Iraanse olie machtiger wapen dan kernbom

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Iraanse olie machtiger wapen dan kernbom
Bron : http://www.planet.nl/plan(...)tid=685013/sc=b11e9f
Gepubliceerd op dinsdag 21 februari 2006
Er is veel te doen om het Iraanse atoomprogramma. Maar wellicht vormt de lancering van de Iraanse Oliebeurs (IOB), gepland voor 20 maart, een grotere bedreiging voor de VS dan een Iraanse kernbom.

In een nieuwe provocatie van aartsvijand de Verenigde Staten, opent Iran volgende maand zijn oliebeurs, waar de brandstof in euro’s in plaats van dollars verhandeld zal worden. Dat kan grote gevolgen hebben voor de Amerikaanse hegemonie in de oliehandel.

Iran is een grote speler op de internationale oliemarkt. Het land is de tweede producent van ruwe olie na Saudi-Arabië en pompt vijf procent van de totale wereldbehoefte uit de bodem. Iran heeft oliereserves van 126 miljard vaten, ofwel tien procent van de totale wereldreserves. Iran is bovendien het op een na grootste land ter wereld wat betreft gasreserves.

Voorts ligt Iran strategisch ten opzichte van grootverbruikers als China, India en Europa. Iran en India sloten vorig jaar een deal voor de levering van vloeibaar gas de komende 25 jaar en Iran zal 30 jaar lang gas leveren aan China. Beide landen investeren ook in de ontwikkeling van het Iraanse olieveld Yadaravan. De economieën van India en vooral China zijn international gigantisch in opkomst.

Europa is grootste afnemer
Dat Iran zijn olie in euro’s wil verhandelen is niet onlogisch. Europa is zijn grootste afnemer en de handel met EU-landen is goed voor 45 procent van de totale Iraanse export. Meer dan een derde van de Iraanse olie-uitvoer gaat richting Europa. De dollars die Iran daarvoor krijgt moet het land omwisselen, waarbij fluctuerende valutakoersen en transactiekosten om de hoek komen kijken. De koers van de dollar ten opzichte van de euro is sinds 2002 met meer dan een kwart gedaald, en dat heeft de koopkracht van Iran ten opzichte van de EU aanzienlijk gereduceerd.

Logischerwijs profiteert Europa van de sterkere euro, en is bovendien het voordeel van de Iraanse Oliebeurs (IOB) dat Europese landen in hun eigen valuta olie van Iran kunnen kopen, zonder de kosten van het omwisselen in de dollar.

Landen stappen over op euro
Olie is het bloed van elke moderne, geïndustrialiseerde economie. Als ’s werelds grootste olie-importeur zal de Amerikaanse economie het meest te lijden hebben onder de Iraanse overschakeling op de euro. Niet voor niets zei president Bush dit jaar in zijn State-of-the-Union-toespraak dat Amerika af moet van zijn ‘verslaving’ aan olie.

Als de euro een serieus alternatief wordt voor de dollar op de internationale oliemarkt, zullen geleidelijk andere landen overstappen op de euro. De organisatie van olieproducerende landen OPEC handelt nu nog alleen in dollars, maar als de leden ook voor de euro kunnen kiezen, zal de macht van de VS over de OPEC uitgehold worden.

China en Japan zijn blij dat ze niet langer alleen maar afhankelijk zijn van de dollar en zich beter kunnen wapenen tegen zijn depreciatie door ook euroreserves aan te leggen. Dat zal leiden tot verdere devaluatie van de dollar. Dat heeft grote gevolgen voor het reusachtige Amerikaanse begrotingstekort, dat steunt op buitenlandse - voornamelijk Aziatische - leningen en handel in de dollar. Daar staat tegenover dat de eurozone niet kampt met een gigantisch begrotingstekort.

Amerikaanse bedrijven worden bovendien gedwarsboomd door het Amerikaanse handelsembargo tegen Iran, waardoor ze niet kunnen investeren in de lucratieve olie-industrie.

De oprichting van de IOB is voor Iran natuurlijk niet alleen een economisch besluit. Iran wil zijn aartsvijand Amerika een slag toebrengen en regionale heerschappij bewerkstelligen. “Het is onderdeel van een zeer intelligentie, creatieve Iraanse strategie, om op elke mogelijk manier in het offensief te gaan en anderen tegen de VS te mobiliseren”, zei Iran-expert George Perkovich van het Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in augustus 2005 tegen de Christian Science Monitor.

Militaire aanval
Sommige waarnemers achten de bedreiging van de IOB voor het door de bestaande oliebeurzen NYMEX en de ICE gecontroleerde petrodollarsysteem zo groot, dat een Amerikaanse militaire aanval op Iran niet wordt uitgesloten. Ze wijzen erop dat Saddam Hussein in 2000 zijn olie in euro’s ging verkopen. Vijf jaar en een oorlog later wordt de Iraakse olie weer in dollars verhandeld.

Tot dusver lieten de VS Iran over aan Europa. Maar president Bush en consorten hebben nooit verhuld dat een aanval op Iran tot de mogelijkheden behoort. Mogelijk worden de fluwelen handschoenen na 20 maart uitgetrokken.

