Chinese politiek

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Op zondag 24 maart 2019 09:01 schreef Knipoogje het volgende:

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Is dat wat je ambieert? Stel je voor dat onze overheid 500.000 Zuidhollanders naar Limburg stuurt omdat de Limburgse cultuur ons stoort.

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Op zondag 24 maart 2019 10:21 schreef Digi2 het volgende:

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Stuur dan liever friezen naar Limburg die denken zelfs een eigen dialect als taal te moeten prolongeren

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Op zondag 24 maart 2019 10:20 schreef Roces18 het volgende:

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Jij haat je eigen land zo erg, ik zou bijna een ticket voor je kopen zodat je kan verhuizen. China wenst niet te verenigen maar is uit op eigen gewin. En Nationalisme is wel verenigen, alleen dan binnen eigen gelederen.

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Op zondag 24 maart 2019 13:07 schreef Knipoogje het volgende:

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Ik heb overigens wel het idee dat China liever met het Westen zaken doet dan met Rusland. Die hele Chinese middenstand is inmiddels verzot op de westerse cultuur (antiek enzo) en de EU en de VS leveren China natuurlijk heel wat meer centjes op dan het instabiele Rusland.

Al vallen die grensprovincies in Rusland prima om te volken (volgens mij zijn ze daar ook stiekem mee bezig)

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Xi Fails to Calm Europe as Juncker Takes Another Swipe at China

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stepped up his criticism of Chinese trade practices just days after President Xi Jinping sought to soothe European concerns in Paris.

At the March 26 meeting, held together with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the EU side explained that “it can’t stay like this, that Chinese companies have free access to our markets in Europe, but we don’t to the markets in China,” Juncker told lawmakers in the German state of Saarland on Monday.

He also said Chinese investments in the continent can make it harder in the EU to agree on foreign policy. “One country isn’t able to condemn Chinese human rights policy because Chinese investors are involved in one of their ports,” Juncker said. “It can’t work like this.”
Europe has become more vocal in its criticism of China as of late, calling the country a partner as well as an economic competitor and a “systemic rival” on governance. Concerns are mounting over China’s growing influence, predatory investments and possible hacking of 5G data networks.

The EU has also been divided over China’s Belt and Road infrastructure project, which some see as a threat to sovereignty. Italy’s populist government last month signed on to the initiative, brushing off the concerns.

Juncker said he’s not against the project “as long as the conditions are right.” If European companies can profit from it and “if you don’t only meet Chinese workers on these construction sites but also European workers, then this is all feasible,” he said.

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Op maandag 1 april 2019 22:42 schreef Digi2 het volgende:

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Of er europese bedrijven van gaan profiteren en je niet alleen maar chinese werknemers tegenkomt op de bouwplaatsen moet ik nog zien.

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Op dinsdag 2 april 2019 09:30 schreef icecreamfarmer_NL het volgende:

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voor de lange termijn

Is China's fishing fleet taking all of West Africa's fish? - BBC News

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The BBC investigates illegal and unsustainable fishing off the west coast of Africa to find out how one of the most fertile ecosystems on earth has been pushed to the brink

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The only system out there that would appear to be at all competitive with liberal democracy is the so-called "China model," which mixes authoritarian government with a partially market-based economy and a high level of technocratic and technological competence.

Yet if asked to bet whether, 50 years from now, the U.S. and Europe would look more like China
politically or vice versa, I would pick the latter without hesitation. There are many reasons to think
that the China model isn't sustainable. The system's legitimacy and the party's ongoing rule rest on continued high levels of growth, which simply won't be forthcoming as China seeks to make the
transition from a middle-income country to a high-income one.

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Yoshikazu Kato, Adjunct Associate Professor of Asia Global Institute, discusses with Fukuyama the latter’s work - Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy.

Kato: In your critical work Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, you pointed out that the study of development “necessarily centers around the process by which political institutions emerge, evolve, and eventually decay.” [①] In a speech you delivered at Johns Hopkins SAIS in October 2014, you said, “I do not think American civilization or private sectors are in decline—the big problem is a function of the government in the United States.”

With these in mind, my question is: how can the American political system institutionally avoid decay, and actually work toward restoration and even evolution? What efforts should the government make?

