[Centraal] Crisis in Syri� #139 Jowbar krijgt klappen.

twitter:

hxhassan twitterde op zondag 31-08-2014 om 03:31:11 Islamic State (ISIS) seems to have formally begun its campaign to take Deir Ezzor airport. http://t.co/2tpqlH8rVb reageer retweet

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 16:31 schreef Reki het volgende:

twitter:

hxhassan twitterde op zondag 31-08-2014 om 03:31:11 Islamic State (ISIS) seems to have formally begun its campaign to take Deir Ezzor airport. http://t.co/2tpqlH8rVb reageer retweet

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 14:48 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

سمارت دمشق جوبر رصد سلسلة من الصواريخ المتساقطة على الحي 31 8 2014

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:10 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Bombardementen op Jowbar, zie TT.

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:14 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Arab_Air_Force

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:15 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Nee

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:19 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Isra�l is dan ook hypocriet.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 00:27 schreef UpsideDown het volgende:
Was een kwestie van tijd voor dat ging gebeuren, Deir ez-Zor is inmiddels een enclave geworden in het IS-rijk, en dus de lul. Het verstandigste lijkt me om te evacuren, anders liggen de hoofden straks weer op het plaatselijke dorpsplein.

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Op zondag 31 augustus 2014 21:03 schreef Jigzoz het volgende:

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Dat constante ge-allahuakbar komt echt ongelofelijk zwakzinnig over.

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Een factor in de oorlog zijn de Koerden, een volk van 35 miljoen mensen met een eigen taal en cultuur, maar geen eigen land. Ze zijn verspreid over onder meer Turkije, Syri�, Irak (Iraaks-Koerdistan), Iran en de vroegere Sovjet-Unie. De Syrische Koerden vechten tegen zowel de regering als de rebellen.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:29 schreef mig72 het volgende:

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Vraagje:

Zijn de rebellen gelijk aan ISIS of moeten we die partij apart zien?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:41 schreef Senor__Chang het volgende:

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Je hebt 4 partijen; Assad, ISIS, de rebellen en de Koerden. De rebellen zijn dan weer verdeeld van gematigd tot jihadistisch.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:46 schreef mig72 het volgende:

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Maar hoe moeten we ISIS van de rebellen onderscheiden dan? Als ze allebei zonder duidelijke organisatie en guerilla stijl ten strijde trekken?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 02:07 schreef Senor__Chang het volgende:

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ISIS heeft wel degelijk een goede organisatie en tactiek.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 01:24 schreef Montana_ir het volgende:
Isis beesten zeggen dat ze 100 PKK soldaten hebben vermoord.

Pas op : schokkende beelden !

https://justpaste.it/ja7im_pkk

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Attacking the Islamic State IS attacking Assad

The Assad dictatorship has worked hard to create a binary between itself and extremists. The destruction of the IS will leave the dictatorship exposed and vulnerable as never before.

With the United States being sucked inexorably into an unavoidable and wider conflict with the self-styled "Islamic State" (IS; formerly ISIS) in Iraq, attention has quickly turned to the fact that the terrorist group's main redoubt is in northern Syria. Therefore, if there is to be a broad confrontation with the IS, as US military Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey warned last week, it would have to extend itself into Syria. And there is every indication that the United States is preparing contingencies for just that.

Inevitably, the cry has gone up in some quarters that the only logical thing to do is to partner with the ghastly dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad in order to defeat these crazed fanatics. Indeed, a recent report, although apparently based largely on conjecture, by Patrick Cockburn in The Independent, suggests that Western intelligence agencies are already sharing information on the IS with the Damascus dictatorship through the German intelligence agency.

The Assad regime smells yet another opportunity to rehabilitate itself, similar to the outrageous chemical weapons deal that was struck after numerous instances of chemical attacks against Syrian civilians and rebels. That turned Assad into a partner of the West, at least insofar as the chemical weapons decommissioning project was concerned. But that implied that Assad had to keep controlling key areas of the country and that his rule had an important, positive purpose, at least in that narrow framework. He discovered a new formula in international relations: dumping chemical weapons on innocent people is a potential path to new diplomatic and political legitimacy.

And how has that gone? Well, in May, France and Human Rights Watch simultaneously accused the Syrian dictatorship of continuing to use chemical weapons, including chlorine gas. Big success!

