Oorlog in Oekra�ne #924

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 19:44 schreef Ulx het volgende:
Maar jij denkt dat Zaluzhnyi op wilde geven?

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 11:09 schreef oheng het volgende:
De olieraffinaderij in Kremenchuk, Oekra�ne is gisteren ook geraakt.

Er is ook een drone neergehaald in de olieraffinaderij in Yaroslav, rusland.

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 15:03 schreef -XOR- het volgende:

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China heeft natuurlijk wel een pensioenstelsel

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 19:56 schreef Ulx het volgende:
En nee, hij heeft de situatie geen patstelling genoemd

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 15:03 schreef -XOR- het volgende:

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China heeft natuurlijk wel een pensioenstelsel, en daar valt verder ook wel een (Russische snit) mouw aan te passen (forse overlijdensuitkering voor een soldaat die tijdens de oorlog sneuvelt).

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 15:01 schreef bleiblei het volgende:

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Zal hierdoor wel afgefakkeld worden hier, maar....

Tja, al die hoge militairen die van het dak schreeuwen dat we aangevallen gaan worden is ergens ook wel een typisch gevalletje van prediken voor eigen portemonnee. Zou ik ook doen in hun gevallen. Dit is het moment om je leger weer een beetje volwassen te krijgen na decennia te zijn afgeknepen. Vraag blijft hoe realistisch het is dat Rusland voorbij de Baltische landen gaat oorlog voeren.

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De totale graanproductie in de Europese Unie (EU) zal in het seizoen 2023/2024 5 procent hoger liggen dan vorig seizoen.
Marktanalisten van de EU hebben hiermee hun verwachting van een stijging met 8,4 procent naar beneden bijgesteld. Oorzaak is het droge voorjaar.21 Jul 2023

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Welk land produceert het meeste graan?
Het ministerie maakt aan de hand van cijfers van 2018 inzichtelijk wat Oekra�ne produceert aan voeding. In totaal produceerde Oekra�ne in dat jaar bijna 170 miljoen ton aan voedingsmiddelen en grondstoffen. Hiervan produceert het land veruit het meeste graan en peulvruchten (69,6 miljoen ton).3 Mar 2022

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ISW: Russia sets conditions to destabilize Moldova
The Kremlin prepares to destabilize Moldova, likely as a part of the efforts to hinder its EU integration, among other objectives, the U.S.-based think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) wrote in its Jan. 28 assessment.

Tensions between Moldova and Russia escalated following Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the pro-Western government of Moldova repeatedly accusing the Kremlin of destabilization attempts.

Alexei Polishchuk, the director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Countries at the Russian Foreign Ministry, claimed in an interview on Jan. 28 for the Russian state-run media outlet TASS that Moldova began to "destroy its ties" with the Russian-led CIS organization, as the rumors about Moldova leaving the CIS by the end of 2024 are circulating.

The CIS was established following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, and it currently groups nine former Soviet republics. Moldova has not formally left the CIS but effectively suspended its participation in the organization in 2022.

Polishchuk alleged that leaving the CIS would not benefit citizens or the Moldovan economy. He also mentioned that the settlement of the Transnistria issue in Moldova is in a "deep crisis," and Russia could fix deteriorating relations between Moldova and Transnistria as a "mediator and guarantor" in this issue.

Transnistria is a breakaway region internationally recognized as part of Moldova. Russian troops have occupied Transnistria since the early 1990s when Russia invaded the region under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians.

Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Serebrian announced on national radio on Jan. 28 that Moldova would not return to the 5+2 Transnistria negotiating process that included Russia as the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues.

Speaking at a press conference on Jan. 29, Serebrian said Chisinau is determined to resolve the Transnistria issue "exclusively" through peaceful means.

"This position is supported by our colleagues in Kyiv. There are no plans for military or other kind of pressure on Transnistria," the official said.

According to the ISW, Russia could make similar claims to Moldova as to Ukraine, referring to Russia’s accusations of Ukraine’s "abandoning" the Minsk Agreements, used as part of justifications for the full-scale invasion.

