[Centraal] Crisis in Syri� #139 Jowbar krijgt klappen.

twitter:

hxhassan twitterde op zondag 31-08-2014 om 03:31:11 Islamic State (ISIS) seems to have formally begun its campaign to take Deir Ezzor airport. http://t.co/2tpqlH8rVb reageer retweet

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 16:31 schreef Reki het volgende:

twitter:

hxhassan twitterde op zondag 31-08-2014 om 03:31:11 Islamic State (ISIS) seems to have formally begun its campaign to take Deir Ezzor airport. http://t.co/2tpqlH8rVb reageer retweet

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 14:48 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

سمارت دمشق جوبر رصد سلسلة من الصواريخ المتساقطة على الحي 31 8 2014

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:10 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Bombardementen op Jowbar, zie TT.

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:14 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Arab_Air_Force

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:15 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Nee

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:19 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Isra�l is dan ook hypocriet.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 00:27 schreef UpsideDown het volgende:
Was een kwestie van tijd voor dat ging gebeuren, Deir ez-Zor is inmiddels een enclave geworden in het IS-rijk, en dus de lul. Het verstandigste lijkt me om te evacuren, anders liggen de hoofden straks weer op het plaatselijke dorpsplein.

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:03 schreef Jigzoz het volgende:

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Dat constante ge-allahuakbar komt echt ongelofelijk zwakzinnig over.

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Een factor in de oorlog zijn de Koerden, een volk van 35 miljoen mensen met een eigen taal en cultuur, maar geen eigen land. Ze zijn verspreid over onder meer Turkije, Syri�, Irak (Iraaks-Koerdistan), Iran en de vroegere Sovjet-Unie. De Syrische Koerden vechten tegen zowel de regering als de rebellen.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:29 schreef mig72 het volgende:

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Vraagje:

Zijn de rebellen gelijk aan ISIS of moeten we die partij apart zien?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:41 schreef Senor__Chang het volgende:

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Je hebt 4 partijen; Assad, ISIS, de rebellen en de Koerden. De rebellen zijn dan weer verdeeld van gematigd tot jihadistisch.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:46 schreef mig72 het volgende:

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Maar hoe moeten we ISIS van de rebellen onderscheiden dan? Als ze allebei zonder duidelijke organisatie en guerilla stijl ten strijde trekken?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 02:07 schreef Senor__Chang het volgende:

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ISIS heeft wel degelijk een goede organisatie en tactiek.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:24 schreef Montana_ir het volgende:
Isis beesten zeggen dat ze 100 PKK soldaten hebben vermoord.

Pas op : schokkende beelden !

https://justpaste.it/ja7im_pkk

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Attacking the Islamic State IS attacking Assad

The Assad dictatorship has worked hard to create a binary between itself and extremists. The destruction of the IS will leave the dictatorship exposed and vulnerable as never before.

With the United States being sucked inexorably into an unavoidable and wider conflict with the self-styled "Islamic State" (IS; formerly ISIS) in Iraq, attention has quickly turned to the fact that the terrorist group's main redoubt is in northern Syria. Therefore, if there is to be a broad confrontation with the IS, as US military Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey warned last week, it would have to extend itself into Syria. And there is every indication that the United States is preparing contingencies for just that.

Inevitably, the cry has gone up in some quarters that the only logical thing to do is to partner with the ghastly dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad in order to defeat these crazed fanatics. Indeed, a recent report, although apparently based largely on conjecture, by Patrick Cockburn in The Independent, suggests that Western intelligence agencies are already sharing information on the IS with the Damascus dictatorship through the German intelligence agency.

The Assad regime smells yet another opportunity to rehabilitate itself, similar to the outrageous chemical weapons deal that was struck after numerous instances of chemical attacks against Syrian civilians and rebels. That turned Assad into a partner of the West, at least insofar as the chemical weapons decommissioning project was concerned. But that implied that Assad had to keep controlling key areas of the country and that his rule had an important, positive purpose, at least in that narrow framework. He discovered a new formula in international relations: dumping chemical weapons on innocent people is a potential path to new diplomatic and political legitimacy.

And how has that gone? Well, in May, France and Human Rights Watch simultaneously accused the Syrian dictatorship of continuing to use chemical weapons, including chlorine gas. Big success!

But the notion that Assad is a plausible or useful long-term ally against the IS can only be based on the most superficial and pseudo-logical understanding of Syrian realities. In fact, the IS has been, and remains, the linchpin of the survival of the Damascus regime.

From the outset of the uprising against him, even when he was faced by only unarmed demonstrators, Assad and his cronies wove an elaborate mythology about an assault by international jihadists backed by Al Qaeda. And over the course of the next year-and-a-half his regime worked night and day to ensure that this mythology became a reality.

And, after all, the Syrian regime had a long-standing relationship with the Islamic State’s immediate predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Throughout the American occupation, Damascus gave a laissez pass� to foreign fighters who wanted to go to Iraq and join the AQI in order to attack Americans, Shiites and others. As long as they kept their heads down in Syria, they were welcome to pass through. So these two entities have a very long history of not only knowing each other, but knowing how to make each other useful. The sordid history of Assad-AQI/ISIS collaboration was neatly encapsulated in a short but invaluable essay by Peter Neumann in the London Review of Books last April.

As the uprising gained steam, the Syrian dictatorship released the most notorious Salafist-jihadists they were holding from prison. They concentrated their fire power on the Free Syrian Army and other nationalist groups that actually threatened to potentially overthrow the regime successfully, while ignoring the steady gains of ISIS. As Hassan Hassan has pointed out, "When [ISIS] Islamic radicals took over Raqqa, ... the regime did not follow the same policy it had consistently employed elsewhere, which is to shower liberated territories with bombs, day and night." Instead, it did nothing. Except purchase large quantities of oil from ISIS, fattening their coffers even further.

It's not so much that the regime welcomes the loss of these relatively remote areas in northern and eastern Syria. It's that it can do without them if it has to. What's central to the survival of the Assad dictatorship is a long strip in the western half of the country beginning at the Lebanon border, continuing up through Qalamoun, Damascus, and Homs and thence into the Alawite heartland around Latakia. As long as those areas can be secured, the fundamental interests of the dictatorship are guaranteed. If Kurdish areas in the north fall to local fighters, or the IS overruns large areas of the West, that's just unfortunate.

But there is a distinct upside to the rise of the IS for the regime. It has established, in the minds of many Syrians, and particularly many in the West, a false binary in which the choice is between deranged jihadist monsters versus a criminal mafia regime that is largely responsible for the death of at least 200,000 people in the past three years and that will stop at nothing to cling to power.

So now Assad and his henchmen say they want to be part of the battle against the IS. It's a perfect example of the arsonist showing up at an uncontrolled blaze posing as a fireman. Obviously, nobody wants to have an uprising against them. But if you must have enemies, the more deranged and terrifying they are, the better. So as long as there is a war in Syria, Assad simply cannot do without the Islamic State or something extremely similar.

The notion of partnering with the Syrian government against the IS is just silly at every level.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 19:25 schreef IPA35 het volgende:
Bla bla bla.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 19:59 schreef Gabrunal_2013 het volgende:
PKK? Daar zullen de Turken niet blij mee zijn!

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 19:32 schreef J0kkebr0k het volgende:

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Wat ranzig.

Mensonterend ook.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 21:07 schreef J0kkebr0k het volgende:

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Dus?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 14:26 schreef Slayage het volgende:

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waar?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 21:38 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Zij hebben liever ISIS.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 21:54 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Jawel Turkije helpt ISIS.