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Op dinsdag 21 februari 2006 16:02 schreef sizzler het volgende:
De euro zal wel weer stijgen tov de dollar. Mooi als je naar dollar(gerelateerde) landen gaat. Maar tegelijkertijd worden onze producten duurder tov Amerikaanse. En dat is weer niet goed voor de export. Niet dat het zo'n vaart zal lopen. Binnen een jaar valt de VS Iran binnen en dan laten ze de olie weer gewoon in dollars betalen. Net als bij Irak.

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Geheime diensten: Iran bouwt kernwapen

Iran ontwikkelt wel degelijk een kernwapen. De Iraanse regering haalt de benodigde hoogwaardige apparatuur uit Europa. En het land zoekt naar materialen waarmee een langeafstandsraket kan worden ontwikkeld.

Dat blijkt uit een rapport dat is gebaseerd op informatie van de Britse , de Franse, de Duitse en de Belgische geheime diensten, schrijft de Britse krant the Guardian woensdag.

Waarschuwing
Het rapport, gedateerd 1 juli 2005, is gebruikt om Europese regeringsleiders te waarschuwen. Ook zijn belangrijke personen in het bedrijfsleven ingelicht. Zij moeten goed opletten bij het exporteren naar schurkenstaten.

Iran blijft weigeren te buigen voor de eis van Amerika en de Europese Unie te stoppen met het verrijken van uranium. Teheran beweert dat verrijkt uranium alleen zal worden gebruikt om energie op te wekken in een door de Russen gebouwde kerncentrale.

Maar het rapport wijst er op dat Iran in Europa en landen van de voormalige Sovjet-Unie een netwerk heeft opgezet van bedrijven, instellingen en academische instituten met maar een doel: kennis over en materialen voor kernwapens verzamelen.

Verder verzamelt Iran ook materialen voor chemische wapens. Net als Pakistan en Syrië overigens.

Israël
Iran zet intussen de internationale betrekkingen steeds verder op scherp. Zondag vergeleek de Iraanse president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad de Israëliërs met de nazi's (lees Iran: Israël net zo erg als nazi-Duitsland).

Volgens geruchten is de Israëlische premier Ariel Sharon van plan om eind maart locaties in Iran aan te vallen, waar in het geheim uranium wordt verrijkt. Volgens militaire bronnen zou dan het 'point of no return' zijn bereikt, omdat Iran dan genoeg kennis heeft vergaard om uranium te verrijken en binnen twee tot vier jaar kernwapens te maken (lees 'Israëlische leger gaat Iran aanvallen').

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Will Iran’s oil kill the U.S. dollar?
Bron : aljazeera
If Iran launched its IOB, the U.S. dollar will weaken and the euro strengthen

Speculations have begun regarding whether the proposed March 2006 launch of the Iranian oil bourse (IOB), will become the catalyst for a significant blow to the position of the U.S. dollar?

Iran is about to begin pricing its oil in euros. Unfortunately, just about everyone would benefit--except the United States- Without some form of U.S. intervention, the euro is going to establish a firm foothold in the international oil trade.

The U.S. dollar has been the strongest currency of the world for more than half a century, with about 70% of percent of all currency reserves in American dollars.

This could be a logical explanation for why the Islamic republic would be the U.S.’s next target.

This is closely related to the fact that oil, the most important commodity traded in the world, is mostly priced in U.S. dollars. The majority of countries that are oil importers have to buy their oil in U.S. dollars, which forces them to keep most of their foreign currency in dollars.

The crippling U.S. debt crisis makes its fragile economy mostly dependent on the high demand for its currency in order to remain afloat.

There is a move underway by Iran, the world’s second-largest producer of crude oil—and labeled a member of President Bush’s so-called “axis of evil”, that threatens the current dominant position of the American dollar.

Tehran has lately confirmed its plan to create a euro-based exchange in oil—to compete with the London and New York dollar-denominated oil exchanges, both American-owned.

If proved successful, the Iranian oil bourse (IOB) is expected to give the euro a foothold in the international oil trade, solidifying its status as an alternative oil transaction currency. This would eventually lead to a major currency flight from the dollar to the euro—and a disaster for America.

The IOB will see crude oil, petrochemicals and other commodities of the same kind traded in euros.

But the question here is what are Iran’s motives behind such a move?

According to economists, Iran’s move does make sense, especially since the European Union is Iran’s biggest trading partner. Also it will deal a major blow to Iran’s archfoe America, and, by hoping to make Iran the main hub for oil deals in the region; it will drive the Islamic Republic forward in its quest for regional supremacy.

George Perkovich, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, has made it clear that the move is: “part of a very intelligent, creative Iranian strategy—to go on the offense in every way possible and mobilize other actors against the U.S.” (Christian Science Monitor, August 30).

This economic move could be the best and most effective strike against a mighty military foe, the United States.