In a previous assessment, the ISW determined that Russia is slowly shaping the information space aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future campaigns by framing Russia as a protector of "threatened Russian language speakers" in Moldova.

This approach is almost identical to the narratives constructed by Russia to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In January, Russian-state media continued to embolden pro-Russian separatists in Moldova, possibly in an attempt to sow political instability and division, the ISW reported.

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NATO Far Right's Plot for Ukraine Land 'Exactly What Putin Wants'
wo far-right parties in NATO nations have laid claim to swaths of Ukraine, expressing their desire to seize portions of the country and perhaps exploiting a hypothetical victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his forces fighting there.

Over the past week, leaders of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and the Hungarian Our Homeland Movement have both raised the possibility of annexing parts of western Ukraine, citing territorial claims dating back hundreds of years. The claims come as the Ukraine-Russia conflict nears its two-year anniversary.

Newsweek has contacted the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry by email to request comment on both parties' claims.

Claudiu T�rziu, one of the leaders of the AUR, said in a speech last week: "We will not be truly sovereign until after we restore the Romanian state within its natural borders." He said these would include the western Ukrainian regions of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. The Hungarian regions are home to significant Romanian and Hungarian minorities.

"Bessarabia must come home," T�rziu said. "Northern Bukovina cannot be forgotten, southern Bessarabia, the land of Hertsa, Transcarpathia, everything that was and is of the Romanian nation must return to the borders of the state." T�rziu added: "Our goal is for Romania to be one of the leading countries in the world."

L�szl� Toroczkai, leader of the Our Homeland Movement, likewise set his sights on Transcarpathia, which comprises Ukraine's westernmost Zakarpattia oblast.

"Regarding the war in Ukraine, our message is very simple: immediate ceasefire, peace and a resolution through talks," Toroczkai said in a video posted on his party's website.

"If this war ends up with Ukraine losing its statehood, because this is also on the cards, then, as the only Hungarian party taking this position, let me signal that we lay claim to Transcarpathia."

Such territorial claims are not new, particularly among the nationalist far-right in both countries. However, such sentiment extends into the mainstream, too. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb�n, for example, angered both Romania and Ukraine in November 2022 by wearing a soccer scarf bearing a map of an expanded Hungary.

Oleksandr Merezhko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and the chair of the body's foreign affairs committee, told Newsweek the simultaneous territorial claims are a concern for Ukraine because of the timing.

"Russia is trying to start an offensive," Merezhko said. "This is exactly what Putin wants. I don't rule out that these statements might be somehow coordinated. At the same time, I don't see—as of now—strong reaction to these unacceptable statements from the authorities in Hungary and Romania."

"Such statements are dangerous especially now," Merezhko added. "They undermine trust."

The Kremlin routinely seeks to weaponize European far-right and far-left parties in its efforts to destabilize Western capitals. George Simion, a co-leader of the AUR, has previously been accused by Ukrainian intelligence of past ties with the Russian security services.

Both the AUR and Our Homeland Movement have traditionally espoused pro-Russia views. The latter has described Ukraine as an unfriendly country and urged Kyiv to give up the land occupied by Moscow's forces in exchange for peace. The AUR has pushed back against Romanian military support for Ukraine, asserting that the war is "not ours."

Tense Ukrainian-Hungarian relations pre-date Moscow's full-scale invasion, undermined by a long-running dispute over the rights of the Hungarian minority living in western Ukraine.

The enmity has deepened since Russia's attack on February 2022 due to Orb�n's "spoiler" role within the European Union and NATO. The right-wing populist leader has repeatedly sought to block or water down EU sanctions and is still standing in the way of NATO enlargement to include Sweden.

Bucharest has been a key partner for Kyiv since February 2022, providing a wide range of weapons and supplies to Ukraine's defenders and serving as a vital conduit for Western aid and Ukrainian exports.

This pro-Ukraine stance may be challenged later this year and next via presidential and parliamentary elections. The AUR is polling second behind the Social Democratic Party, which, with the support of the center-right National Liberal Party, leads the ruling coalition under Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu.