Fukuyama: The United States has faced periods of crisis and decay before, such as after the Civil War, when the country saw the rise of an industrial economy, and the Great Depression. In both of those cases, there was eventually an appropriate response: in the first, a grassroots movement for civil service reform that led to the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883, and in the latter, the New Deal. Renewal, however, is not automatic: it requires grassroots mobilization, good leadership from the top, and the right ideas to catalyze political action. At the moment I don't see any of these factors in American politics, only an inchoate anger on the part of voters on the left and right. The most powerful grassroots group right now is the Tea Party, whose policy ideas would make our current situation worse.

Kato: Inequality has been on the rise in recent years. I am curious about how you see the issue in terms of the challenges it poses to liberal democracy. Can liberal democratic institutions solve the problem of inequality? And, how much responsibility does liberal democracy bear in this problem? Are institutional reforms necessary?

Fukuyama: I think that the rise in inequality and the decline of the middle class constitute one of the biggest problems facing democracy today. It is very important to have a broad middle class, for the sake of democratic stability. If you have a lot of poor people and a small oligarchy, then you have Latin America, whose politics have veered between conservative rule and irresponsible populism. The problem today is that inequality is primarily driven by the advance of technology, with smart machines replacing first low-skilled, then increasingly skilled labor. In the U.S., future jobs are bifurcated between low-wage, low-skilled ones like those in home healthcare, and high-skilled ones like those in programming and banking. This is not a problem unique to democracies, but democratic stability rests on a broad middle-class social base and is therefore particularly threatened. At the moment I do not see anyone offering a credible solution to this problem.

Kato: It seems to me that every nation and region in the world is considering the role of government right now. We’ve seen an immigration crisis in Europe, political turmoil in Latin America, geopolitical problems in the Asia-Pacific, and economic recession across regions. Under these uncertain circumstances, what should states do? And what should they not do? What, in your opinion, is the essence of government’s role? I’m sure it varies depending on political systems and contexts, but I’d just like your general perspective.

Fukuyama: Many governments around the world are seen as out of touch with voters, and as a result, populist parties have become increasingly prevalent in Europe and the U.S. The problem is not, as many Americans think, with the size of government, but rather with its quality: governments should be responsive to changing demands from citizens, and flexible enough to find new ways of meeting them. Politicians in many countries are excessively indebted to powerful and well-organized interest groups, that collectively do not represent the wishes of the whole population.

Kato: With regard to the quality of government and the capacity to be responsive to changing citizen demands, how do you evaluate the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? Could American politics get some implications from the Chinese experiences?

Fukuyama: If you look to results, the CCP seems to be quite capable in many respects. It has exercised a great deal of discipline in, for example, creating township and village enterprises that are beyond the capacity of most developing countries, and stripping the People’s Liberation Army of its money-making businesses. However, there is also a great deal of corruption in the Chinese government and party. We do not empirically know the exact extent and how this compares with other countries; this is a topic for research that I have been trying to undertake.

Kato: It seems to me that the Chinese have historically placed great importance on the idea of “strong states, strong government, and strong leaders.” We see this reflected in the high reputation of Xi Jinping, who has emerged as the most authoritative Chinese leader in recent times. What’s your take on this, taking into account the three things you’ve described as the basic components of a modern political order: the state, rule of law, and democratic accountability? Do you see Chinese politics continuing to develop only in the sense of China becoming a strong state, but neglecting the rule of law and democratic accountability? And is this sustainable?

Fukuyama: The classic problem of Chinese politics that has never been solved is the problem of the "bad emperor." In a system with a strong state but no rule of law or democracy, a good emperor can move quickly to implement policies, more quickly than in a liberal democracy. But what guarantees the continuing supply of good emperors? A bad emperor can do much more damage in such a system than in one with checks and balances. At the moment, Xi is accumulating a great deal of personal power, and seems to be breaking out of the consensus for collective leadership that was formed after 1978. But we do not know what his intentions are in the long run—he could become a great reformer, or he could become something considerably worse.

Kato: I agree completely with your observation. My further question is: could the checks-and-balances mechanism resolve the classic problem in Chinese politics while working within the confines of Chinese-style meritocracy within the CCP or “democracy within the party”? What I mean is, would these be institutionally sufficient in preventing the rise of a “bad emperor”?

