Ben ik werken, wordt er een heel topic volgeschreven

In het voorjaar stond ik in de planning om een reportage over de fietstoeristische mogelijkheden in Georgië te schrijven, dat ging mis omdat aan Georgische kant alles niet op tijd rond was. Ivm daarmee heb ik toen wat informatie gezocht, vooral op
www.rferl.org. Wat artikelen die ik toen vond (vet van mijn hand):
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Caught Between Russia And Georgia, South Ossetia Rift Widens
By Jean-Christophe Peuch
VIENNA, November 14, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- In November 2006, the breakaway South Caucasus region of South Ossetia held two sets of simultaneous presidential elections.
Neither was recognized internationally, but both have left the region with the very real impact of two parallel, and mutually exclusive, leadership structures that may make the resolution of its breakaway status even less likely.
One, backed by Moscow, reinstated the region's de facto incumbent, separatist leader Eduard Kokoity. The second, organized with Tbilisi's unofficial support, brought in an "alternative" candidate, former separatist Prime Minister Dmitry Sanakoyev, to head a new, pro-Georgian provisional administration.
That ballot, held in regions of South Ossetia populated predominantly by ethnic Georgians, was accompanied by a referendum in which a vast majority of residents voted in favor of a confederation arrangement with Tbilisi.
Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht, who at the time of the vote was serving as the chairman-in-office for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, was among the Western officials to express his displeasure with the duelling votes. "The so-called elections," he said, "increase tensions and divisions at a time when the sides to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict should be devoting all efforts to stabilizing the situation and moving forward the negotiating process."
Georgian authorities, however, have continued to maintain at home and abroad that Sanakoyev was the solution to the continued impasse over the breakaway region. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, addressing the OSCE Permanent Council late last month, claimed the provisional administration now controls "about half" the territory of South Ossetia.
The OSCE is there to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties, with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement of the conflict. It also has monitors on the ground who gather information on the military situation in the conflict zone and maintain close contacts with the the Russian-Georgian-Ossetian Joint Peacekeeping Force.
Noghaideli also went on to describe the separatist government as "falling apart," and praising Sanakoyev's team as choosing "the path of peace and leading South Ossetia forward." He added that "tens of thousands" of local residents are expressing "the very same desires."
Scattered Villages
It's a bold claim in a region whose estimated population -- a mix of Georgians and Ossetians -- stands at just 70,000. Western diplomats, moreover, say it is impossible to corroborate. Former Georgian Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who aggressively sought to bring Tskhinvali back into the Georgian fold during his time at the post, recently described Sanakoyev as a "caricature" who has been unable to woo significant numbers of Ossetians from the separatist leadership.
Sanakoyev's provisional administration is headquartered in a predominantly Georgian village located in a part of South Ossetia that is under Tbilisi's jurisdiction. He has said the settlements under his control are home to mainly Georgians but boast a substantial Ossetian minority of 8,000. Noghaideli upped the ante in his remarks to the OSCE, saying that figure is nearly twice as high.
Russia and South Ossetia's separatist authorities have both dismissed Sanakoyev's team as a puppet administration that has no mandate to speak on behalf of all Ossetians. Moscow also says that what is calls the "Sanakoyev factor" is seriously complicating status negotiations involving the Joint Control Commission (JCC), the four-party body that continues to supervise the implementation of the 1992 cease-fire agreement that ended the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.
The JCC, which comprises delegates from Russia, Georgia, and North and South Ossetia, has had little luck finding points of compromise or agreement on questions like the establishment of confidence-building measures and the demilitarization of the conflict zone. To Russia's mind, this is largely the fault of Georgian initiatives like the provisional government. Tbilisi in turns blames the commission's purported inefficiency on Russia's continued support to the separatist government.
Following an inconclusive commission meeting last month, Russia's chief negotiator, Yury Popov, said the emergence of Sanakoyev had had an "irritating effect" on the security situation in South Ossetia and was hampering the negotiation process. He also criticized Tbilisi for obstructing talks with demands like its insistence that the separatist government establish contact with Sanakoyev.
