Oorlog in Oekraïne #1310 Fedorov bleef niet aan

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I can confirm that throughout 2023–2024 we suffered enormous losses because of repeated counterattacks to retake tree lines and ruins, and it all followed the same pattern.

Our troops occupied advantageous positions and destroyed the enemy as if at a shooting range. Enemy losses were 17–25 times greater than ours. But then "someone" decided the line on the map wasn't neat enough, and the endless orders began: "straighten the line," "retake the previously lost positions."

The result was losses that were impossible to justify, with two consequences. First, the casualty ratio dropped to only three to one. Second, our infantry was often too small in number and disoriented, allowing the enemy to break through not only the "retaken positions" but also the previously stable defensive line where they had earlier failed again and again despite enormous losses. This is how we lost an enormous number of people—so many that, had they been preserved, there would have been far less need for new mobilization.

The second recurring pattern was the rotations in 2023–2024. During these rotations, the enemy struck newly arrived units and broke through. These constant rotations to patch holes elsewhere, with breakthroughs as the inevitable consequence, were also characteristic of Syrskyi's style.

Any other army in the same situation would have assigned sectors of responsibility to large formations—divisions, corps, armies—and reinforced them with fresh battalions. Instead, we saw the constant creation of new units and endless crisis micromanagement instead of an overall strategy.

By 2025–2026, this entire Syrskyi-style way of fighting had become impossible because of drones. Yet attempts to continue fighting this way have not stopped. Fighting through unjustified losses and constant micromanagement without sustained support has simply become a habit. If earlier this approach cost us Ocheretyne, now it is Siversk. The strategy remains the same: weaken our own forces and allow the enemy to gain the advantage.

Anyone would have replaced General Syrskyi long ago with someone more capable. Anyone would also have sought the advice of a trusted military adviser instead of reacting emotionally and trying to command military professionals directly.

At the end of 1942, Stalin recognized the brilliance of General Antonov, whose phenomenal memory impressed him, and made him his principal adviser. It was precisely because Stalin listened to Antonov that the victories which followed became possible. Antonov also had the courage to tell Stalin the truth in private, although after the war Stalin's pride resurfaced, and he sent Antonov away to the provinces in 1948.

Churchill and Roosevelt tested generals and replaced them until they found commanders who did not merely fight, but who won. Once they found winners, they tolerated them despite all their eccentricities.

Today, in the era of drone warfare, we objectively need a different kind of war than the one fought under Syrskyi and Zelenskyy in previous years. We need a different team of generals capable of winning the war that is being fought today, because Syrskyi's methods lead toward defeat once the enemy completes its mobilization. And we must have the patience to trust new generals instead of interfering with their command.

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Syrskyi's conflicts with the GUR and the SBU are another story that everyone remains silent about.

There is reason to suspect that this is why Malyuk was removed, and now Khmara as well, handing the SBU over to the political wing while pushing this service toward a deep systemic crisis.

There is also reason to suspect that this is why Budanov's candidate was not appointed, and why the GUR's capabilities have been reduced by half across the board.

The story is this.
Syrskyi got many officers killed, not only soldiers, and a couple of years ago this created a severe shortage of platoon and company commanders, along with shortages in other officer positions. Syrskyi then demanded that the intelligence and security services immediately provide him with seven thousand officers.

He was refused, and that resentment is believed to be one of the reasons why Syrskyi, by manipulating Zelenskyy, has tried to strike both the SBU and the GUR--their combat units, the chiefs who refused him, and their personnel.

Of course everyone stays silent because it is a very ugly story. But continuing to hide it now means destroying Ukraine's future and destroying the possibility of Victory.

Incidentally, this also explains why Syrskyi is now reportedly planning to remove Khmara. He was one of those who, together with Malyuk, refused to hand over his people--and forgiveness is simply not an option.

That is why we need a new Commander-in-Chief immediately, and there are many reasons for it. We need new approaches, a new quality of military leadership, and we need to restore the sense of the Defense Forces as a community. Right now they are dominated by the Soviet mentality, intrigue, and a prison-like system--something even worse than a prison.

It cannot continue like this. The Defense Forces cannot endure Syrskyi's system, the country cannot endure it, and if the enemy doubles its army this autumn, we certainly will not endure it.