Fukuyama: I'm not sure that these mechanisms would be sufficient to check a bad emperor, since the question of who would check the party itself would remain. China needs multiple checks, beginning with law and rules to regularize the party's behavior. Democracy within the party would be a down payment on real democracy, but not sufficient in itself to lead to accountable government.

Kato: How do you evaluate the survival of the authoritarian political system in China since the collapse of the Soviet Union with regard to your “end of history” theory? [②] From your point of view, how much will China factor into the future development of political discourse around the world?

Fukuyama: China poses the most important challenge to the idea of the end of history, insofar as it is an authoritarian semi-capitalist system that has mastered economic modernization and may become the world's wealthiest and most powerful country. The issue is whether that system is sustainable over the long run. There are a number of reasons for thinking that it is not, beginning with the challenge of dealing with the enormous social stresses that have appeared as a result of modernization. But if China manages these stresses and remains strong and stable for another generation, then I think there is in fact a real alternative to liberal democracy.

Kato: Since President Xi started conducting expansive economic and financial diplomacy, the so-called “China Model” seems to have spread, particularly to developing countries and regions. It’s easy for some countries to see the model as an attractive one in terms of economic development, and even state-building. The CCP is aware of this and is actively “advertising” the model to such countries in order to extend the Chinese sphere of influence. In my view, the outcome of the CCP’s efforts to expand China’s influence depends significantly on the resilience of Western liberal democracy. What do you think?

Fukuyama: Many people would like to replicate China's authoritarianism, but they are not able to replicate other critical aspects of the China model, such as meritocracy, a disciplined party hierarchy, respect for education, and above all, a sense among the rulers that they have a certain responsibility to act in the public interest. All Asian authoritarian regimes have shared this characteristic of rulers who cared about the development of the broader society, something that is missing in other parts of the world like the Middle East or Africa.

Kato: In your book Political Order and Political Decay, you paid great attention to the future development of the rule of law in China, writing that the “creation of a rule of law that would limit political authority in China is thus still very much a work in progress.” [③] Following the publishing of your book, the CCP held its Fourth Plenum in October 2014 and focused nominally on the rule of law, though official plenum documents still emphasized the importance of “leadership under the party.” The CCP has consistently insisted that this is the rule of law with Chinese characteristics.

Fukuyama: The Chinese have been promoting "rule-based decision-making" for some years now, meaning that lower levels of the government are increasingly governed by rules. The Fourth Plenum simply continued in this tradition. But true rule of law requires that the law be binding on the most powerful actors in the political system, which in China's case means the Communist Party. China needs true rule of law in this sense, an acknowledgement by the party that it is subordinate to law. This has not been forthcoming.

Kato: I appreciate your continuous efforts in exploring the relationship between the Chinese middle class and political change. I also agree with your idea that “the future of rule of law and democracy in China will depend on whether [the middle class] can shift the classic balance of power between state and society that persisted in China’s past.” [④] Personally, I am not optimistic that the Chinese middle class could become a driving force in future political developments in China, since it is generally not very interested in democracy, freedom of speech, and the rule of law. A significant portion can even be said to have already given up on achieving more political freedom.

The topics that the middle class is concerned with seem confined to the social sphere. Things that are important to those in the middle class, such as improvements in education, housing, and healthcare, could be provided under the current political system. Additionally, the middle class does not seem to think that democratic accountability could work better than the CCP’s “sophisticated bureaucracy.” Most Chinese people feel that CCP dictatorship is not a bad system. They also tend to think that no alternative could be better. Of course, their belief in the authoritarian political system is tied to nationalism.

Fukuyama: I think the middle class is happy with the CCP's rule as long as the country continues to grow economically. However, this is not going to happen forever. It is very hard to move from middle- to high-income status, and the question you have to ask is: how will the middle class feel in the face of economic stagnation, or even a setback that lowers incomes and employment?

Kato: Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has assertively pushed new organizations of international cooperation such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This, to me, indicates that China has never been satisfied with the world order established by the United States following World War II. Nowadays, China seems to be challenging the world order, perhaps even creating a new one. Could China become a primary architect of a new world order?