But the notion that Assad is a plausible or useful long-term ally against the IS can only be based on the most superficial and pseudo-logical understanding of Syrian realities. In fact, the IS has been, and remains, the linchpin of the survival of the Damascus regime.

From the outset of the uprising against him, even when he was faced by only unarmed demonstrators, Assad and his cronies wove an elaborate mythology about an assault by international jihadists backed by Al Qaeda. And over the course of the next year-and-a-half his regime worked night and day to ensure that this mythology became a reality.

And, after all, the Syrian regime had a long-standing relationship with the Islamic State’s immediate predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Throughout the American occupation, Damascus gave a laissez pass� to foreign fighters who wanted to go to Iraq and join the AQI in order to attack Americans, Shiites and others. As long as they kept their heads down in Syria, they were welcome to pass through. So these two entities have a very long history of not only knowing each other, but knowing how to make each other useful. The sordid history of Assad-AQI/ISIS collaboration was neatly encapsulated in a short but invaluable essay by Peter Neumann in the London Review of Books last April.

As the uprising gained steam, the Syrian dictatorship released the most notorious Salafist-jihadists they were holding from prison. They concentrated their fire power on the Free Syrian Army and other nationalist groups that actually threatened to potentially overthrow the regime successfully, while ignoring the steady gains of ISIS. As Hassan Hassan has pointed out, "When [ISIS] Islamic radicals took over Raqqa, ... the regime did not follow the same policy it had consistently employed elsewhere, which is to shower liberated territories with bombs, day and night." Instead, it did nothing. Except purchase large quantities of oil from ISIS, fattening their coffers even further.

It's not so much that the regime welcomes the loss of these relatively remote areas in northern and eastern Syria. It's that it can do without them if it has to. What's central to the survival of the Assad dictatorship is a long strip in the western half of the country beginning at the Lebanon border, continuing up through Qalamoun, Damascus, and Homs and thence into the Alawite heartland around Latakia. As long as those areas can be secured, the fundamental interests of the dictatorship are guaranteed. If Kurdish areas in the north fall to local fighters, or the IS overruns large areas of the West, that's just unfortunate.

But there is a distinct upside to the rise of the IS for the regime. It has established, in the minds of many Syrians, and particularly many in the West, a false binary in which the choice is between deranged jihadist monsters versus a criminal mafia regime that is largely responsible for the death of at least 200,000 people in the past three years and that will stop at nothing to cling to power.

So now Assad and his henchmen say they want to be part of the battle against the IS. It's a perfect example of the arsonist showing up at an uncontrolled blaze posing as a fireman. Obviously, nobody wants to have an uprising against them. But if you must have enemies, the more deranged and terrifying they are, the better. So as long as there is a war in Syria, Assad simply cannot do without the Islamic State or something extremely similar.

The notion of partnering with the Syrian government against the IS is just silly at every level.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 19:25 schreef IPA35 het volgende:
Bla bla bla.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 19:59 schreef Gabrunal_2013 het volgende:
PKK? Daar zullen de Turken niet blij mee zijn!

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 19:32 schreef J0kkebr0k het volgende:

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Wat ranzig.

Mensonterend ook.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 21:07 schreef J0kkebr0k het volgende:

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Dus?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 14:26 schreef Slayage het volgende:

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waar?

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 21:38 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Zij hebben liever ISIS.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 21:54 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Jawel Turkije helpt ISIS.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:03 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Nee, Turkmenen worden gehaat door ISIS. Turkije heeft de Turkmenen in Syri� en Irak altijd gebruikt als 5e colonne maar in feite geven ze geen ene fuck om hen.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:05 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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ISIS maakt PKK dood = profit.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:06 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Nee maar ze zijn bruikbaar.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:09 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Overal hoor je dat ze hen wapens leveren en Turks grondgebied laten gebruiken.

ISIS verkoopt hen olie voor 1/4e van de marktwaarde. Gaat harde cash in om.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:15 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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De Amerikanen zullen Turkije ertoe maken dat ze hiermee stoppen.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:18 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Dit is slechts wat ik krijg uit mijn Twitter-feed. Ook van betrouwbare bronnen.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:19 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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De NAVO niet, Erdogan.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:20 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Met een erg sterk eigen willetje...

