Former Pentagon Official Talks to Aydınlık Newspaper
Former Pentagon Official Talks to Aydınlık Newspaper
Published 11-11-2014
Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, has commented on the current situation of the Middle East.
Şafak Terzi
*Is Barzani serious with his support for Kobane? What can a few hundred peshmerga do against ISIS?
Barzani isn't serious in his support for Kobane, because he hates the PYD and YPG almost as much as Turkey and ISIS do. He's agreed to send in troops once it became clear that Kobane was becoming a potent symbol for the Syrian Kurds--as potent as Halabja is for Iraqi Kurds--and when President Erdogan concluded that ISIS might not win. By sending in troops, both Erdogan and Barzani can try to claim a share of any victory that comes the Syrian Kurdish way.
*The PKK didn't target privates, because they said that these privates were the sons of the people. But they rather targeted high ranking soldiers/commanders(most of the commanders in the East of Turkey didn't wear their rank to hide themselves)..What has changed? What makes the PKK attack privates off duty soldiers when they are considered as civilian? And why from behind, which everyone, including Kurds will see as a sick act? And that will have a bad effect on their legitimacy.
There has never been a peace process--in Palestine, in Ireland, or elsewhere--in which spoiler factions didn't try to conduct terrorism to knock the process off the rails. But, Erdogan set a very dangerous precedent when he legitimized Hamas, which conducts the same sort of actions, and yet Erdogan calls their violence legitimate. The precedents which Erdogan has set are going to result in the flow of Turkish blood and, perhaps sooner than many Turks imagine, the state's partition.
*Is PKK losing power and ground in Turkey? Why did they attack soldiers when the opening is still on the agenda?
The PKK has never been stronger. What's the process you talk about? The one in which Erdogan took Ocalan and transformed him from obscurity into the pivotal and undisputed Kurdish leader? Or the one that Erdogan always talks about before elections, and then stalls after elections? Turks and Kurds also have radically different conceptions of the peace process. Turks saw the goal to get the PKK to lay down its arms. The PKK wants equality. They want Ocalan to walk as free as Erdogan.At the same time, Erdogan has emasculated the Turkish army. Political purges have consequences, both in terms of morale and capability. Why should officers put their lives on the line for a group that Erdogan himself has legitimized when, the next day, these same officers could be arbitrarily placed in prison on the sultan's whim?
*In your answers you state that the PKK has never been stronger. And that sooner than many Turks imagine, Erdoğan's policies will lead to the state's partition. What I understand from your statements is that the PKK is politically at its strongest point. But how about PKK's military strength. What we've witnessed in Kobane shows that the PKK is not so strong as many were expecting. And for the partition of the state -ultimately- there is need for a strong military fighting or deterrent force. Do you think that the PKK is also militarily at its peak strength?
The PKK has been the only successful group in Syria against both ISIS and the regime. Sure, they are fighting and having difficulty, but that is against the backdrop of what was for months a blockade by Turkey and ISIS resupplied with all the ordnance and equipment captured in Mosul. Militarily, the PKK has shown it can pretty much govern provinces like Hakkari in Turkey, and broad swaths of territory inside Syria beyond Kobane. In Kobane it faces a frontal assault; in Turkey, it is a guerrilla group which is a completely different way of war.Partitions often occur when terrorism or insurgency wears down states, not always after a decisive, World War II or Korean War type battle. Demographically, the Kurds have a higher birthrate than Turkish elite. And Erdogan pushed Turkey down the slippery slope when he legitimized the PKK in the eyes of the world, both by means of his outreach to Hamas and then by his decision to anoint Ocalan the effective representative of Turkey's Kurds for any questions relating to the peace process and the future of the community.
*Looking at Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's appoach towards the Turkish military after the 17th december corruption scandal(to create an alliance against the Gülenists), do you think that the Turkish army is back on stage? And that the "resolution against ISIS" is actually targeting the PKK to destroy the PKK completely and was actually directly formed by the Turkish general staff(despite Erdoğan)? And actually the Turkish army taken Erdoğan from his way that will lead to the state's partition?
Again, I hear different rumors about recent National Security Council (MGK) meetings, but the fact of the matter is the Turkish army is too weak to act. Turkish officers and those close to them deny this, but I think they're putting their honor above reality. Erdogan outplayed the military. The Turkish military failed in its mission to protect the constitution, and Turkey has a dictatorship as a result. Certainly, the Turkish military would say they never accept partition. But, the point is this: Even after Erdogan is dead or in prison, the decisions he made will have consequences and cannot be reversed.
