WGR Werk, Geldzaken, Recht en de Beurs
Hier kun je alles kwijt over sollicitaties, werksituaties, belastingen, (handelen op) de beurs, hypotheken, beleggingen en salarissen, arbeidscontracten of geschillen met je (huis)baas. Alles over werk, geldzaken en recht dus.
Wat the meuk is dit.....
Derivates report Q42008 van OCC.gov
Check pag 13....
Percentage of total credit exposure to risk based capital.
Check de tabel hieronder..... valt jullie niks vreemds op ? Is dit een kado van AIG (= lees overheid) dat GS niet mag omvallen als de stekker bij AIG eruit gaat.
[ Bericht 10% gewijzigd door Drugshond op 03-04-2009 07:42:38 ]
Derivates report Q42008 van OCC.gov
Check pag 13....
Percentage of total credit exposure to risk based capital.
Check de tabel hieronder..... valt jullie niks vreemds op ? Is dit een kado van AIG (= lees overheid) dat GS niet mag omvallen als de stekker bij AIG eruit gaat.
[ Bericht 10% gewijzigd door Drugshond op 03-04-2009 07:42:38 ]
Nieuwsberichten hierover zijn nog schaars... dat verandert nog wel.
News from the front: Bank losses spreading
Online Journal Associate Editor
Apr 1, 2009, 00:26
Last Friday, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reported that for the first time in history commercial US banks have suffered a $3.4 billion quarterly loss in a giant sector that they thought, until now, was solid: that is, bets on interest rates. The loss was more than seven times worse than their previous quarterly loss in that category.
Of the total derivatives loss, only 7.8 percent was in credit default swaps, the instrument that brought down AIG. Notably, 82 percent of total losses were in interest rate derivatives, the solid category. The remainder is in “other.” U.S. banks, alone, control $204 trillion in derivatives today. These facts came from the notable Dr. Martin Weiss. A more detailed look is linked here.
But first, consider the most breathtaking losses of the Wall Street casino came from America’s five biggest banks. In fact, Bank of America’s total derivatives risk is at 179 percent of its risk-based capital; Citibank’s was at 278 percent of its risk-based capital; JPMorganChase was at 382 percent of its risk-based capital; and Goldman Sachs’ total credit exposure at year-end was at a whopping 1,056 percent, or over ten times more than its capital. Do you get the picture now?
Wall Street and the investment banks mostly have messed up this economy so badly it is unbelievable. So you have to get out the Glass-Steagall Act and look at each one of these monsters and let them live or die, depending on whether their assets exceed their debt. I doubt if any of the above would pass the test. They should be closed if they can’t. And the 7,000 other banks in the country that did not play derivatives roulette in the Wall Street casino should be helped, loaned money, after a bankruptcy reorganization.
We should even consider reinstating the law against interstate banking, and allow banks just to operate in one state, all the better to serve their communities. And that should go for foreign banks as well.
This kind of austerity seems in order. As to the Fed, it should be printing money in red not green ink for what it’s worth.
Obama is turning out to be economically dumber than dirt. And he’s playing with the worst people in the world, all related to Goldman Sachs: Geithner, Summers, Emanuel, and briefly Paulson. Their sole object is to recapitalize their losses with taxpayer money via bailouts, handouts, and steal-outs. They don’t care about you and me or anyone. I hope the NSA is reading this communiqué and that they pass it on to Obama.
We are in deep trouble, and the least of it is using IMF currency as a substitute for US currency. A single currency won’t work anyhow. We need to restore the dollar if we want to have a US economy. This isn’t an argument. It’s real. Plus the Fed is in the middle of creating another bubble, this time with its cockamamie Treasuries. Okay, that’s all I have for today, which should be quite enough.
News from the front: Bank losses spreading
Online Journal Associate Editor
Apr 1, 2009, 00:26
Last Friday, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reported that for the first time in history commercial US banks have suffered a $3.4 billion quarterly loss in a giant sector that they thought, until now, was solid: that is, bets on interest rates. The loss was more than seven times worse than their previous quarterly loss in that category.
Of the total derivatives loss, only 7.8 percent was in credit default swaps, the instrument that brought down AIG. Notably, 82 percent of total losses were in interest rate derivatives, the solid category. The remainder is in “other.” U.S. banks, alone, control $204 trillion in derivatives today. These facts came from the notable Dr. Martin Weiss. A more detailed look is linked here.
But first, consider the most breathtaking losses of the Wall Street casino came from America’s five biggest banks. In fact, Bank of America’s total derivatives risk is at 179 percent of its risk-based capital; Citibank’s was at 278 percent of its risk-based capital; JPMorganChase was at 382 percent of its risk-based capital; and Goldman Sachs’ total credit exposure at year-end was at a whopping 1,056 percent, or over ten times more than its capital. Do you get the picture now?
Wall Street and the investment banks mostly have messed up this economy so badly it is unbelievable. So you have to get out the Glass-Steagall Act and look at each one of these monsters and let them live or die, depending on whether their assets exceed their debt. I doubt if any of the above would pass the test. They should be closed if they can’t. And the 7,000 other banks in the country that did not play derivatives roulette in the Wall Street casino should be helped, loaned money, after a bankruptcy reorganization.
We should even consider reinstating the law against interstate banking, and allow banks just to operate in one state, all the better to serve their communities. And that should go for foreign banks as well.
This kind of austerity seems in order. As to the Fed, it should be printing money in red not green ink for what it’s worth.
Obama is turning out to be economically dumber than dirt. And he’s playing with the worst people in the world, all related to Goldman Sachs: Geithner, Summers, Emanuel, and briefly Paulson. Their sole object is to recapitalize their losses with taxpayer money via bailouts, handouts, and steal-outs. They don’t care about you and me or anyone. I hope the NSA is reading this communiqué and that they pass it on to Obama.
We are in deep trouble, and the least of it is using IMF currency as a substitute for US currency. A single currency won’t work anyhow. We need to restore the dollar if we want to have a US economy. This isn’t an argument. It’s real. Plus the Fed is in the middle of creating another bubble, this time with its cockamamie Treasuries. Okay, that’s all I have for today, which should be quite enough.
Wat betekent dit in dagjesmensen taal?
Good intentions and tender feelings may do credit to those who possess them, but they often lead to ineffective — or positively destructive — policies ... Kevin D. Williamson
Ben nog bezig met dit topic.....quote:
Hoe komt GS opeens aan 30 triljoen aan uitstaande derivaten ?!? En ja nu zijn ze ook too big to fail
.[ Bericht 1% gewijzigd door Drugshond op 03-04-2009 07:22:16 ]
Is Goldman Sachs Running a Derivatives Casino?
November 25,2008
State-owned enterprises such as Shenzhen Shennan Circuit Co.(SCC) and Air China have recently suffered big losses in international derivatives trading, focusing investor attention on derivatives market and structural options. The situation is frightening investors by reviving the ghosts from the CAO (China Aviation Oil) incident of 2005.
Three years after CAO ran up $550 million in losses in derivatives speculation in oil prices, domestic companies such as SCC have become the target of J. Aron & Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs. Now losses from a "small probability event" are spreading and spreading.
Let us look at the contract between SCC and J. Aron & Company.
The contract is valid is from March 3, 2008, to December 31, 2008. When the floating price of oil is higher than $63.5/barrel, SCC will receive a monthly income of $300,000 (200,000 barrels × $1.5/barrel). When the floating price is lower than the $63.5/barrel but above $62/barrel, SCC will have the proceeds of ( floating price - $62/barrel) × 200,000 barrels per month. When the floating price is below $ 62/barrel, SCC has to pay ($62/barrel - the floating price) × 400,000 barrels.
The contract was signed on March 12, 2008, and its code is 165723967102.11. On that day, the futures price index for light crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange closed at $106.81/barrel. In light of the situation at that time, the risk of the contract seemed very slim, most insiders believing it was not likely the futures price of crude oil would fall below $62/barrel before Dec. 31.
By March this year, the price of oil had risen to over $100/barrel. Forecasting oil prices became the focus of industry insiders. Goldman Sachs, which before had accurately forecast that oil would reach $95/barrel by the end of 2007, predicted that month that the average price of crude oil would continue to rise to $141/barrel in 2008. The oil price hitting $147/barrel in July made Goldman Sachs
Look positively magical in it prescience.
At the time SCC signed its contract, insiders said that $100/barrel had opened a new era and that the days of cheap oil were gone forever.
And that agreement looked like cash on the barrelhead---as long as by the end of this year oil price didn’t fall below $62/barrel, SSC was set to rake in the cash. At the time, "oil falling below $62/barrel" seemed a microscopically "small probability event."
Though really, not so much cash. Regardless of how high oil prices might soar above $63.5/barrel, the maximum monthly earning for SSC is only $300,000. However, if oil prices fall below $62/barrel, losses can mount up quickly and almost without end. It’s a trader’s nightmare—a position with a limited upside and an unlimited downside. Positing that, by the end of this year, oil falls to $40/barrel, SSC will be paying out $8.8 million per month. The total net profit of SSC in 2007 was just over $17 million.
This contract is designed to be similar to a game in casino. The market maker pays for losses due to “great probability events,” and usually costs are modest; the market player must cover losses due to “small probability events,” and these can be massive. When the market maker faces many players, the odds of “great probability events” against “small probability events” and the ratio of compensation will favor the market maker.
Moreover, when the market maker has a certain impact on the bet, it is the least conducive to players.
In this oil price gamble, Goldman Sachs has played at least three roles------predictor, speculator and gambler. The research center of Goldman Sachs plays the role of predictor, Goldman's fund plays the role of speculator, and J. Aron & Company plays the role of gambler.
Since July this year, turning points of commodity prices such as crude oil have occurred. Goldman Sachs issued a forecast, greatly surprising the global market, that oil prices may drop to $40/barrel. Oil is currently trading at over $53/barrel, but it has been below $50/barrel and could well drop to $40 or even less. It should be noted that Goldman Sachs fund has played an important role in the ups and downs of the oil price, and, with companies such as Morgan Stanley, has been referred to as one of the large organizations influencing the futures price of oil.