Some of the praises China has sung about state capitalism over the years, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, appear to focus not on how state capitalism is good, but rather how liberal democracy is in decline. Thus, the future of democracy might depend on how liberal democracy can revitalize itself. If it cannot do so, it could forfeit legitimacy to state capitalism. Does this make sense to you?

Fukuyama: Yes, I think that the perceived success or failure of different systems has a big impact on ideas and the sorts of systems that other countries choose. The danger right now is that several authoritarian systems seem to be doing well, while democracies like the U.S., the E.U., and Japan are mired in low growth and/or joblessness. So it is very important for the elites in these countries to pay attention to questions of political reform. This will have an effect far beyond their borders.

Kato: If you had a chance to meet and speak with President Xi, what would you advise him at this moment?

Fukuyama: I would suggest that in domestic politics he focus on creating a real rule of law and greater individual freedom for Chinese citizens, and that on an international level he should work with other regional powers to turn down the rhetoric on the various issues that are dividing them.

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All Asian authoritarian regimes have shared this characteristic of rulers who cared about the development of the broader society, something that is missing in other parts of the world like the Middle East or Africa.

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China wil verbod op minen van bitcoins

China wil het minen van bitcoins gaan verbieden, zo blijkt dinsdag uit een bijgewerkte lijst van de overheidsinstantie National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). De lijst is nog niet definitief.

China is de grootste producent ter wereld van computerhardware die bedoeld is voor het minen van bitcoins en andere cryptovaluta's. De Chinese overheid zet echter steeds meer druk op de cryptovalutasector.

De lijst van de NDRC werd in 2011 voor het eerst gepubliceerd. Er staan sectoren op die de overheid wil ontmoedigen, beperken of verbieden. Op de nieuwe versie van de lijst staat nu ook het minen van cryptovaluta's, als één van de activiteiten die beschouwd worden als onder meer onveilig.

De NRDC wil graag eerst de publieke opinie horen, voordat de lijst definitief wordt. Er mag tot 7 mei commentaar worden gegeven.

Het is nog niet duidelijk per wanneer of hoe het minen van bitcoins wordt uitgebannen in China.

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Studie: Chinezen kopen vooral grote, kwakkelende bedrijven

Kort nieuws - 9 april 2019 - Auteur: Redactie Duitslandweb

Chinese investeerders kopen volgens een studie van het Duitse Ifo-Institut vooral grote bedrijven die het niet zo goed doen en veel schulden hebben.
De onderzoeksgroep heeft ruim 70.000 internationale bedrijfsovernames tussen 2002 en 2018 onderzocht. In 1900 overnames kwamen de kopers uit China, in 171 gevallen ging het om Duitse bedrijven die door Chinese investeerders zijn gekocht.

Gemiddeld zijn de ondernemingen die door Chinese bedrijven zijn gekocht, zeven keer groter dan bedrijven die door investeerders uit andere landen werden overgenomen. Ze hadden meer schulden, maakten minder winst en waren daardoor goedkoper.

Chinese staatsbedrijven concentreerden zich in de onderzochte periode vooral op bedrijven in de grondstoffenwinning en de landbouw. Chinese private investeerders hadden een voorkeur voor elektronicabedrijven en de auto-industrie. Onderzoeker Clemens Fuest merkt op dat de veelgehoorde klacht dat Chinese bedrijven met overheidsgeld concurrenten overbieden door dit onderzoek wordt weerlegd. China gaat concurrentie juist vaak uit de weg door meer op omvang dan op winstgevendheid te letten. Lees meer bij Ifo Institut

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EU-China-top ten einde: 'EU is meer op haar strepen gaan staan'

Met de toenemende (economische) macht van China in het achterhoofd, probeerde de EU op de top van vandaag meer tegengas te geven. Dat is deels gelukt.

China is de Europese eis voor betere toegang van Europese bedrijven tot de Chinese markt en een meer evenwichtige handelsrelatie voor een deel tegemoetgekomen. Peking deed op een top Brussel toezeggingen over zaken als staatssteun, openbare aanbestedingen en technologie-overdracht.

