[vierde ronde] Het dodetopicspel #895 Ja

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Op dinsdag 16 januari 2018 23:26 schreef Dr.Mikey het volgende:
RamBam bij studenten verenigingen.

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Op dinsdag 16 januari 2018 23:32 schreef hemarookworst het volgende:

[..]

niks aan, niks schokkends aan

zware ontgroeningen bij het corps oh wow wat schokkend, al eeuwen bekend

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Op dinsdag 16 januari 2018 23:33 schreef hemarookworst het volgende:

[..]

ik wil het niet goed praten, maar het is iets wat al lang bekend is

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Op dinsdag 16 januari 2018 23:50 schreef hemarookworst het volgende:
The Advocacy Coalition Framework is one of the most influential approaches to public
policy to emerge from the 1990s. It is highly cited and its approach has been used in over
80 studies of public policy, primarily in the US but also in a wide range of developed
countries. It is one of a small number of prominent approaches developed in the US
after Heclo’s (1978: 94–7) famous identification of a departure from the simple “clubby
days of Washington politics” toward “complex relationships” among a huge, politically
active population. Issues which were once “quietly managed by a small group of insiders”
have now become “controversial and politicized” (Heclo 1978: 105). Its key aim is to
make sense of such complex policy-making systems which:
• contain multiple actors and levels of government;
• process policy in very different ways, from intensely politicized disputes containing
many actors in some areas, to issues that are treated as technical or specialist
and processed routinely, largely by policy specialists, out of the public spotlight;
• produce decisions based on limited information and often high levels of uncertainty
and ambiguity; and
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• take considerable time (perhaps “a decade or more”) to turn decisions into
outcomes.
The ACF is distinctive in a number of ways. First, it is relatively ambitious, seeking
to produce what we might consider to be the closest thing to a general theory of
policy-making. Second, it has been subject to an unusually high number of revisions
in the light of experience and a desire to extend its insights beyond the US. Third, the
framework is largely predicated on the idea that people engage in politics to translate
their beliefs, rather than their simple material interests, into action. Consequently, at its
heart is a system in which coalitions of actors with different belief systems interact and
compete to dominate policy subsystems. Fourth, the description of subsystems appears
to be different from most conceptualizations of policy communities or networks,
which often describe the great potential for insulated relationships between groups
and government (Cairney 2012: 203). Rather, a wide range of actors are involved within
each coalition. Fifth, it represents not only an approach to the study of contemporary
public policy but also a set of ideas about how we should conduct scientific inquiry. For
example, its rejection of the use of cycles and stages to explain policy-making is based
as much on scientific criteria as conceptual or empirical concerns. Consequently, its
proponents—and Paul Sabatier in particular—have influenced the discussion of public
policy as a discipline and a branch of science.
A Summary of the ACF
An advocacy coalition contains “people from a variety of positions (elected and agency
officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system—i.e.
a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions—and who show
a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier 1988: 139). The ACF
focuses on the interaction between competing advocacy coalitions within a policy
subsystem which, in turn, operates within a wider political system and external environment.
Its description of subsystems paints a picture of a relatively open, multi-level
policy-making system:
Our conception of policy subsystems should be broadened from traditional notions
of iron triangles limited to administrative agencies, legislative committees, and
interest groups at a single level of government to include actors at various levels
of government, as well as journalists, researchers and policy analysts who play
important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas.
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993a: 179)
This picture results partly from a focus on the role of ideas in policy-making—actors
may be influential because they articulate important ideas, not simply because they
can exercise power. It focuses in particular on the importance of belief systems: many
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actors may be influential because they share a set of beliefs with a large number of others;
translating those beliefs into policy decisions and outcomes is a common project.
Beliefs are the “glue” that keeps a large number of actors together. There are three
main types:
• Deep Core Beliefs. These regard an actor’s “underlying personal philosophy,”
often expressed as a point on the left/right-wing continuum (Sabatier 1993: 30).
Examples include: beliefs on whether people are evil or socially redeemable; how
we should rank values such as freedom and security; and whose welfare should
count the most (Sabatier, 1998: 103).
• Policy Core Beliefs. These regard “fundamental policy positions.” Examples
include: the proper balance between government and market and the proper distribution
of power across levels of government (Sabatier 1993: 31; 1998: 110).
• Secondary Aspects. These relate to the funding, delivery, and implementation of
policy goals (1993: 31).