Growing Rift
To be sure, the creation of the provisional administration has made separatist authorities increasingly nervous and has negatively affected relations within the region. Earlier this year, Georgian and Ossetian villagers squared off against each other on several incidents in a fight over access to the region's water supplies.
OSCE officials note that the rift between the conflict zone's divided communities "is getting wider and wider every day," and that the vast majority of Ossetians do not trust Georgian authorities. They also say the existence of two antagonistic administrations, located just a few kilometers from each other in a region that has yet to be demilitarized, has only intensified the risk of direct confrontation.
Another fallout of the "Sanakoyev factor" is that it has seriously complicated the OSCE's relations with the Kokoity administration, thus putting the only international presence on the ground at risk.
The separatist authorities last month blocked Lithuanian water engineers from entering Tskhinvali as a protest against official contacts between Vilnius and Sanakoyev. Lithuania, which has pledged 100,000 euros to rehabilitate Tskhinvali's water supply network as part of the OSCE-led Economic Rehabilitation Program for South Ossetia, is now threatening to fund projects only in Sanakoyev-controlled areas.
The creation of the provisional administration has for the most part been met with embarrassment by the international community. Although the pro-Georgian leader traveled to Brussels this summer for informal talks with members of the European Parliament, only a few individual countries have taken the step of to making official contact with Sanakoyev.
In April, the European Union's special representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, exchanged a few words with Sanakoyev on the sidelines of a NATO Parliamentary Assembly seminar in Tbilisi. But Semneby has so far refrained from official contacts with Sanakoyev and has made it clear that the EU will maintain ties with the separatist authorities.
British diplomat Roy Reeve, who until recently headed the OSCE mission to Georgia, was at odds with Tbilisi over Sanakoyev, arguing that engaging in a dialogue with the head of the provisional administration risked putting the organization's regional operations at risk.
Whether Reeve's successor, Finnish diplomat Terhi Hakala, will follow the same nonengagement policy is unclear. The OSCE expects Finland's upcoming chairmanship of the OSCE to refocus attention on South Ossetia and other post-Soviet frozen conflicts. But Helsinki's stance on Sanakoyev remains muted. Sanakoyev traveled to Finland with Saakashvili last month, but it is not clear if he was invited to meet with Finnish officials -- or if so, at what level.
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EU: For Brussels, Not All Frozen Conflicts Are Alike
By Ahto Lobjakas
BRUSSELS, October 25, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- At a European Parliament debate on South Ossetia and Transdniester today, EU officials had two distinct messages. First, that the bloc's involvement in Moldova will remain strong. Second, that Georgia's requests for greater EU involvement are "unrealistic."
From the EU’s point of view, not all frozen conflicts are alike.
It continues to acknowledge Russia’s key role in attempts at resolution. But when it comes to its own involvement, Brussels is clearly more enthusiastic about Moldova than it is about Georgia.
Moldova will share a border with the EU as of January 1, 2007, when Romania will join the bloc. As a result, Russia’s involvement in Transdniester is keenly felt in Brussels.
EU Cautious On Georgia
The more distant Georgia, by contrast, could suffer more because of the EU’s strategic need for Russian goodwill as an energy supplier and global partner.
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and a number of other countries are unwilling to complicate their relations with Russia.
Evidence of this came in the EU's warning to Georgia today that the bloc's involvement in its two frozen conflicts -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- will remain limited.
Speaking in Strasbourg on behalf of the current EU presidency, Finnish Europe Minister Paula Lehtomaeki said Tbilisi wants Brussels to step up participation in peace talks with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and to deploy EU peacekeepers to the region.
But those expectations, she said, are likely to prove "unrealistic."
“There are discussions going on currently within the EU about strengthening the EU’s role, but Georgia’s expectations may be unrealistically high," Lehtomaeki said. "The EU urges the Georgian leadership to have patience. Quick decisions, too-quick decisions with regard to the South Ossetian and Abkhazian peace processes must be avoided, as they could endanger the presence of the UN and the OSCE in the region.”
