annihilating of enemy C2 AND force composition prior to any ground movement. This is Air-Land war a la 73 Easting.
6/
What does this mean?
Russia, despite its overwhelming size and inevitability of their goals in this situation, is incredibly out of date. Within the first 6hrs they stopped precision strikes (likely out of munitions) and began ground movement into contested air territory.
7/
Their deep strike air assault attempts thus far have been repulsed at Kyiv’s main airport, as well as in Mariupol and Odessa. Air dominance is still not even ensured nor were precision strikes fully successful in eliminating anti-air capabilities, also hindering their air aslt
8/ Their air-to-ground attacks have already diverted to unguided bombs in large part. Ukraine, despite the hopelessness of their fight, are outfighting the Russians who claimed 2 days to total victory.
9/Is this intended?
I don’t think this is doctrinal carryover, but rather capability-dictated-doctrine. In other words, this likely a financial/industrialization issue.
10/ They lack the volume of precision guided missiles/etc to decapitate, so they were forced to commit to an air assault before achieving even air dominance.
11/ Their ground troops are surprisingly mired on the outskirts of every city as they struggle to capture them, largely due to advanced anti-tank capabilities.
12/ Does the doctrine fit reality?
From a capabilities perspective, there was little choice. From an objectives perspective, no. Defenders in cities are forcing the Russians to siege them out, which is counter to deep strike’s method.
13/ Modern army sizes are not capable of siege anymore especially in open terrain — millions of combatants on either side of single cities in Stalingrad/Moscow during WW2; hundreds of thousands across the entire theatre in Ukraine today.
14/ Unguided munitions used on defended civilian areas will result in high casualties and possible insurgency.
15/ What can we learn from this?
Russia is utterly incapable. Ukrainians resisted hybrid warfare and forced conventional conflict. Their doctrine does not fit modern warfare’s objectives. This is likely due to their limited material capabilities.
16/ The internal damage to Russia will not be worth it, and their poor showing will do more to embolden their regional counterparts rather than cow them. The longer Ukraine survives the worse it looks and the more damaging it will be from a game-theoretic regional view.
17/ This is the modern equivalent of the Winter War and will likely encourage Finland and Sweden to join NATO, and unnerve the Serbs as to the veracity of Russian support.
18/ End game:
Russia wins in a week or so but continues to face an insurgency, more virulent the longer the active phase of war goes on. Ukraine is forced to sign a Versailles style dearmament treaty and is forced into a Belarus-style vassal state situation.
19/ Zelensky waits in exile but is likely assassinated in an obscured fashion but that will take a few years. Russia becomes increasingly ostracized and isolated until Putin’s death, especially within their region. The US steps up covert armament of Taiwan.
20/ Long term:
The fucking French conventional army would mop the floor with Russia by the look of this. The Russians cannot fight a modern war and their bullying capability is limited, and would be ineffective against NATO’s air power alone -
21/ something easily deployed from distance, though I’d expect more NATO allocation of forces near Russia after this anyways.
22/ This is a death-spasm, the fever breaking, and Russia’s decline is pretty much locked looking at this, simply from seeing how they fight. A US-Russian war would look like Iraq ‘91, both by overwhelming asymmetry and by multilateral coalition backing.
23/ Another thought addendum:
Russians are currently trying to hold the airport after they took it briefly, but they do not control it.
24/ Great insight in this event alone:
Deep Strike doctrine focuses on overwhelming an enemy across every front but with relatively limited concentration, and awaits for one of many avenues to break through so that then they can double down on any successes.
Enemy capability is hindered by rear actions and strikes to reduce their logistics and C2, increasing odds of small successes to capitalize on.
What happens when you don’t find any successes and your rear actions fail? That’s quite a slog of a fight, and while Soviet size armies were capable of working through it anyways, modern Russia can’t nearly as easily.
~25/ That all said, who knows how much man power Russia has committed thus far vs Ukrainian man power — if we are seeing only 30% of Russia’s force thus deployed, maybe there’s a lot more on the table.
26/ Alternatively, can Russia afford to deploy more than 30% of 90% of its active force (current in western theatre) anywhere ever? Leaves one awfully defenseless…
27/ if they fully commit to Ukraine and NATO decides to strike at Kaliningrad / Japan the Kuril Islands / China upper Manchuria / Georgia Abkhazia / etc etc etc. Truly an animal backed into a corner.