It is reported that the marketing team of J. Aron & Company also contacted a number of domestic companies, which have the same demand for hedging risk as SSC.
J. Aron & Company is not always the winner in these gambles, but it can control the risk according to the design of "small probability event and great earnings," and if it plays well only a few times, it can reap great profits. It is clear that with the support of its parent company, which has strong “research ability” and “ability to participate in the market," it is not so difficult for “small probability events” to occur. However, under this “business model,” Chinese enterprises, only beginners in international financial markets, are doomed to pay expensive fees to learn the ropes.
The designer of derivatives in Goldman Sachs is perhaps a casino master. In this gamble of oil prices, it seems that one Chinese firm hit the tables at Vegas and left without his shirt.
==================================
Owke..... GS is dus aan het gokken. Nieuwe grote speler in derivaten land. En neemt aardig wat risico als percentage van zijn eigen kapitaal.
November 25,2008
State-owned enterprises such as Shenzhen Shennan Circuit Co.(SCC) and Air China have recently suffered big losses in international derivatives trading, focusing investor attention on derivatives market and structural options. The situation is frightening investors by reviving the ghosts from the CAO (China Aviation Oil) incident of 2005.
Three years after CAO ran up $550 million in losses in derivatives speculation in oil prices, domestic companies such as SCC have become the target of J. Aron & Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs. Now losses from a "small probability event" are spreading and spreading.
Let us look at the contract between SCC and J. Aron & Company.
The contract is valid is from March 3, 2008, to December 31, 2008. When the floating price of oil is higher than $63.5/barrel, SCC will receive a monthly income of $300,000 (200,000 barrels × $1.5/barrel). When the floating price is lower than the $63.5/barrel but above $62/barrel, SCC will have the proceeds of ( floating price - $62/barrel) × 200,000 barrels per month. When the floating price is below $ 62/barrel, SCC has to pay ($62/barrel - the floating price) × 400,000 barrels.
The contract was signed on March 12, 2008, and its code is 165723967102.11. On that day, the futures price index for light crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange closed at $106.81/barrel. In light of the situation at that time, the risk of the contract seemed very slim, most insiders believing it was not likely the futures price of crude oil would fall below $62/barrel before Dec. 31.
By March this year, the price of oil had risen to over $100/barrel. Forecasting oil prices became the focus of industry insiders. Goldman Sachs, which before had accurately forecast that oil would reach $95/barrel by the end of 2007, predicted that month that the average price of crude oil would continue to rise to $141/barrel in 2008. The oil price hitting $147/barrel in July made Goldman Sachs
Look positively magical in it prescience.
At the time SCC signed its contract, insiders said that $100/barrel had opened a new era and that the days of cheap oil were gone forever.
And that agreement looked like cash on the barrelhead---as long as by the end of this year oil price didn’t fall below $62/barrel, SSC was set to rake in the cash. At the time, "oil falling below $62/barrel" seemed a microscopically "small probability event."
Though really, not so much cash. Regardless of how high oil prices might soar above $63.5/barrel, the maximum monthly earning for SSC is only $300,000. However, if oil prices fall below $62/barrel, losses can mount up quickly and almost without end. It’s a trader’s nightmare—a position with a limited upside and an unlimited downside. Positing that, by the end of this year, oil falls to $40/barrel, SSC will be paying out $8.8 million per month. The total net profit of SSC in 2007 was just over $17 million.
This contract is designed to be similar to a game in casino. The market maker pays for losses due to “great probability events,” and usually costs are modest; the market player must cover losses due to “small probability events,” and these can be massive. When the market maker faces many players, the odds of “great probability events” against “small probability events” and the ratio of compensation will favor the market maker.
Moreover, when the market maker has a certain impact on the bet, it is the least conducive to players.
In this oil price gamble, Goldman Sachs has played at least three roles------predictor, speculator and gambler. The research center of Goldman Sachs plays the role of predictor, Goldman's fund plays the role of speculator, and J. Aron & Company plays the role of gambler.
Since July this year, turning points of commodity prices such as crude oil have occurred. Goldman Sachs issued a forecast, greatly surprising the global market, that oil prices may drop to $40/barrel. Oil is currently trading at over $53/barrel, but it has been below $50/barrel and could well drop to $40 or even less. It should be noted that Goldman Sachs fund has played an important role in the ups and downs of the oil price, and, with companies such as Morgan Stanley, has been referred to as one of the large organizations influencing the futures price of oil.
It is reported that the marketing team of J. Aron & Company also contacted a number of domestic companies, which have the same demand for hedging risk as SSC.
J. Aron & Company is not always the winner in these gambles, but it can control the risk according to the design of "small probability event and great earnings," and if it plays well only a few times, it can reap great profits. It is clear that with the support of its parent company, which has strong “research ability” and “ability to participate in the market," it is not so difficult for “small probability events” to occur. However, under this “business model,” Chinese enterprises, only beginners in international financial markets, are doomed to pay expensive fees to learn the ropes.
The designer of derivatives in Goldman Sachs is perhaps a casino master. In this gamble of oil prices, it seems that one Chinese firm hit the tables at Vegas and left without his shirt.
==================================
Owke..... GS is dus aan het gokken. Nieuwe grote speler in derivaten land. En neemt aardig wat risico als percentage van zijn eigen kapitaal.
1. Thanks for all je posts :-)quote:Op vrijdag 3 april 2009 07:32 schreef Drugshond het volgende:
Is Goldman Sachs Running a Derivatives Casino?
November 25,2008
2. Dit is te doorzichtig voor woorden: sluit een contract, en duw daarna zelf de olieprijs omlaag... Onvoorstelbaar dat die banken hier mee weg komen. Dit is pure misdaad.
ze gaan fungeren als bad bank heb ik het idee, ik heb nog geen tijd gehad om alles door te nemen, maar dat is het eerste wat in me opschiet.
wederom weer goodstuff Drugshond
wederom weer goodstuff Drugshond
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
Bloomberg
Converted to Banks
The notional amount of derivatives rose 14 percent to $24.5 trillion as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, both of New York, were included in the report for the first time after converting to banks in September.
The top five banks were New York’s JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Bank of America Corp. of Charlotte, North Carolina; New York- based Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs, and London-based HSBC Corp. Wachovia Corp. of Charlotte, was pushed out of the top five by Goldman Sachs.
The five banks accounted for 96 percent of the $200 trillion in derivatives contracts held by U.S. banks, according to the OCC report.
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs had revenue of $40 million in the fourth quarter from cash and derivative trading, OCC said. That compares with a $1.79 billion loss at JPMorgan, a $2 billion decline at Bank of America and Citibank’s $4.49 billion shortfall. HSBC lost $1.46 billion in the quarter.
JPMorgan remained the largest user of derivatives among its competitors, with $87.4 trillion in notional value, more than Bank of America and Citibank combined. Goldman Sachs held $30.2 trillion in derivatives at the end of the fourth quarter, OCC said.
The OCC reports shows the comparable size of the privately traded over-the-counter market and what is traded on regulated U.S. exchanges. About 97 percent of JPMorgan’s trading in the fourth quarter occurred in the over-the-counter market, with Bank of America at 94 percent and Citigroup at 98 percent.
Converted to Banks
The notional amount of derivatives rose 14 percent to $24.5 trillion as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, both of New York, were included in the report for the first time after converting to banks in September.
The top five banks were New York’s JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Bank of America Corp. of Charlotte, North Carolina; New York- based Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs, and London-based HSBC Corp. Wachovia Corp. of Charlotte, was pushed out of the top five by Goldman Sachs.
The five banks accounted for 96 percent of the $200 trillion in derivatives contracts held by U.S. banks, according to the OCC report.
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs had revenue of $40 million in the fourth quarter from cash and derivative trading, OCC said. That compares with a $1.79 billion loss at JPMorgan, a $2 billion decline at Bank of America and Citibank’s $4.49 billion shortfall. HSBC lost $1.46 billion in the quarter.
JPMorgan remained the largest user of derivatives among its competitors, with $87.4 trillion in notional value, more than Bank of America and Citibank combined. Goldman Sachs held $30.2 trillion in derivatives at the end of the fourth quarter, OCC said.
The OCC reports shows the comparable size of the privately traded over-the-counter market and what is traded on regulated U.S. exchanges. About 97 percent of JPMorgan’s trading in the fourth quarter occurred in the over-the-counter market, with Bank of America at 94 percent and Citigroup at 98 percent.
Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk
Although it was not widely known, Goldman, a Wall Street stalwart that had seemed immune to its rivals’ woes, was A.I.G.’s largest trading partner, according to six people close to the insurer who requested anonymity because of confidentiality agreements. A collapse of the insurer threatened to leave a hole of as much as $20 billion in Goldman’s side, several of these people said.
Although it was not widely known, Goldman, a Wall Street stalwart that had seemed immune to its rivals’ woes, was A.I.G.’s largest trading partner, according to six people close to the insurer who requested anonymity because of confidentiality agreements. A collapse of the insurer threatened to leave a hole of as much as $20 billion in Goldman’s side, several of these people said.
Is Goldman Tempting the Interest Rate Black Swan with 1056% Risk Exposure ?
Yep, Goldman Sachs (GS)... Looks like Blankfein's minions went from a TCE/RBC ratio of 4% to 1,056% in the span of one quarter! In fact, Goldman is so enamored with Interest Rate Swaps that it has almost the same notional outstanding as Bank of America (BAC), and more than Citigroup (C).
The thing to note, is that unlike both Citi and BofA, which actually are real consumer banks with a depositor base, Goldman is a consumer bank only in name (when is the last time you deposited your cash in a Goldman retail branch?). Consequently, BOA and C have total assets of $1.5 trillion and $1.2 trillion, both more than 10x the assets of GS, which is at $162 billion (and this excludes the incremental assets at the Bank Holding Company level for both BOA and C).
Has Goldman, in its pursuit to catch up with the imaginary PIMROCK decided to chew off a little more than its assets would allow? 1,056% more in fact? Or, alternatively, has the company bet a little too much in its bet that it can easily anticipate interest rate moves?