*Has the alliance/cooperation between Erdoğan and Öcalan come to an end? Has the PKK broken the cease fire?
The peace process is doomed, but the reverberations of Erdogan's policies will be permanent. He has taken the PKK and given it a shot of adrenalin. Just as Maliki, Sisi, Netanyahu, and Assad, did before him, Ocalan has outplayed Erdogan.As for Erdogan, he thought that Islam could unite both Turks and Kurds. What he forgot is that Kurds—just as with Turks—are not so willing to abandon their ethnic identity. At the same time, Erdogan’s own sectarianism undercut his outreach. How can he expect Islam to unite Turks and Kurds when he treats Alevis, many of whom are also Kurdish, as second class citizens?
*How do you evaluate the recent resolution of the Turkish parliament against terrorism? Who is it targeting? The PKK or iSIS?
If I had to list the targets in order, they would be Assad's regime, followed by the PKK, and ISIS last.
*Are PKK/PYD led by the same leadership? Are they simply the same?
Generally, yes. But the PYD really is a local branch, dealing with local problems, not the least of which is governance.
*The American media is calling the PKK / PYD in Kobané as freedom fighters. Does this reflect Washington's stance?
Just the fact that Americans call the town Kobane rather than Ayn al-Arab reflects that the United States has accepted the Kurdish narrative. And the fact that we now are providing direct aid to a PKK affiliate is the natural result of a decade of Erdogan’s not too subtle anti-Americanism. Years ago, I would tell Kurdish nationalists, much to their annoyance, not to force a choice between Kurds and Turkey: if the United States had to choose between Kurdistan and Ankara, we would choose Ankara. After all, Turkey was a long-standing NATO ally with which the United States had broad relations. But, after more than a decade of Erdogan and the anti-Americanism and religious incitement in which he and his proxies have engaged, we’ve come to the point where Washington has chosen the PKK over Turkey. That’s a result not only of Erdogan’s personality but also the fact that he has used people like Egemen Bagis whose only accomplishment is to make many Americans think the AKP is corrupt and Turks are obnoxious. Turkey once had skilled diplomats, but the AKP has long ago transformed the Turkish embassy from the representative of Turkey to the representative of the AKP. So, in short, yes: Americans see the PKK/YPG as freedom fighters. And that is the result both of Mr. Erdogan’s policies and the fact that Turkey has transformed its diplomatic service from professional into a joke.
*Are these organisations together with the Free Syrian Army, the real allies of the US?
I don’t see the Free Syrian Army as an ally of the United States—it’s much too radical for my tastes. Frankly, many Americans believe that the PYD is the only group in Syria with which Washington can work.
*Is there an agreement and alliance between the FSA and PYD against ISIS?
More of mutual interests than alliance.

o you think there is still a possibility to establish the Kurdish Corridor and extend Kurdistan to the East Mediterranean?
No. Some ultranationalist Kurds claim such a thing, but it’s not in the realm of reality.
*And if the Kurdish Corridor is not in the realm of reality, what are the Kurdish forces fighting for? Does this mean that the target to create a Greater Kurdistan has collapsed? And again, -in this case- how can we talk about a strong PKK?
Greater Kurdish means different things to different people. The Kurds aren't going to say, "No thank you. We don't want a state" just because they don't have a port on the Mediterranean. There are lots of landlocked countries in the world, and Kurdistan could become one of them. That said, Ocalan writes about regional federalism and decentralization. By developing such close ties to Iraqi Kurdistan, Erdogan also established a precedent. Turks shouldn't fool themselves: Erdogan brings Barzani to Diyarbakir for a rally, and you don't think that sends a message to Turkey's Kurds about Erdogan endorsing federalism? That said, if you ask the PKK or the KRG if they want an independent state, they will say no or not yet. Barzani will hold off so long as the Turks fill his bank account. But ordinary Kurds? They want independence, not a "wise men commission." If Erdogan thinks otherwise, he's more of a fool than people outside of Turkey consider him.
*Is it possible that the Barzani forces and the PKK/PYD really come to an agreement? Is Kobane a priority for Barzani?
No, Barzani hates the PKK and PYD, not because of their tactics but rather because Ocalan is more popular than Barzani among most Kurds, at least outside a narrow corner of Iraq.
*The number of Syrian Kurds who have fled to Turkey is much more than the population of Kobane. Does ISIL want to get rid of these people in the whole region to establish its own authority?
Yes.