28/ Deep War theory is famously successful in tabletop exercises due to an odds game (rolling a dice for each battle front means that more battle fronts = more chance of success, and a strategy of using even small successes further encourages this game-reality miss match)
Kees Heistee was ook een vrouwquote:
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KLB / Mensen die denken topfotograaf te zijn
Zo leer je elke dag wat nieuws. Ik had nog nooit van ze gehoordquote:
Don't worry about the future. Or know that worrying is as effective as trying to solve an algebra equation by chewing bubble gum.
Hij is ook geen Nederlander vermoedelijkquote:
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Jij hebt een teringhekel aan Nederland of niet?
quote:
[..]
Nederlandse leger op weg...
[ afbeelding ]
HAHAHAHAHHAHA!quote:
[..]
Nederlandse leger op weg...
[ afbeelding ]
Qua eigen standpunt bedoel ik.quote:
[..]
GroenLinks zit niet in de regering, dus die kunnen geen boter bij de vis doen.
Bijna 30 jaar.quote:
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Ik weet niet of nu al praten de beste optie is. Kijk naar Wit-Rusland, dat gaat al 20 jaar gebukt onder Loekasjenko. 20 jaar is lang hoor, deze oorlog duurt pas 2 dagen, je wil een dergelijk scenario echt wel vermijden.
Hehe, nee schaamlap LGBT is niet de reden dat je geen meisje kan krijgenquote:
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Nederlandse leger op weg...
[ afbeelding ]
Opgeblazen gevoel of winderigheid? Zo opgelost met Rennie!
Jij bent écht grappig!quote:
[..]
Nederlandse leger op weg...
[ afbeelding ]
[i]Put me on a pedestal and I'll only disappoint you
Tell me I'm exceptional and I promise to exploit you
Give me all your money and I'll make some origami honey
I think you're a joke but I don't find you very funny[/i]
Tell me I'm exceptional and I promise to exploit you
Give me all your money and I'll make some origami honey
I think you're a joke but I don't find you very funny[/i]
Makkelijk ook. Kalf, put.quote:
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Ik ben ook geen GL-er maar het spreekt wel voor je als je je fouten kan toegeven. Nu hopen dat er ook echt wat gebeurt en het niet bij louter woorden blijft.
Denk aan Baudet die als Putin hier binnen valt heel dapper en eerlijk "Misschien had ik het fout gezien wat betreft Putin!" zegt.
Un dann rettet kein Kavallerie,
keine Zorro kümmert sich dodrömm.
Dä piss höchstens e " Zet " en der Schnie
keine Zorro kümmert sich dodrömm.
Dä piss höchstens e " Zet " en der Schnie
Ik vrees wel een beetje een EU leger dat als veerdienst gaat functioneren eerlijk gezegdquote:
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Misschien willen ze dat extra budget steken in diversity officers, tanks in regenboogkleuren spuiten en zo.
Het zou wel echt een beerput geven als de NAVO ze nu wel toevoeg. Dan heb je echt een cockshow daar.
quote:
Zijn er streams waar iets op te zien valt?
![Ukraine Live Camera - Multiple View Points [Russian Invasion]](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/iZebYm-nenY/0.jpg)
"Als mannen sneller als risico worden gezien en vrouwen overal mee wegkomen, dan verliezen we de nuance en rechtvaardigheid in het gesprek over grensoverschrijdend gedrag.
Dat is geen bescherming meer.
Dat is machtsmisbruik vermomd als moraal."
Dat is geen bescherming meer.
Dat is machtsmisbruik vermomd als moraal."
True. Dan heb je WOIII. Gebeurt dus niet.quote:
Het zou wel echt een beerput geven als de NAVO ze nu wel toevoeg. Dan heb je echt een cockshow daar.
Tuurlijk.quote:
Zijn er streams waar iets op te zien valt?
ik hoop het wel maar zie de kans heel klein in .... als dat nu gaat gebeuren dan heb je pas echt popcorn time .. dan breekt overal de pleuris uitquote:
Het zou wel echt een beerput geven als de NAVO ze nu wel toevoeg. Dan heb je echt een cockshow daar.
