quote:
Expert blames US with emboldening Iraqi Kurds
Iraqi Kurds underestimate Turkey's resolve, overestimate US sympathy, Rubin says
A leading U.S. expert on Iraq said that the Washington administration was partly responsible for an irreconcilable attitude by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership in pursuing a secessionist agenda and supporting the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which attacks Turkish targets from the war-torn country's Kurdish-controlled north.
Iraqi Kurds may regret having underestimated Turkey's resolve to fight the PKK and to stop the creation of an independent Kurdistan, Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the conservative think tank, the American Enterprise Institute here, said in an article published in this week's The Weekly Standard.
Secretary of State Condoleezza "Rice's inattention to symbolism further bolstered the Iraqi Kurds' nationalist drive," Rubin wrote.
He was referring to Rice's moves to recently refer to the Turkish-Iraqi frontier as "the border between Turkey and Kurdistan" and to meet Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government, at the latter's headquarters in northern Iraq rather than in Baghdad during her first visit to Iraq as secretary of state.
"Kurdish officials painted her decision as an endorsement of their national aspirations," Rubin said.
"The State Department has been unwilling to meet [Iraqi Kurdish] toughness with toughness. By restricting freedom of movement on the basis of ethnicity, Kurdish authorities have violated the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. [The State Department] nonetheless refused to make U.S. aid conditional on better behavior of the Kurds," he said. "On June 23, 2004, U.S. authorities transferred $1.4 billion to Kurdish leaders. Less than a week after receiving that windfall, the Kurdistan Regional Government signed its own oil-prospecting agreement with the Norwegian company DNO, a slap in the face to Iraqi unity."
Rubin's critique of the Iraqi Kurds and the U.S. administration was the most comprehensive and harshest so far in Washington.
Between 2002 and 2004, Rubin worked as a country director for Iran and Iraq in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Since the 2003 Iraq war, he has frequently visited northern Iraq and Turkey.
Rubin gave several examples pointing to Kurdish aspirations for independence, also suggesting expansionist tendencies.
"Kurdish television and newspapers are rife with incitements to unrest, often referring to Iraqi Kurdistan as 'South Kurdistan,' thereby implying that large chunks of Turkey must be 'North Kurdistan.' ... The Kurdish flag adopted by Barzani is that of the short-lived, separatist Mahabad (Kurdish) Republic, which, with Soviet backing, declared its independence from Iran in 1946. Maps printed on Iraqi Kurdish presses and sold in the Erbil and Sulaimaniya markets show a Greater Kurdistan stretching from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf," he wrote.
Rubin said that the Iraqi Kurdish leadership clearly sheltered the PKK, and many weapons supplied by the United States to the peshmerga ended up in the hands of the terrorist group.
"Barzani places little restriction on PKK travel within northern Iraq. In October 2006, two PKK leaders received treatment in an Erbil hospital; three monthslater they were photographed in an Erbil restaurant. Meanwhile, the PKK continues to smuggle explosives and carry out attacks in Turkey," he said.
"Iraqi Kurdish leaders continue to shelter the PKK. Whether their support is active or passive is irrelevant, for there are no acceptable levels of support for terror. Nor is it responsible to undercut the security of a long-term NATO ally like Turkey," he wrote.
However, referring to Barzani's recent remarks that "Turkey, Syria and Iran should get used to the idea of an independent Kurdistan," Rubin suggested that the Kurds might pay a price for confronting Turkey.
"The Kurds underestimate Turkish resolve. Many Iraqi Kurds say the peshmerga can defeat the Turkish army in the mountains of northern Iraq - and believe that, in any case, it won't come to that," he said.
"In 1998, a similar standoff occurred when the Syrian government ignored Turkish demands that Damascus stop sheltering the PKK. The Turkish army mobilized. The late Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad had a more sober view of the Turks and expelled PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Those in Turkey's political and military decision-making circles from the time said they planned to enter Syria, with or without a green light from Washington," Rubin said.
"Barzani also overestimates the meaning of U.S. sympathy for the Kurds," he said. "Nor would fear of European disapproval deter Ankara from attacking PKK bases. Too many European leaders have already made clear that Turkey has no hope of entering the European Union. And polls show the Turkish public no longer looks favorably upon EU membership. Turkish officials understand that even if they receive no green light from Washington, the only consequence of a cross-border raid would be to force Iraqi officials to seal their northern border."
Let's get ready to RUMBLEEEEEEEE