This, Lehtomaeki warned, could result in a “vacuum.”
EU member states have long debated whether to enhance their presence in Georgia -- possibly by sending border monitors, police missions, or even peacekeepers.
Reluctant To Step On Russia's Toes
But France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and a number of other countries are unwilling to complicate their relations with Russia. That reluctance has proved an insurmountable obstacle.
The same applies to Georgia’s request for an EU observer role on the Joint Control Commission for South Ossetia.
Lehtomaeki and EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner did balance their message to Georgia, reiterating their concerns about Russia's response to recent tensions between the two countries.
Ferrero-Waldner said some Russian measures may contravene international agreements.
“We are particularly also worried by the expulsion of large numbers of Georgians from Russian territory, which appears to be in direct contradiction to Russia’s commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act," Ferrero-Waldner said. "I raised this issue recently also with [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov.”
But she also noted that Georgia shares responsibility for the current tensions with Russia.
She called on Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to “rebuild trust” with the breakaway regions and get relations with Russia back on a “diplomatic track.”
Finnish Europe Minister Lehtomaeki said the EU’s special representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, has been given a mandate to “facilitate” links between Moscow and Tbilisi.
Russian-Georgian relations will be on the agenda of an EU-Russia foreign ministers meeting on November 3, and at the EU-Russia summit on November 24.
But Trandniester Is Another Story
The EU reaction to developments in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniester was much more active.
Both Lehtomeaki and Ferrero-Waldner said the EU is concerned about Russia’s lack of cooperation in resolving the conflict.
A pro-independence banner hanging last month in the Transdniester capital, Tirasopol (TASS)Ferrero-Waldner said Russian calls for some form of international recognition of Transdniester would “complicate” attempts to resolve the conflict:
“While we’re happy that high-level talks between Russia and Moldova have recently resumed, we have been concerned about Russia’s support to the Transdnistrian leadership," she said. "In a recent statement, [Russian Foreign] Minister Lavrov called for ‘political recognition’ of the results of the referendum in Transdniester which neither the European Union nor the OSCE have recognized. I think this could complicate finding a solution to this conflict.”
Ferrero-Waldner said the EU also rejects Russia’s insistence on a Transdniestrian-Moldovan "transit protocol." She said saying Moscow’s attempts to win Transdniester recognition as an independent international actor are the main stumbling block in peace talks.
Ferrero-Waldner warned that without a resolution, the Transdniestrian issue will “seriously” hamper Moldova’s political and economic development.
She said the recent partial resumption of talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol, although welcome, falls short of the comprehensive return to the negotiating table demanded by the EU.
Ferrero-Waldner also said the EU had been worried after Viktor Yanukovych’s election as prime minister that Ukraine might stop enforcing strict controls on its border with Transdniester.
However, the commissioner said, Kyiv has since given the EU express assurances it will not drop its border controls.
Over de Kodori-kloof, die dus nu door de Abkhazische luchtmacht gebombardeerd zou worden:
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Georgia: Troops Deployed To Rein In Militia
By Liz Fuller
RFE/RL -- News Analysis graphic, button, bug
(RFE/RL)
PRAGUE, July 26, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- Early on July 25, Georgia deployed up to 1,000 troops to the lower reaches of the Kodori Gorge, which straddles the breakaway republic of Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia, in a bid to rein in an armed Svan militia commanded by the region's former governor, Emzar Kvitsiani.
The Svans are an ethnic group closely related to the Georgians, and their traditional home is in the high mountains of northwest Georgia. The military situation, and Kvitsiani's whereabouts, remain unclear. The Georgian television station Rustavi-2 reported on July 26 that at least four people, including two police officers, were hospitalized after fighting the previous day. And on July 26, the Russian news agency regnum.ru reported that Kvitsiani's men have abandoned armed resistance and 60 of them have been arrested.