Er komt meer wederkerigheid in de relatie, zei EU-president Donald Tusk. "Een grote stap in de goede richting, maar er moet de komende tijd wel geleverd worden", aldus Europees Commissievoorzitter Juncker.

EU first, China second
Op de 21e EU-China-top kwamen de Chinese premier Li Keqiang, Tusk en Juncker met een gemeenschappelijke verklaring. Wie de verklaring van dit jaar en vorig jaar naast elkaar legt, ziet op het eerste oog misschien weinig verschillen.

Maar Maaike Okano-Heijmans, onderzoeker en China-expert van denktank Clingendael, signaleert wel degelijk een subtiele verandering. "Mij valt op dat de EU de eigen economische belangen veel meer voorop heeft gezet."

Speerpunten van Brussel bovenaan verklaring
Brussel is er beter in geslaagd om de speerpunten van de Europese Commissie vooraan in het gezamenlijke statement te krijgen, ziet de onderzoeker. "Open markten, eerlijke competitie, een eerlijk speelveld, transparantie. Die termen staan nu veel eerder genoemd in de verklaring."

Nieuw in het gezamenlijk statement is het benoemen van de komst van 5G en de samenwerking tussen China en Europa als het daarom gaat. Veel meer wordt er niet over gezegd, maar 'het is toch belangrijk dat het erin staat', zegt Okano-Heijmans.

Peking erkende ook dat het onwenselijk is dat bedrijven worden gedwongen technologische kennis over te dragen als ze investeren in China.

Investeringsakkoord nog in wording
Al met al heeft de Europese Unie hier duidelijk iets meer van zich willen laten horen, concludeert de onderzoeker. "De EU is meer op haar strepen gaan staan."

Een akkoord over investeringen waar beide grootmachten al jaren over onderhandelen moet volgend jaar zijn afgerond. China deelt het principe van een open markt voor inschrijving op publieke aanbestedingen en belooft hier snel werk van te maken.

'Systeemrivaal'
De regeringsleiders van de EU-landen maakten er vorige maand een hard punt van dat de relatie met China - de onderlinge handel is goed voor ruim 1 miljard euro per dag - wederkerig moet zijn en dat ze daarvoor eensgezind en minder naïef moeten opereren.

De Europese Commissie had kort daarvoor gesteld dat China niet alleen een strategische partner en economische concurrent is, maar ook een 'systeemrivaal', die zijn invloed in de wereld versterkt met een ander bestuursmodel.

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"Maar Maaike Okano-Heijmans, onderzoeker en China-expert van denktank Clingendael, signaleert wel degelijk een subtiele verandering. "Mij valt op dat de EU de eigen economische belangen veel meer voorop heeft gezet."

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Op woensdag 10 april 2019 09:46 schreef rockstah het volgende:
https://www.abc.net.au/ne(...)oism-revival/9287484

Is al oud nieuws blijkbaar maar ik vind het wel opmerkelijk, blijkbaar stimuleert de CCP nu het Taoïsme om de groei van het christendom tegen te gaan, na eerst dus gepoogd te hebben om het uit te roeien.

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Op woensdag 10 april 2019 09:54 schreef Zomaar-een-Chinees het volgende:

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Chinese studenten werden in de jaren 80 gebrainwashed met 'Democratische ideeen' "toevallig" overgewaaid vanuit Amerika. Dit leidde tot de studentenopstand. Al deze studenten bleken ook een bekeerd Christen te zijn. Blijkbaar gaan de bijbel en Democratie dus hand in hand al sinds de Europeanen uitvaarden naar de rest van de wereld om deze te onderwerpen. Het is wel geinig hoor dat Democratie. Niet dat dit in het Westen zelf zo goed werkt. Met al dat wanbeleid wat vantevoren al vaststaat dat wordt ingevoerd ongeacht wat de stemmer ook stemt. Punt is, als die studenten hadden gewonnen. Dan was China stuurloos. Want studenten zijn geen leiders. In dat geval zou VS instappen om alles over te nemen. Ik begrijp dat China hiervoor waakt.

