[Centraal] Crisis in Syrië en Irak #430

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 11:32 schreef Richestorags het volgende:

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Om kansloos te blaten in Twitterreeksen?

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The Syrian conflict is about to turn into a struggle between two military commanders who have great public and political support from their home countries. They are closely monitoring the developments of the town of al-Bab in northern Syria.

One of these officers is Qasem Soleimani who has been commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force since 1988. He is known as ‘The Iranian sword in the Middle East.’

The Quds Force carries out IRGC’s external activities, which is why Soleimani has been regularly touring Iraq, Syria, and Yemen over the past few years. He was once the unparalleled commander of military operations in the Middle East.

He currently has a rival on the ground in Iraq and especially in Syria, though. His new competitor is Major General Zekai Aksakallı, commander of the Turkish Special Forces.

Aksakallı might well end up being a new foreign hero in the Syrian war. His forces are directly linked to the general command of the Turkish armed forces.

These two commanders have both participated in military operations against the Kurds, gaining their initial military experience and fame in wars against Kurdish forces.

For his initial military assignment, Soleimani was sent to the Kurdish province of Urmia to fight Kurdish forces that were in control of a wide area in eastern (Iranian) Kurdistan at the time.

Similarly, Aksakallı’s initial military experience started with his engagement in Turkey’s operations against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

However, their relationship with the Kurdistan Region’s political leadership is different.

In 2012, Soleimani reportedly tried to convince Erbil to let Iran use Kurdistan Region territory to transport weapons to Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria.

“Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) officials rejected Soleimani’s request,” sources say.

The Turkish Special Forces led by Aksakallı currently have 15 military and coordination bases in the Kurdistan Region.

Soleimani is known to be the kind of military commander who does not stay long in a single military zone. That is why western media refers to him as the ‘shadow commander.’

Aksakallı was born in 1962 in Erzurum. He is also known to be a roaming commander. He was sent to Azerbaijan in 1984 to train the Azeri military. Years later, he reemerged across the Azerbaijan-Armenia border in 2014.

Soleimani was on the battlefields in Syria at the time. “He’s running the war himself,” a Pentagon official was cited as saying.

Two years later, Aksakallı reemerged in plain military clothing in Jarabulus. He was not wearing any insignia to indicate his military rank. In August 2016, in an operation known as Euphrates Shield, Turkish Special Forces alongside Syrian opposition forces recaptured Jarabulus from ISIS.

Turkey had earlier suggested the idea of creating a safe zone, but the idea was turned into action only last year. The reason behind the idea was to create a shelter for opposition forces and civilians, and prevent the creation of a Kurdish region in western (Syrian) Kurdistan, and push back ISIS militants from the Turkish-Syrian border.

Turkey’s aim was to turn the safe zone into a de facto region which it can use if situations become more complex. Sources close to the Turkish government and army say that Aksakallı himself did the planning for the operation known as Euphrates Shield and he is currently leading it.

The commander of the Turkish Special Forces did not stop in Jarabulus. Rather, he, with his forces, penetrated deeper into Syrian territory. A photograph of Aksakallı taken near the town of al-Bab surfaced in February this year.

South of al-Bab are pro-Bashar al-Assad forces – who execute orders coming from Soleimani. Unlike the photo taken in Jarabulus, Aksakallı appeared in civilian clothing.

These two commanders both have rural backgrounds which may explain why they keep quiet at political events. However, they both are charismatic within their military forces. Aksakallı is the strongest candidate so far to become the country’s generalissimo in 2018. They both strongly support the authorities of their countries. Right from the beginning of the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Soleimani has been serving on different military fronts and defending the country’s objectives.

Aksakallı has close relations with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the July 15 coup, he became known as Erdoğan’s savior. He apparently discouraged many military commanders from participating in the coup, thereby undermining the attempt to seize power. He scrambled a fighter jet to hit another jet which was reportedly targeting Erdoğan’s plane. He also designed the plan to retake Istanbul airport to ensure that the president’s plane could land.

On the night of the coup, Aksakallı was at a party with his wife. He was attacked by commando forces upon exiting from event. He foiled the attack, though his wife was wounded. This explains why he received broad military powers. He is also seen as a political savior by the country’s political authorities.