Core beliefs span most policy areas and are the least susceptible to change in light of
empirical evidence (“akin to a religious conversion”—Sabatier 1993: 31, 36). They are
too broad to guide policy-specific behavior. Instead, policy core beliefs are employed
within particular subsystems. Although policy core beliefs are more susceptible to
change, they are generally stable within the period of study (over the period of one policy
cycle of a “decade or so”—Sabatier and Weible 2007: 193). Any “enlightenment function”
may take place over decades because beliefs are “primarily normative—and thus
largely beyond direct empirical challenge” (Sabatier 1993: 44). In most cases, change
refers to “secondary aspects,” when beliefs on the routine delivery of specific policies
are refined according to new information (1993: 31, 221).
Coalitions interact within policy subsystems, defined simply as a broader “set of
actors who are involved in dealing with a policy problem” (Sabatier 1988: 138). It includes
varying number of coalitions (usually from one to four), policy “brokers,” whose role
is to minimize conflict and produce workable compromises between coalitions, and
a “sovereign” or “government authority” to make policy decisions and oversee the
policy-making infrastructure. Although there is generally more than one coalition, it
is not unusual for one coalition to dominate the subsystem for long periods or for a
negotiated settlement to favor the beliefs of one coalition. Further, although brokers
and sovereigns are separated analytically, it is often difficult to know where coalitions
end and policy-makers begin, since governmental organizations may often appear to
hold, and act on, beliefs consistent with those of a particular advocacy coalition.
Policy subsystems exist within a wider system (Figure 33.1) that sets the parameters
for action and provides each coalition with different constraints and opportunities. It
includes:
• factors that are “relatively stable” over the time period generally studied (a “decade
or more”), such as “social values” and the broad “constitutional structure”;
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• the “long term coalition opportunity structures” related to the nature of political
systems—e.g. are there multiple, open venues or a small number of centralized
processes? Do governments control majorities or need to cooperate with other
parties?; and,
• “external (system) events,” such as socioeconomic change, a change in government,
or the impact from decisions made in other subsystems.
Although the ACF is built on a critique of the “stages heuristic” (to be discussed
shortly), it still focuses on change over a “decade or more” to allow (albeit notionally)
for a full policy cycle. Coalitions interact, a decision is made, institutions are set up or
modified, the impacts of policy outputs are evaluated, and the information is interpreted
differently by each coalition learning from previous decisions and adapting
their strategies (in line with that new information and external events) during the
next cycle.
There are two main sources and types of change in this framework (if we exclude
major changes to coalitions following an “enlightenment function” that may take
decades to occur). The first is relatively minor policy change that takes place within
subsystems: coalitions engage in policy learning, adapting the secondary aspects of
their belief systems in light of new information. Learning has a particular meaning
POLICY SUBSYSTEM
Coalition A
a. Policy belief
b. Resources
a. Policy belief
b. Resources
Policy Coalition B
brokers
Strategy
regarding guidance
instruments
Strategy
regarding guidance
instruments
Decisions by
governmental authorities
Institutional rules, resource
allocations, and appointments
SHORT-TERM
CONSTRAINTS AND
RESOURCES OF
SUBSYSTEM ACTORS
2007 Advocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram
LONG-TERM COALITION
OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURES
1. Overlapping societal
cleavages
2. Degree of consensus
needed for major
policy change
RELATIVELY STABLE
PARAMETERS
1. Basic attributes of the
problem area (good)
2. Basic distribution of
natural resources 3. Fundamental
sociocultural values and
social structure 4. Basic constitutional
structure (rules)
EXTERNAL (SYSTEM)
EVENTS
1. Change in socio
economic conditions
2. Change in public
opinion
3. Changes in systemic
governing coalition
4. Policy decisions and
impacts from other sub
systems
Policy impacts
Policy outputs
Fig. 33.1 The ACF Flow Diagram (2007 version)
Source: Weible et al. 2009: 123
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in the ACF (compare with other forms of learning described by Bennett and Howlett
1992). It takes place through the lens of deeply held policy beliefs; coalitions learn
on their own terms—selecting the information they hold to be most relevant and
acceding only to change which does not undermine the coalition’s main source of
cooperation.