Hunting The Hunter
Kvitsiani was named governor of the Georgian-controlled stretch of the remote Kodori Gorge in 1999 by then-President Eduard Shevardnadze. In that capacity, he formed an armed militia known as Monadire (Hunter), that was theoretically subordinate to the Georgian Defense Ministry.
In April 2005, Georgia's present Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili ordered the disarming and disbanding of Monadire, whose members retaliated by accusing Okruashvili of selling out to the leadership of the unrecognized Republic of Abkhazia. Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili rejected an alternative proposal to subordinate Monadire to his ministry, and the militia apparently continued to function on an unofficial basis.
A Georgian military ambulance in the Kodori Gorge on July 26 (InterPressNews)But on July 22, Kvitsiani issued an open challenge to the Georgian leadership, saying that Monadire would not permit government plans to occupy the Georgian controlled section of the gorge on July 27.
He also warned that in light of the unresolved killings in recent months of numerous Svans, including banker Sandro Girgvliani, he would "start a civil war" if Merabishvili were reappointed interior minister in the new Georgian cabinet. Merabishvili's wife and several senior Interior Ministry personnel were involved in a public altercation with Girgvliani in a Tbilisi bar just hours before he was found dead on the city outskirts with his throat cut.
Talks Ruled Out
Kvitsiani demanded that Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, parliament majority faction member Giga Bokeria and State Minister Kakha Bendukidze come to Kodori for negotiations, but Bokeria, President Mikheil Saakashvili, and parliament speaker Nino Burdjanadze on July 24 ruled out any talks with Kvitsiani, whom they branded a criminal.
Givi Targamadze, who chairs the Georgian parliament's Defense and Security Committee, told the independent television channel Rustavi-2 on July 25 that Kvitsiani's militia, estimated to number only a few hundred men, are armed by, and are acting on orders from, Russia.
Militia leader Emzar Kvitsiani in an undated file photo (InterPressNews)The possibility that Kvitsiani was indeed co-opted by Russia to provoke the Georgian military to launch an offensive against Kodori is only one of several. It is also conceivable that Kvitsiani was acting in league with the Abkhaz leadership, which may have calculated that an incautious Georgian military response in the Kodori would strengthen its argument that the Russian peacekeepers currently deployed in the Akhaz conflict zone should not under any circumstances be withdrawn.
Sergei Bagapsh, president of the unrecognized Republic of Abkhazia, has reportedly deployed Abkhaz forces to the lower reaches of the gorge, in accordance with a warning he issued on July 25 that they would "respond appropriately" if the Georgians advanced beyond a certain point.
Kvitsiani is reported to have met recently with Abkhaz Interior Minister Otar Khetsia, and to have refused an offer late on July 25 from Abkhaz Deputy Defense Minister Garri Kupalba of safe passage into Abkhazia.
Alternative Theories
Alternatively, Kvitsiani may, as he claims, be motivated exclusively by concerns over discrimination against the Svan minority and the Georgian government's failure to provide reliable transportation and other assistance to Kodori's population. Or, he may have been set up, through a middleman, by "hawks" within the Georgian leadership eager to create a pretext for military intervention in Abkhazia.
A Georgian helicopter conducting a mission in the gorge on July 26 (InterPressNews)Whatever the case, the Russian Foreign Ministry responded on July 25 to reports of the deployment of Georgian troops to Kodori with a statement accusing Tbilisi of violating the May 1994 cease-fire and agreements on the deployment of troops to the conflict zone. The commander of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia described the deployment of Georgian forces in Kodori as a military operation.
That though is denied by the Georgians. Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili says the operation in Kodori is a police action, and has pledged that Georgia will not extend the operation onto Abkhaz territory.
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Georgia: What Is Behind Expansion Of Armed Forces?
By Liz Fuller and Richard Giragosian
Georgia -- Georgian troops, armed forces prepare for May 26 military parade to mark the Independence Day of Georgia, 19May2006
What is the reason for Georgia's military buildup?
(InterPressNews)
September 19, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- Georgia's parliament voted overwhelmingly on September 14 to adopt a bill aimed at enlarging the country's armed forces by forming an additional fifth brigade numbering 2,500 men.