According to a report published recently by Asia Times, “Oil in euros would benefit millions … in the EU and its trading partners …. And it would loosen the grip the U.S. has on OPEC members”

“One of the Federal Reserve’s nightmares may begin to unfold in the spring of 2006,” one expert on the subject stated, “when it appears that international buyers will have a choice of buying a barrel of oil for $60 on the NYMEX [New York Mercantile Exchange] and IPE [London’s International Petroleum Exchange] or purchase a barrel of oil for ¤45 to ¤50 via the Iranian bourse” (Global Politician, September 2).

The IOB will accelerate the already-existent global trend of shifting foreign currency reserves from dollars to euros would. Thus, “countries switching to euro reserves from dollar reserves would bring down the value of the U.S. currency. Imports would start to cost Americans a lot more …. As countries and businesses converted their dollar assets into euro assets, the U.S. property and stock market bubbles would, without doubt, burst” (The Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability, Nov. 15, 2004).

The impact of a reserve currency switch would be catastrophic for the U.S., according to the Global Politician. The U.S. “would simply have to stop importing” (op. cit.).

If Iran launched its IOB, the U.S. dollar will weaken and the euro strengthen—helping speed up the economic decline of the U.S.

Numerous economists have expressed optimism about Iran’s ambitions, saying that the impact of the Iran oil bourse on the American dollar—and U.S. economy could be worse than Iran launching a “direct nuclear attack.”

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Hoe Bush rijk wordt van de oorlog
Bron : PlanetInternet

Gepubliceerd op donderdag 17 april 2003
De Amerikaanse president Bush verdient indirect een fortuin aan de oorlog in Irak, via de geheimzinnige investeringsmaatschappij Carlyle Group, die wapentuig levert aan het Amerikaanse leger. George Bush sr. is adviseur van deze invloedrijke groep met wereldwijde connecties, zelfs met Bin Laden.

Het hoofdkantoor van de Carlyle Group bevindt zich middenin het centrum van de macht; aan de Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, tussen het Witte Huis en het Capitool in. De Carlyle Group is geen bekende naam, en het bedrijf wil dat ook graag zo houden. Maar de invloed van de investeringsmaatschappij is groot.

George Bush senior: topadviseur

De Carlyle Group werd in 1987 opgericht en wordt bestuurd door voormalige hoofdrolspelers in de internationale politiek. Het bedrijf wordt dan ook wel 'the ex-presidents' club' genoemd. Oud-minister van Defensie (in het kabinet van president Ronald Reagan) en voormalig adjunct-directeur van de CIA Frank Carlucci is directeur, de voormalige Britse premier John Major is voorzitter van Carlyle Europe, oud-minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en Financiën James Baker (respectievelijk onder Reagan en Bush sr.) is een topadviseur, en oud-president George Bush senior is topadviseur.

Ook Bush jr. werkte voor Carlyle

Maar ook de huidige president Bush heeft directe banden met Carlyle gehad. In 1990 werd hij benoemd tot directielid van een van Carlyles eerste aankopen, de vliegtuigvoedsel producent Caterair. Het bedrijf werd met verlies weer verkocht, en in 1992 vertrok Bush om gouverneur van Texas te worden. In die functie benoemde Bush enkele leden van de commissie die de investeringen van een pensioenfonds voor leraren beheerde. Dezelfde commissie besloot later om honderd miljoen dollar van de belastingbetaler te investeren in de Carlyle Group.

Eigenaar van producenten van oorlogstuig

De vele bedrijven waarvan de Carlyle Group eigenaar is zijn producenten van onder meer van apparatuur, voertuigen en wapens voor het Amerikaanse leger. United Defense maakt bijvoorbeeld raketlanceersystemen die op de Amerikaanse fregatten in de Golf worden gebruikt, alsmede andere lanceersystemen en gevechtsvoertuigen. Het bedrijf is op zijn beurt eigenaar van Bofors, een Zweedse munitiefabrikant. Maar Carlyle bezit ook de Franse krant Le Figaro en het bedrijf dat de flessen van het limonademerk Dr Pepper bottelt. In Nederland heeft de Carlyle Group ook belangen; eind vorig jaar werd kabelbedrijf Casema aan de investeringsmaatschappij verkocht.

Niettemin beweert de Carlyle Group dat slechts zeven procent van zijn fondsen geïnvesteerd is in defensiebedrijven, wat veel minder zou zijn dan andere investeringsmaatschappijen.

Connecties met familie Bin Laden

Carlyle heeft over de hele wereld connecties, waaronder enkele zeer opmerkelijke. Sinds 1995 investeert de familie Bin Laden in Carlyle. De familie houdt vol dat ze al lang geleden de banden met hun beruchte lid Osama hebben verbroken. Bush sr. zou de Bin Ladens twee keer hebben bezocht ten behoeve van Carlyle. Overigens zou de investering geannuleerd zijn en doet Carlyle geen zaken meer met de Bin Ladens.

Sinds 11 september 2001 is de betekenis van Carlyle gegroeid. De IT Group kreeg in het najaar van 2001 diverse contracten van de Amerikaanse regering om met antrax besmette gebouwen schoon te maken, waaronder het Hart Senate Office Building, het kantoor van de Amerikaanse senator Tom Daschle. Carlyle bezit 25 procent van de IT Group.