As pointed out, over $160 trillion in Interest Rate contracts exist currently. What the credit crunch taught us is that the risk management of credit derivatives was woefully inadequate in a time when credit was flowing freely and the system was nice and liquid. After the bubble burst, certain entities (wink wink AIG) ended up having to commit capital to a sizable amount, more than half at times, of the total notional of derivatives the company had underwritten - a scenario previously never thought possible. And the massive reduction in global CDS notional outstanding over the past year and a half (from over $60 trillion to under $30 trillion today) has been a direct result of financial companies realizing they did not provision well enough for the "black swan" day, and thus rushing to unwind as much of these ticking time bombs as they could.
In the meantime, the interest rate black swan is growing. Do not misunderstand us: Zero Hedge has no idea what, if any, a black swan in Interest Rates may be. It is - by definition - an unexpected, unpredictable, outlier, aka fat-tail, event. Its prediction would immediately render it a grey swan at best, if not beige. However, instead of focusing so much on CDS as the financial system bogeyman, is it not time to look at some of these other derivative instruments that may soon plague the Basel I/II and whatever other risk consortia appear in the future.
At $200 trillion in total derivatives, and $160+ trillion plus concentrated in Interest Rates, a fat tail event here, whether due to a paradigm shift in US monetary policy (that whole thing about Greenspan focusing on inflation instead of deflation now might raise a few eyebrows), or something totally different, even partial needs to satisfy these contracts will result in staggering and unmanageable repercussions to the global economy (tangentially, is it even physically possible to print $200 trillion in one year?)
Of course, as everything is smooth sailing in IR Swaps for now, I doubt anyone will even think about potential issues in this space... until it is too late.
Yep, Goldman Sachs (GS)... Looks like Blankfein's minions went from a TCE/RBC ratio of 4% to 1,056% in the span of one quarter! In fact, Goldman is so enamored with Interest Rate Swaps that it has almost the same notional outstanding as Bank of America (BAC), and more than Citigroup (C).
The thing to note, is that unlike both Citi and BofA, which actually are real consumer banks with a depositor base, Goldman is a consumer bank only in name (when is the last time you deposited your cash in a Goldman retail branch?). Consequently, BOA and C have total assets of $1.5 trillion and $1.2 trillion, both more than 10x the assets of GS, which is at $162 billion (and this excludes the incremental assets at the Bank Holding Company level for both BOA and C).
Has Goldman, in its pursuit to catch up with the imaginary PIMROCK decided to chew off a little more than its assets would allow? 1,056% more in fact? Or, alternatively, has the company bet a little too much in its bet that it can easily anticipate interest rate moves?
As pointed out, over $160 trillion in Interest Rate contracts exist currently. What the credit crunch taught us is that the risk management of credit derivatives was woefully inadequate in a time when credit was flowing freely and the system was nice and liquid. After the bubble burst, certain entities (wink wink AIG) ended up having to commit capital to a sizable amount, more than half at times, of the total notional of derivatives the company had underwritten - a scenario previously never thought possible. And the massive reduction in global CDS notional outstanding over the past year and a half (from over $60 trillion to under $30 trillion today) has been a direct result of financial companies realizing they did not provision well enough for the "black swan" day, and thus rushing to unwind as much of these ticking time bombs as they could.
In the meantime, the interest rate black swan is growing. Do not misunderstand us: Zero Hedge has no idea what, if any, a black swan in Interest Rates may be. It is - by definition - an unexpected, unpredictable, outlier, aka fat-tail, event. Its prediction would immediately render it a grey swan at best, if not beige. However, instead of focusing so much on CDS as the financial system bogeyman, is it not time to look at some of these other derivative instruments that may soon plague the Basel I/II and whatever other risk consortia appear in the future.
At $200 trillion in total derivatives, and $160+ trillion plus concentrated in Interest Rates, a fat tail event here, whether due to a paradigm shift in US monetary policy (that whole thing about Greenspan focusing on inflation instead of deflation now might raise a few eyebrows), or something totally different, even partial needs to satisfy these contracts will result in staggering and unmanageable repercussions to the global economy (tangentially, is it even physically possible to print $200 trillion in one year?)
Of course, as everything is smooth sailing in IR Swaps for now, I doubt anyone will even think about potential issues in this space... until it is too late.
Mijn gok is dat ze zichzelf helemaal hebben vastgespijkerd op eventuele toekomstige renteverhogingen.quote:Op vrijdag 3 april 2009 07:52 schreef edwinh het volgende:
ze gaan fungeren als bad bank heb ik het idee, ik heb nog geen tijd gehad om alles door te nemen, maar dat is het eerste wat in me opschiet.
wederom weer goodstuff Drugshond
M.a.w. niks deflatie.... bij (hyper)inflatie gaan ze dik cashen.
Fenix from the flames noem ik zoiets.
dan zou Goldman Sachs na de actie van Obama en co (monetairy easing, waardoor de rente als een baksteen zakte) de afgelopen weken nu technisch falliet moeten zijnquote:Op zaterdag 4 april 2009 01:22 schreef Drugshond het volgende:
[..]
Mijn gok is dat ze zichzelf helemaal hebben vastgespijkerd op eventuele toekomstige renteverhogingen.
M.a.w. niks deflatie.... bij (hyper)inflatie gaan ze dik cashen.
Fenix from the flames noem ik zoiets.
Het feit dat ze contracten in de boeken hebben staan, wil niet zeggen dat ze ook echt exposure hebben. Kan zijn dat ze alleen als doorgeefluik fungeren? Ze geven een bond uit, en swappen dat naar een andere rente. Of een swap in en uit, back to back.
Vanzelfsprekend hebben ze door de hoeveelheid derivaten een hoop meer counterparty risk dan anderen (en degenen die swaps met Goldman aangaan dus ook), maar het feit dat ze veel van dit spul in de boeken hebben staan wil nog niet perse zeggen dat ze een speculatieve positie hebben ingenomen. Voor hetzelfde geld (en dat lijkt me waarschijnlijker) zijn het neutrale posities.
Goeie....quote:Op zaterdag 4 april 2009 02:54 schreef Dinosaur_Sr het volgende:
[..]
dan zou Goldman Sachs na de actie van Obama en co (monetairy easing, waardoor de rente als een baksteen zakte) de afgelopen weken nu technisch falliet moeten zijn
Het feit dat ze contracten in de boeken hebben staan, wil niet zeggen dat ze ook echt exposure hebben. Kan zijn dat ze alleen als doorgeefluik fungeren? Ze geven een bond uit, en swappen dat naar een andere rente. Of een swap in en uit, back to back.
Vanzelfsprekend hebben ze door de hoeveelheid derivaten een hoop meer counterparty risk dan anderen (en degenen die swaps met Goldman aangaan dus ook), maar het feit dat ze veel van dit spul in de boeken hebben staan wil nog niet perse zeggen dat ze een speculatieve positie hebben ingenomen. Voor hetzelfde geld (en dat lijkt me waarschijnlijker) zijn het neutrale posities.
ff een side artikel die eigenlijk een eigen topic verdient maar wellicht hier meer voedingsbodem vindt/
JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, Wells Fargo and More Than 1,800 Other Institutions Believed to Be at Risk of Failure Based on Fourth Quarter 2008 Data
New Data Topic of Audio Press Briefing
JUPITER, Fla.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Several of the nation’s largest banks, including JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Sun Trust Bank, HSBC Bank USA, plus more than 1,800 regional and smaller institutions are at risk of failure despite government bailouts, according to Martin D. Weiss, Ph.D., president of Weiss Research, Inc., an independent research firm.
The analysis is based on Fourth Quarter 2008 data from TheStreet.Com and the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Several large institutions received significant ratings downgrades from the prior quarter, including Citibank, downgraded from C- to D; Wells Fargo, downgraded from C- to D+; and SunTrust Bank, downgraded from C- to D+.
In addition, Dr. Weiss will provide updated commentary of his white paper issued on March 19. Titled “Dangerous Unintended Consequences: How Banking Bailouts, Buyouts and Nationalizations Can Only Prolong America’s Second Great Depression and Weaken Any Subsequent Recovery,” the white paper names U.S. banks and thrifts believed to be at risk of failure, using that data to demonstrate that the U.S. government greatly underestimates the scope of the debt crisis, while overestimating its ability to effectively save troubled institutions without severe adverse consequences.
The debt crisis is much greater than the government has reported, according to the white paper. The FDIC’s “Problem List” of troubled banks includes 252 institutions with assets of $159 billion. The updated review by Weiss Research, however, shows that 1,816 banks and thrifts are at risk of failure, with total assets of $4.67 trillion, compared to 1,568 institutions, with $2.32 trillion in total assets in prior quarter.
Five large U.S. banks have credit exposure related to their derivatives trading that exceeds their capital, with four in particular — JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Bank America and Citibank — taking especially large risks.
At year end 2008, Bank of America’s total credit exposure to derivatives was 179 percent of its risk-based capital; Citibank’s was 278 percent; JPMorgan Chase’s, 382 percent; and HSBC America’s, 550 percent, according to the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). In addition, in the fourth quarter, Goldman Sachs began reporting as a commercial bank, revealing an alarming total credit exposure of 1,056 percent, or more than ten times its capital. Although the banking authorities have not defined how much exposure is considered excessive, Weiss believes that, as a rule, bank exposure to any single risk category should be limited to 25 percent of capital. Goldman Sachs has exceeded that limit by a factor of 42 to 1.
“Equally alarming,” writes Dr. Weiss, “is the fourth quarter OCC data demonstrating that record bank losses are spreading to interest-rate derivatives. Until now, bank derivatives losses have been limited almost exclusively to credit defaults swaps (CDS), which represent only 7.8 percent of the notional value U.S. derivatives held by all U.S. banks. In the fourth quarter, although the CDS losses continued at a near-record pace, we also witnessed record losses in the interest-rate sector, which represents 82 percent of the derivatives market: The nation’s banks lost $3.4 billion in interest-rate derivatives, or more than seven times their worst previous quarterly loss in this category.”