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 18:41 schreef trein2000 het volgende:

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Bijzonder

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 19:00 schreef Delenlill het volgende:

Update from Ukraine | Ruzzia forced to run from Tabaivka right after taking it. Z-Army Fails Again

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Russian soldiers bring their weapons home from front line and open fire on people
The Russian soldiers are taking away weapons from the combat zone; dozens of servicemen have already been put on trial for mishandling guns.

Source: Vyorstka, Russian Telegram channel

Details: Since the beginning of the full-scale war in February 2022, at least 42 servicemen in Russia have appeared in court for the appropriation, storage, transportation and carrying of weapons, ammunition and explosive devices (Articles 222 and 222.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). Vyorstka has discovered this by studying the bases of all Russian garrison military courts.

Judging by the published verdicts, the Russian soldiers bring the firearms found at the front back home or keep unused cartridges and grenades for themselves. They carry them to military units, hiding them in armoured vests, backpacks and sleeping bags, then bring them to a secret place, and when going home on vacation, they take these weapons with them.

At least 18 servicemen who had come home from the war have already been convicted. Two dozen more are awaiting a court decision.

One soldier was sent to prison for 2.5 years. During the inspection at the checkpoint of the Crimean bridge, which he used to come home, 4 hand grenades, 5 bullets and a smoke grenade were found in his backpack. The soldier told investigators that he was carrying explosive devices "for personal safety."

The rest of the servicemen have been fined for several tens of thousands of roubles and received suspended terms. Sometimes weapons were found during inspections at checkpoints, Road Patrol Service posts and train stations.

For example, when searching a soldier from Kursk, who was coming home through Crimea, an employee of the State Road Safety Inspectorate found a Val rifle, a Makarov pistol and 300 rounds of ammunition in his backpack.

In Samara Oblast, employees of the Road Patrol Service found a Makarov pistol and two loaded magazines in the car of a soldier from Chelyabinsk, in which he was coming home from the war.

At a train station in Voronezh Oblast, an F-1 hand grenade was seized from a soldier after he had his backpack scanned with an X-ray. Later, he told investigators that he wanted to use the grenade for fishing.

Those who manage to bring weapons home keep them in their apartments and cottage houses.

In Reutov (Moscow Oblast), two friends who came home from the war gave loaded magazines from a Kalashnikov assault rifle and a Dragunov rifle to the owner of the apartment they rented. She took the ammunition, and a few days after that, she called the police.

In Bryansk, another soldier took a fragmentation grenade from the front, brought it to the service apartment and put it on a shelf in the corridor. On the same day, he had a fight with his wife. The policemen, who arrived at the scene, saw the grenade and called the bomb disposal experts.

One of the convicts got drunk and started firing his pistol in a public place. He found a Makarov pistol with cartridges and an RGD-5 grenade under the seat of a combat vehicle that returned to the unit after the battle. He kept the find in the ground, and three weeks after that, he dug up a gun, took it with him for a walk and started shooting into the air near a grocery store. The court assigned him compulsory works.

Several servicemen who took combat ammunition from the front managed to avoid criminal liability: their cases were closed. They convinced the court that they came to their senses and made amends by giving public lectures in their military units about responsibility for illegal possession of weapons and by donating 5 to 10 thousand roubles to help children.
In August 2022, in Smolensk Oblast, four armed men, one of them being a contracted soldier, attacked Ukrainian refugees at a temporary accommodation point. The same month, in Rostov-on-Don, a military officer shot a taxi driver from a Makarov pistol as the two argued about politics.

In December in Petrozavodsk, another soldier killed his wife with a handgun, Vyorstka emphasised.

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 19:56 schreef Ulx het volgende:

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Zaluzhnyi en Zelenskyy hebben de normale mot die altijd speelt tussen politiek en leger. Niets bijzonders.

En nee, hij heeft de situatie geen patstelling genoemd, hij heeft gezegd dat net als in WO1 de militaire techniek beide kanten in evenwicht houdt, en dat ze daarom zwaarder spul als F16's en raketten nodig hebben. En Zaluzhnyi heeft verder aangegeven dat hij de bereidheid tot collectief doodgeschoten en opgeblazen worden van de Russische soldaten verkeerd heeft ingeschat. Net als vrijwel de complete rest van de wereld dacht hij ook dat Rusland wel zou kappen na het verlies van 150.000 soldaten. Blijkbaar niet, dus dan moeten we maar kijken wat de Russen gaan doen na 300 of 500.000 dode soldaten. So be it.