De oorlog in Afghanistan, en nu in Irak, waren voor de dochters van Carlyle een perfecte gelegenheid om hun oorlogstuig te leveren aan het Amerikaanse leger. Indirect komt dit ten goede aan de portemonnee van de werknemers van Carlyle, waaronder dus de vader van de huidige Amerikaanse president Bush. De oud-president wordt betaald met aandelen in de Carlyle Group, en verdient derhalve aan bijvoorbeeld de Irak-oorlog. Als zoon ligt het voor de hand dat de huidige president Bush erfgenaam is.

'Gerecyclede samenzweringstheorieën'

De Carlyle Group vindt het verhaal, uitvoerig omschreven in het boek The Iron Triangle - Inside the Secret World of the Carlyle Group van de gerenommeerde Amerikaanse journalist Dan Briody (dat deze maand verschijnt), echter niet meer dan een paranoïde samenzweringstheorie. "Pel de lagen van feitelijke fouten en zelfgenoegzaamheid weg en alles dat je overhoudt zijn insinuaties zonder grond", zegt woordvoerder Chris Ullman. "Dit boek is een verzameling gerecyclede samenzweringstheorieën gemaskeerd als onderzoeksjournalistiek."

Invloed op regeringsbeleid

Het is weliswaar moeilijk om de vinger te leggen op de mate waarin Carlyle invloed uitoefent op het beleid van de Amerikaanse regering, maar de nauwe band tussen medewerkers van Carlyle en leden van de regering is een feit.

Carlyle zelf ontkent voor de regering te lobbyen om belangenverstrengeling te voorkomen, maar de vraag is welke pet Baker en Major dragen als ze in Londen in Bush' voordeel een toespraak geven over de vermadelijde presidentsverkiezingen van 2000. Of als minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Colin Powell een toespraak geeft op een banket van Carlyle.

Het is bekend dat verkiezingscampagnes in de Verenigde Staten gefinancierd worden door het bedrijfsleven. George Bush junior staat bekend als de 'pro-business president'. Het is een dubieus gegeven, maar het wordt extra wrang als presidenten rijk worden van een oorlog die ze zelf voeren.

Peter Schong, Planet nieuws/Neos.nl. Met dank aan Patric Geissbuehler.

Bronnen: Red Herring, Guardian, Observer

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Op dinsdag 21 februari 2006 21:00 schreef Frutsel het volgende:
stel dat de VS, met hun miljarden aan onderzoek en projecten, met een alternatief komt voor olie... waardoor bijv. auto's, schepen en vliegtuigen kunnen vliegen... al dan niet op de korte of lange termijn.... Waar blijft het Midden Oosten dan nog ?

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Op dinsdag 21 februari 2006 21:08 schreef basilisk het volgende:

[..]

Zoiets aparts als olie uit teergronden misschien? Met de huidige olieprijzen is olie uit teergrond economisch rendabel en het schijnt dat er in VS en Canada een enorme hoeveelheid onder de grond zit.

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Op dinsdag 21 februari 2006 21:53 schreef Hallulama het volgende:
De ijzeren driehoek (complete documentaire, online te bekijken)

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Oil, Geopolitics, and the Coming War with Iran
Bron : tomdispatch.com
By Michael T. Klare

As the United States gears up for an attack on Iran, one thing is certain: the Bush administration will never mention oil as a reason for going to war. As in the case of Iraq, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be cited as the principal justification for an American assault. "We will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon [by Iran]," is the way President Bush put it in a much-quoted 2003 statement. But just as the failure to discover illicit weapons in Iraq undermined the administration's use of WMD as the paramount reason for its invasion, so its claim that an attack on Iran would be justified because of its alleged nuclear potential should invite widespread skepticism. More important, any serious assessment of Iran's strategic importance to the United States should focus on its role in the global energy equation.

Before proceeding further, let me state for the record that I do not claim oil is the sole driving force behind the Bush administration's apparent determination to destroy Iranian military capabilities. No doubt there are many national security professionals in Washington who are truly worried about Iran's nuclear program, just as there were many professionals who were genuinely worried about Iraqi weapons capabilities. I respect this. But no war is ever prompted by one factor alone, and it is evident from the public record that many considerations, including oil, played a role in the administration's decision to invade Iraq. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that many factors -- again including oil -- are playing a role in the decision-making now underway over a possible assault on Iran.

Just exactly how much weight the oil factor carries in the administration's decision-making is not something that we can determine with absolute assurance at this time, but given the importance energy has played in the careers and thinking of various high officials of this administration, and given Iran's immense resources, it would be ludicrous not to take the oil factor into account -- and yet you can rest assured that, as relations with Iran worsen, American media reports and analysis of the situation will generally steer a course well clear of the subject (as they did in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq).

One further caveat: When talking about oil's importance in American strategic thinking about Iran, it is important to go beyond the obvious question of Iran's potential role in satisfying our country's future energy requirements. Because Iran occupies a strategic location on the north side of the Persian Gulf, it is in a position to threaten oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates, which together possess more than half of the world's known oil reserves. Iran also sits athwart the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which, daily, 40% of the world's oil exports pass. In addition, Iran is becoming a major supplier of oil and natural gas to China, India, and Japan, thereby giving Tehran additional clout in world affairs. It is these geopolitical dimensions of energy, as much as Iran's potential to export significant quantities of oil to the United States, that undoubtedly govern the administration's strategic calculations.