That move would raise the total manpower of the Georgian armed forces to 32,000, which is more than twice the optimum figure of 13,000-15,000 initially recommended in the 2005 assessment conducted by the U.S. State Department's International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) at the request of the Georgian government.
Meanwhile, the parliament's Defense and Security Committee also approved an increase in defense spending, which the full Georgian parliament is widely expected to adopt in a vote set for September 25. The proposed rise in Georgian defense spending, the latest in several such increases over the last few years, calls for a 315 million-lari ($190.4 million) increase in funding for the military in 2007, making defense spending the largest category of state budgetary expenditures.
Both the planned expansion of the Georgian armed forces and the continued increase in defense spending are justified by some Georgian officials as a necessity in light of a broader military buildup in the region. That argument points to the meager size of the Georgian Army in contrast to its neighbors, a comparison that, at least on paper, is borne out by the fact that Azerbaijan's Army is nearly three times larger and even small Armenia has an army roughly double the size of the Georgian force. The dramatic increases in defense spending in the region in the past few years, most notably in the case of Azerbaijan's current $1 billion defense budget, are also cited as an important factor driving Georgian military planning.
On the other hand, Georgia is not at risk of attack from either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Moreover, many experts argue that the trend toward a significantly larger Georgian military is neither particularly prudent nor beneficial for the country's unique security needs. For example, in conformity with the expert advice of the ISAB, the Georgian leadership agreed in the late 1990s to slash the armed forces' manpower and to move instead to create a smaller, more mobile army that would conform more closely to NATO standards.
The army was duly downsized from approximately 38,000 men to some 20,000 in early 2004, primarily by reducing ancillary, noncombat personnel. But the team of young politicians headed by Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power in the wake of the November 2003 Rose Revolution, set about reversing that trend.
Building Up Reserves
Visiting Washington in June 2005, then-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili first suggested that it may be "necessary" to increase the number of active-duty personnel substantially, by adding an additional infantry brigade to the army's existing four. In its report for 2005 (issued on March 14), the ISAB noted that plans for a four-brigade structure plus an increased reserve force "represent an increase of 25-30 percent on earlier planning figures" as laid out in the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) agreed with NATO in 2004, and thus "raise questions of affordability."
Rather than proceed immediately to create a new fifth brigade, Tbilisi focused in 2005-06 on an ambitious program, launched in the fall of 2004, to train thousands of reservists who could be mobilized in an emergency. Initially, it was planned to train 15,000-20,000 reservists by the end of 2005, Saakashvili was quoted as saying in January of that year; by August 2006, he said 50,000 men (and women) had already undergone training, and that the total number of reservists should be doubled to at least 100,000.
But some military experts derided that proposal as unworkable and unnecessary. For example, Kakha Katsitadze, a former head of the strategic planning department of the armed forces General Staff, predicted that it would prove impossible to train that many reservists; he also said the three-week training period they are required to undergo is painfully inadequate, according to Caucasus Press on August 12, 2006.
However, the Georgian parliament went ahead and enacted legislation in December 2006 that required all men between the ages of 27-40 to perform 18 days compulsory military training every second year. That legislation went into effect in March 2007. At the same time, National Guard commander Colonel Nika Djandjgava, extended the time frame for completing the training of a 100,000-strong reservist force until 2012, training 20,000 annually, according to Civil Georgia on March 9.
Why Does Georgia Need Bigger Army?
It remains unclear why Georgia has moved at this juncture to increase its armed forces, especially in light of hopes to progress at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2009 from Intensified Dialogue with NATO to a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP is regarded as the final phase before a formal invitation to join the alliance is forthcoming, although it is not a watertight guarantee that such an invitation will be issued within a specific time frame: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia embarked on MAPs prior to the 2004 NATO summit.
