quote:
Verkorte transcript
So in 2018, it was the hundredth anniversary of the terrible 1918 flu pandemic. This was called the Spanish flu. And it just killed millions and millions of people around the world. So on that hundredth-year anniversary, many gatherings were held to discuss the lessons of that flu pandemic for today. And there was this one gathering of high-level people in Atlanta, Georgia, where the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is based. And among the officials there was a group from the National Security Council. It had actually been created, a special unit on global health security that was created after that terrible Ebola outbreak in West Africa. So one of the officials with that group, with that unit steps up to the podium and she says —
Luciano Borio: "The threat of pandemic flu is our number one health security concern. We know that it cannot be stopped at the border."
So this is a pretty senior health official on the National Security Council warning her colleagues that there is a very predictable threat here — a pandemic flu and —
"Are we ready to respond to a pandemic? I fear the answer is no."
And as it happens, the very next day, that global health security unit where she worked was shut down by a senior member of the Trump administration. So fast forward two years. And it’s early January, January 3. It’s a Friday. And the secretary of health and human services, Alex Azar, is at home in Washington. And he gets this phone call from Robert Redfield, this doctor who’s the head of the C.D.C. And Dr. Redfield tells Dr. Azar about these reports coming out of China, that there are these clusters of pneumonia cases, and that the likely culprit is a new coronavirus. And Alex Azar, the health and human services secretary, says, this is a very big deal.
Even though it was a new virus, the Chinese quickly made the sequence of it available. And labs were really quickly able to create a test for that, including the World Health Organization had already approved a test that was developed by some German scientists. But the U.S., which considers the C.D.C the world’s premier public health agency, they decided to make their own test. But it didn’t actually get F.D.A. approved until the first week of February. And at that point, it could be distributed to public health laboratories across the country. But, you know, now we’re already over a month into this scary new outbreak by that point.
And they’re finally able to mail out the kits to public health laboratories around the country — state health laboratories, some big city health laboratories, this network of labs that our public health system has. And the next day — the first step that the labs have to do is they have to check that test. They have to what’s called “validate it,” make sure it’s working. And right that next day, the C.D.C starts getting reports from some of these public health labs, saying, we’re not able to validate this test. We’re having problems. We’re getting some inconclusive results. And that’s the first sign that something may have gone wrong.
The C.D.C says it was definitely working in their lab. So they’ve told all the labs across the country, if it’s not working for you, of course, don’t use it. Just send samples to us. Of course, that adds time. You have to collect a sample in your local area and then send it to Atlanta, and then wait for that result to come back.
There were travelers coming from parts of the world where we didn’t have a travel ban that now had a large number of cases. And they weren’t being screened at the airports. They were going out into the communities. And there was just this urgency of being able to test more. And that’s when this one group of doctors and researchers took matters into their own hands.
So her name is Helen Chu. She’s a physician and a researcher in Washington state, which is where the first case of coronavirus was detected in the U.S. back in January. And she and her colleagues see a potential solution to this testing problem in their own work.
Helen Chu: "We had a study in place that was set up for detection of respiratory viral illnesses in the community from people who are sick, and then testing them in the lab for flu and other respiratory viruses. So we had this infrastructure in place already, essentially, in the Seattle area to be able to detect early entry of a virus into the city and then to understand how it spread."
The state health officials knew about their project. And they immediately thought about the potential of this project to help with this issue of testing. They make their own coronavirus test really fast. And they’re ready to go to help the state by the first week of February. But there’s one hitch.
"We had to go through regulatory clearance, essentially. We had to talk to C.D.C. We had to talk to F.D.A."
They don’t have the approval to test and then give those results out for two reasons. One is they’re not a clinical lab, so they don’t have the regulatory approval for that. And number two is they’ve just created this new coronavirus test, which isn’t yet F.D.A. approved.
"And so we were at a point where we could test thousands and thousands of samples at very high throughput. But we didn’t know what to do when we found a positive.."
So there’s good reason to have some of those regulations in place. But they figure, this is a public health emergency. And they feel like there’s got to be some way around this bureaucratic red tape, where they could at least screen these samples and get that information out to the public health authorities to confirm that test, whatever it is.
"We had the information. We had the data there sitting in our lab where we could actually answer the question. And that was frustrating, that we could answer it. We had the capacity to answer it, but we couldn’t move forward, because we didn’t know what to do. Everybody felt very hesitant about us being able to provide results or to do the testing at all."
But the C.D.C doesn’t seem to find a way around it. Weeks go by. And they’re getting more and more frustrated. And they’re seeing the outbreak is growing in China, and it’s spreading to other countries. So we know there’s a potential for it to be an outbreak not just in China.
"Everyone wanted to be able to do this the proper way — to go through C.D.C and state labs and have them have the high capacity to do the testing of all of these patients who really needed a diagnosis. But it just couldn’t be done."
And then it gets to February 25. It’s more than a month since that first case. And they finally just said —
"What we would do is move forward with research testing only."
Well, they’re just going for it. And technically, they can test, right? But the issue is, they can’t report the results.
"So what we would do would just be to go ahead and test the samples for coronavirus, but not to associate that with the information from the sample. So the clinical information."
They’re sitting on information that they’re not supposed to communicate because of these regulatory issues. It’s all going to be fine as long as they don’t find a case. What happened was, one of the very first days that they started testing:
"February 27, we got the first positive. What I thought was, oh, no. If it came up that early in our testing, that meant that it had probably been here for a while and that we just didn’t know that it was there. And so the questions racing through my head at that point where, what is the right thing to do right now? And so what happened at that point was that we rapidly convened a meeting of the investigators. We talked through the ethics of the different options — keep it to ourselves, tell public health, or tell the participants. And what we are allowed to do was to keep it to ourselves. But what we felt like we needed to do was to tell public health. And so that’s what we did."
They decide that the most ethical thing is to report the result to the local health authority. They confirmed the result. And it’s this local teenager in the very same county as that first positive case, but no known link to that person and no travel history. And that next morning, the public health lab went out and they found this teenager, who was feeling better by that point. Because he had had a mild form of this illness, which is most common, especially in young people. And they get to him just after he walks into his school and they end up shutting the school down to make sure that nobody else will catch the virus.
It is a pattern that these programs, when there’s a crisis, they get really well funded. And as soon as Ebola recedes into history, we start cutting those parts of government. You can look back after the anthrax attacks and 9/11. And there was all this money that went into bio-terrorism preparedness and hospital preparedness. And then you look at the numbers, and they go down over time. This is a reaction of humanity and society and government, is to sort of like — when it’s in the news and it’s fresh in our minds, we invest in it, and then we turn away. So I feel like this is a pattern. And when this happens, and we have these gaps in our preparedness that the government always seems to have, what I have found over and over again as a reporter is regular people step in and fill some of those holes. And I’m thinking — right now I have this image of Hurricane Katrina and government officials not being able to rescue everybody who needed help all at once. People waving towels off of rooftops and people stuck in hospitals. And then it was these regular people who had airboats, who were fishermen from western Louisiana. And they show up, and they just take people to dry ground. I’ve seen examples like that over and over. In this case, we saw Dr. Chu and her colleagues doing something like that. But, what I found out today on the phone with Dr. Chu was that —
"Yesterday, the Washington state regulators called their lab and asked us to shut down."