Coalitions also engage in a form of learning to adapt to the beliefs of another coalition,
particularly when its views become “too important to ignore” (Jenkins-Smith
and Sabatier 1993b: 43). However, they do not simply accept the arguments of other
coalitions and adopt their preferred policies. Learning is a political process and “not
a disinterested search for ‘truth’” (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993b: 45; Sabatier
1988: 151). Information on the success of policy is limited and subject to framing by
each coalition. In some cases, there are commonly accepted ways to measure policy
performance. In others, it is a battle of ideas which takes place in the context of a
tendency of coalitions to “exaggerate the influence and maliciousness of opponents”
(Weible 2007: 99). Technical information is often used “primarily in an ‘advocacy’
fashion” (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993b: 45; Sabatier 1988: 152) and a dominant
coalition can successfully challenge the data supporting policy change for years
(Sabatier 1998: 104). This process generally does not produce major changes in policy
or the balance of power between coalitions. Rather, coalitions interpret and frame
new information in line with their core and policy beliefs. In most cases, learning
follows the routine monitoring of policy implementation, as members consider how
policy contributes to positive or unintended outcomes and whether their beliefs
regarding the best way to solve the policy problem are challenged or supported by the
evidence.
The second is relatively major change prompted largely by external events. Events
may set in motion “internal” or “external shocks” to subsystems, with the potential
to alter coalitions and the balance of power between them. An internal shock
relates to the effect of major external change on a coalition’s belief system, akin to a
crisis of confidence. The event prompts a coalition to revisit its policy core beliefs,
perhaps following a realization by many actors that existing policies have failed
monumentally, and their consequent departure to a different coalition. An external
shock has the added element of coalition competition—another coalition uses the
experience of a major event to reinforce its position within the subsystem, largely
by demonstrating that its belief system is best equipped to interpret and solve the
policy problem. In other words, the major event is not enough to cause an external
shock; it also has to be exploited successfully by a competing coalition which is
better equipped to learn and adapt. Such processes may vary, from the election of
a new government with beliefs that favor one coalition over another, to a “focusing
event” such as an environmental crisis that undermines the ability of a coalition
to defend current policy or allows another coalition to successfully redefine
the policy problem and seek new solutions. In each case, some coalitions may be
a source of stability and there is a process of mediation within subsystems. While
many of these external factors—such as global recession, environmental crises,
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and demographic changes—appear to have an independent causal value, coalitions
influence how sovereigns understand, interpret, and respond to them. External
events provide new resources to some coalitions. It is then up to those coalitions to
use them.
In other words, coalitions have to exercise power effectively to maintain or
improve their positions within subsystems. This regards a mix of resources available
to them—resources to gather and interpret information, the weight of public opinion
and their ability to rally active public support, their funding—and the skillfulness
of their leadership (Sabatier 1993: 29; Weible 2006: 99–100; Sabatier and Weible
2007: 201–3).
ACF Expansion and Revision
The ACF is based on a “Lakatosian” approach to science (Jenkins-Smith, in correspondence,
2010; Cairney 2012: 219). In effect, the ACF as a scientific project resembles
an advocacy coalition: secondary aspects are amended in the light of empirical
testing, while the core remains relatively insulated and the policy core is unlikely to
change in the absence of a monumental failure to explain its object of study (Cairney
2013). As in an advocacy coalition, its main authors are unlikely to reject the ACF as
a broad understanding of the policy-making system, but they are more likely than
most policy scholars to revise certain aspects of their theory in the light of experience.
There is a difficult balance to maintain: a “Popperian” attachment to falsifying
hypotheses derived from the theory operates alongside a theory that is revised to
maintain its value.
This revision process has taken place regularly since 1993 and the ACF flow diagram
in Figure 33.1 differs markedly from the original model derived from studies of the US
(in areas such as environmental policy). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s review sought to
clarify:
• the role of administrative organizations (as potential members of coalitions but
also relatively subject to belief-change following a change of government) and
“hierarchically superior jurisdictions” which may, in rare cases, override subsystem
policy in the face of opposition from the dominant coalition (1993: 217;
Sabatier 1998: 119);
• the impact of technical information on policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
1993: 219);
• the difference, within policy core beliefs, between “normative precepts” that are
unlikely to change, and “precepts with a substantial empirical content” that are
more likely to change in the light of new evidence (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
1993: 220–1); and,
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• that an external event will not cause subsystem change unless at least one coalition
has the skill to exploit its new opportunity (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
1993: 222).