Having said this, let me proceed to an assessment of Iran's future energy potential. According to the most recent tally by Oil and Gas Journal, Iran houses the second-largest pool of untapped petroleum in the world, an estimated 125.8 billion barrels. Only Saudi Arabia, with an estimated 260 billion barrels, possesses more; Iraq, the third in line, has an estimated 115 billion barrels. With this much oil -- about one-tenth of the world's estimated total supply -- Iran is certain to play a key role in the global energy equation, no matter what else occurs.

It is not, however, just sheer quantity that matters in Iran's case; no less important is its future productive capacity. Although Saudi Arabia possesses larger reserves, it is now producing oil at close to its maximum sustainable rate (about 10 million barrels per day). It will probably be unable to raise its output significantly over the next 20 years while global demand, pushed by significantly higher consumption in the United States, China, and India, is expected to rise by 50%. Iran, on the other hand, has considerable growth potential: it is now producing about 4 million barrels per day, but is thought to be capable of boosting its output by another 3 million barrels or so. Few, if any, other countries possess this potential, so Iran's importance as a producer, already significant, is bound to grow in the years ahead.

And it is not just oil that Iran possesses in great abundance, but also natural gas. According to Oil and Gas Journal, Iran has an estimated 940 trillion cubic feet of gas, or approximately 16% of total world reserves. (Only Russia, with 1,680 trillion cubic feet, has a larger supply.) As it takes approximately 6,000 cubic feet of gas to equal the energy content of 1 barrel of oil, Iran's gas reserves represent the equivalent of about 155 billion barrels of oil. This, in turn, means that its combined hydrocarbon reserves are the equivalent of some 280 billion barrels of oil, just slightly behind Saudi Arabia's combined supply. At present, Iran is producing only a small share of its gas reserves, about 2.7 trillion cubic feet per year. This means that Iran is one of the few countries capable of supplying much larger amounts of natural gas in the future.

What all this means is that Iran will play a critical role in the world's future energy equation. This is especially true because the global demand for natural gas is growing faster than that for any other source of energy, including oil. While the world currently consumes more oil than gas, the supply of petroleum is expected to contract in the not-too-distant future as global production approaches its peak sustainable level -- perhaps as soon as 2010 -- and then begins a gradual but irreversible decline. The production of natural gas, on the other hand, is not likely to peak until several decades from now, and so is expected to take up much of the slack when oil supplies become less abundant. Natural gas is also considered a more attractive fuel than oil in many applications, especially because when consumed it releases less carbon dioxide (a major contributor to the greenhouse effect).

No doubt the major U.S. energy companies would love to be working with Iran today in developing these vast oil and gas supplies. At present, however, they are prohibited from doing so by Executive Order (EO) 12959, signed by President Clinton in 1995 and renewed by President Bush in March 2004. The United States has also threatened to punish foreign firms that do business in Iran (under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996), but this has not deterred many large companies from seeking access to Iran's reserves. China, which will need vast amounts of additional oil and gas to fuel its red-hot economy, is paying particular attention to Iran. According to the Department of Energy (DoE), Iran supplied 14% of China's oil imports in 2003, and is expected to provide an even larger share in the future. China is also expected to rely on Iran for a large share of its liquid natural gas (LNG) imports. In October 2004, Iran signed a $100 billion, 25-year contract with Sinopec, a major Chinese energy firm, for joint development of one of its major gas fields and the subsequent delivery of LNG to China. If this deal is fully consummated, it will constitute one of China's biggest overseas investments and represent a major strategic linkage between the two countries.

India is also keen to obtain oil and gas from Iran. In January, the Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) signed a 30-year deal with the National Iranian Gas Export Corp. for the transfer of as much as 7.5 million tons of LNG to India per year. The deal, worth an estimated $50 billion, will also entail Indian involvement in the development of Iranian gas fields. Even more noteworthy, Indian and Pakistani officials are discussing the construction of a $3 billion natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan ¬ an extraordinary step for two long-term adversaries. If completed, the pipeline would provide both countries with a substantial supply of gas and allow Pakistan to reap $200-$500 million per year in transit fees. "The gas pipeline is a win-win proposition for Iran, India, and Pakistan," Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz declared in January.

Despite the pipeline's obvious attractiveness as an incentive for reconciliation between India and Pakistan -- nuclear powers that have fought three wars over Kashmir since 1947 and remain deadlocked over the future status of that troubled territory -- the project was condemned by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during a recent trip to India. "We have communicated to the Indian government our concerns about the gas pipeline cooperation between Iran and India," she said on March 16 after meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh in New Delhi. The administration has, in fact, proved unwilling to back any project that offers an economic benefit to Iran. This has not, however, deterred India from proceeding with the pipeline.