Aksakallı does not like political wrangling in spite of his strong position among politicians. Like Soleimani, he regards himself as a military man. He was invited by the parliament’s investigation committee to answer questions about the coup, but refused to make an appearance, saying, “I am busy with the war in Syria.”

People close to Aksakallı say that he has close relations with his soldiers, just like Soleimani. He even participates in their parties and events. He visits military headquarters in northern (Turkish) Kurdistan during religious feasts like Ramadan.

Unlike Iran’s elite Pasdaran and Quds Forces, Turkish Special Forces are committed to orders from the higher military chain of command. Hence, Turkey cannot engage in militia wars or operations that involve militia forces, unlike Iran. However, there seems to be a change in Turkey’s policies following the operation to retake Jarabulus. Turkish armed forces are taking part in this operation side by side with the Free Syrian Army. Aksakallı himself came up with the idea of launching the operation this way. He might therefore now think that Turkey should be more open to engage in external operations.

After the operation to free al-Bab, the pro-Assad forces (led by Soleimani) and the joint forces of the Turkish army and the Free Syrian Army (led by Aksakallı) might turn to Raqqa. If these two nationalist military commanders fail to test each other’s strength and experience in al-Bab, then the operation to free Raqqah could provide answers to their rivalry.

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In this tale of two men, both are national heroes backed by unmatched political and popular support while commanding the best-equipped, most elite armed units in Iraq and Syria. More topically, both are now closely following the developments at al-Bab and preparing for their aftermath.

One of the two people I am talking about is already a well-known social phenomenon: Gen. Qasem Soleimani, known as "Iran's sword in the Middle East." Since 1988, he has been commanding the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His every visit to Iraq and Syria becomes a social media event, with all his pictures and statements going viral.

Born in 1957 in a mountain village of Kirman province in southeast Iran, he worked in construction for a while and then joined the Revolutionary Guard. His official education is limited to elementary school.

The star of Soleimani, who proved his loyalty to the Iranian regime and revolution with his success in putting down the 1979 Kurdish uprising at Mahabad, truly shone in the Iran-Iraq War. Currently, the Iranian security bureaucracy is managed by generals who, like Soleimani, proved themselves in that war while amassing significant combat experience. The links between these generals set the course in Iran's domestic politics and now also Iran's policies in Iraq and Syria.

Even a brief Google search will yield enough information on Soleimani's reputation and achievements to impress anyone. For some, he is the shadow commander of Iran. For others, he is the conqueror of Aleppo -- lately, he has been called "the architect of the victory at Mosul."

But today Soleimani has a rival in Iraq and especially in Syria: Lt. Gen. Zekai Aksakalli, commander of the Turkish Special Forces (TSF), who is directly attached to the chief of general staff.

Aksakalli has been commanding the TSF, the Turkish military's most elite unit, since 2013. His already impeccable reputation skyrocketed during the July 15 abortive coup, when he avoided capture by the coup plotters, then played a major role in thwarting the attempt. Because of his major success and the gratitude felt toward him, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in July, even though rumors had circulated that he was going to retire in August.

Aksakalli was born in the eastern Turkish city of Erzurum in 1962. After finishing high school, he enrolled in the Army War Academy, where he made global achievements in cross-country track competitions. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1984 and spent most of his career in commando units and combating the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) with the Special Forces Command, and then training the Azerbaijani military. He first became visible in the media in November 2014 when he visited the Azerbaijan-Armenia border. Photos of him aiming a sniper rifle became a hit in Turkish media. He was next seen on a national TV channel the night of the coup attempt, when his unyielding opposition to the coup attempt won the public's admiration and confidence. Next, in August, we saw Aksakalli at Jarablus, Syria.

At Jarablus, Aksakalli was wearing standard military field fatigues with no rank insignia so he would appear to be a regular trooper to anyone looking through a scope from a distance. This month, Aksakalli was photographed observing the al-Bab region through binoculars, but this time he was dressed in military-type civilian clothes, as Soleimani does.

Today under Aksakalli, the TSF maintains about 15 liaison offices in Iraq's Bashiqa, Zakho, Dahuk, Kanimasi and Bamerni. He is effectively in charge of the entire Operation Euphrates Shield.

Both commanders hail from modest rural backgrounds and have charismatic personalities. They don't have academic degrees and don't conceal their nationalist inclinations. Both are supported by their own headquarters staff members who have been loyally serving them for a long time. Both are adored by the public and can count on full political support for their activities, especially in Syria. Both are tough soldiers who overcame many adversities in their military careers but also acquired impressive combat experience.