Dr. Weiss continues, “In the face of such enormous risks and losses it’s entirely unreasonable to expect the U.S. Government to offset them without unacceptable damage to its own credit, credibility and borrowing power.” !!!! W000t
!!!!
Dr. Weiss points to early signs that the credit of the U.S. Treasury may already be suffering some damage in the wake of government bailout programs such as the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the Federal Reserve’s recent $1.15 trillion commitment to purchase bonds, and the $1 trillion Private-Public Investment Program (PPIP). For example, the cost of credit default swaps traded by international investors to insure against a future default by the U.S. Treasury recently surged to 14 times its 2007 level; while, more recently, the price of the 30-year Treasury bonds has fallen by 24 points.
“The ‘too-big-to-fail’ doctrine has failed,” concludes Weiss. In its place, he recommends the following steps to build a firmer foundation for a future recovery:
Abandon the unrealistic goal of saving all failing financial institutions, focusing instead on the goal of rebuilding the economy’s foundation in preparation for an eventual recovery.
Pro-actively downsize or shut down the weakest institutions no matter how large they may be; provide opportunities for borderline institutions to rehabilitate themselves under a strict regulatory regime; and give well-capitalized, liquid and prudently-managed institutions better opportunities to gain market share.
Seriously consider breaking up the weak megabanks, following the model of the Ma Bell breakup in 1984.
Build confidence in the banking system with better disclosure and transparency, including the public release of the confidential official ratings on all banks called CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk).
Switch priorities from the battles we can’t win to the war we can’t afford to lose, such as emergency assistance for the millions most severely victimized by a depression.
================
M.a.w. de banken willen eigenlijk niet dat de rente koste wat het kost laag blijft, en nemen hierop enorme risico's. Wie gijzelt nu wie... is de betere vraag ? Als de inflatie eraan komt mag de FED het verschil gaan bijbetalen. Dit is een nog subtielere bailout dan het PIPP program.
[ Bericht 0% gewijzigd door Drugshond op 11-04-2009 14:18:24 ]
JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, Wells Fargo and More Than 1,800 Other Institutions Believed to Be at Risk of Failure Based on Fourth Quarter 2008 Data
New Data Topic of Audio Press Briefing
JUPITER, Fla.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Several of the nation’s largest banks, including JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Sun Trust Bank, HSBC Bank USA, plus more than 1,800 regional and smaller institutions are at risk of failure despite government bailouts, according to Martin D. Weiss, Ph.D., president of Weiss Research, Inc., an independent research firm.
The analysis is based on Fourth Quarter 2008 data from TheStreet.Com and the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Several large institutions received significant ratings downgrades from the prior quarter, including Citibank, downgraded from C- to D; Wells Fargo, downgraded from C- to D+; and SunTrust Bank, downgraded from C- to D+.
In addition, Dr. Weiss will provide updated commentary of his white paper issued on March 19. Titled “Dangerous Unintended Consequences: How Banking Bailouts, Buyouts and Nationalizations Can Only Prolong America’s Second Great Depression and Weaken Any Subsequent Recovery,” the white paper names U.S. banks and thrifts believed to be at risk of failure, using that data to demonstrate that the U.S. government greatly underestimates the scope of the debt crisis, while overestimating its ability to effectively save troubled institutions without severe adverse consequences.
The debt crisis is much greater than the government has reported, according to the white paper. The FDIC’s “Problem List” of troubled banks includes 252 institutions with assets of $159 billion. The updated review by Weiss Research, however, shows that 1,816 banks and thrifts are at risk of failure, with total assets of $4.67 trillion, compared to 1,568 institutions, with $2.32 trillion in total assets in prior quarter.
Five large U.S. banks have credit exposure related to their derivatives trading that exceeds their capital, with four in particular — JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Bank America and Citibank — taking especially large risks.
At year end 2008, Bank of America’s total credit exposure to derivatives was 179 percent of its risk-based capital; Citibank’s was 278 percent; JPMorgan Chase’s, 382 percent; and HSBC America’s, 550 percent, according to the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). In addition, in the fourth quarter, Goldman Sachs began reporting as a commercial bank, revealing an alarming total credit exposure of 1,056 percent, or more than ten times its capital. Although the banking authorities have not defined how much exposure is considered excessive, Weiss believes that, as a rule, bank exposure to any single risk category should be limited to 25 percent of capital. Goldman Sachs has exceeded that limit by a factor of 42 to 1.
“Equally alarming,” writes Dr. Weiss, “is the fourth quarter OCC data demonstrating that record bank losses are spreading to interest-rate derivatives. Until now, bank derivatives losses have been limited almost exclusively to credit defaults swaps (CDS), which represent only 7.8 percent of the notional value U.S. derivatives held by all U.S. banks. In the fourth quarter, although the CDS losses continued at a near-record pace, we also witnessed record losses in the interest-rate sector, which represents 82 percent of the derivatives market: The nation’s banks lost $3.4 billion in interest-rate derivatives, or more than seven times their worst previous quarterly loss in this category.”
Dr. Weiss continues, “In the face of such enormous risks and losses it’s entirely unreasonable to expect the U.S. Government to offset them without unacceptable damage to its own credit, credibility and borrowing power.” !!!! W000t
!!!!Dr. Weiss points to early signs that the credit of the U.S. Treasury may already be suffering some damage in the wake of government bailout programs such as the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the Federal Reserve’s recent $1.15 trillion commitment to purchase bonds, and the $1 trillion Private-Public Investment Program (PPIP). For example, the cost of credit default swaps traded by international investors to insure against a future default by the U.S. Treasury recently surged to 14 times its 2007 level; while, more recently, the price of the 30-year Treasury bonds has fallen by 24 points.
“The ‘too-big-to-fail’ doctrine has failed,” concludes Weiss. In its place, he recommends the following steps to build a firmer foundation for a future recovery:
================
M.a.w. de banken willen eigenlijk niet dat de rente koste wat het kost laag blijft, en nemen hierop enorme risico's. Wie gijzelt nu wie... is de betere vraag ? Als de inflatie eraan komt mag de FED het verschil gaan bijbetalen. Dit is een nog subtielere bailout dan het PIPP program.
[ Bericht 0% gewijzigd door Drugshond op 11-04-2009 14:18:24 ]
Het blijft voor mij (en misschien wel voor iedereen?) een vraag in hoeverre je die genoemde risico's van derivaten etc tegen elkaar kunt wegstrepen. Want instituten hebben verplichtingen naar elkaar toe. Wat blijft er per saldo als netto 'gat' over als je de Citi, AIG, GS etc van deze wereld ten onder laat gaan? Misschien wel veel minder dan het nu lijkt. Maar goed, die ondoorzichtigheid is natuurlijk ook de kern van het probleem.
Dit lijstje aanbevelingen ben ik het dus helemaal mee eens.quote:Abandon the unrealistic goal of saving all failing financial institutions, focusing instead on the goal of rebuilding the economy’s foundation in preparation for an eventual recovery. Pro-actively downsize or shut down the weakest institutions no matter how large they may be; provide opportunities for borderline institutions to rehabilitate themselves under a strict regulatory regime; and give well-capitalized, liquid and prudently-managed institutions better opportunities to gain market share. Seriously consider breaking up the weak megabanks, following the model of the Ma Bell breakup in 1984. Build confidence in the banking system with better disclosure and transparency, including the public release of the confidential official ratings on all banks called CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk). Switch priorities from the battles we can’t win to the war we can’t afford to lose, such as emergency assistance for the millions most severely victimized by a depression.
"If you want to make God laugh, tell him about your plans"
Mijn reisverslagen
Mijn reisverslagen
Dinsdag komt Goldman Sucks met cijfers, dus ben benieuwd.
President Camacho
TV series: Boardwalk Empire | Burn Notice | Dexter | Game of Thrones | Impractical Jokers | Luther | Sherlock | Sons of Anarchy
TV series: Boardwalk Empire | Burn Notice | Dexter | Game of Thrones | Impractical Jokers | Luther | Sherlock | Sons of Anarchy
die zullen positief worden opgevat denk ik. met die mark to market regel is het vrij makkelijk om creatief te boekhouden net zoals bij wells fargoquote:Op zaterdag 11 april 2009 18:32 schreef pberends het volgende:
Dinsdag komt Goldman Sucks met cijfers, dus ben benieuwd.
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
Hehe, iddquote:Op zaterdag 11 april 2009 18:36 schreef edwinh het volgende:
[..]
die zullen positief worden opgevat denk ik. met die mark to market regel is het vrij makkelijk om creatief te boekhouden net zoals bij wells fargo
.
President Camacho
TV series: Boardwalk Empire | Burn Notice | Dexter | Game of Thrones | Impractical Jokers | Luther | Sherlock | Sons of Anarchy
TV series: Boardwalk Empire | Burn Notice | Dexter | Game of Thrones | Impractical Jokers | Luther | Sherlock | Sons of Anarchy
De enorme derivaten-verliezen van de banken betroffen tot nu toe het kleine rode stukje (7,8%). Nu is het blauwe, 82% grote deel van de cirkel aan de beurt...alleen wordt die door de mark to market regel weg gewerkt, achjah beetje windowdressing hier en daar, de top van ahold ging er nog bijna voor in de bak , times has changed.
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
intressting
http://www.moneyandmarket(...)king-white-paper.pdf
Executive Summary lezen zegt feitenlijk al genoeg over het hele stuk
[ Bericht 18% gewijzigd door edwinh op 11-04-2009 19:12:17 ]
http://www.moneyandmarket(...)king-white-paper.pdf
Executive Summary lezen zegt feitenlijk al genoeg over het hele stuk
[ Bericht 18% gewijzigd door edwinh op 11-04-2009 19:12:17 ]
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
Is die regel er serieus doorgekomen???quote:Op zaterdag 11 april 2009 18:36 schreef edwinh het volgende:
[..]
die zullen positief worden opgevat denk ik. met die mark to market regel is het vrij makkelijk om creatief te boekhouden net zoals bij wells fargo
Money is short, times are hard, here's my fucking business card!