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:22 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Dat weten ze wel denk ik. Kunnen er alleen weinig aan doen.

Turkije is slim en koopt super goedkope olie van ISIS...

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:18 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Dit is slechts wat ik krijg uit mijn Twitter-feed. Ook van betrouwbare bronnen.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 23:37 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Elijah J Magnier is gewoon een betrouwbare bron..

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 23:44 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Ja. Maar het maakt mij niet uit of hij dat wel of niet deed.

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 23:54 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Denken dat zo'n bombardement zoals die ik liet zijn uit Jobar minder erg is dan gas...

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Op maandag 1 september 2014 22:05 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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ISIS maakt PKK dood = profit.

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 10:38 schreef Slayage het volgende:
Pro-government Syrian activist arrested after rare public dissent

BEIRUT Mon Sep 1, 2014 9:58am EDT

(Reuters) - Syrian authorities have arrested a pro-government activist who launched a social media campaign calling on officials to provide information about hundreds of missing soldiers, residents and activists said on Monday.

The arrest on Friday has fueled an already unusually bold push by some government supporters to hold officials accountable for the rising death toll among President Bashar al-Assad’s loyalists.

geen inslag te zien helaaas

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=783_1409647147

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ISIS isn’t the first group to use the butcher’s knife as an instrument of policy. Nor will it be the last


Chopping off someone’s head or sawing it off or slicing it off is about gore. Blood. Pain. Grotesquerie. Death by the blade is about shame, suffering in an animal slaughterhouse. It’s the most repulsive theatre, understood by the Romans, the Tudors, the French revolutionaries, the austerest guardians of Wahhabism. Colour it bright red.

To be hanged, drawn and quartered was about fear, terror – a word liberally used in Paris after 1789 – and obedience. It still is. The most judicious, accurate and gruesome description I have ever read of such executions – those of a nervous disposition need read no further – came from an expatriate Irishman who chanced upon the “judicial” beheading of three Saudis in Jeddah in 1997.

“Standing to the left of the first prisoner, and a little behind him, the executioner focused upon his quarry. I watched as the sword was drawn back with the right hand. A one-handed back swing of a golf club came to mind … The down-swing begins. How can he do it from that angle? … The blade met the neck and cut through it like…a heavy cleaver cutting through a melon … a crisp, moist smack. The head fell and rolled a little. The torso slumped neatly. I see now Why they tied wrists to feet … the brain had no time to tell the heart to stop, and the final beat pumped a gush of blood out of the headless torso on to the plinth.”

Oddly, back then – in the days when decapitation was regarded as a mundane if unpleasant ritual in Wahhabi Saudi society – this description, in The Irish Times of all places, elicited not the slightest response. No one worried about the sins of the three poor wretches, nor the “trial” they underwent, nor the pain they must have endured. It was all part of a timeless tradition. You know, these warrior chaps, always chopping off bits of one another. Decapitations, amputations, you name it.

Now that the habit has stretched across the deserts to Iraq and Syria, however, and embraced the good, the bad, the ugly and the truly innocent, we’re all talking about genocide, apocalypse and the end of the world. Isis, the latest Middle Eastern plague we have to fear and loathe – remember Khomeini’s hangmen, Saddam’s torturers and Assad’s executioners? – has quite deliberately turned to the butcher’s knife as an instrument of policy. Debate, discussion, objections have no place in the polity of this Salafist lot.

It’s rule by fear, Ghengis Khan-style, Tamerlane the victorious – is it not passing brave to ride in triumph through Mosul? – in which power (and revenge) is imposed through the knife. Shia Iraqi soldiers? Shoot them in the back of the head by the battalion. Christians? Convert or die. Syrian recruits? Strip them and slice their throats. And videotape the whole gruesome business. Not since the Wehrmacht took tourist snapshots of their massacres of the Jews of the Soviet Union have we had culprits documenting their own war crimes on such a scale. Indeed, the mobile phone video, the blog and the internet have become the new purveyors of earthly terror.