"Als mannen sneller als risico worden gezien en vrouwen overal mee wegkomen, dan verliezen we de nuance en rechtvaardigheid in het gesprek over grensoverschrijdend gedrag.
Dat is geen bescherming meer.
Dat is machtsmisbruik vermomd als moraal."
Dat is geen bescherming meer.
Dat is machtsmisbruik vermomd als moraal."
Nee daar mag je niet om vragenquote:
Zijn er streams waar iets op te zien valt?
Oke ik dacht eerst dat het onzin was, maar nu schrijft de volkskrant ook dat de Russen eventueel het ISS kunnen laten neerstorten...wtf
https://www.volkskrant.nl(...)oorzetten~b4cd943db/
Volgens mij niet zomaar mogelijk echter, dus ben niet te bang maar toch bizar dat het zomaar ter sprake komt.
https://www.volkskrant.nl(...)oorzetten~b4cd943db/
Volgens mij niet zomaar mogelijk echter, dus ben niet te bang maar toch bizar dat het zomaar ter sprake komt.
Opgeblazen gevoel of winderigheid? Zo opgelost met Rennie!
Alsof de Russen dat wat uitmaakt, die gek in het Kremlin houd je alleen tegen door Kiev in een nieuw Stalingrad te veranderen.quote:
Dat de Oekrainse regering de bevolking aanmoedigde om weerstand te bieden lijkt me een stommiteit. Dan geef je de Russen gewoon een excuus om burgerdoelen aan te vallen..
[ Bericht 2% gewijzigd door #ANONIEM op 25-02-2022 13:53:57 ]
Siswet is zodadelijk weer livequote:
Zijn er streams waar iets op te zien valt?
You know what they call a Quarter Pounder with Cheese in Paris?
een land in oorlog kon toch niet toetreden?quote:
Het zou wel echt een beerput geven als de NAVO ze nu wel toevoeg. Dan heb je echt een cockshow daar.
Nou, ik denk dat het een beetje een sarcastische manier is om te benadrukken waar de belangen in het westen de afgelopen jaren hebben gelegen. In plaats van in te zetten om een sterke defensie was er de naïve overtuiging dat dit toch niet meer nodig zou zijn. En men is meer bezig geweest met het leger "inclusief" en "divers" maken dan met daadwerkelijke zich versterken. Hoe denk je dat het Nederlandse leger het nu zou doen tegen Rusland? Ik zou het al knap vinden als ze het 24 uur vol zouden houden tegen een kwart van de Russische troepen.quote:
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Jij hebt een teringhekel aan Nederland of niet?
'I moved to Peru and shaved half my head and wrote for Teen Vogue. If I can come back from the depths of leftism, trust me, anyone can.' - Gina Florio
Neequote:Op vrijdag 25 februari 2022 13:52 schreef Eyjafjallajoekull het volgende:
Oke ik dacht eerst dat het onzin was, maar nu schrijft de volkskrant ook dat de Russen eventueel het ISS kunnen laten neerstorten...wtf
https://www.volkskrant.nl(...)oorzetten~b4cd943db/
Volgens mij niet zomaar mogelijk echter, dus ben niet te bang.
quote:Sending Nato forces to Ukraine would risk leading to 'existential' threat
Nato troops must not enter Ukraine because of the “risk of miscalculation” leading to “existential” threat, the armed forces minister has said.
James Heappey has told MPs that the government would “explore all that we can do to support the Ukrainians themselves over the next few days”.
He adds:
But we must all in this house be clear that British and Nato troops should not, must not, play an active role in Ukraine.
We must all be clear what the risk of miscalculation could be and how existential that could very quickly become if people miscalculate and things escalate unnecessarily.
are we infinite or am I alone
dan hadden ze zich net zo goed meteen kunnen overgeven zonder verzetquote:
[..]
Ga alsjeblieft praten...
Gaat voor de BHFH-award 2005!
Humanitas est in bestias bonitas.
I am the hole I can't get out of.
Humanitas est in bestias bonitas.
I am the hole I can't get out of.
Maar het lijkt er dus op dat de staat van het Russische leger nog zwakker is dan we al dachten, tijd om er voor eens en altijd mee af te rekenen dus
Klopt. Onzinnig fantasietje dat ze nu even snel de Navo binnen worden geloodst.quote:
[..]
een land in oorlog kon toch niet toetreden?