"I never let my schooling interfere with my education." — Mark Twain
"I never let my schooling interfere with my education." — Mark Twain
Nice one.quote:Op zaterdag 11 april 2009 19:05 schreef edwinh het volgende:
intressting
http://www.moneyandmarket(...)king-white-paper.pdf
Executive Summary lezen zegt feitenlijk al genoeg over het hele stuk
Over de resultaten van Wells Fargo wordt alweer getwijfeld, de nieuwe mark to market regel wordt weer ruim toegepast, ik snap niet dat tijdens de G20 hierover is ingestemd wat een hachelijke apen zijn het ook. Meer toezicht hier , meer toezicht daar en dan dit.........
http://www.housingwire.co(...)rors-at-wells-fargo/
http://www.housingwire.co(...)rors-at-wells-fargo/
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
Of ben je nog met het topic bezig DH ?quote:
The Hick from French Lick
The camera always points both ways. In expressing the subject, you also express yourself.
The camera always points both ways. In expressing the subject, you also express yourself.
A very interesting data point, also provided by the NYSE, implicates none other than administration darling Goldman Sachs in yet another potentially troubling development. The chart below demonstrates the program trading broken down by the top 15 most active NYSE member firms. I bring your attention to the total, principal, customer facilitation and agency columns.
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/(...)+program+trading.png
Key to note here is that Goldman's program trading principal to agency+customer facilitation ratio is a staggering 5x, which is multiples higher than both the second most active program trader and the average ratio of the NYSE, both at or below 1x. The implication is that Goldman Sachs, due to its preeminent position not only as one of the world's largest broker/dealers (pardon, Bank Holding Companies), but also as being on the top of the high-frequency trading/liquidity provision "food chain", trades much more often for its own (principal) benefit, likely in tandem with the other top dogs on the list: RenTec, Highbridge (JP Morgan), and GETCO.
In this light, the program trading spike over the past week could be perceived as much more sinister. For conspiracy lovers, long searching for any circumstantial evidence to catch the mysterious "plunge protection team" in action, you should look no further than this.
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/(...)+program+trading.png
Key to note here is that Goldman's program trading principal to agency+customer facilitation ratio is a staggering 5x, which is multiples higher than both the second most active program trader and the average ratio of the NYSE, both at or below 1x. The implication is that Goldman Sachs, due to its preeminent position not only as one of the world's largest broker/dealers (pardon, Bank Holding Companies), but also as being on the top of the high-frequency trading/liquidity provision "food chain", trades much more often for its own (principal) benefit, likely in tandem with the other top dogs on the list: RenTec, Highbridge (JP Morgan), and GETCO.
In this light, the program trading spike over the past week could be perceived as much more sinister. For conspiracy lovers, long searching for any circumstantial evidence to catch the mysterious "plunge protection team" in action, you should look no further than this.
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
Ik snap er maar weinig van. Dit houdt in dat het aandeel Goldman Sachs kunstmatig hoog wordt gehouden? Maar waarom?quote:Op maandag 13 april 2009 09:54 schreef edwinh het volgende:
A very interesting data point, also provided by the NYSE, implicates none other than administration darling Goldman Sachs in yet another potentially troubling development. The chart below demonstrates the program trading broken down by the top 15 most active NYSE member firms. I bring your attention to the total, principal, customer facilitation and agency columns.
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/(...)+program+trading.png
Key to note here is that Goldman's program trading principal to agency+customer facilitation ratio is a staggering 5x, which is multiples higher than both the second most active program trader and the average ratio of the NYSE, both at or below 1x. The implication is that Goldman Sachs, due to its preeminent position not only as one of the world's largest broker/dealers (pardon, Bank Holding Companies), but also as being on the top of the high-frequency trading/liquidity provision "food chain", trades much more often for its own (principal) benefit, likely in tandem with the other top dogs on the list: RenTec, Highbridge (JP Morgan), and GETCO.
In this light, the program trading spike over the past week could be perceived as much more sinister. For conspiracy lovers, long searching for any circumstantial evidence to catch the mysterious "plunge protection team" in action, you should look no further than this.
President Camacho
TV series: Boardwalk Empire | Burn Notice | Dexter | Game of Thrones | Impractical Jokers | Luther | Sherlock | Sons of Anarchy
TV series: Boardwalk Empire | Burn Notice | Dexter | Game of Thrones | Impractical Jokers | Luther | Sherlock | Sons of Anarchy
Nu snap ik het ook niet meer. Ik dacht dat ik dit moest lezen als: Goldman Sachs handelt met eigen kapitaal (al dan niet geld van het PPT) i.p.v. kapitaal van klanten (in welke vorm dan ook) m.a.w. niet perse gericht op het hoog houden van het aandeel Goldman Sachs.quote:Op maandag 13 april 2009 10:27 schreef pberends het volgende:
[..]
Ik snap er maar weinig van. Dit houdt in dat het aandeel Goldman Sachs kunstmatig hoog wordt gehouden? Maar waarom?
Doel van analyse of moraal van het verhaal zou dan zijn dat dit verschil tussen transacties met eigen geld en het geld van klanten te groot is wat zou kunnen duiden op een liquiditeitsprobleem van onderuit (zie piramide hieronder) en een liquiditeitsprobleem van de bank zelf aangezien het geld ws van het PPT komt.
[ Bericht 5% gewijzigd door dramatiek op 13-04-2009 12:40:41 (plaatje toegevoegd) ]
http://www.mrwonkish.nl Eurocrisis, Documentaires, Economie
lees dit artikel en dan wordt het denk ik wel helder, let op soms moet je een stukje enkele malen lezen om het uberhaupt te snappen.....
http://zerohedge.blogspot(...)arket-liquidity.html
we zijn waarschijnlijk op het punt gekomen dat de quand funds en program traders hun trader programma's zo hebben ingesteld dat de BMR zo weer ongedaan kan worden gemaakt wat resulteerd in een verkoop golf ala oktober 1987 ,die toen ook werd geacceleerd door programtraders.
http://zerohedge.blogspot(...)arket-liquidity.html
we zijn waarschijnlijk op het punt gekomen dat de quand funds en program traders hun trader programma's zo hebben ingesteld dat de BMR zo weer ongedaan kan worden gemaakt wat resulteerd in een verkoop golf ala oktober 1987 ,die toen ook werd geacceleerd door programtraders.
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
er staat terloops een heel aardige verwijzing naar de overname van Wachovia in.quote:Op zondag 12 april 2009 09:20 schreef edwinh het volgende:
Over de resultaten van Wells Fargo wordt alweer getwijfeld, de nieuwe mark to market regel wordt weer ruim toegepast, ik snap niet dat tijdens de G20 hierover is ingestemd wat een hachelijke apen zijn het ook. Meer toezicht hier , meer toezicht daar en dan dit.........
http://www.housingwire.co(...)rors-at-wells-fargo/
Ik zal het proberen uit te leggen. Les 1 in hoe laat ik verliezen weglopen zonder ze in m'n verlies en winstrekening te laten lopen.
Wells Fargo heeft in 2008 Wachovia bank overgenomen. Op dat moment waardeert Wells Fargo alle activa en passiva van Wachovia op marktwaarde (incl. uitstaande hypotheken). Het verschil met de betaalde koopsom is goodwill (of badwill). Als nu in Q1 2009 blijkt dat de hypotheek die Wachovia aan een klant heeft verstrekt onvolwaardig is, en afgeboekt moet worden, wordt de voorziening voor oninbare hypotheken verhoogd. De tegenrekening is echter NIET de verlies- en winstrekening (zoals het geval zou zijn geweest als Wachovia zelfstandig zou rapporteren), maar de tegenrekening is 'goodwill' of 'badwill'. Purchase accounting heet dat. Verliezen op activa van acquisities worden via goodwill/badwill verwerkt, op de balans dus en niet op de P&L. En onder US GAAP doe je dat eeuwigdurend (onder IFRS is er een termin van 1 jaar). Ergo, verliezen van uitstaande kredieten verstrekt door Wachovia kosten Wells Fargo wel geld, maar zie je niet terug in de P&L.
En Wachovia is geen kleine acquisitie, maar een bankmoloch.
Happy accounting everybody
(en vergeet de verlies- en winstrekening maar)
PS: als ik tijd heb zal ik eens proberen om te laten zien hoe dit in de rapportages van Wells Fargo over Q1 2009 terugkomt, en dat houden tegen de persberichten
Juist, dan kan je een positief weekje op WS verwachten, beetje handig boekhouden nee hoor niks aan de hand
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
quote:Goldman Sachs haalt miljarden op
NEW YORK (AFN) - Het Amerikaanse bankconcern Goldman Sachs heeft 5,5 miljard dollar (4,1 miljard euro) bij investeerders opgehaald om op koopjesjacht te gaan. Een speciaal fonds, GS Vintage Fund V, gaat zich bezighouden met het overnemen van belangen van investeringsmaatschappijen die met grote kortingen worden aangeboden.
Goldman Sachs kondigde het nieuwe fonds maandag aan, nadat de zakenkranten The Wall Street Journal en Financial Times er al melding van hadden gemaakt.
Door de financiële crisis kampen investeringsmaatschappijen met financieringsproblemen. Hun investeringen worden daardoor soms tegen een 50 tot 70 procent lagere prijs aangeboden. Goldman Sachs heeft al vier fondsen die zich met het opkopen van deze belangen bezighouden.
When the student is ready, the teacher will appear.
When the student is truly ready, the teacher will disappear.
When the student is truly ready, the teacher will disappear.
GS is goed bezig! Hopelijk doen de andere grote banken ook goede zaken. Deze week een hoop cijfers 
Zelf heb ik alleen C als aandelen in Amerikaanse banken. Ja, ook wel ING en Lloyds maar dat is Europees
Zelf heb ik alleen C als aandelen in Amerikaanse banken. Ja, ook wel ING en Lloyds maar dat is Europees
'I am who I am because of everyone'
Precies dat vroeg ik me ook al af.quote:
Hoeveel is deze winst waard mbt de nieuwe boekhoudregels?
Money is short, times are hard, here's my fucking business card!