Further revisions were prompted by the rise in ACF applications to countries other
than the US. For example, the relative subsystem stability may only apply to “mature”
subsystems and they may not yet have developed in “nascent” subsystems (Sabatier
1998: 110–14; Sabatier and Weible 2007: 192). Sabatier and Weible (2007: 199) also sought
to address wider criticisms:
that it is too much of product of its empirical origins in American pluralism. It
makes largely tacit assumptions about well-organized interest groups, missionoriented
agencies, weak political parties, multiple decision making venues, and the
need for supermajorities to enact and implement major policy change.
The ACF diagram was revised to reflect: (a) the generally higher “degree of consensus
needed to institute a major policy change” in political systems with proportional
representation elections and a norm of minority or coalition government
(Sabatier 1998: 121; Sabatier and Weible 2007: 200); and (b) the often-lower availability
of multiple, open venues in “corporatist” systems characterized by centralized
decision-making, restricted to a small number of leaders of business groups and
unions (2007: 200). Both factors combine to produce the relatively new “long-term
coalition opportunity structures” box in Figure 33.1. The main authors also generally
advise caution when applying the ACF to countries in which we might make
different assumptions about, for example, the role of the civil service (only some
countries have politically appointed bureaucrats), the relationships between levels
and types of government (not all countries have a US-style constitution setting out
their respective responsibilities), and the balance of power between political parties
(Sabatier 1998). A combination of such factors suggests that subsystems, as the main
focus of analysis, can be defined in quite different ways in different systems (Cairney
2012: 214).
A further major revision by Sabatier and Weible (2007: 204–7) identified two
sources of policy change: the distinction between internal and external shocks,
already described, and “alternative dispute resolution”, which refers to the conditions
(including a widespread recognition of stalemate, a process that includes
stakeholders who respect a neutral chair, and an ability to resolve issues empirically)
in which major policy change can result from negotiated agreements between
“previously warring coalitions” (2007: 205–7). More recent revisions include
attempts to provide better descriptions of the role of public opinion, from simply
being subsumed under “socioeconomic conditions” as a source of external constraint,
towards treating it as a resource to be used and manipulated by coalitions
(Jones and Jenkins-Smith 2009: 39).
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How the ACF has Shaped
Thinking and Research
According to John (2003: 481), the ACF was one of two approaches (alongside punctuated
equilibrium theory) to mark a ““punctuation” in thinking about public
policy.” Its most famous exposition (Sabatier and Jenkin-Smith 1993) has been cited
over 2,200 times and several related works have been cited from 1,200 to 1,870 times
in the last 15–20 years. It has produced over 80 applications in publications by the
authors, their colleagues, and other inspired scholars (Weible et al. 2009) and is now
an almost-automatic inclusion in textbooks and overviews of the policy literature
(including Birkland 2005; Cairney 2012; John 2012; Smith and Larimer 2009). It has
been used regularly to explain policy-making outside the US: in the European Union
and some member states; in countries such as Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Japan;
and, in fewer cases, Africa, South America, and Asia (Sabatier and Weible 2007: 217–20;
Weible et al. 2009: 125). Some of the most cited examples include: forestry policy (Elliott
and Schlaepfer 2001a, 2001b); drug policy in Switzerland (Kübler 2001); California
marine protected area policy (Weible 2006), and the US President’s National Economic
Council (Dolan 2003).
However, such applications have been limited in two main ways. First, most ACF
case studies “remain within environmental and energy policies” (Weible et al.
2009: 125) which could exaggerate, for example, the importance of the European Union
(environmental policy is the most Europeanized, compared to areas such as health
and education with often-minimal EU involvement) and international cooperation or
international organizations (Litfin 2000).
Second, the ACF is often applied in a rather loose way, often without adopting the
methods, recommended by its main authors (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993c), that
tend to be used by authors who became closely associated with the ACF (e.g. see Weible
2007: 104; Zafonte and Sabatier 2004). The ACF may be used, as part of a desktop exercise,
to provide one of many conceptual perspectives on an empirical case study that
has been produced relatively independently of the ACF method (Cairney 2013: 9). Case
studies may be “ACF-inspired” without testing any of its hypotheses (Weible et al.
2009: 128)—a limitation that may seems particularly problematic for a framework
designed to generate hypotheses to allow confirmation or revision.
That said, many of the 80 studies covered by Weible et al. (2009) confirm that a major
external event is a necessary but insufficient condition for major subsystem change (18
studies) and that it often, but not always, prompts a significant number of members to
defect to other coalitions (13 studies). Others (20 studies) broadly confirm that policy
learning across coalitions tends to be more likely in less contentious areas with relatively
high potential to resolve issues empirically. In other words, despite these limitations,
the ACF has still been subject to an unusually high amount of testing in a field
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(political science and public policy) that has not produced many studies in which people
examine the world using a common framework organized by a small number of
scientists (other examples include the Policy Agendas Project (PAP), <http://www.policyagendas.org>,
and the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD),
Poteete et al. 2010).