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“Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he says. The general concludes that it would take a massive technological leap to break the deadlock. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 20:41 schreef Delenlill het volgende:
https://www.newsweek.com/(...)ania-hungary-1864729
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Kyiv Raises Stakes by Expanding Appeals to Ukrainian ‘Wedges’ Inside Russia

Executive Summary:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ordered Kyiv to devote more attention to Ukrainian “wedges” within the Russian Federation.
• Zelenskyy’s pronouncement has set off alarm bells in official Moscow, which is already worried about what such attention and contacts may mean to its control over critical parts of the country.
• Moscow will likely increase repression against Ukrainians and other minorities inside Russia, moves that may prove counterproductive not only for Russia itself but for the outcome of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine as well.

For more than a decade, Moscow has claimed that a significant portion of the people who live within Ukraine are ethnic Russians and that the Russian government is within its rights to intervene on their behalf. Many around the world have accepted these claims without close examination. Few have paid attention to the reality that there have been and remain many large ethnic Ukrainian population centers in Russian territories. These communities can be found not only in regions neighboring Ukraine but also as far as the Pacific coast. (For background on the Ukrainian “wedges,” numbering more than three million people, see Window on Eurasia, June 9, 2016; EDM, January 18, 2023; and the sources cited therein.) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently elevated the significance of these “wedges” against the backdrop of Russia’s war. On January 22, he issued a decree directing the Ukrainian government and the international community to focus more attention on the plight of these Ukrainian communities under repressive Russian rule and thereby make them allies in Kyiv’s fight against Moscow’s invasion (President.gov.ua, January 22).

Today, more than a dozen centers of Ukrainian life exist within the Russian Federation. Most were formed at the end of tsarist times or during Stalin’s deportations in the 1940s. Ukrainians call them “wedges,” with the three most important being the “crimson” wedge of regions immediately adjoining Ukraine, the “blue” (or “yellow”) wedge along the Russian-Kazakhstan border separating Bashkortostan and the peoples of Idel-Ural from Central Asia, and the “green” wedge between Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and Khabarovsk in the Russian Far East. Zelenskyy focused on the crimson wedge in his decree, which has already been the focus of attacks by Ukrainian forces. Kyiv’s attention to this particular community has outraged Russians who view these territories as theirs from time immemorial. It has also frustrated other nationalities, such as the Circassians, who were there before the Russian imperial advance. This may prove to be a problem for Ukraine in its efforts to reach out to the peoples of the North Caucasus (Apn.ru, September 30, 2022; see EDM, January 24, 2023; Kavkazr.com, January 22).

The other two wedges located much further away from Ukraine could ultimately prove to be the most explosive. The blue wedge along the Russian-Kazakhstan border has been growing in importance because Russians view that strip of land as a wall between the peoples of Idel-Ural, including the Tatars and Bashkirs, which they see as critical to holding the Muscovite empire together (Vpoanalytics.com, May 23, 2022). Bashkir activists believe that recovering what they call the “Orenburg Corridor” will make this historically Ukrainian territory a bridge to independence from Russia (Window on Eurasia, February 7, 2023). These activists have been gaining support for their aspirations both in Ukraine and Kazakhstan (Webkamerton.ru, November 16, 2021).

The “green” wedge in the Far East was once the largest Ukrainian population center within what is now the Russian Federation. Ethnic Ukrainians who arrived in the last decades of tsarist times formed a majority of the population there in the 1920s. This community remains the focus of Moscow’s greatest concerns. In 2023, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council, said many residents of the region, despite speaking Russian and identifying as Russians in the census, are, in fact, Ukrainians in spirit. As such, they are a serious threat to Moscow’s control (see EDM, June 8, 2023; Aif.ru, January 11). Such Muscovite fears have only intensified in recent months, given the raft of attacks on Russian infrastructure and increased criticism of Kremlin policies enacted against the people of the region who are presented as agents of the Ukrainian security services (Stoletie.ru, January 19).