"I never let my schooling interfere with my education." — Mark Twain
"I never let my schooling interfere with my education." — Mark Twain
Dat is het hele punt..... vroeger lees vorig jaar was er al veel onbegrip over de zogenaamde L3 assets en hoe deze in de boeken stonden. Nu heeft men verkapt deze assets ondergebracht als zogenaamde marktwaarde.quote:
Nou niet helemaal waar banken die diep in de shit zitten komen in aanmerking voor het PPIP-programm. Maar volgens de laatste berichten zouden daar geen grote banken erbij zitten.
M.a.w. de grote jongens redden zich wel.. (gedekt door de FED). de kleintjes iets minder. Vraag is alleen of men dit buiten Amerika ook gaat slikken of conforme creatieve regels gaat hanteren.
It's the power of keeping up the appearances (before the next snowfall).
Goldman, Give It All Back
While the bank is returning the government's $10 billion, why not also return the $13 billion it got from the U.S. through AIG's bailout?
By Matthew Goldstein
If Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein wants to put his money where his mouth is, he won't stop with just giving back the $10 billion in federal bailout money the investment firm got last autumn. He'll also offer to return some of the $13 billion Goldman (GS) got from the U.S. government by way of the bailout of American International Group (AIG).
Goldman's decision to sell shares and raise the necessary cash to repay the government is being seen by some as a show of strength. That's especially so after the firm posted a better-than-expected profit for the first quarter of $1.81 billion—largely driven by its proprietary trading desk. That's the same group of bond and commodity traders responsible for much for Goldman's outsized profits during the credit boom. So everything old is new again at Goldman. Right?
But more than anything, the move to repay the TARP money is being motivated by Blankfein's desire to free his firm of all those nettlesome government mandates on executive compensation and bonuses. Now there's nothing wrong with Goldman giving back the TARP money if it really doesn't need it. After all, government officials have always said they expected the banks to repay Treasury at some point.
AIG's CDOs: How Different from TARP?
Still, if Blankfein really wants to help U.S. taxpayers out, he can go the extra mile and give back some of that AIG money the firm got, too. If the government had allowed AIG to file for bankruptcy, Goldman likely would have incurred an even bigger fourth-quarter loss than it reported. So Blankfein owes a bit of gratitude to Uncle Sam. And as my BusinessWeek colleague Roben Farzad pointed out on CNBC on Mar. 27, Blankfein can thank taxpayers by forking over its AIG largesse.
Now we know Goldman will object that the AIG bailout money is different from TARP. The firm will argue that the dollars that passed through AIG were nothing more than money it was owed on all those credit default swaps it had purchased to insure some of its portfolio of collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. In Goldman's world, all the government was doing was allowing AIG to live up to its contractual agreements.
But, as we have seen in this financial crisis, some contracts can be broken. Maybe it was a smart move for the government to indirectly bail out AIG's trading partners to prevent a systemic financial collapse. But the government didn't have to make firms such as Goldman completely whole by paying face value for the CDOs that AIG had insured.
If nothing else, maybe Goldman should now take the haircut it probably should have taken on those CDOs at the time of the AIG bailout. The bank could start by offering to give some of that $13 billion back, too.
Businessweek.com
While the bank is returning the government's $10 billion, why not also return the $13 billion it got from the U.S. through AIG's bailout?
By Matthew Goldstein
If Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein wants to put his money where his mouth is, he won't stop with just giving back the $10 billion in federal bailout money the investment firm got last autumn. He'll also offer to return some of the $13 billion Goldman (GS) got from the U.S. government by way of the bailout of American International Group (AIG).
Goldman's decision to sell shares and raise the necessary cash to repay the government is being seen by some as a show of strength. That's especially so after the firm posted a better-than-expected profit for the first quarter of $1.81 billion—largely driven by its proprietary trading desk. That's the same group of bond and commodity traders responsible for much for Goldman's outsized profits during the credit boom. So everything old is new again at Goldman. Right?
But more than anything, the move to repay the TARP money is being motivated by Blankfein's desire to free his firm of all those nettlesome government mandates on executive compensation and bonuses. Now there's nothing wrong with Goldman giving back the TARP money if it really doesn't need it. After all, government officials have always said they expected the banks to repay Treasury at some point.
AIG's CDOs: How Different from TARP?
Still, if Blankfein really wants to help U.S. taxpayers out, he can go the extra mile and give back some of that AIG money the firm got, too. If the government had allowed AIG to file for bankruptcy, Goldman likely would have incurred an even bigger fourth-quarter loss than it reported. So Blankfein owes a bit of gratitude to Uncle Sam. And as my BusinessWeek colleague Roben Farzad pointed out on CNBC on Mar. 27, Blankfein can thank taxpayers by forking over its AIG largesse.
Now we know Goldman will object that the AIG bailout money is different from TARP. The firm will argue that the dollars that passed through AIG were nothing more than money it was owed on all those credit default swaps it had purchased to insure some of its portfolio of collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. In Goldman's world, all the government was doing was allowing AIG to live up to its contractual agreements.
But, as we have seen in this financial crisis, some contracts can be broken. Maybe it was a smart move for the government to indirectly bail out AIG's trading partners to prevent a systemic financial collapse. But the government didn't have to make firms such as Goldman completely whole by paying face value for the CDOs that AIG had insured.
If nothing else, maybe Goldman should now take the haircut it probably should have taken on those CDOs at the time of the AIG bailout. The bank could start by offering to give some of that $13 billion back, too.
Businessweek.com
Beetje kort door de bocht artikel imo. Dat GS dat geld kreeg is precies waarom ze die verzekering hadden afgesloten. Ongeacht of AIG het had overleefd zonder overheidssteun heeft GS imo recht op de uitkering van de verzekering. Anders kan beter de verzekeringspremie ook teruggehaald worden etc.
Wells Fargo 'winst' blijkt 'creatief' rekensommetje
Bank kan juist $ 120 miljard verlies verwachten - Voormalige directeur AIG: Overheid plundert de bevolking
Wells Fargo kantoorgebouw (links) in Los Angeles.
De Amerikaanse bank Wells Fargo, de op één na grootste hypotheekverstrekker van de VS, meldde vorige week dat het over het eerste kwartaal van 2009 een voorlopige winst van $ 3 miljard had behaald, veel hoger dan analisten hadden verwachtten. Gevolg: de koers van het aandeel Wells Fargo steeg 32%, waardoor ook de koersen van andere bankaandelen wereldwijd begonnen te stijgen.
De iets beter geïnformeerde nieuws volger wist natuurlijk onmiddellijk dat de 'winst' niets anders dan bedrog kon zijn. En kijk aan, de aap komt nu al uit de mouw. De 'winst' blijkt niets anders dan een 'creatief' rekensommetje te zijn.
Frederick Cannon (KBW Inc.) schat dat Wells Fargo zo'n $ 50 miljard extra aan kapitaal nodig heeft, om de federale overheid terug te betalen en haar verliezen te dekken. Er vanuit gaande dat de recessie nog wel een jaar voortduurt en de werkeloosheid verder zal stijgen, kan de bank het komende jaar een verlies van $ 120 miljard verwachten.
Over de vorige week gemelde $ 3 miljard 'winst' schrijft Cannon: 'Er werden maar weinig details bekend gemaakt, maar wij denken dat het meeste positieve nieuws te maken had met fusie-boekhouding (met Wachovia, december 2008), veranderde boekhoudregels en hypotheek moratoriums, en niet een onderliggende trend laten zien.'
'We verwachten dat de resultaten en het kapitaal door de voortdurende zwakte in de economie onder druk zullen blijven staan,' aldus Cannon, die verder schrijft dat de netto lasten over het eerste kwartaal ($ 3,3 miljard) kunstmatig laag zijn vanwege de al eerder genoemde moratoriums op sommige hypotheken, en het feit dat consumenten in die periode belastingteruggave ontvingen. Hij verwacht daarom dat de lasten in het tweede kwartaal opnieuw versneld zullen gaan oplopen.
Stress Test 19 banken eveneens fake
Wells Fargo zal naar verwachting de door de regering Obama uitgevoerde 'stress-test' van 19 grote Amerikaanse banken doorstaan. Beleggers kijken met hoge verwachtingen naar de uitkomst van deze 'stress-test', waaruit moet blijken of de 19 banken in staat zijn om een verdergaand verslechtering van de economie te kunnen weerstaan.
Nu al wordt geschreven dat alle banken de test zullen doorstaan, maar dat sommige banken 'aanvullende financiële steun' nodig zullen hebben om te overleven.
De hele test is een farce, omdat als tijdens de test zou blijken dat een bank niet voldoende kapitaal heeft, de Amerikaanse overheid onmiddellijk te hulp zal schieten. De politici zijn namelijk doodsbang dat het omvallen van een grote bank tot een kettingreactie zal lijden, en het hele financiële systeem definitief om zeep zal helpen. Dat zal de regering ten koste van nog eens vele miljarden gaan voorkomen.
Daarom zijn de resultaten van de stress test slechts hypothetisch, beter gezegd nog: voor de show. Zoals de resultaten van Wells Fargo dat ook waren. Of misschien is de conclusie, dat er ronduit gelogen en bedrogen wordt, wel een betere omschrijving van wat er gebeurt. Iedere Amerikaanse man, vrouw en kind heeft nu al tienduizenden belasting dollars betaald aan het failliete banken systeem. Hoe bizar kan het nog worden dat banken, die met biljoenen gemeenschapsgeld gered worden, ineens met 'record winsten' (want zo bracht Wells Fargo de $ 3 miljard 'winst' over het eerste kwartaal) op de proppen komen.
De voormalige directeur van het Amerikaanse mega concern AIG, Hank Greenberg, nam voor de tv (CNBC) letterlijk het woord 'plundering' in de mond. De Westerse overheden, de Amerikaanse voorop, plunderen de welvaart van hun bevolking, ten gunste van de banken en bankiers, die zichzelf al jaren op schandalige wijze verrijkt hebben. Greenberg eiste daarom dat de overheid de betalingen aan de banken terugdraait.