Both men excel in motivating their subordinates. They are experts in unconventional warfare. Their photos add to their charisma, but neither is a good orator. Both are strongly anti-US, and they see the United States as the source of all regional problems. However, that doesn't make them pro-Russia, as their nationalist-independent ideologies are not a secret. Both prefer to be in the field instead of talking politics in Ankara and Tehran, constantly accessible to the media. Neither is really comfortable with rigid civilian political control. For example, in November, when the parliamentary inquiry commission on the coup attempt invited Aksakalli to come to Ankara to testify, he refused, saying, "I am fighting in Syria."

It is well-known that Soleimani has been having persistent disagreements with civilian decision-makers in Tehran over the status, functions and responsibilities of Shiite militias in Iraq.

Meanwhile, the biggest difference between the two commanders is that they are commanding in Syria and Iraq the elite forces of two rival countries and their allied indigenous armed militias -- making them rivals in the field. Although there has not been any armed confrontation between the national units and local militias they command, developments in northern Syria signal that this probability is not too far off.

Their military careers are not similar. Aksakalli is a uniformed military man who served in conventional units of the Turkish army, obedient to the chain of command with strict field discipline. Soleimani, however, frequently takes personal initiatives and achieved amazing status as a paramilitary civilian who could solve problems by himself.

Although it may sound much too speculative at this point, I think one way or another the paths of Aksakalli and Soleimani will eventually cross for the first time in northern Syria, particularly around Raqqa. If Turkey heads toward Raqqa after the capture of al-Bab, will there be clashes between the Shiite militias commanded by Soleimani and the Sunni Free Syrian Army elements controlled by Aksakalli?

I admit, it may difficult to answer now. But six months ago I was laughing off such an eventuality, and now I am seriously scratching my head over it.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 14:08 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Deze reactie in de comments vat eigenlijk alles wel goed samen.

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En deze:

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Er is geen equivalent van Soleimani in de wereld, laat staan in Turkije of de regio. Zelfs de welbekende Amerikaanse generaal Petraeus zag Soleimani als een 'waardige tegenstander', die hem in Irak volledig buitenspel had gezet.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 14:26 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Gaat erom dat ze gelijk hebben. Die Turk mag zijn schoenen niet eens poetsen.

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https://www.washingtonpos(...)m_term=.d2ce036ca72a

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https://books.google.nl/b(...)20of%20karla&f=false

[ afbeelding ]

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Ga niet een heel discussie starten over Turkei vs Aryaland hierdoor, het is gewoon gedeeld voor mensen die het willen lezen.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 14:37 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Valt me toch tegen van je. Die gebrekkige kennis van de Turks-Iraanse geschiedenis. De Turken hebben in geen enkele heads-up oorlog van de Perzen gewonnen.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Perso-Turkic_War
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Perso-Turkic_War

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 14:57 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Je haalt verschillende dingen door elkaar.

Je had het over een directe militaire clash. Die keren dat de Perzen tegenover de Turken stonden hebben de Turken nooit gewonnen. Ze hebben Iran wel inderdaad wel voor lange tijd bestuurd (ook eigenlijk niet helemaal waar, aangezien de bureaucraten en viziers vaak Perzen waren), maar daar is een nooit een oorlog aan vooraf gegaan. Iran was destijds simpelweg een defensieloos stukje gebied dat voor het oprapen lag. Er is nooit een equivalent van Manzikert geweest waarin de Turken de Perzen in een beslissende oorlog versloegen en het rijk overnamen. En de Ottomaanse-Safavidische clash was in feite een intra-Turkse oorlog.