There’s no point in searching for the dark inspiration behind decapitation. Almost every ancient text can be used to justify judicial murder, ethnic cleansing or genocide. The Bible is packed with the stuff. But the unique element about Isis – true to the bleak 18th-century philosophy of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab himself, so harsh and intolerant that the people of Basra threw him out of their city after his brief visit to what is now Iraq – is the idea of a return to the origins of Islam, to purity. Which means pre-schism Islam, before the great Shia divide. And purity is about absolutes, absolute right and absolute wrong, which is why the flag of Isis is black and white – as was the flag of al-Qa’ida.

Of course, the original al-Qa’ida favoured the men who would create this monster. When Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qa’ida’s man in Iraq, was killed in a US air raid in 2006, Osama bin Laden described him as “a lion of jihad”. But via his successor Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi and now Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, this particular al-Qa’ida clone moved out of control. Far from claiming to represent all Muslims, al-Qa’ida’s local affiliates espoused Sunni – even tribal – aspirations. Thus a letter written – probably by Bin Laden himself, less than a year before his assassination by the Americans – complains that some of his “brothers” had become “totally absorbed in fighting our local enemies” and using other Muslims as human shields (Bin Laden called this the “barricade argument”).

Addressing one of his advisers, Bin Laden specifically questioned the actions of “our brother Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi”, demanding that “several sources” be questioned about him – as well as about his Islamic State lieutenant al-Nasir li-Din Allah. “In these efforts,” Bin Laden wrote, “there should be a special message directed to our brothers there that stresses the importance of unity and collectiveness and that they maintain a basic foundation of the religion so it must get precedence over names, titles or entities if they obstruct the achievement of that great duty.” In other words, the al-Qa’ida leader was having grave doubts about Isis, its leadership and its role.

The last critical paragraph of this letter, which passed through the hands of the Americans who found it in Bin Laden’s compound in 2011 after they killed him in Abbottabad – so there’s a red light over the sourcing – begins: “We must avoid the stigma of being a one-dimensional sect [sic], opposed to all others. We are Muslims following the teachings of Islam and we are not the owners of the Salafist way … It is important to have a memorandum … clarifying the issues of penitence … and the virtue of patience; refraining from accusing and judging without being qualified to judge.” Bin Laden even wanted al-Qa’ida to apologise when Muslims were wrongly killed by al-Qa’ida surrogates.

If only we had captured this man and put him on trial for al-Qa’ida’s crimes against humanity – rather than murdered him, which we did – perhaps due process would have allowed us to hear more of Bin Laden’s argument. But of course, we liquidated him. And now America’s military bosses are talking hysterically about apocalypse and their President admits he doesn’t “have a strategy yet”, at least not until he can “cobble together the kind of coalition we need …” And so the blood-dimmed tide is loosed.

Read more at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=969_1409626278#btPXDsDiBf2Qs9Ks.99

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 13:20 schreef firefly3 het volgende:
De FSA zit momenteel al nusra grootschalig aan te vallen in het noorden.

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 14:18 schreef theunderdog het volgende:

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Bron?

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 15:26 schreef firefly3 het volgende:

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RQ-170

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 16:49 schreef Blue_Panther_Ninja het volgende:

'We don't have a strategy, yet' - US & UK in ISIS response slow-mo

Niemand kan iets te doen tegen ISIS.

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 16:51 schreef theunderdog het volgende:

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 17:09 schreef Blue_Panther_Ninja het volgende:

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Fixed.

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 17:11 schreef theunderdog het volgende:

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 17:13 schreef Blue_Panther_Ninja het volgende:

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Wat wil je nou?

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 17:13 schreef theunderdog het volgende:

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Het zou misschien verstandig zijn als je je oprecht gaat verdiepen in diplomatiek enzo.

Daarbij, je zin is verkracht.

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Op dinsdag 2 september 2014 18:43 schreef IPA35 het volgende:

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Syri� haat Iran?!

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Op woensdag 3 september 2014 19:14 schreef firefly3 het volgende:
Oudere foto van de jesus divisie. Te ingewikkeld denk ik voor de mensen die de FSA allemaal als moslim takfiri bestempelen.

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Op woensdag 3 september 2014 19:14 schreef firefly3 het volgende:
Oudere foto van de jesus divisie. Te ingewikkeld denk ik voor de mensen die de FSA allemaal als moslim takfiri's bestempelen. Atheisten heb je ook nog binnen de FSA.

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