Moscow has tried to assimilate the ethnic Ukrainians within Russia by suppressing Ukrainian institutions and preventing the outside world from learning much about these communities, both in Soviet times and more recently. The Ukrainians in Ukraine, nevertheless, have a long history of interest in connecting with their co-ethnics inside Russia. That interest has grown over the years as efforts by activists and parliamentarians after Ukraine’s independence in 1991 to do more to support these communities did not gain much traction until Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Anschluss of Ukraine’s Crimea and his invasion of Donbas in 2014. At that time, those efforts were expanded, with many in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) expecting the Ukrainian government to reach out to the wedges and make them its allies (Topwar.ru, June 11, 2014; Window on Eurasia, June 9, 2016, August 26, 2018). Kyiv did relatively little, however. Its attention to the wedges has been overshadowed by its appeals to and support for other non-Russians inside Russia until now (President.gov.ua, September 29, 2022; see EDM, October 13, 2022; Svoboda; Abn.org.ua, August 24, 2023).

Some Ukrainians are hopeful that Zelenskyy’s recent pronouncement will finally lead to concerted government efforts to connect with these communities, though many remain pessimistic. One skeptic, Yuri Kononenko, who founded the Library of Ukrainian Literature in Moscow (since closed) and oversees an archive on Ukrainian diaspora communities in Kyiv, says that the Ukrainian government lacks “a systematic policy on this issue,” and so its achievements in this area have been “pathetic.” Kononenko suggests that Zelenskyy’s decree has more to do with mobilizing Ukrainians within Ukraine and the diaspora communities in countries other than Russia than with any outreach to the wedges within Russia (Novaya Gazeta Europe, January 23). He does see two positive consequences of the Ukrainian president’s new stance. On the one hand, it represents “a symmetrical answer” to Putin’s oft-repeated claims that he is engaged in “’the reunification’” of Russia’s historical territories. On the other hand, Zelenskyy’s decree will likely increase attention to and research on an essential component of Ukrainian life that has often been ignored.

Many Russian commentators have concluded the opposite of Ukrainian skeptics’ view and are already demanding that Moscow respond forcefully (Vz.ru, January 22; Ukraina.ru, January 24). In the coming days, such demands are likely to become more frequent. The Kremlin will presumably launch a propaganda barrage and impose even more repressions against Ukrainians inside Russia as well as against any other non-Russians seeking Kyiv’s support. Both these moves could prove counterproductive, attracting more attention to the Ukrainian wedges and to the duplicity of Moscow’s claims about ethnic Russians in Ukraine. This, in turn, could prompt ethnic Ukrainians and other non-Russians to become increasingly alienated from and at odds with Moscow. If that happens, Kyiv’s expanded attention to the wedges could give Ukraine some powerful new allies in its fight against Putin’s aggression.

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 20:55 schreef BlaZ het volgende:

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Niet meer dan normaal, na de tweede wereldoorlog wilde Nederland zelfs een uitbreiding met gebieden die voorheen Nederlandstalig waren.

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BBB oppert Oekra�ners terug te sturen naar veilige delen land
6 min geledenin BINNENLAND

DEN HAAG - BBB vindt dat er serieus moet worden nagedacht over het terugsturen van Oekra�ense vluchtelingen naar veilige delen van het land. „
We kunnen hier niet iedereen huisvesten”, zei BBB-Kamerlid Mona Keijzer in een Kamerdebat over asiel en migratie. Oekra�ne is al bijna twee jaar in oorlog met Rusland.

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Volgens het Kamerlid zijn 650.000 Oekra�ense dienstplichtigen hun thuisland ontvlucht en verblijven nu in diverse Europese landen waaronder Nederland.

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Keijzer vindt dat ook Oekra�ners huur moeten gaan betalen.

Ze noemt het „onderhand volstrekt onuitlegbaar” dat vluchtelingen geen huur en zorgkosten hoeven te betalen, maar minima wel.

