Fourth-Generation Warfare and al-Qa'ida
In the 1990s, al-Qa'ida carried out an organizational and operational transformation in the way terrorist movements functioned. In effect, it initiated a revolution in terrorist affairs (RTA).(5) Some military analysts suggest this RTA by al-Qa'ida is a key development in the transformation of warfare into its 4th generation.(6) Martin van Creveld, in his 1991 book, The Transformation of War, was among the first to propose that a new form of war was emerging. He argued, "The modern paradigm for warfare, in which nation-states wage war for reasons of state, using formal militaries. . .[is] being eclipsed by a post-modern approach. . . National sovereignties are being undermined by organizations [terrorists and other non-state armed groups] that refuse to recognize the state's monopoly over armed violence."(7)
How were non-state armed groups, including terrorist groups, adapting to globalization, network-based organization, and information age technologies? How would these developments affect the terrorist's capacity to execute unconventional attacks? How would terrorist groups cooperate among themselves and with state sponsors in order to operate and fight globally?
The response can be defined as 4th Generation Warfare (4th GW), which al-Qa'ida appears to have emulated:
4th generation warfare is highly irregular, unconventional and decentralized in approach.
Asymmetrical operations are employed to bypass the superior military power of nation-states to attack and exploit vulnerable political, economic, population, and
symbolic targets, thus demoralizing both government and its populace.
Both organization and operation are masked by deception, denial, stealth, and related techniques of intelligence and counterintelligence tradecraft. They wear no uniforms and infiltrate into the populations of the nation-states they seek to attack.
Information age technologies profoundly influenced terrorist organizations and operations. The development of network-based terrorist organizations with transnational connections through cell phones, fax machines, e-mail, and websites provide these non-state armed groups with global reach.
Modern communications and transportation technologies greatly complicate this new battlefield. Not only are there no fronts, but also the old distinctions between civilian and military targets become generally irrelevant.
Laws and conventions of war applied to nation-states do not constrain terrorists (and their state sponsors) as they seek new and innovative means, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, to attack civilians and nonmilitary targets and inflict terrible carnage.
4th generation warriors, frequently in the name of religious-based millenarian ideologies, are remorseless enemies. Their operations are marked by unlimited violence, unencumbered by compassion or constraints.
Since the September 11 attacks, much has been learned about al-Qa'ida regarding how it bears an unmistakable resemblance to this template of 4th Generation Warfare (4th GW). It adapted itself to globalization, network-based organization, and information age technologies while relying on deception, denial, stealth, and related techniques of counterintelligence tradecraft.
Indeed, in one piece that appeared in an al-Qa'ida internet magazine following September 11, one operative described how the organization had studied, learned from, and adapted 4th GW concepts to its war fighting doctrine.(8) The author, Abu Ubeid al-Quarashi, began by discussing the origins of those ideas as conceptualized in U.S. defense journals, citing key references. Next, he noted that since the late 1980s, "The Islamic nation has chalked up the most victories, in a short time, in a way [the world] has not known since the rise of the Ottoman Empire. These victories were achieved. . . against the best armed, best trained, and most experienced armies in the world (the USSR in Afghanistan, the United States in Somalia, Russia in Chechnya, and the Zionist entity in southern Lebanon)."
How did they do it? According to al-Quarashi, "The mujahideen proved their superiority in 4th Generation Warfare using only light weaponry. They are part of the people, and hide amongst the multitudes." These victories established "precedents for world powers and large countries being defeated by [small] units of mujahideen. . . despite the great difference between the two sides." The ultimate example, he underscored, was on September 11, when al-Qa'ida "dealt Americans the most severe blow ever to their morale." The key lesson learned was that "the time has come for the Islamic movements facing a general crusader offensive to internalize the rules of fourth-generation warfare. They must consolidate appropriate strategic thought, and make appropriate military preparations."(9)
Counterintelligence Principles
How does al-Qa'ida employ counterintelligence tools in support of its terrorist operations? Intelligence analysts must be able to distinguish between real signals indicating an attack, and "noise" which refers to irrelevant messages or those sent intentionally to deceive. True signals are "always embedded in the noise and irrelevance of false ones."(10) There was considerable "noise" prior to the September 11 attacks that allowed al-Qa'ida to achieve strategic surprise. Through increased communications among terrorist cells, the intelligence community knew that an attack was imminent, yet did not know where or how the terrorists would strike.(11)
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue2/jv8n2a6.html