Japan has also broken ranks with Washington on the issue of energy ties with Iran. In early 2003, a consortium of three Japanese companies acquired a 20% stake in the development of the Soroush-Nowruz offshore field in the Persian Gulf, a reservoir thought to hold 1 billion barrels of oil. One year later, the Iranian Offshore Oil Company awarded a $1.26 billion contract to Japan's JGC Corporation for the recovery of natural gas and natural gas liquids from Soroush-Nowruz and other offshore fields.

When considering Iran's role in the global energy equation, therefore, Bush administration officials have two key strategic aims: a desire to open up Iranian oil and gas fields to exploitation by American firms, and concern over Iran's growing ties to America's competitors in the global energy market. Under U.S. law, the first of these aims can only be achieved after the President lifts EO 12959, and this is not likely to occur as long as Iran is controlled by anti-American mullahs and refuses to abandon its uranium enrichment activities with potential bomb-making applications. Likewise, the ban on U.S. involvement in Iranian energy production and export gives Tehran no choice but to pursue ties with other consuming nations. From the Bush administration's point of view, there is only one obvious and immediate way to alter this unappetizing landscape -- by inducing "regime change" in Iran and replacing the existing leadership with one far friendlier to U.S. strategic interests.

That the Bush administration seeks to foster regime change in Iran is not in any doubt. The very fact that Iran was included with Saddam's Iraq and Kim Jong Il's North Korea in the "Axis of Evil" in the President's 2002 State of the Union Address was an unmistakable indicator of this. Bush let his feelings be known again in June 2003, at a time when there were anti-government protests by students in Tehran. "This is the beginning of people expressing themselves toward a free Iran, which I think is positive," he declared. In a more significant indication of White House attitudes on the subject, the Department of Defense has failed to fully disarm the People's Mujaheddin of Iran (or Mujaheddin-e Khalq, MEK), an anti-government militia now based in Iraq that has conducted terrorist actions in Iran and is listed on the State Department's roster of terrorist organizations. In 2003, the Washington Post reported that some senior administration figures would like to use the MEK as a proxy force in Iran, in the same manner that the Northern Alliance was employed against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The Iranian leadership is well aware that it faces a serious threat from the Bush administration and is no doubt taking whatever steps it can to prevent such an attack. Here, too, oil is a major factor in both Tehran's and Washington's calculations. To deter a possible American assault, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and otherwise obstruct oil shipping in the Persian Gulf area. "An attack on Iran will be tantamount to endangering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and, in a word, the entire Middle East oil," Iranian Expediency Council secretary Mohsen Rezai said on March 1st.

Such threats are taken very seriously by the U.S. Department of Defense. "We judge Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy using predominantly naval, air, and some ground forces," Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 16th.

Planning for such attacks is, beyond doubt, a major priority for top Pentagon officials. In January, veteran investigative reporter Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker magazine that the Department of Defense was conducting covert reconnaissance raids into Iran, supposedly to identify hidden Iranian nuclear and missile facilities that could be struck in future air and missile attacks. "I was repeatedly told that the next strategic target was Iran," Hersh said of his interviews with senior military personnel. Shortly thereafter, the Washington Post revealed that the Pentagon was flying surveillance drones over Iran to verify the location of weapons sites and to test Iranian air defenses. As noted by the Post, "Aerial espionage [of this sort] is standard in military preparations for an eventual air attack." There have also been reports of talks between U.S. and Israeli officials about a possible Israeli strike on Iranian weapons facilities, presumably with behind-the-scenes assistance from the United States.

In reality, much of Washington's concern about Iran's pursuit of WMD and ballistic missiles is sparked by fears for the safety of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, other Persian Gulf oil producers, and Israel rather than by fears of a direct Iranian assault on the United States. "Tehran has the only military in the region that can threaten its neighbors and Gulf security," Jacoby declared in his February testimony. "Its expanding ballistic missile inventory presents a potential threat to states in the region." It is this regional threat that American leaders are most determined to eliminate.

In this sense, more than any other, the current planning for an attack on Iran is fundamentally driven by concern over the safety of U.S. energy supplies, as was the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the most telling expression of White House motives for going to war against Iraq, Vice President Dick Cheney (in an August 2002 address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars) described the threat from Iraq as follows: "Should all [of Hussein's WMD] ambitions be realized, the implications would be enormous for the Middle East and the United States.... Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror and a seat atop 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, [and] directly threaten America's friends throughout the region." This was, of course, unthinkable to Bush's inner circle. And all one need do is substitute the words "Iranian mullahs" for Saddam Hussein, and you have a perfect expression of the Bush administration case for making war on Iran.

So, even while publicly focusing on Iran's weapons of mass destruction, key administration figures are certainly thinking in geopolitical terms about Iran's role in the global energy equation and its capacity to obstruct the global flow of petroleum. As was the case with Iraq, the White House is determined to eliminate this threat once and for all. And so, while oil may not be the administration's sole reason for going to war with Iran, it is an essential factor in the overall strategic calculation that makes war likely.

Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author of Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Oil (Metropolitan Books).

