http://www.mideastsecurity.co.uk/?p=212The photographs are from the actual passports used by the eleven to enter the UAE. It is unlikely that any of the passports will reflect the true identities of the individuals, despite the fact that they were used previously to apply for items such as credit cards. All of this will have been done to add credibility to the identities and to lower any suspicion that these identities were not genuine.
Peter Elvinger, 49, is considered to be the main suspect, as he acted as the co-ordinator of the group. He entered Dubai on a French passport. The other ten suspects were identified by Dubai Police as: Kevin Daveron, Evan Dennings and Gail Folliard (all travelling on passports issued by the Republic of Ireland), Paul John Keely, Stephan Daniel Hodes, Melvyn Adam Mildiner, Jonathan Louis Graham, James Leonard Clarke and Michael Lawrence Barney (all travelling on passports issued by the United Kingdom) and Michael Bodenheimer, (travelling on a passport issued by Germany).
In CCTV footage released by the Dubai Police, two of the group (Clarke and Barney) are seen checking into the Al Bustan Rotana hotel immediately after Mabhouh checked in. The group’s only female member, Folliard, is also seen checking into the hotel. Less than 20 minutes after he returned to his room, Mabhouh was murdered in Room 230. Police examinations revealed that Mabhouh had suffered a massive electric shock to the head, and was then suffocated. Within 18 hours of Mabhouh checking into the hotel, the entire group of suspects had left the UAE. Two arrests have been made so far, both Palestinian nationals residing in the UAE. One of them has apparently confessed to being involved in the murder, acting as observer or “trigger” for the hit squad.
The assassination team’s preparations and activities for the hit have been extensively re-traced by the excellent work of General Tamim’s criminal investigation officers. Middle East Security staff viewed the detailed footage released by the Dubai Police, which lasts nearly 28 minutes. Our assessment is that this was an extremely professional operation, carried out using at least two surveillance teams identified by Dubai Police, and almost certainly more. The team members make frequent use of hotel switches, changes of appearance, use of different vehicles and employ professional surveillance drills including handovers without compromising the fact that the teams know each other. They use sophisticated communications equipment but no mobile telephones. The communications devices appear to be slightly larger than an average mobile phone and would use embedded encryption. It is likely that they would use VHF or UHF transmission, to allow the team to communicate within the general area of the operation, while ensuring that transmissions were not sent too far. In one scene, the female member stands with a male accomplice in the hotel lobby and she appears to check a covert microphone either under her left lapel or attached to it, only seconds before the first surveillance team depart the Al Bustan Rotana hotel, where the assassination takes place. It is the only occurrence in the whole footage where a team member’s professionalism appears to slip.
Two execution squads are identified, each comprising two men. Three of the four members of the execution squad are powerfully built and resemble military individuals. The victim was triggered to his hotel by surveillance, possibly by one of the arrested Palestinian nationals now in Dubai Police custody. Using a Palestinian national known to the victim would have enabled the team to ensure that the victim’s suspicions were not aroused just before the hit. This spotter would probably have triggered Mabhouh to the surveillance team and then withdrawn. The surveillance teams then handover inside the hotel lobby and the outgoing team withdraws, without acknowledging the second team’s presence. One hour before the murder, one of the team takes up position at the entrance to the hallway containing Mabhouh’s room. This was probably the first attempt to kill Mabhouh, but appears to be aborted due to the unexpected arrival of a hotel guest coming out of the lifts by the team member. Between this attempt and the killing, hotel records show an unsuccessful attempt to re-program the door of Room 230. This is a surprising failure for such a well-planned operation.
Less than one hour after the initial attempt, the female member, Folliard, walks out of sight of the CCTV camera with an accomplice, towards Mabhouh’s room, then returns, taking up position by the lifts. The two execution teams then arrive in the lift, walk to Mabhouh’s room and the murder is carried out. The execution teams then enter the lift together, one of them still wearing white cotton gloves which he was not wearing earlier. His elbows appear to be reddened, which may indicate he fought with or restrained Mabhouh during the murder. The execution squad then leave the hotel, one of the killers still wearing the cotton gloves. Mabhouh’s possessions, mobile phone and other belongings will almost certainly have been searched for anything of intelligence value, especially any information relating to the arms deal he was about to conclude.
The method of killing would have ensured that there was less chance for Mabhouh to raise the alarm or to escape. The administration of a significant electric shock would ensure that he was paralysed sufficiently to have then been suffocated without a struggle, or without managing to raise the alarm. A modified device similar to a cattle-prod would produce the desired effect, similar to a TASER, which would immobilise the victim. The actual suffocation of Mabhouh appears to be a grey area. A pillow stained with his blood was reported to be next to the body, but this may have been deployed as a prop, to deflect attention away from other methods, to buy time. He may have been subjected to induced suffocation by means of a drug. (Note: In September 1997, an attempted assassination was carried out in Jordan by MOSSAD agents carrying Canadian passports. The attempted assassination was directed at HAMAS Press Bureau Chief Khaled Masha’al, and it involved the use of a drug believed to be Fentanyl, which was delivered as a powerfully delivered, atomised spray. This would lead to rapid absorption through the skin, ensuring the drug entered the human system more quickly). Fentanyl is described in one report [1]as “hundreds of times more potent than street heroin, and tends to produce significantly worse respiratory depression, making it somewhat more dangerous than heroin to users”.
One Israeli newspaper carried a report saying that a preliminary HAMAS investigation has laid the blame with another, unnamed, Arab government and not with MOSSAD. This claim has not been confirmed in media reporting by HAMAS and it is highly unlikely that HAMAS would arrive at such a conclusion. Mabhouh’s killing was professionally carried out by a large, well-trained team who would have been very aware that they were constantly captured on CCTV cameras. Mabhouh was in Dubai to conclude an arms deal, he also had ties with Iran and it is quite possible that he planned to visit Iran after his trip to the UAE. These factors, together with his alleged involvement in the abduction and killing of two Israeli soldiers in 2006, would almost certainly be sufficient motives for MOSSAD to target him for assassination.
The freedom of movement and the general openness of Dubai worked in the favour of the assassination team, who carried out their operation regardless of CCTV cameras and in full knowledge of the plethora of forensic evidence they will have left behind them. If this operation is traced to a foreign power and is proven to be an extra-judicial killing, and not an organised criminal hit, it will create an even bigger diplomatic row than the abortive attempted killing of Khaled Misha’al in Jordan.