In 2005, then-Georgian Defense Minister Okruashvili explained the decision to increase the strength of the armed forces in terms of the presence of some 1,000 Georgian troops in Iraq as part of the international peacekeeping force there. But on September 14 -- the same day that the parliament signed off on the increase -- Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili announced that Georgia will begin reducing its contingent in Iraq in 2008, Imedi TV reported.
As for the additional 315 million laris in funding for the armed forces, Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli told parliament it will be used to bring the Georgian Army into compliance with NATO standards. Deputy Defense Minister Vera Dzneladze was more explicit: Caucasus Press on September 8 quoted her as saying that it will be used to build a new military base in Khoni, western Georgia, which will house the planned fifth brigade; to set up a blood bank at the Gori military hospital; for the purchase of munitions, communications systems, and military aircraft; and on the reconstruction of the airfield at Kopitnari, west of Kutaisi.
Thus, taken together, Georgia's decision to increase both army manpower and defense spending raises the question whether Georgia is really interested in complying with NATO standards. Some commentators have suggested that, instead, Georgia's military buildup could be connected to plans to launch a military campaign to regain its breakaway regions of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, or even both.
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Georgia: Extent Of 'Victory' In Kodori Offensive Unclear
By Liz Fuller
Georgia – Georgian soldiers leave Kodori Gorge, 29Jul2006
Georgian soldiers leaving the gorge on July 29. Some have questioned their performance.
(InterPressNews)
PRAGUE, August 1, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- Georgian officials have sought to present last week's incursion into the Kodori Gorge as a major territorial gain. But such claims gloss over the Georgian failure to apprehend former Kodori Governor Emzar Kvitsiani, whose defiance of the Georgian authorities served as the catalyst for what Tbilisi claims was simply a police operation.
Speaking on national television on July 28, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili said that Georgia now "directly controls a very important strategic part of the territory of Abkhazia," and will "establish Georgian jurisdiction and constitutional order in the heart" of that breakaway region.
"We have a good army in Georgia. They are really good boys...but the commander...is an idiot. He knows nothing about military strategy." -- Kvitsiani
Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili said the same day that "practically the whole of the gorge is under the control of the police."
Such claims are, however, an exaggeration, insofar as Georgia has merely extended its control over the upper reaches of the gorge -- formerly a no-man's-land controlled by Kvitsiani's Monadire (Hunter) militia -- as far as the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia.
Kristian Bzhania, a spokesman for Abkhaz President Sergei Bagapsh, derided the Georgian claims, telling regnum.ru that "we have another word for what Saakashvili calls the heart."
Bagapsh himself warned when the Georgian forces first entered Kodori that he would mobilize his army if the Georgian contingent actually advanced onto Abkhaz territory.
Georgian Military Performance Questioned
Saakashvili and Okruashvili praised the conduct of the Kodori operation, which was supervised by Okruashvili and Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili personally as both army and Interior Ministry troops took part. (Okruashvili subsequently clarified the division of responsibilities between the Defense and the Interior ministries, saying that the latter carried out the operation and the armed forces merely provided "logistical support," according to "Novye izvestia," as cited on August 1 by apsny.ru.)
Former Governor Emzar Kvitsiani (InterPressNews, undated)Former Governor Emzar Kvitsiani (InterPressNews, undated)U.S. military personnel in Georgia described the Georgian troops' performance to one Washington analyst as less than stellar, noting that morale among the Georgian servicemen was not good and that at one point the operation was halted due to "inclement weather conditions."
The Russian newspaper "Vedomosti" on July 28 likewise quoted unnamed "experts" as saying the Georgian military is not yet professional enough to conduct large-scale operations.
Former Kodori Governor Kvitsiani, who managed to evade the advancing Georgian troops and whose current whereabouts are unknown, was particularly scathing. He said in video footage broadcast on July 30 by the independent Georgian television channel Imedi that claims that his fighters were surrounded were "laughable."
Kodori Strategy Questioned
Kvitsiani claimed that the Georgian troops "do not know the area and cannot read maps.... We have a good army in Georgia. They are really good boys...but the commander...is an idiot. He knows nothing about military strategy."