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03-02-2006 : Iran and the jaws of a trap
Bron : Asian Times
By Paul Levian

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

Judging from the rather frantic behind-the-scenes efforts of Russia and China in Iran, they seem to appreciate that the Iranian leadership is in for a big and probably deadly surprise. The Bush administration has not only handled its Iran dossier much more skillfully than Iraq, but also managed to set up Iran for a war it can neither win nor fight to a draw.

If the Iranian leaders think they can deter an attack because the
US is bogged down in Iraq they are already between the jaws of a well-set trap. Though a Western war against Iran will be a big geopolitical defeat for Russia and China, they cannot but resign themselves to this outcome if they are unable to convince the Iranians to accept the Russian proposal - ie uranium enrichment in Russia.

The Russians saw the writing on the wall when France, Germany and Britain began to march in lockstep with the United States. In particular, the widely but wrongly discounted nuclear belligerence of President Jacques Chirac last month implied that France was ready to accept the US use of nuclear weapons in a war against Iran if they saw fit to do so.

The Iranian leadership's obvious confidence in its ability to deter the US, Britain and Israel seems to rest on mainly four assumptions. Iran is militarily much stronger than Iraq, much larger, its terrain more difficult, its society more cohesive - thus more difficult to defeat, to occupy and to pacify. In addition, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad seems to take particular comfort from the widely anticipated wave of popular outrage and anti-Western attacks in the wider Middle East if Iran should be attacked.

Moreover, the economic costs of a war against Iran in terms of the price of oil and the interruption of the Iranian supply would propel the world economy into a tailspin. And finally, Iranian leaders seem to accept at face value the US moans over its overstretched military forces and the demoralization of US forces in Iraq.

Certainly, Iranian misconceptions are helped mightily by the defeatism of the Western debate about such a war. "No good options" has become something like the consensus view: an airborne and special forces "surgical strike" (as well as a massive attack) against the Iranian nuclear industry and military targets could at best delay its nuclear program and will be followed by retaliation in Iraq, Lebanon etc; a ground attack is out of the question because most of deployable US ground forces are desperately busy in Iraq.

If such things could be planned, one might be persuaded to consider this debate as an aspect of strategic deception. In fact, the US and British forces in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf as well as the forces in Afghanistan are quite able to redeploy on short notice, for example during the days of an initial air campaign against Iran for large-scale operations against the remaining Iranian forces and can be reinforced during the war. The US military infrastructure at the borders of Iran has a very substantial capability to deal with surge requirements.

The somewhat standard scenario for this war - as indicated by Chinese and Russian war games - has the following features:

An initial Israeli air attack against some Iranian nuclear targets, command and control targets and Shahab missile sites. Iran retaliates with its remaining missiles, tries to close the Gulf, attacks US naval assets and American and British forces in Iraq. If Iranian missiles have chemical warheads (in fact or presumed), the US will immediately use nuclear weapons to destroy the Iranian military and industrial infrastructure. If not, an air campaign of up to two weeks will prepare the ground campaign for the occupation of the Iranian oil and gas fields.

Mass mobilization in Iraq against US-British forces will be at most a nuisance - easily suppressed by the ruthless employment of massive firepower. And Israel will use the opportunity to deal with Syria and South Lebanon, and possibly with its Palestinian problem.

The character of this war will be completely different from the Iraq war. No show-casing of democracy, no "nation-building", no journalists, no Red Cross - but the kind of war the United States would have fought in North Vietnam if it had not had to reckon with the Soviet Union and China.

Paul Levian is a former German intelligence officer.

(Copyright 2006 Paul Levian.)
_{Paul Levian is a former German intelligence officer.}

quote:

... en de aanval kan beginnen. In de lente van 2006?
* December vorig jaar werd bekend dat premier Sharon het leger zou hebben verordonneerd eind maart klaar te zijn voor mogelijke aanvallen op Iran. Sharon ontkent en de Times die de informatie onthulde, houdt rekening met een vorm van verkiezingsretoriek, gezien de landelijke verkiezingen in maart.
* In deze periode nemen de aanstaande midterm-verkiezingen aan belangrijkheid toe. Een oorlog met Iran zou dan niet slecht uitkomen voor de Republikeinse partij, zo beweren meerdere specialisten.
* De dag na het het einde van het Iraanse kalenderjaar op 20 maart zal Iran een oliebeurs beginnen die is gebaseerd op Petroeuro's, niet Petrodollars. Na de inval van de VS in Irak is de politieke, maar ook lucratieve stap door Saddam van Petrodollars naar Petroeuro's teruggedraaid. Het beursinitiatief van Iran wordt door William Clark, auteur van het boek Petrodollar Warfare, gezien als een 'obvious encroachment on U.S. dollar supremacy in the international oil market', genoteerd in een artikel dat al stamt uit oktober 2004, getiteld The Real Reasons Why Iran is the Next Target: The Emerging Euro-denominated International Oil Marker.
* Ook is het zo dat op 23 maart de Raad van Bestuur van de Federale bank van de VS zal stoppen met het publiceren van 'the M3 monetary aggregate. The Board will also cease publishing the following components: large-denomination time deposits, repurchase agreements (RPs), and Eurodollars', schrijft Rob Kirby van Kirby Analytics. Hij schrijft verder: 'What strikes me as being even odder is the date - March 23, 2006 - that the Fed plans to cease reporting this data. Any guesses as to what else [of major significance] is supposed to happen on or about this date? It just so happens that on March 20, 2006 - everybody's favorite Middle Eastern Nation, Iran - is scheduled to begin trading oil for Petroeuros on their own "newly minted" Iranian Oil Bourse [IOB].' Dit gegeven hangt volgens de schrijver samen met de grote hoeveelheden dollars die buiten de VS worden vastgehouden. Wat als die worden losgelaten en de Euro tot nieuwe held wordt verkozen? Lees daarover dit DaanSpeak-artikel: Wereldwijde recessie dreigt door duikvlucht dollar. Kirby schrijft dat het dollargat dat aldus zou ontstaan, door de Fed zal worden opgevuld met extra gedrukte dollars, maar tegen die tijd zou dat niet zijn te volgen omdat de M3-gegevens niet meer worden gepubliceerd...
* Ander toeval wil dat in maart het atoomagentschap een rapport over Iran gaat uitbrengen.
* Ook is het zo dat de Irakoorlog begon in maart 2003, iets dat mogelijk te maken had met de temperatuur in die periode in dat gebied.
* Het Indiase The Telegraph: 'Top-ranking Americans have told equally top-ranking Indians in recent weeks that the US has plans to invade Iran before Bush's term ends.' Geen loze opmerking, aangezien een jaar voor de aanval in Irak een dergelijke ontmoeting plaatshad...