The ACF and Science
A further aspect of the ACF’s influence is that represents not only an approach to the
study of contemporary public policy but also a set of ideas about how we should practice
science. The ACF itself was generally modeled on a “Lakatosian” approach to science
and Paul Sabatier (1999, 2007) in particular sought to use some of these ideas about
the scientific study of policy-making to set the agenda for the evaluation—and possible
combination or rejection—of the most popular theories of public policy.
Sabatier (2007b: 330; 1999) highlights three main advantages to the use of multiple
theories: it provides “some guarantee against assuming that a particular theory is the
valid one”; it shows us that “different theories may have comparative advantages in different
settings”; and, the knowledge of other theories “should make one much more
sensitive to some of the implicit assumptions in one’s favoured theory.” He then outlines
a set of principles that can be used to decide how useful a theory might be in general
or in particular situations. A similar approach was used by Eller and Krutz (2009)
in a special issue of the Policy Studies Journal.
It is important not to enforce this set of criteria too strongly. For example, Cairney
(2013: 10) combines their (Sabatier 2007b; Eller and Krutz 2009) arguments to produce
a simple set of principles for scientific comparison:
1. A theory’s methods should be explained so that they can be replicated by others.
2. Its concepts should be clearly defined, logically consistent and give rise to empirically
falsifiable hypotheses.
3. Its propositions should be as general as possible.
4. It should set out clearly what the causal processes are.
5. It should be subject to empirical testing and revision.
As stated, these principles are difficult to live up to fully (indeed, it is debatable if even
the ACF lives up to them—Cairney 2013: 10). They have the potential to present a misleading
picture of scientific research, ignoring the extent to which studies are generally
not replicated (we accept a large number of findings on trust); people follow different
rules and engage on different terms when discussing research (without a way for us to
decide which terms are the most appropriate); and a complex world does not allow us to
falsify hypotheses in a straightforward way (if at all). In other worlds, there in an inescapably
subjective element to scientific research in which we pursue our beliefs, and
confirm or deny the value of theories, by using criteria that do not allow us to validate
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one claim and reject another unproblematically (Cairney 2013: 11–12; see Parsons
2000: 129 for stronger criticisms). On this basis, people like Radaelli (2000: 134) present
important objections to the unquestioning adherence to these principles, calling for a
balance between our needs to generalize (to explain a small part of all cases) and to be
more specific (to explain a large part of particular cases).
Yet we can infer Sabatier’s attitude to science in more than one way—although he
makes a public commitment to certain principles, he does not necessarily use them in
an overly narrow or too punitive way. Take, for example, the use of these principles in
a rather hard way to question the value of the “stages heuristic” (a focus on the policy
cycle as it follows certain stages, including agenda setting, formulation, legitimation,
implementation, evaluation, and maintenance/termination). Sabatier (1991: 147) argues
strongly that it “has outlived its usefulness and must be replaced, in large part because
it is not a causal theory.” This argument is outlined in greater depth in texts such as
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993a, 1994), but with a combination of criticisms based on
scientific principles (it “does not provide a clear basis for empirical hypothesis-testing”)
and an argument, that can be found in the wider literature, about its descriptive limitations
(which have already prompted a whole series of alternatives to stage-based
research— Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994: 177–8; Cairney 2012: 41). In other words,
this is a combination of a specific attachment to scientific principles with a broader
(and perhaps more openly subjective) focus on the extent to which an approach is valuable.
Further, Sabatier (1999) proved, at least temporarily, able to humor the approaches
of which he did not approve (also note Sabatier’s (1986) earlier engagement with the
implementation literature) and we can see the same mixed attitude towards multiple
streams analysis in Sabatier (1991, 1999, 2007b).
In other words, if we read the language used by Sabatier (2007b: 8–10), it often
appears softer on scientific criteria; establishing a commitment to them but being reasonably
open to challenge. For example, “Each framework must do a reasonably good
job of meeting the criteria of a scientific theory” and “be the subject of a fair amount of
recent conceptual development and/or empirical testing” (2007: 8, emphasis added).