Russian experts have pointed out that even if, as Abkhaz presidential envoy to Gali Raion Ruslan Kishmaria has alleged, Georgia is deploying more troops to the upper reaches of the Kodori Gorge with the aim of advancing into the lower reaches and attacking Sukhum, the Abkhaz capital, such an offensive is fraught with risk.
"Izvestia" on August 1 quoted an unnamed Russian general as saying that "starting a campaign in Kodori in summer would be suicidal." He pointed out that the mountains are covered in foliage, providing the enemy with excellent cover, and that it would be virtually impossible to use armor or heavy artillery. A Russian military analyst similarly noted that at one point the gorge narrows to the point that two platoons of Abkhaz special forces could easily block any further Georgian advance.
Are Intentions Military Or Law Enforcement?
Georgian First Deputy Foreign Minister Valeri Chechelashvili said on July 31, however, that Tbilisi has no intention of using Kodori as a bridgehead to advance further into Abkhazia. And Abkhaz President Bagapsh apparently sees no danger of such an advance at this point.
Bagapsh told volunteers from the North Caucasus on August 1 that there is no need at this juncture to mobilize the entire male population of Abkhazia, Caucasus Press reported, although he added that "there are people within the Georgian government whose ambitions are so high they are incapable of rational decisions."
But Abkhaz Defense Minister Lieutenant General Sultan Sosnaliyev told Interfax on August 1 that Tbilisi is secretly replacing the Interior Ministry troops deployed to Kodori with regular military personnel -- a claim that has not been verified.
Standoff With Russia
The Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement on July 31 demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Georgian forces from Kodori. That statement warned that the Georgian authorities' actions risk fueling tensions and provoking an unanticipated "confrontation."
Meanwhile, Okruashvili responded on July 31 to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's demand for international monitoring of the Georgian troops in Kodori by saying Tbilisi would consent only after international military experts have been allowed to inspect the former Russian military base in Gudauta, Abkhazia.
Under an agreement signed in November 1999, Moscow undertook to withdraw its troops and materiel from that base by July 1, 2001, but the Georgian government claims that some Russian personnel are still there. Whether Okruashvili is trying to buy time in order to prepare for a new offensive is as yet unclear.
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Georgia: Is Armed Conflict Brewing?
By Liz Fuller
RFE/RL -- News Analysis graphic, button, bug
(RFE/RL)
July 2, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- Senior political figures in Russia and in the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have expressed concern in recent days that the escalation of tensions in the South Ossetian conflict zone herald a new attempt by Georgia to restore what they consider its hegemony over that unrecognized republic by force of arms.
Senior political figures in Russia and in the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have expressed concern in recent days that the escalation of tensions in the South Ossetian conflict zone herald a new attempt by Georgia to restore what they consider its hegemony over that unrecognized republic by force of arms.
There is also speculation, however, that Georgian artillery attacks on the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, could equally be intended to deflect attention from a planned incursion into Abkhazia, possibly as the world focuses on the informal talks in Kennebunkport between U.S. President George W. Bush and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.
Georgia has sought on two previous occasions to coopt irregular forces to launch a new incursion into Abkhazia to bring that breakaway republic back under its control.
As recently as June 26, Dmitry Sanakoyev, whom Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili named in May to head a pro-Tbilisi provisional administration in South Ossetia that is clearly intended to take control of the region following the collapse of the current pro-Moscow leadership headed by de facto President Eduard Kokoity, assured members of the European Parliament in Brussels of his commitment to direct dialogue with the people of South Ossetia to a peaceful solution to the conflict that erupted in 1990.
Violence Breaks Out
But within days, three separate mortar attacks were launched on Tskhinvali on June 29 and 30, reportedly killing one young man and injuring a second man and a woman. Moscow and Tskhinvali have blamed Tbilisi for the attacks, although Georgian officials have denied any responsibility. That denial raises the possibility that renegade elements within the Georgian armed forces were acting on their own initiative, as was apparently the case in August 2004, when Georgian Interior Ministry troops launched a disastrous attack on South Ossetian villages in which up to a dozen Georgians were killed.
