Iran blokkeert olietransport bij sancties

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Op vrijdag 30 december 2011 11:29 schreef SeLang het volgende:
De Amerikanen daarentegen moeten verkiezingen winnen. En niemand heeft trek in een duur conflict, nog los van het feit dat ze daar domweg geen geld voor hebben. Dus zij zullen geneigd zijn om toe te geven.

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Op vrijdag 30 december 2011 11:34 schreef starla het volgende:

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Net of er dan opeens minder vraag is naar olie.

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Op vrijdag 30 december 2011 11:37 schreef starla het volgende:
En omdat de vraag blijft, blijft het inkopen van olie.

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Op vrijdag 30 december 2011 11:49 schreef starla het volgende:

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Dit snap ik niet. Iran gaat zichzelf toch niet afsluiten? Dat zou economische zelfmoord zijn. De prijs gaat omhoog omdat andere olieproducerende landen hun product niet kwijt kunnen waardoor het aanbod minder is dan de vraag. Iran kan dus lekker zijn olie kwijt voor een hogere prijs.

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Although Iran is one of the largest term-contract suppliers after Saudi Arabia,
the vast majority of crude oil buyers have not categorized it as a baseload supplier
in the past. Even Japanese companies, which are well represented on Iran’s
customer list, regard these supplies as among the most expendable. This status
reflected both Iran’s past record of aggressive marketing, as well as the political uncertainties
that surrounded its oil exports, as was illustrated by the broadening of the US
boycott on all purchases of Iranian crude oil in 1995. Although they limited the scope of
Iran’s sales outlets, these political measures did not inhibit its oil exports or significantly
undermine the prices Iran received for its crude oils on the international market. Tehran’s
secondary status was also partly the result of its own marketing methods, which have
included a heavy reliance on spot sales, prefinancing and other alternative methods. But
in recent years Iran has not been under pressure to boost sales volumes, and its termcontract-
sales policies became steadier and more stable.
[..]
Iran
Iran has proven to be very adept at maintaining its export base even though the US
market remains off-limits due to sanctions.
[..]
State-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is the country’s exclusive
seller and is known for using perhaps the widest array of marketing techniques of
any oil exporter. It has made varying use of traders as marketing intermediaries, while also
relying on barter, prefinancing deals, crude oil-for-product swaps, sales from storage, spot
deals, delivered sales in Europe and the Mediterranean, and a host of other alternatives to
traditional f.o.b. term contracts. A large chunk of Iran’s crude oil exports to Japan since 1999
has been committed to debt reduction. NIOC has its own trading venture, the Swiss-based
Naftiran Intertrade Co. (Nico), which markets spot barrels in Europe. Iran Light exports range
around 35% of total sales, while Iran Heavy accounts for 45%. Virtually all offshore output is
exported and now accounts for around 20% of the total.
The more traditional term contracts that Iran maintains are kept up annually
with Asian customers, mainly in Japan (630,000 b/d in 2004), South Korea (199,000
b/d) and China (266,000 b/d). Current sales to Asia average about 1.2 million b/d spread
out among several countries and account for just under half of total exports. Prices are under
the standard monthly formula terms with fairly predictable volumes. NIOC applies a marketrelated
pricing system to all its oil exports. For sales to Asia, Iran Light was linked to Oman
and Iran Heavy only to Dubai until 1998; since then, however, both are expressed as
differentials to a monthly average of both crudes on an f.o.b. basis.
European sales make up most of the rest of Iranian exports, about 35%. Formula
prices used to be linked to spot North Sea Brent levels, but in January 2001, NIOC
followed Saudi Arabia and Kuwait by adopting Brent B-Wave pricing for those
markets. Pricing is mostly handled on a cargo-by-cargo basis with substantial variation
among buyers. Some Western buyers, in particular Shell and BP, consider their combined
purchases of about 450,000 b/d of Iranian crude to be spot barrels rather than term no matter
how regular and stable the volumes are.
US sales remain suspended and NIOC’s marketing efforts have been complicated
by the tight US government restrictions that prevent any US refiner from utilizing
Iranian crude oil anywhere in the world. US firms, including Exxon Mobil and Coastal
States, were among Iran’s biggest buyers before the 1995 Executive Order signed by US
President Bill Clinton forced them to stop. With the continuation of the US embargo and
concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a revival of direct oil sales to the US from Iran and
participation of US companies in the country’s oil sector development appears unlikely in the
near future.

Iran crude grades
Azadegan • Foroozan Blend • Iran Heavy • Iran Light • Lavan Blend • Sirri
Bron: International Crude Oil Handbook