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Iran heeft het in militaire zin eigenlijk altijd wel goed gedaan tegen de Turken of staten/rijken in Anatolie; geen enkele entiteit uit Anatolie heeft bijvoorbeeld ooit Iran geregeerd.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:17 schreef Perrin het volgende:

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Zo gaat het daar al duizenden jaren.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:21 schreef JubaUrbicus het volgende:

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Oftewel Irak in 2 delen splitsen, Turks Irak en Iran Irak. De sjiieten mogen met Iran en de sunnieten en de Koerden mogen met Turkije. Lijkt mij wel een goede oplossing.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:24 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Punt is alleen dat de Ottomanen en Safaviden beiden Turks waren en diens legers grotendeels uit Turken bestonden. Dus niet echt een Perzisch leger dat slaags raakte met de Turken. Het feit dat zowel de Seltsjoeken als Safaviden cultureel gezien Perzisch waren doet daar niets aan af. Anders kan ik net zo goed stellen dat de Perzen onder Nader Sjah de Ottomanen wisten te verslaan.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Yeghev%C4%81rd

Buiten dat hebben de Perzen slechts drie keer echt tegenover de Turken gestaan. Twee keer wonnen de Perzen; een keer wisten de Turken, enkel samen met de Byzantijnen, de Perzen te verslaan.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Perso-Turkic_War

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:26 schreef JubaUrbicus het volgende:

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Sjiieten zijn toch broeders van elkaar, de Arabische sjiieten en de Perzische kunnen het volgens mij goed met elkaar vinden. Ze zijn lid van dezelfde sekte (mainstream 12vers) en werken met elkaar samen momenteel op veel fronten. Daarnaast miljoenen Perzische bedevaartgangers die jaarlijks naar Karbala en Najef afreizen.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:29 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Iran zal nooit Irak, of een gedeelte ervan, overnemen. Het prefereert directe invloed door middel van omkoping van Iraakse politici en door haar gecontroleerde proxies.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:33 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Is goed, habibi.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:25 schreef Twiitch het volgende:
Zelfs al krijg je de Irakezen zo ver, zowel Israël als SA gaan een dergelijke uitbreiding van Iran niet accepteren lijkt me.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:37 schreef Twiitch het volgende:

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En jij verwacht dat de VS aan de zijlijn blijven staan wanneer Iran aan het annexeren slaat?

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:38 schreef ElDinosaur het volgende:

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SA heeft al grote moeite met een stel schapenherders in Jemen. Typisch voorbeeld dat geld niet alle problemen op kan lossen.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:38 schreef JubaUrbicus het volgende:

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Zo raar is dat niet, de Baath partij was ook populair bij sjiieten zowel in Syria als in Irak. Nationalisme en dan voornamelijk het Baath nationalisme was een ideologie die religieus sektarisme volledig heeft geannulleerd zowel bij haar sunnitische als haar sjiietische aanhangers.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:40 schreef Twiitch het volgende:

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Dat klopt, maar ze hadden het hier over Irak verdelen tussen Turkije en Iran. Dat lijkt me bij voorbaat al kansloos zonder militair optreden.

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Ja jeetje zeg, wat wil jij gaan doen als je ineens vleugels krijgt?

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 15:42 schreef Stabiel het volgende:

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Aantal factoren:

1) Directe annexatie zorgt enkel voor nationalistische spanningen. De Iraakse Sjiieten mogen dan een sterke affectie voor Iran hebben vanwege een gemeenschappelijke religieuze identiteit, maar dat verdwijnt snel als Iran het land gaat bezetten. Zeker in het licht van de welbekende Arabisch-Perzische strijd.
2) Directe annexatie zorgt ervoor dat Iran direct verantwoordelijk wordt voor haar welzijn, maar Irak is te chaotisch en onontwikkeld voor Iran om hier aan vingers aan te verbranden.
3) Iran's strategie is controle (of invloed) middels proxies. Dat geeft een land veel meer flexibiliteit dan andersom het geval zijn.
4) Najaf (Irak) en Qom (Iran), die beide de grote sjiitische leercentra vertegenwoordigen, zijn de facto rivalen van elkaar. Zelfs de meest invloedrijke geestelijke in Irak, Sistani (die zelf een Iranier is), heeft altijd invloed vanuit Qom proberen buiten te houden. Laatst nog een relevante artikel hierover in Al-Monitor:

http://www.al-monitor.com(...)haidari-muqtada.html

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 22:49 schreef ElDinosaur het volgende:

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Wat Turkije doet kan me weinig schelen, alleen die ultra's die geen enkel realiteitsbesef hebben komen me de strot uit ondertussen.

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Op vrijdag 3 maart 2017 22:59 schreef ElDinosaur het volgende:

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Oh, ik sta vierkant achter Assad in dit conflict. Ik ben dan ook aanhanger van de gedachte dat democratie in het M-O gewoonweg niet werkt.