quote:

Op woensdag 22 februari 2006 10:53 schreef Basp1 het volgende:
Wanneer er een revolutionaire nieuwe energiebron zou worden uitgevonden dan hoeven we niets meer met boten te vervoeren dan kan alles met een vliegtuig en zijn we ook niet meer afhankelijk van het suezkanaal.

quote:

China Expands. Europe Rises. And the United States . . .
bron : NY Times
By FRED KAPLAN

Published: December 26, 2004


IT'S a risky business to predict the decline of the American empire. Ask Paul Kennedy, the Yale historian, who issued such a forecast in his 1987 book, "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers," only to witness an almost immediate American resurgence.

Yet the signposts, at the end of this year, are ominous. As an economic power, the United States no longer sets the rules, much less rule the game. As a military power, it vastly outguns the rest of the world, but has a harder time translating armed might into influence.

On March 1, the European Union announced that it was raising import tariffs on a long list of American products, and would go on raising them each month until Congress repealed a subsidy for American exporters that had been ruled illegal by the World Trade Organization. Congressmen railed against this intrusion but finally gave in. Americans realized that, in the global economy they largely created and for 60 years dominated, they could no longer do whatever they wanted.

Last month, China's president, Hu Jintao, embarked on a 12-day tour of Latin America, and wound up making commitments to invest $30 billion in the region. China is now Brazil's second largest trading partner and Chile's largest export market. In trade, technology, investment, education and culture, China has been displacing the United States all across Asia, and is now starting to do the same in America's backyard.

There is nothing necessarily alarming about an expansive China or an emergent Europe, except perhaps that they coincide with a growing American dependence on both.

The United States government spent $650 billion more this year than it raised in revenue, and financed the deficit largely by borrowing from foreign central banks, mainly those of Japan and China. They have been willing creditors because American consumers send much of the money right back by purchasing foreign-made products. It's a neat balancing act, to a point. But the American accumulated debt to foreign investors has now swelled to $3.3 trillion - 28 percent of gross domestic product, nearly double the share of four years ago.

In the 1990's, the United States admonished Mexico and Argentina to get their economic houses in order. This month, the Chinese premier gave Washington a strikingly similar lecture.

These imbalances are not inherently disastrous. The Chinese get something out of the deal, a ready consumer market for their overheated production lines. If they stop lending to the United States, it would cause a deep recession here, but then Americans could not buy as many of their goods, and the recession would ricochet right back to Asia.

It's a variation on the old joke: If you owe the bank $1 billion, the bank owns you; if you owe the bank $1 trillion, you own the bank.

But what if another trillion-dollar customer walked into the bank? The bankers might be more willing to foreclose on the debtor, knowing that they could pick up business from the new tycoon.

The European Union, in many respects, is looking more and more like this new tycoon. Its currency, the euro, has risen in value by 35 percent against the dollar in the last three years.

Again, that is not necessarily bad. In theory, a falling dollar makes American exports cheaper, attracting demand that then boosts the dollar; a rising euro crimps European exports, which then lowers the euro; equilibrium is restored. In reality, this process unfolds slowly and shakily: in October, for instance, American exports rose, but American imports soared, too.

A more serious consequence of the dollar's fall is that the euro has become more rewarding for foreign investors, and they are reacting accordingly. In 2001, Middle Eastern oil-producing countries kept 75 percent of their currency reserves in dollars; now the figure is 61 percent, with much of the rest in euros. Chinese and Russian central bankers are also shifting reserves. This trend, at some point, could set off a spiral: the dollar declines, causing further sell-offs, leading to a further decline, and so on.