Kokoity on June 29 held talks in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who impressed on him the need for the "maximum restraint." The following day, Kokoity told fellow Ossetians in Vladikavkaz, the capital of neighboring North Ossetia, that "no matter how difficult it is for us, we shall not allow the dummy government in Tbilisi to draw us into an armed conflict."
On June 29, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made an unannounced visit to Tbilisi, where he met with President Saakashvili and parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze. No details of their talks were divulged, but senior diplomats from the so-called Friends of the UN Secretary-General group of countries (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) met in Bonn on June 27-28 with senior Abkhaz and Georgian officials to discuss, among other issues, the security situation in the Kodori Gorge, which straddles the territory of the unrecognized republic of Abkhazia and Georgia proper. Tbilisi deployed Interior Ministry troops in July 2006 to the upper, Georgian-controlled part of the gorge, but is now in the process of withdrawing them and coopting local personnel to serve as their replacement, according to a detailed summary of the Bonn talks posted on June 29 on kavkaz-uzel.ru.
Unidentified Armed Men
According to the summary, the diplomats expressed concern in Bonn at reports that unidentified armed men have been spotted in the lower, Abkhaz-controlled sector of the Kodori Gorge, and they called on both the Georgian and Abkhaz delegations to the talks to investigate and clarify those reports. The Georgian delegation reportedly denied that any Georgian security personnel have ventured on to territory controlled by the Abkhaz side.
Georgia has sought on two previous occasions to coopt irregular forces to launch a new incursion into Abkhazia to bring that breakaway republic back under its control. The first attempt, in May 1998, by two Georgian guerrilla formations, the so-called White Legion and Forest Brothers, was launched across the Inguri River that marks the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia, and failed spectacularly.
In the second, in early October 2001, senior Georgian officials whose identity has never been established coopted Chechen resistance fighters loyal to field commander Ruslan Gelayev and transported them across Georgia to the Kodori Gorge, whence they sought to penetrate Abkhaz territory. They were, however, beaten back by the Abkhaz armed forces (see also "Particpants Disclose Details Of Gelaev Abkhaz Incursion"). More than 100 people were reported killed in the 1998 offensive and some 40 -- including five UN observers -- in 2001. Any armed force that did succeed in advancing to the lower reaches of the Kodori Gorge would be strategically placed to launch an attack on the Abkhaz capital, Sukhum
.
Warning Note?
Could UN Secretary-General Ban's lightning stopover in Tbilisi have been connected with the reported presence of unidentified fighters in Abkhazia? If so, Ban might have delivered a warning to President Saakashvili that any new military aggression in Abkhazia would not only incur condemnation from the international community, but risk undercutting Georgia's position at the ongoing UN-mediated peace talks.
But Saakashvili, who has on numerous occasions referred to the Abkhaz and Ossetians as "brothers" and "allies" whom he professes to love, must be acutely aware that he has a maximum of 15-16 months to make good on his repeated pledges to restore Georgia's territorial integrity before his first presidential term expires. Should he try and fail, he will be perceived as a lame duck, and strengthen the man observers identify as his likely main challenger in the 2008 presidential ballot, Irakli Okruashvili, a decided hawk who has served as both defense and interior minister. It was Okruashvili who, as interior minister, commanded the abortive attack on South Ossetia three summers ago. Okruashvili is currently said to be preparing to launch his own political party, to which some parliament deputies from Saakashvili's United National Movement are reportedly ready to defect.
Nav het door mij vet gemarkeerde deel in het laatste artikel, er zijn Tsjetsjenen woonachtig in een van de valleien op Georgisch grodgebied, maar grenzend aan Tsjetsjenië. De vraag is natuurlijk of Georgië als een kat in het nauw deze Tsjetsjenen wil inzetten tegen de Osseten. Vergeet niet dat Ossetiërs en Tsjetsjenen helemaal water en vuur zijn, zeker sinds Beslan (in Noord-Ossetië).