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Repetition breeds reality. Such is the case with allegations the U.S. has leveled at China in their budding economic Cold War. Across the American political spectrum, it’s now taken for granted that China forces U.S. companies to transfer critical technology in order to do business on the mainland, engages in rampant hacking and theft of intellectual property, and massively and unfairly subsidizes its high-tech industries — all of which contributes to fears that the country poses an existential threat to America’s prosperity.

Like many longtime observers of China, I’ve been getting more than my fair share of airtime over the past several months. Typically, the interview starts with a false premise followed by a loaded question: “Everyone knows that China is stealing hundreds of billions of dollars a year in U.S. intellectual property. Isn’t it high time for America to stand up to its greatest economic threat?”
But, what exactly does “everybody” really know? This assertion is drawn from the findings of the “IP Commission Report” co-chaired by two renowned public servants, former Director of National Intelligence Adm. Dennis Blair and former Utah governor Jon Huntsman Jr., now ambassador to Russia. In 2017, the commission estimated that intellectual-property theft cost the U.S. economy somewhere between $225 billion and $600 billion annually, an exceptionally broad range. Stolen trade secrets are thought to account for 80-90 percent of the total, the remainder being counterfeit and pirated hardware and software.

When it comes to stolen trade secrets, though, there’s a problem. There’s no hard data to support the estimates. The IP Commission rests its case on a 2014 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and the Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade, which itself relies on dubious “proxy modeling” — in essence, coming up with statistical guesstimates using available data on nefarious activities such as narcotics trafficking, corruption, occupational fraud and illicit financial flows. While these are problematic features of any nation, it takes a rather large leap of faith to convert this information into the 1-3 percent of GDP that the IP Commission claims is lost to theft of intellectual property.

The commission’s estimates of how much of this loss to attribute to China are even more dubious. They come from the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), which reported $1.35 billion in seizures of counterfeit and pirated goods in 2015. Another model — this one constructed by researchers at the OECD — was used to convert this to a U.S. total. Then 87 percent of that was attributed to China — 52 percent from the mainland and 35 percent from Hong Kong. With no direct tally available for pirated software, once again a “model” (from the Business Software Alliance) was used to impute 61 percent of that total to Asia Pacific.
Meanwhile, no attempt was made to quantify the Chinese share of stolen trade secrets, which, as noted above, accounts for the bulk of the overall estimate of America’s IP losses. The bottom line: The only thing “everybody knows” about China’s alleged IP theft from the U.S. comes from flimsy evidence derived from highly dubious models.

Unfortunately, an equally suspicious approach was used to support the case leveled by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in the so-called Section 301 report published last March and used to justify America’s tariff war against China. The heart of the USTR’s case is that companies are forced to transfer technology when they enter into mainland joint ventures.
Within the JV structure, a voluntary contract between two parties, it’s hardly shocking that U.S. and Chinese partners share talent, strategies, operating systems, process designs and, yes, production technologies in their collective efforts to build a new business.

But, even the USTR confesses it has no hard evidence to prove that this sharing is forced — the essence of the allegation. Buried on page 19 of the 182-page USTR report is the admission that “transfer policies and practices have become more implicit, often carried out through oral instructions and ‘behind closed doors.’” Here, following the highly questionable precedent of the IP Commission, the USTR also rests its case on proxy surveys conducted by the U.S.-China Business Council, in which 19 percent of respondents claim they’ve been forced to transfer technology to their Chinese partners. Curiously, in the council’s latest survey (conducted in 2018), 99 percent of respondents saw no deterioration in IP protection over the past year.
Bias even creeps into the evidence on cyber-attacks presented by the USTR. While there have been reports of very recent cyber incursions by state-sponsored Chinese hackers, most of the allegations documented by the USTR predate a September 2015 cyber accord signed by Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping.

Finally, while state-sponsored industrial policies (such as “Made in China 2025”) are alleged to be a unique and unfair effort by China to dominate leading-edge industries such as artificial intelligence, little mention is made of similar industrial policies long supported by Japan, Germany, and even the U.S. through its Pentagon-centric R&D program. Nor is there any effort to provide serious economic analysis of the outsize U.S.-China bilateral trade imbalance — the political lightning rod in the trade battle — as but one piece of America’s multilateral deficits with 102 nations that have long afflicted a savings-short U.S. economy.