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Kamerlid Julian Bushoff van GroenLinks-PvdA noemde het idee van BBB ,,nieuw en zorgelijk.

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 20:55 schreef BlaZ het volgende:

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Niet meer dan normaal, na de tweede wereldoorlog wilde Nederland zelfs een uitbreiding met gebieden die voorheen Nederlandstalig waren.

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Op maandag 29 januari 2024 20:55 schreef BlaZ het volgende:

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Niet meer dan normaal, na de tweede wereldoorlog wilde Nederland zelfs een uitbreiding met gebieden die voorheen Nederlandstalig waren.

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Kazakhstan faces new wave of provocative statements from Russia
Officials in Moscow have tried to play down the importance of the remarks by prominent public figures.

When is the name of a railway station more than just a name?

Tina Kandelaki, a well-known Russian TV presenter and the deputy general director of Russian government-controlled media holding Gazprom-Media, has views on the matter.

Earlier this month, she took to her Telegram account to upbraid Kazakhstan for having the temerity to give a number of train stations more Kazakh — and, accordingly, less Russian — names.

This is a certain first step to the exclusion of ethnic Russians from public life in Kazakhstan, she argued, citing what she described as a “dangerous” precedent set by the former Soviet Baltic republics.

“There too everything started small, and then it really snowballed. Russian schools were shut down, Soviet monuments were removed, the Russian language was banned and, finally, pensioners were kicked out into the cold,” she wrote in a January 16 post teeming with falsehoods.

The remarks generated much indignation in Kazakhstan, not to speak of some mockery. Businesswoman and activist Togjan Qojaly expressed bemusement at the name-changes Kandelaki found so troublesome. Some of the old names were just numbers, so “Railway siding No. 13” becomes “Akshi railway siding,” “Railway station 26” becomes “Zhetitobe railway station,” and so on. In almost all other cases, Kazakh names are substituted with other equally Kazakh names or the transliteration is changed.

“What other than 'Opornaya' [Note: one of the old station names] belongs to the Russian language? The numbers 13, 460, 10?” Qojaly asked in a Facebook post.

Undaunted by the criticism, Kandelaki doubled down. In a follow-up post, she reminded her readers that the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization had, as she put, helped Kazakhstan restore stability after the violent political unrest of January 2022. This is a characterization of events that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has flatly rejected. For Kazakhstan to be doing anything to somehow disrespect Russia and its culture and language is ingratitude, Kandelaki suggested.

This is not first flare-up of this kind. Kazakhstan has earned the ire of Russian ultra-nationalists for failing to be sufficiently loyal. Astana has studiously avoided registering any support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while also similarly refraining from criticizing it. At the same time, it has been eager to be seen as complying with Western economic sanctions against Moscow for fear of also getting caught up in the same punitive policy.

Kandelaki’s status as an important executive at the owner of one of the Russian state’s most fierce propaganda outlets — one which can be viewed in Kazakhstan, incidentally —makes her remarks difficult to ignore entirely.

And so the Foreign Ministry in Astana reacted. On January 22, ministry representative Aibek Smadiyarov announced Kandelaki had been included in a list of people barred from entry to Kazakhstan.

“If you don’t like someone, you do not let them into your home. We will do the same,” said Smadiyarov.

That same day, however, NTV, a station owned by Kandelaki’s Gazprom-Media, broadcast yet more content aimed at ruffling Kazakh feathers.

Speaking on a political talk show, a historian called Mikhail Smolin, known for his pro-Russian imperialism views, shared the opinion that before the Russian Revolution, there were no such peoples as Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Azerbaijanis.

That forced Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova to do some damage limitation. In an official statement, she spoke of the importance of Russia’s strategic relations with the “sovereign, independent states” of Central Asia.

“[Smolin’s] odious statements are purely subjective in nature, and have nothing to do with … reality … and they remain entirely on the conscience of their author,” Zakharova said.

Sergei Yershov, a member of Kazakhstan’s upper house of parliament, on January 25 described this recent string of remarks by public Russian figures as an attempt to sow instability in the region.

“[The aim] is again to throw things into the mix: ‘This one is bad, this one is bad, but we are good,’” he said.