[POL SC 587] De dag van de Arbeid op de dag van de Rust

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 13:46 schreef MrX1982 het volgende:
De Amerikaanse ambassade moet gewoon in de 2de kamer gaan zitten.

Kunnen ze eindelijk orde op zaken stellen in dit land

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Van Baalen meent dat de ambassadeur met het uitspreken van zijn voorkeur voor de zittende premier Blair en diens Labourpartij te ver is gegaan. "Als vertegenwoordiger van een land mag je je niet in binnenlandse aangelegenheden van een ander land mengen." En, meent Van Baalen: "Een ambassadeur moet niet aan duimelarij doen."

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VVD-fractievoorzitter Van Aartsen stak niet onder stoelen en banken dat hij een lichte voorkeur had voor John Kerry, omdat diens presidentschap "uitdagender zou zijn voor Europa".

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„Vanuit het perspectief van defensie- en
buitenlands beleid kies ik voor Bush.
Hij is veel beslister dan Kerry. Als
leider van een groot land kun je niet te
veel mitsen en maren. Kerry draait te
veel. Hij lijkt daarin op oud-minister
van Buitenlandse Zaken Van Mierlo.
Ik voel me veiliger bij Bush. Hij moet
wel meer doen voor de NAVO."

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 13:41 schreef kLowJow het volgende:

[..]

Wat is culturele zelfreflectie.

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Italian media have published classified sections of an official US military inquiry into the accidental killing of an Italian agent in Baghdad.

The 40-page report was censored by the Pentagon before being officially published on Saturday.

Italy has refused to accept the US report's findings and is to publish its own version of events later this week.

Details of the official report were published in newspapers on Sunday with censored material restored in full.

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 13:05 schreef Harry_Sack het volgende:

[..]

Het is niet te geloven he?

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US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld paid a secret visit to former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and offered him freedom and possible return to public life if he made a televised request to armed groups for a ceasefire with allied forces, a media report said.

Saddam promptly rejected the offer, Ynetnews reported quoting a London based Al-Quds Al-Arabi daily.

The visit came during Rumsfeld's visit to Iraq about two weeks ago and was known only to a few Iraqi officials in Jordan, the Arab daily reported quoting sources.

Some two weeks ago the British Telegraph had reported that Iraqi gunmen were offered a "deal" to halt all terror attacks in return for a reduced sentence for Saddam, likely to be sentenced to death.

However, an Iraqi government official is said to believe that Saddam's Baath party will request to return to politics, the report said.

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 14:08 schreef ExtraWaskracht het volgende:

[..]

Wat denk je zelf?

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SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 17:09 schreef Monidique het volgende:
Ik begon je al een beetje te missen, Johan.

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 17:10 schreef Johan_de_With het volgende:

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Ik ben in Boedapest. Over enige uren in Wenen. Ciao!

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 17:11 schreef Monidique het volgende:

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Wat ben je dan aan het doen?

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 17:10 schreef Johan_de_With het volgende:

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Ik ben in Boedapest. Over enige uren in Wenen. Ciao!

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Op maandag 2 mei 2005 17:13 schreef Sidekick het volgende:

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Ik heb altijd al geweten dat jij een japanner bent.