China is far from perfect and must be held accountable for verifiable economic transgressions. But America’s case against China is based on anecdotes and shaky evidence that don’t stand up to serious scrutiny. As a trade war now morphs into a cold war, the current U.S. administration would be wise to stop relying on such “alternative facts” to wage its battles.

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China today is typically seen as a major economic power, and is expected to conform to international norms that are based on Western institutions, reflecting contemporary Western values. While its economy is big in the aggregate, China is nowhere close to being a developed country. In rough terms, the U.K. reached China’s current per capita income over a century ago. At that time, the U.K. was able to make all the rules, and no one was there to impose international sanctions against it for its behavior no matter how outrageous it was by today’s standards. When the British Empire grew, its military invaded other countries, violently suppressed “native” uprisings, prised open foreign markets with the gunboats of the Royal Navy, and expanded its imperial possessions. In contrast to today, how China conducts its economic reform, how it manages its currency, how it invests overseas are constantly scrutinized and judged against norms and standards set by Western countries, even though China’s per capita GDP is still only a fraction of theirs.

Fan believes that the playing field in the global economy is stacked against today’s successful emerging markets. They are expected to conform to standards that have been created by Western countries at levels of development and income many multiples higher than the emerging markets. China, with a GDP per capita of around $10,000, is expected to behave exactly like countries with GDP per capita six to eight times higher.

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For example, Fan points out that prior to the global financial crisis, Western political leaders, scholars, and experts came to China and preached the merits of market deregulation and privatization of the state sector. After the global financial crisis, they are still preaching, but what they preach has changed. Now the same pundits are preaching the need of reducing inequality and singing the virtue of inclusive growth to China, with the same conviction and certainty as before.

As it happens, Fan agrees with many of their arguments, but he firmly believes that emerging markets need to evolve their own development pathways. The worst possible course of action is for emerging markets to adopt wholesale the standard prescriptions of market reforms and political liberalization from the West. The result is typically economic stagnation and political chaos, with the occasional financial crisis. And he points to the chronic failures in economic development in some of the Latin American countries as a consequence of such policy mistakes.

In contrast, Fan suggests that the successful rapid industrialization and economic development of East and Southeast Asia has been achieved through pragmatic policies that combine flexible market reforms with strong state control over the pace and scope of economic opening. East Asia tapped into the global market through selective liberalization, notably in labor intensive manufacturing in the early phase of their economic takeoffs. "Infant industries" were protected when it was considered necessary, and many sectors, especially in finance, remained tightly regulated for much longer. The government also played a major role in investing in public infrastructure without which the private sector would not be able to compete in the global market. Many mistakes were undoubtedly made, notably the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but East Asia was able to respond effectively and recovered. In a way, East Asia pioneered the practice of "cross the river by feeling the stones" long before Deng formulated it into one of his most famous aphorisms.

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Op woensdag 10 april 2019 09:46 schreef rockstah het volgende:
https://www.abc.net.au/ne(...)oism-revival/9287484

Is al oud nieuws blijkbaar maar ik vind het wel opmerkelijk, blijkbaar stimuleert de CCP nu het Taoïsme om de groei van het christendom tegen te gaan, na eerst dus gepoogd te hebben om het uit te roeien.

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Op woensdag 10 april 2019 09:54 schreef Zomaar-een-Chinees het volgende:

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Chinese studenten werden in de jaren 80 gebrainwashed met 'Democratische ideeen' "toevallig" overgewaaid vanuit Amerika. Dit leidde tot de studentenopstand. Al deze studenten bleken ook een bekeerd Christen te zijn. Blijkbaar gaan de bijbel en Democratie dus hand in hand al sinds de Europeanen uitvaarden naar de rest van de wereld om deze te onderwerpen. Het is wel geinig hoor dat Democratie. Niet dat dit in het Westen zelf zo goed werkt. Met al dat wanbeleid wat vantevoren al vaststaat dat wordt ingevoerd ongeacht wat de stemmer ook stemt. Punt is, als die studenten hadden gewonnen. Dan was China stuurloos. Want studenten zijn geen leiders. In dat geval zou VS instappen om alles over te nemen. Ik begrijp dat China hiervoor waakt.