Bank kan juist $ 120 miljard verlies verwachten - Voormalige directeur AIG: Overheid plundert de bevolking
Wells Fargo kantoorgebouw (links) in Los Angeles.
De Amerikaanse bank Wells Fargo, de op één na grootste hypotheekverstrekker van de VS, meldde vorige week dat het over het eerste kwartaal van 2009 een voorlopige winst van $ 3 miljard had behaald, veel hoger dan analisten hadden verwachtten. Gevolg: de koers van het aandeel Wells Fargo steeg 32%, waardoor ook de koersen van andere bankaandelen wereldwijd begonnen te stijgen.
De iets beter geïnformeerde nieuws volger wist natuurlijk onmiddellijk dat de 'winst' niets anders dan bedrog kon zijn. En kijk aan, de aap komt nu al uit de mouw. De 'winst' blijkt niets anders dan een 'creatief' rekensommetje te zijn.
Frederick Cannon (KBW Inc.) schat dat Wells Fargo zo'n $ 50 miljard extra aan kapitaal nodig heeft, om de federale overheid terug te betalen en haar verliezen te dekken. Er vanuit gaande dat de recessie nog wel een jaar voortduurt en de werkeloosheid verder zal stijgen, kan de bank het komende jaar een verlies van $ 120 miljard verwachten.
Over de vorige week gemelde $ 3 miljard 'winst' schrijft Cannon: 'Er werden maar weinig details bekend gemaakt, maar wij denken dat het meeste positieve nieuws te maken had met fusie-boekhouding (met Wachovia, december 2008), veranderde boekhoudregels en hypotheek moratoriums, en niet een onderliggende trend laten zien.'
'We verwachten dat de resultaten en het kapitaal door de voortdurende zwakte in de economie onder druk zullen blijven staan,' aldus Cannon, die verder schrijft dat de netto lasten over het eerste kwartaal ($ 3,3 miljard) kunstmatig laag zijn vanwege de al eerder genoemde moratoriums op sommige hypotheken, en het feit dat consumenten in die periode belastingteruggave ontvingen. Hij verwacht daarom dat de lasten in het tweede kwartaal opnieuw versneld zullen gaan oplopen.
Stress Test 19 banken eveneens fake
Wells Fargo zal naar verwachting de door de regering Obama uitgevoerde 'stress-test' van 19 grote Amerikaanse banken doorstaan. Beleggers kijken met hoge verwachtingen naar de uitkomst van deze 'stress-test', waaruit moet blijken of de 19 banken in staat zijn om een verdergaand verslechtering van de economie te kunnen weerstaan.
Nu al wordt geschreven dat alle banken de test zullen doorstaan, maar dat sommige banken 'aanvullende financiële steun' nodig zullen hebben om te overleven.
De hele test is een farce, omdat als tijdens de test zou blijken dat een bank niet voldoende kapitaal heeft, de Amerikaanse overheid onmiddellijk te hulp zal schieten. De politici zijn namelijk doodsbang dat het omvallen van een grote bank tot een kettingreactie zal lijden, en het hele financiële systeem definitief om zeep zal helpen. Dat zal de regering ten koste van nog eens vele miljarden gaan voorkomen.
Daarom zijn de resultaten van de stress test slechts hypothetisch, beter gezegd nog: voor de show. Zoals de resultaten van Wells Fargo dat ook waren. Of misschien is de conclusie, dat er ronduit gelogen en bedrogen wordt, wel een betere omschrijving van wat er gebeurt. Iedere Amerikaanse man, vrouw en kind heeft nu al tienduizenden belasting dollars betaald aan het failliete banken systeem. Hoe bizar kan het nog worden dat banken, die met biljoenen gemeenschapsgeld gered worden, ineens met 'record winsten' (want zo bracht Wells Fargo de $ 3 miljard 'winst' over het eerste kwartaal) op de proppen komen.
De voormalige directeur van het Amerikaanse mega concern AIG, Hank Greenberg, nam voor de tv (CNBC) letterlijk het woord 'plundering' in de mond. De Westerse overheden, de Amerikaanse voorop, plunderen de welvaart van hun bevolking, ten gunste van de banken en bankiers, die zichzelf al jaren op schandalige wijze verrijkt hebben. Greenberg eiste daarom dat de overheid de betalingen aan de banken terugdraait.
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
Yep, daarom vind ik het ook een subjectief prutsartikel.quote:Op woensdag 15 april 2009 17:34 schreef snabbi het volgende:
Beetje kort door de bocht artikel imo. Dat GS dat geld kreeg is precies waarom ze die verzekering hadden afgesloten. Ongeacht of AIG het had overleefd zonder overheidssteun heeft GS imo recht op de uitkering van de verzekering. Anders kan beter de verzekeringspremie ook teruggehaald worden etc.
Kees de Kort haalde GS ook nog aan in zijn column. Ik meen dat het de column van afgelopen dinsdag was.
Als je verzekeraar failliet gaat kun je die uitkering echt wel op je buik schrijven.quote:
Beetje kort door de bocht artikel imo. Dat GS dat geld kreeg is precies waarom ze die verzekering hadden afgesloten. Ongeacht of AIG het had overleefd zonder overheidssteun heeft GS imo recht op de uitkering van de verzekering. Anders kan beter de verzekeringspremie ook teruggehaald worden etc.
Money is short, times are hard, here's my fucking business card!
"I never let my schooling interfere with my education." — Mark Twain
"I never let my schooling interfere with my education." — Mark Twain
Da´s helemaal waar. Maar opdraaien voor een terechte uitkering van een verzekering en ordinaire staatssteun omdat ze hun zaakjes niet op orde hebben is een verschil.quote:Op zaterdag 18 april 2009 10:48 schreef Lemmeb het volgende:
[..]
Als je verzekeraar failliet gaat kun je die uitkering echt wel op je buik schrijven.
DOJ Investigating CDS Market
Here come the cops!
July 14 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Justice Department is investigating the market for credit-default swaps, according to Markit Group Ltd., the data provider majority-owned by Wall Street’s largest banks.
Is this real or a dog-and-pony show?
No idea.
But as I have said before, here's my view on the CDS market:
It is a bucket shop nightmare. Banks control the bid process and transparency is nil. Since the trades are all over-the-counter there is no published central bid/offer/size/open interest information available to investors on an open, equal-access basis. This keeps spreads wide which the dealers love, since their primary source of income on these instruments is in fact the spread. What's worse is that instead of representing your order as a customer in the market, the dealers have an incentive to deal inside the trade, that is, as a "bucket shop" with your "trade" never actually being represented in the market at all! This sort of behavior (where you're actually trading against the house, not in the market) is illegal in the securities (and FX) markets in general - but not in the CDS marketplace.
The asymmetry of information is intentional. If open interest, bid, offer and size were to be published the bank's would be unable to maintain wide spreads on these contracts - they would contract to just a few basis points.
Asymmetric information creates systemic risk. If you don't know who holds what in terms of open interest, you have no way as a regulator to assess potential interconnectedness or whether proper margin supervision is being maintained or where concentrations of risk may reside. We now know for a fact that margin supervision has not been maintained, as AIG was asymmetrically exposed vastly beyond its capital adequacy. There is no particular reason to believe this is an isolated circumstance either; current dealers, which happen to be the humongous banks, may claim to have balanced positions (that is, no real exposure even though notional contract value outstanding is ridiculous in size) but there is no possible way to validate that claim without exposure of positions through central clearing and a central counterparty. Note that AIG said nothing about being asymmetrically exposed until it blew up - in fact, they made public statements to the contrary less than a year prior!
Asymmetric information and secrecy makes possible financial arson. The lack of insurable interest plus the ability to control information flow makes it trivial for severely-lopsided positions to be put on and maintained, leading to a perverse incentive to create self-fulfilling prophecies via intentional acts of financial sabotage. This doesn't work in the options market because the market-maker on the other side immediately hedges his position with a counterbalancing trade and when that gets expensive the price of the option goes up (a LOT!) to cover the risk, and in addition the open interest is public along with trade volume, allowing everyone to see "what's up" immediately. Evil requires secrecy!
The DOJ is right to be looking into this, but are they looking in the right places and with the right intent?
Who knows - neither the DOJ or Markit is talking, at least not at present.
I await the possibility of being pleasantly surprised by the appearance, no matter how fleeting, of a cop on the scene.
====================================================================
Ghe, zou hier iets uit voort komen
, juist nu 
Here come the cops!
July 14 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Justice Department is investigating the market for credit-default swaps, according to Markit Group Ltd., the data provider majority-owned by Wall Street’s largest banks.
Is this real or a dog-and-pony show?
No idea.
But as I have said before, here's my view on the CDS market:
It is a bucket shop nightmare. Banks control the bid process and transparency is nil. Since the trades are all over-the-counter there is no published central bid/offer/size/open interest information available to investors on an open, equal-access basis. This keeps spreads wide which the dealers love, since their primary source of income on these instruments is in fact the spread. What's worse is that instead of representing your order as a customer in the market, the dealers have an incentive to deal inside the trade, that is, as a "bucket shop" with your "trade" never actually being represented in the market at all! This sort of behavior (where you're actually trading against the house, not in the market) is illegal in the securities (and FX) markets in general - but not in the CDS marketplace.
The asymmetry of information is intentional. If open interest, bid, offer and size were to be published the bank's would be unable to maintain wide spreads on these contracts - they would contract to just a few basis points.
Asymmetric information creates systemic risk. If you don't know who holds what in terms of open interest, you have no way as a regulator to assess potential interconnectedness or whether proper margin supervision is being maintained or where concentrations of risk may reside. We now know for a fact that margin supervision has not been maintained, as AIG was asymmetrically exposed vastly beyond its capital adequacy. There is no particular reason to believe this is an isolated circumstance either; current dealers, which happen to be the humongous banks, may claim to have balanced positions (that is, no real exposure even though notional contract value outstanding is ridiculous in size) but there is no possible way to validate that claim without exposure of positions through central clearing and a central counterparty. Note that AIG said nothing about being asymmetrically exposed until it blew up - in fact, they made public statements to the contrary less than a year prior!