Further, Sabatier (2007: 8) uses rather subjective criteria for the inclusion of theories
in his edited books, including a statement that could just as easily have been made by
Fischer (2003): “A number of currently active policy scholars must view it as a viable
way of understanding the policy process” (Sabatier 2007: 8).
Indeed, Sabatier’s own reflection on his scientific bent (2000: 137) describes perhaps
an impish description of his position—“presuppositionist neo-positivist”—
and a more serious, broad commitment to good communication between scientists,
summed up by the Popper-like phrase “be clear enough to be proven wrong.” As
Jenkins-Smith (2013) describes, “it was fine to be wrong as long as you were clearly
wrong (and hence could learn from it) . . . clarity begets clarity, mush begets mush.”
This broad attitude is appropriate in scientific fields where we rely on the knowledge
of others, we seek ways to communicate and learn from each other, we need to decide
who to listen to (and who to ignore), and we want to avoid fruitless debates at cross
purposes (Cairney 2013: 15).
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We may also want to discourage people from stretching their theories too much
to match the evidence rather than seek a more convincing theory. For a “Lakatosian”
approach to science, this is an incredibly tricky balancing act: between adapting your
theory continuously when you admit you are wrong (risking the criticism that you are
changing your ideas too much), and making sure that you are adapting to be more right
rather than simply to protect the core of your argument (which includes, for the ACF,
the identification of “non-trivially coordinated coalitions based on belief-systems,” the
“relative autonomy of subsystems,” and the importance of focusing on policy change
over a full cycle—Jenkins-Smith, in correspondence, 2010). The irony for the ACF is
that it may be built on a relatively open, honest, and dynamic approach, but have the
potential to look otherwise.
Conclusion: The ACF’s Legacy on,
and Links to, the Wider World of
Public Policy
There are not many policy frameworks or theories that try to provide an overview of
the entire policy process; to try to explain the interaction between “the five core causal
processes . . . institutions, networks, socioeconomic process, choices, and ideas” (John
2003: 488). For example, although it perhaps remains most relevant to the study of US
politics (in some policy areas), it also became useful as a way to restate the importance
of policy subsystems in countries like the UK facing an alleged stagnation of policy
networks research (see e.g. Dowding, 1995: 147–50). Further, although it was by no
means the first policy framework to discuss the important role of ideas (it owes much to
the work of Majone 1980, and came after Kingdon’s 1984 influential book), it treats their
importance as part of a wider explanation, perhaps reducing the potential for critics
to suggest that ideas are given explanatory value independent of their acceptance and
use by actors within coalitions. It is difficult to get this balance right, but the ACF often
succeeds:
Raw political power may carry the day against superior evidence, but the costs to
one’s credibility in a democratic society can be considerable. Moreover, resources
expended—particularly in the form of favors called in—are not available for
future use. Thus those who can most effectively marshal persuasive evidence,
thereby conserving their political resources, are more likely to win in the long
run than those who ignore technical arguments. (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier
1993b: 44–5; compare with the similar tone in Majone 1989: 2; Kingdon 1984: 131–3;
Hall 1993: 291–2).
Similarly, it goes some way to address the charge, made against previous systems
and socioeconomic theorists (from Easton (1953) to Dawson and Robinson (1963)
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and Hofferbert (1974)) that external factors determine, or largely explain, outcomes
(Cairney 2012: 113). External factors are important, and may prompt major change,
but “shocks” refer largely to the ways in which coalitions compete to adapt to, and
interpret, such events. The ACF has a less developed view about the role of institutions—although
its focus on a myriad of actors and organizations, at multiple levels
of government, helps us understand institutions as forms of behavior linked to rules
and norms accepted or challenged by different coalitions (Sabatier 1993: 25; Sabatier
and Weible 2007: 194; Cairney 2012: 217). Finally, there is much less of a focus (than
in most other accounts of policy-making) on “bounded rationality” (Simon 1976) as
the starting point for considering how policy-makers consider and make choices,
partly because issues about how someone might articulate and pursue their interests
is subsumed within a consideration of the construction and operation of belief systems
(Cairney 2012: 215–16; 282–3).
This degree of conceptual coverage and academic ambition may be the key to its
potential longevity in the policy literature. Like the PAP and IAD, the ACF is one of
a small number of approaches in policy studies linked, initially and very strongly, to a
small core group of authors, before it became established as an approach that could be
used without the involvement of its founders.

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Op dinsdag 16 januari 2018 23:48 schreef Dr.Mikey het volgende: