[Centraal] Irak na de oorlog - deel 37 : Irak staat op instorten

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Op donderdag 19 april 2007 16:48 schreef buachaille het volgende:

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Je moet het ook een beetje in perspectief zien. In Nederland met 16 miljoen inwoners zijn er ieder jaar 1200 gevallen van zelfmoord. Deze mensen gooien zich voor de trein, slikken teveel pillen of maken zich op een andere manier van kant.

In het Midden Oosten zullen dit soort zelfmoorden ook voorkomen maar een klein gedeelte van deze mensen zal zich aanmelden bij de Islamitische extremisten om zoveel mogelijk mensen mee te nemen in de dood.

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Op donderdag 19 april 2007 18:16 schreef Vassili_Z het volgende:
ik geloof dat de Iraake Al-Qaeda een stuk anders is dan de oorspronkelijke Al-Qaeda beweging. Al-Qaeda was ook niet te spreken over Al-Zarqawi en zijn aanslagen op mede-moslims (hetzij van een andere stroming).

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This subject is complicated and detailed. I have brought it up here so as not to address the general public on something they do not know. But please permit me to present it logically:

(A) I repeat that I see the picture from afar, and I repeat that you see what we do not see. No doubt you have the right to defend yourself, the mujahedeen, and Muslims in general and in particular against any aggression or threat of aggression.

(B) I assert here that any rational person understands with ease that the Shia cooperated with the Americans in the invasion of Afghanistan, Rafsanjani himself confessed to it, and they cooperated with them in the overthrow of Saddam and the occupation of Iraq in exchange for the Shia's assumption of power and their turning a blind eye to the American military presence in Iraq. This is clear to everybody who has two eyes.

(C) People of discernment and knowledge among Muslims know the extent of danger to Islam of the Twelve'er school of Shiism. It is a religious school based on excess and falsehood whose function is to accuse the companions of Muhammad { of heresy in a campaign against Islam, in order to free the way for a group of those who call for a dialogue in the name of the hidden mahdi who is in control of existence and infallible in what he does. Their prior history in cooperating with the enemies of Islam is consistent with their current reality of connivance with the Crusaders.

(D) The collision between any state based on the model of prophecy with the Shia is a matter that will happen sooner or later. This is the judgment of history, and these are the fruits to be expected from the rejectionist Shia sect and their opinion of the Sunnis. These are clear, well-known matters to anyone with a knowledge of history, the ideologies, and the politics of states.

(E) We must repeat what we mentioned previously, that the majority of Muslims don't comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.

Indeed, questions will circulate among mujahedeen circles and their opinion makers about the correctness of this conflict with the Shia at this time. Is it something that is unavoidable? Or, is it something can be put off until the force of the mujahed movement in Iraq gets stronger? And if some of the operations were necessary for self-defense, were all of the operations necessary? Or, were there some operations that weren't called for? And is the opening of another front now in addition to the front against the Americans and the government a wise decision? Or, does this conflict with the Shia lift the burden from the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen to the Shia, while the Americans continue to control matters from afar? And if the attacks on Shia leaders were necessary to put a stop to their plans, then why were there attacks on ordinary Shia? Won't this lead to reinforcing false ideas in their minds, even as it is incumbent on us to preach the call of Islam to them and explain and communicate to guide them to the truth? And can the mujahedeen kill all of the Shia in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill ordinary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance? And what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shia? And do the brothers forget that we have more than one hundred prisoners - many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries - in the custody of the Iranians? And even if we attack the Shia out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures? And do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?

All of these questions and others are circulating among your brothers, and they are monitoring the picture from afar, as I told you. One who monitors from afar lacks many of the important details that affect decision-making in the field.

However, monitoring from afar has the advantage of providing the total picture and observing the general line without getting submerged in the details, which might draw attention away from the direction of the target. As the English proverb says, the person who is standing among the leaves of the tree might not see the tree.

One of the most important factors of success is that you don't let your eyes lose sight of the target, and that it should stand before you always. Otherwise you deviate from the general line through a policy of reaction. And this is a lifetime's experience, and I will not conceal from you the fact that we suffered a lot through following this policy of reaction, then we suffered a lot another time because we tried to return to the original line.

One of the most important things facing the leadership is the enthusiasm of the supporters, and especially of the energetic young men who are burning to make the religion victorious. This enthusiasm must flow wisely, and al-Mutanabbi says:

Courage in a man does suffice but not like the courage of one who is wise.

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IRAQ: Thousands missing since war began
18 Apr 2007 11:23:46 GMT
Source: IRIN

BAGHDAD, 18 April 2007 (IRIN) - BAGHDAD, 18 April 2007 (IRIN) - When 53-year-old Tina Abdallah celebrated the fall of deceased former President Saddam Hussein in March 2003, she had no idea that her suffering had just begun. Four years on, the mother of two is desperate for news about her sons who have disappeared in separate incidents following the US-led invasion of 2003.

"During Saddam's time, people were being arrested and sometimes families couldn't get any information about their loved ones. But the proposed democracy hasn't changed this reality. My two sons have disappeared and I can't get any information. I don't even know if they are dead," Tina said.

"I have gone to NGOs, the Ministry of Human Rights and police departments looking for them but no one could help me. My last attempt was in the US-run prisons, but it was even harder to get to speak with someone there because of the huge number of people with the same problem as me," she added.

Because of unrelenting violence hampering all efforts to collect data, the number of people who have disappeared in Iraq since 2003 is not known. But aid workers estimate the figure to be in the tens of thousands.

"Based on studies done by local NGOs, it is probable that at least 15,000 Iraqis have disappeared in the past four years of occupation," Mukhaled al-A'ani, a spokesman for local Iraqi NGO Human Rights Association (HRA), said.

According to Diar Hassnun, a spokesman for Iraq's Ministry of Human Rights, the ministry is working to come up with an official figure for a report it is compiling.

In February 2005, the ministry set up a National Centre for Missing and Disappeared Persons (NCMDP) to help relatives find out what had happened to their loved ones. The initial focus of the centre was to help recover mass graves and identify those who had gone missing since 1978. Now, because of the sheer number of concerned relatives, it is putting more emphasis on finding people who have recently gone missing.

"When this centre was first set up, we didn't expect to receive so many claims of recently disappeared Iraqis. There are hundreds of new missing people every year and since 2006 the situation has worsened in tandem with the sectarian violence," said Hassnun, adding that more than 200,000 people disappeared under Saddam's government, many of whom are still expected to be found in mass graves across Iraq.

Families ignored by the government

But families claim that they have been ignored by the government, and are left on their own to search for their missing relatives, hoping they are being held prisoners somewhere.

"I don't want to think my son is dead," said Abu Khalid, 58, whose 35-year-old son has been missing for the past two years. "I prefer imagining that he is being held in a prison somewhere, as was common during Saddam's time. But if he's not in a prison, I need to find his body at least and stop suffering and dreaming that one day he might come back. I should be able to tell his sons that their father is dead."

HRA's al-A'ani said there are daily reports of hundreds of missing Iraqis and that NGOs are doing there best to help relatives find them.

"We are working very hard with families who are trying to get information about their missing loved ones. Unfortunately, we can't get information in every place," al-A'ani said. "But compared to the number of missing people in 2005, figures for 2006 and 2007 have increased by at least 50 percent."

"Information on less than 10 percent of those missing has been conveyed to their families. Most of the time they [missing persons] had been killed," he added.

But Tina Abdallah clings to the hope that her two sons are alive and will never forget the days on which they disappeared.

Tina said that the first incident happened in August 2004. Aziz, her 28-year-old son, went to his work in a bakery, two weeks before his marriage, and never returned home. Her second son, 25-year-old Ibraheem, never came home from classes at Baghdad's Mustansiriyah University, where he was in his final year.

"I go to the morgue every two days but nothing so far. My husband died from cardiac problems 10 years ago and since then my boys had been taking care of me. Now, I don't even have anything to eat as well as being recently displaced and suffering emotionally from the disappearance of my beloved sons," Tina said.

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Op vrijdag 20 april 2007 01:29 schreef GreyHeron het volgende:
Ongelofelijk de ISI heeft een 'islamitisch kabinet' in Irak gevormd met Abu Hamza al-Muhajir als minister van oorlog.

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'Zeven mariniers niet vervolgd om moord Haditha'
(Novum/AP) - Het Amerikaanse leger heeft zeker zeven mariniers immuniteit verleend in de zaak rond de veronderstelde moord op 24 Iraakse burgers in Haditha in november 2005. Dat blijkt uit gerechtelijke stukken waarop het persbureau AP vrijdag de hand heeft weten te leggen. De militairen kunnen worden opgeroepen als getuige, en de getuigenis die ze eventueel afleggen zal niet tegen hen worden gebruikt.
In Haditha werden op 19 november 2005 24 burgers doodgeschoten, volgens Iraakse omwonenden door Amerikaanse mariniers die wraak wilden nemen omdat een collega bij een aanslag op hun konvooi om het leven was gekomen. De doden waren leden van twee families. De mariniers meldden aanvankelijk dat vijftien burgers, onder wie vrouwen en kinderen, omkwamen bij een bomexplosie en een vuurgevecht met opstandelingen.

Nog zeven mariniers zijn verdachte in de zaak. Hun proces zal waarschijnlijk in de komende weken van start gaan.

Op basis van verslagen van overlevenden en mensenrechtengroepen berichtte het tijdschrift Time in maart 2006 echter dat de Amerikanen het bloedbad bewust hebben aangericht. Pas daarna werd een strafrechtelijk onderzoek gestart. Het Amerikaanse Congreslid John Murtha, zelf ex-marinier, zei vervolgens in mei dat hij van bronnen uit het korps mariniers te horen had gekregen dat de militairen inderdaad onschuldige burgers in koelen bloede hebben omgebracht.

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Soennieten verbolgen over bouw muur in Bagdad
Uitgegeven: 21 april 2007 16:45

BAGDAD - Een belangrijke soennitische Iraakse politicus heeft zaterdag scherpe kritiek geuit op de bouw van een betonnen muur rond een soennitische enclave in Bagdad. Het Amerikaanse leger wil met de 5 kilometer lange muur de wijk Adhamiya, dat vrijwel helemaal omsloten wordt door sjiieten, veiliger maken.

Maar volgens Adnan al-Dulaime, de voorman van het grootste soennitische blok in het Iraakse parlement, leidt de muur alleen maar tot meer strijd. Inwoners van de wijk vrezen dat Adhamiya in een soort gevangenis verandert, meldde de Britse omroep BBC.

Niemand zou van tevoren op de hoogte zijn gesteld. De bouw van de muur rond Adhamiya, een kleine enclave aan de oostkant van de rivier de Tigris, begon anderhalve week geleden.

Volgens het Amerikaanse leger gaat het om een nieuwe strategie om de cyclus van geweld in de Iraakse hoofdstad te doorbreken. De Amerikanen ontkennen dat er plannen zijn om de hele stad in dergelijke stukken op te delen.

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Op zaterdag 21 april 2007 18:49 schreef Vassili_Z het volgende:
Het doel van Al-Qaeda in Irak is erg vaag nu naar mijn mening. Willen ze de jihad steunen door verzet te bieden aan Westerse machten binnen Irak, of willen ze de soennitische stroming beschermen zoniet uitbreiden?

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We must think for a long time about our next steps and how we want to attain it, and it is my humble opinion that the Jihad in Iraq requires several incremental goals:

The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq.

The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas, is in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before un-Islamic forces attempt to fill this void, whether those whom the Americans will leave behind them, or those among the un-Islamic forces who will try to jump at taking power.

There is no doubt that this amirate will enter into a fierce struggle with the foreign infidel forces, and those supporting them among the local forces, to put it in a state of constant preoccupation with defending itself, to make it impossible for it to establish a stable state which could proclaim a caliphate, and to keep the Jihadist groups in a constant state of war, until these forces find a chance to annihilate them.

The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.

The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

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Op zaterdag 21 april 2007 21:03 schreef GreyHeron het volgende:

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Wat Al-Zawahiri aan Zarqawi schreef in 2005 over Irak zal nog wel het zelfde zijn. Zoveel anders is er niet gebeurt met de organisatie waarbij ze de strategie moeten hebben omgooien, behalve dat ze meer aandacht besteden aan Sjiieten en Iraakse veiligheidstroepn en in en om Bagdad niet meer zo veel kunnen doen als wat ze de maanden hier voor hebben gedaan en nu naar bijvoorbeeld Anbar zijn gegaan.

Ze willen in ieder geval meer verzet bieden dan steun aan de Sunni bevolking (volgens hun is dat gewoon het zelfde omdat volgens Al Qai'dath allen Sunni het slachtoffer zijn van de Amerikaanse invasie)
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Twee weken geleden heeft Al-Qaida een boodschap naar buiten gebracht door Abu Sulayman Al 'Utaybi als reactie op een aantal audio en video- boodschappen van Emirs van verschillende Iraakse Jihad fracties. Ze hebben een boodschap naar buiten gebracht ''We we Fight?'' Ik heb het nog niet gezien maar misscien dat daar nog wat in gezegt wordt over hoe en wat.

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Op zondag 22 april 2007 15:56 schreef Vassili_Z het volgende:

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Hmm interessant. Ik vraag me alleen nog af hoe de Iraakse Al-Queada de sjieten ziet, en hoezeer ze afhankelijk zijn van de 'goodwill' van de bevolking.

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Op dinsdag 24 april 2007 09:53 schreef IRAKEES-NL het volgende:

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Laat ik het zo zeggen: Al-Qaeda ziet de sjiieten liever dood dan levend.
Maar als ik het goed begrepen heb wil Al-Qaeda alleen van de soennietische gebieden een Taliban-staat maken. Als de soennieten dat willen dan moeten ze dat vooral doen maar niet voordat Irak in 3'en is gesplitst.

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Op dinsdag 24 april 2007 11:35 schreef Vassili_Z het volgende:

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Dat is ziek. Dat zal denk ik nooit gebeuren dankzij de sjiieten die er hoe dan ook de dienst gaan uitmaken, mede dankzij Iran. Wat denk jij?