Asymmetric information and secrecy makes possible financial arson. The lack of insurable interest plus the ability to control information flow makes it trivial for severely-lopsided positions to be put on and maintained, leading to a perverse incentive to create self-fulfilling prophecies via intentional acts of financial sabotage. This doesn't work in the options market because the market-maker on the other side immediately hedges his position with a counterbalancing trade and when that gets expensive the price of the option goes up (a LOT!) to cover the risk, and in addition the open interest is public along with trade volume, allowing everyone to see "what's up" immediately. Evil requires secrecy!
The DOJ is right to be looking into this, but are they looking in the right places and with the right intent?
Who knows - neither the DOJ or Markit is talking, at least not at present.
I await the possibility of being pleasantly surprised by the appearance, no matter how fleeting, of a cop on the scene.
====================================================================
Ghe, zou hier iets uit voort komen
, juist nu
dat er gemanipulieerd wordt is duidelijk. enkele maanden geleden heb ik wel eens die wekelijkse Program Trading cijfers van GS hier gepost die waren soms gewoon verdriedubbeld. Afmaken maken die bank!
National Suicide: How Washington is Destroying the American Dream
Waarom denk je dat ik juist dit topic kick. Juist nu in conjunctie met het andere topic. En met wat update cijfers.quote:Op woensdag 15 juli 2009 09:14 schreef edwinh het volgende:
dat er gemanipulieerd wordt is duidelijk. enkele maanden geleden heb ik wel eens die wekelijkse Program Trading cijfers van GS hier gepost die waren soms gewoon verdriedubbeld. Afmaken maken die bank!
De big players zitten een beetje op hun retour in deze markt.... behalve eentje.
De voorgeschiedenis van Wachovia is wel eentje om mee te nemen in de vergelijking... maar het dempt ook niet uit.
Nou ja, de andere banken in de grafiek zouden in theorie altijd lager moeten uitkomen dan GS. JPM, BoA, Citigroup en HSBC hebben allemaal commerciële takken en een veel meer gediversifieerde inkomsten stroom. GS heeft trading, asset management en investment banking (grofweg). Al die andere banken hebben nog hun consumer business, etc...quote:Op woensdag 15 juli 2009 08:55 schreef Drugshond het volgende:
[ afbeelding ]
It looks wierd, everyone is playing small-ball except GS.
Beetje een verkeerde vergelijking eigenlijk. Ze zouden bij de andere banken de commerciële business eruit moeten halen en dan de vergelijking moeten maken, dan zullen er een aantal hard omhoog schieten. De investment banking kant doet nu immers weinig revenues en ook asset management gaat niet goed, dus trading is al snel een hoog percentage van de revenues buiten consumer banking.
"Winners never quit, 'cause quitters never win"
"Greedy people get rich, but pigs get slaughtered"
"Greedy people get rich, but pigs get slaughtered"
Gewoon omdat het leuk is om bijna 3 jr oude topics te kicken.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Five Banks Account For 96% Of The $250 Trillion In Outstanding US Derivative Exposure; Is Morgan Stanley Sitting On An FX Derivative Time Bomb?
The latest quarterly report from the Office Of the Currency Comptroller is out and as usual it presents in a crisp, clear and very much glaring format the fact that the top 4 banks in the US now account for a massively disproportionate amount of the derivative risk in the financial system. Specifically, of the $250 trillion in gross notional amount of derivative contracts outstanding (consisting of Interest Rate, FX, Equity Contracts, Commodity and CDS) among the Top 25 commercial banks (a number that swells to $333 trillion when looking at the Top 25 Bank Holding Companies), a mere 5 banks (and really 4) account for 95.9% of all derivative exposure (HSBC replaced Wells as the Top 5th bank, which at $3.9 trillion in derivative exposure is a distant place from #4 Goldman with $47.7 trillion). The top 4 banks: JPM with $78.1 trillion in exposure, Citi with $56 trillion, Bank of America with $53 trillion and Goldman with $48 trillion, account for 94.4% of total exposure. As historically has been the case, the bulk of consolidated exposure is in Interest Rate swaps ($204.6 trillion), followed by FX ($26.5TR), CDS ($15.2 trillion), and Equity and Commodity with $1.6 and $1.4 trillion, respectively. And that’s your definition of Too Big To Fail right there: the biggest banks are not only getting bigger, but their risk exposure is now at a new all time high and up $5.3 trillion from Q1 as they have to risk ever more in the derivatives market to generate that incremental penny of return.
-----------------------------------Ik zit nog ff cijfers te vergelijken met Q42008
Grofweg is de derivaten handel ten opzichte van 2008 Q3 met 30+ % gegroeid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Five Banks Account For 96% Of The $250 Trillion In Outstanding US Derivative Exposure; Is Morgan Stanley Sitting On An FX Derivative Time Bomb?
The latest quarterly report from the Office Of the Currency Comptroller is out and as usual it presents in a crisp, clear and very much glaring format the fact that the top 4 banks in the US now account for a massively disproportionate amount of the derivative risk in the financial system. Specifically, of the $250 trillion in gross notional amount of derivative contracts outstanding (consisting of Interest Rate, FX, Equity Contracts, Commodity and CDS) among the Top 25 commercial banks (a number that swells to $333 trillion when looking at the Top 25 Bank Holding Companies), a mere 5 banks (and really 4) account for 95.9% of all derivative exposure (HSBC replaced Wells as the Top 5th bank, which at $3.9 trillion in derivative exposure is a distant place from #4 Goldman with $47.7 trillion). The top 4 banks: JPM with $78.1 trillion in exposure, Citi with $56 trillion, Bank of America with $53 trillion and Goldman with $48 trillion, account for 94.4% of total exposure. As historically has been the case, the bulk of consolidated exposure is in Interest Rate swaps ($204.6 trillion), followed by FX ($26.5TR), CDS ($15.2 trillion), and Equity and Commodity with $1.6 and $1.4 trillion, respectively. And that’s your definition of Too Big To Fail right there: the biggest banks are not only getting bigger, but their risk exposure is now at a new all time high and up $5.3 trillion from Q1 as they have to risk ever more in the derivatives market to generate that incremental penny of return.
-----------------------------------Ik zit nog ff cijfers te vergelijken met Q42008
Grofweg is de derivaten handel ten opzichte van 2008 Q3 met 30+ % gegroeid.
Die hele transit naar Anglosaksisch boekhouden in de 90s hadden we nooit moeten doorgaan..quote:Op maandag 13 april 2009 13:44 schreef Dinosaur_Sr het volgende:
[..]
er staat terloops een heel aardige verwijzing naar de overname van Wachovia in.
Ik zal het proberen uit te leggen. Les 1 in hoe laat ik verliezen weglopen zonder ze in m'n verlies en winstrekening te laten lopen.
Wells Fargo heeft in 2008 Wachovia bank overgenomen. Op dat moment waardeert Wells Fargo alle activa en passiva van Wachovia op marktwaarde (incl. uitstaande hypotheken). Het verschil met de betaalde koopsom is goodwill (of badwill). Als nu in Q1 2009 blijkt dat de hypotheek die Wachovia aan een klant heeft verstrekt onvolwaardig is, en afgeboekt moet worden, wordt de voorziening voor oninbare hypotheken verhoogd. De tegenrekening is echter NIET de verlies- en winstrekening (zoals het geval zou zijn geweest als Wachovia zelfstandig zou rapporteren), maar de tegenrekening is 'goodwill' of 'badwill'. Purchase accounting heet dat. Verliezen op activa van acquisities worden via goodwill/badwill verwerkt, op de balans dus en niet op de P&L. En onder US GAAP doe je dat eeuwigdurend (onder IFRS is er een termin van 1 jaar). Ergo, verliezen van uitstaande kredieten verstrekt door Wachovia kosten Wells Fargo wel geld, maar zie je niet terug in de P&L.
En Wachovia is geen kleine acquisitie, maar een bankmoloch.
Happy accounting everybody
(en vergeet de verlies- en winstrekening maar)
PS: als ik tijd heb zal ik eens proberen om te laten zien hoe dit in de rapportages van Wells Fargo over Q1 2009 terugkomt, en dat houden tegen de persberichten
ww.ghalia.nl De mooiste Oosterse lampen
Ik word een beetje gestoord van die roulette economie van die banken 
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not sure about the universe." - Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955)
"A fool thinks himself to be wise, but a wise man knows himself to be a fool." - William Shakespeare (1564 - 1616)
"A fool thinks himself to be wise, but a wise man knows himself to be a fool." - William Shakespeare (1564 - 1616)
Wat is daar precies mis mee?quote:Op maandag 26 september 2011 20:19 schreef DaBuzzzzz het volgende:
Die hele transit naar Anglosaksisch boekhouden in de 90s hadden we nooit moeten doorgaan..
Waar ik vooral gestoord van wordt is dat de schade op derden wordt afgewenteld en dat overheden dit faciliteren. Niks mis met roulette mits je de schade zelf draagt, maar helaas moesten overheden banken weer zo nodig te hulp schieten toen de bancaire sector op z'n gat lag in 2008.quote:
Ik word een beetje gestoord van die roulette economie van die banken
De schade wordt altijd op derden afgewenteld, hoe kan dat ook anders? Immers als jezelf niets hebt (wat het geval is bij de banken) valt er ook niks te vergoeden, van een kale kip kan je niet plukken. De fout die de overheden gemaakt hebben is dat ze dezelfde banksters hebben laten zitten i.p.v. ze op het schavot te zetten. Nee... je kan veel beter pro actief schade zien te voorkomen, dit vanuit de filosofie dat voorkomen beter is dan genezen.quote:
Waar ik vooral gestoord van wordt is dat de schade op derden wordt afgewenteld en dat overheden dit faciliteren. Niks mis met roulette mits je de schade zelf draagt, maar helaas moesten overheden banken weer zo nodig te hulp schieten toen de bancaire sector op z'n gat lag in 2008.
"No, I do not believe in patents. I believe that patents make other people dis-incentied in coming up with new thing" - Thomas Peterffy
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