Oorlog in Libië #95. Wie A zegt, moet ook B zeggen! Buigen of barsten!

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On Libya and the Unfolding Crises

Noam Chomsky interviewed by Stephen Shalom and Michael Albert

ZNet (forthcoming), March 30, 2011

1. What are US motives in international relations most broadly? That is, what are the over arching motives and themes one can pretty much always find informing US policy choices, no matter where in the world we are discussing? What are the somewhat more specific but still over arching motives and themes for US policy in Middle East and the Arab world? Finally, what do you think are the more proximate aims of US policy in the current situation in Libya?
A useful way to approach the question is to ask what US motives are not. There are some good ways to find out. One is to read the professional literature on international relations: quite commonly, its account of policy is what policy is not, an interesting topic that I won't pursue.

Another method, quite relevant now, is to listen to political leaders and commentators. Suppose they say that the motive for a military action is humanitarian. In itself, that carries no information: virtually every resort to force is justified in those terms, even by the worst monsters -- who may, irrelevantly, even convince themselves of the truth of what they are saying. Hitler, for example, may have believed that he was taking over parts of Czechoslovakia to end ethnic conflict and bring its people the benefits of an advanced civilization, and that he invaded Poland to end the "wild terror" of the Poles. Japanese fascists rampaging in China probably did believe that they were selflessly laboring to create an "earthly paradise" and to protect the suffering population from "Chinese bandits." Even Obama may have believed what he said in his presidential address on March 28 about the humanitarian motives for the Libyan intervention. Same holds of commentators.

There is, however, a very simple test to determine whether the professions of noble intent can be taken seriously: do the authors call for humanitarian intervention and "responsibility to protect" to defend the victims of their own crimes, or those of their clients? Did Obama, for example, call for a no-fly zone during the murderous and destructive US-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, with no credible pretext? Or did he, rather, boast proudly during his presidential campaign that he had co-sponsored a Senate resolution supporting the invasion and calling for punishment of Iran and Syria for impeding it? End of discussion. In fact, virtually the entire literature of humanitarian intervention and right to protect, written and spoken, disappears under this simple and appropriate test.

In contrast, what motives actually are is rarely discussed, and one has to look at the documentary and historical record to unearth them, in the case of any state.

What then are US motives? At a very general level, the evidence seems to me to show that they have not changed much since the high-level planning studies undertaken during World War II. Wartime planners took for granted that the US would emerge from the war in a position of overwhelming dominance, and called for the establishment of a Grand Area in which the US would maintain "unquestioned power," with "military and economic supremacy," while ensuring the "limitation of any exercise of sovereignty" by states that might interfere with its global designs. The Grand Area was to include the Western hemisphere, the Far East, the British empire (which included the Middle East energy reserves), and as much of Eurasia as possible, at least its industrial and commercial center in Western Europe. It is quite clear from the documentary record that "President Roosevelt was aiming at United States hegemony in the postwar world," to quote the accurate assessment of the (justly) respected British diplomatic historian Geoffrey Warner. And more significant, the careful wartime plans were soon implemented, as we read in declassified documents of the following years, and observe in practice. Circumstances of course have changed, and tactics adjusted accordingly, but basic principles are quite stable, to the present.

With regard to the Middle East -- the "most strategically important region of the world," in Eisenhower's phrase -- the primary concern has been, and remains, its incomparable energy reserves. Control of these would yield "substantial control of the world," as observed early on by the influential liberal adviser A. A. Berle. These concerns are rarely far in the background in affairs concerning this region.

In Iraq, for example, as the dimensions of the US defeat could no longer be concealed, pretty rhetoric was displaced by honest announcement of policy goals. In November 2007 the White House issued a Declaration of Principles insisting that Iraq must grant US military forces indefinite access and must privilege American investors. Two months later the president informed Congress that he would ignore legislation that might limit the permanent stationing of US Armed Forces in Iraq or "United States control of the oil resources of Iraq" -- demands that the US had to abandon shortly after in the face of Iraqi resistance, just as it had to abandon earlier goals.

While control over oil is not the sole factor in Middle East policy, it provides fairly good guidelines, right now as well. In an oil-rich country, a reliable dictator is granted virtual free rein. In recent weeks, for example, there was no reaction when the Saudi dictatorship used massive force to prevent any sign of protest. Same in Kuwait, when small demonstrations were instantly crushed. And in Bahrain, when Saudi-led forces intervened to protect the minority Sunni monarch from calls for reform on the part of the repressed Shiite population. Government forces not only smashed the tent city in Pearl Square -- Bahrain's Tahrir Square -- but even demolished the Pearl statue that was Bahrain's symbol, and had been appropriated by the protestors. Bahrain is a particularly sensitive case because it hosts the US Fifth fleet, by far the most powerful military force in the region, and because eastern Saudi Arabia, right across the causeway, is also largely Shiite, and has most of the Kingdom's oil reserves. By a curious accident of geography and history, the world's largest hydrocarbon concentrations surround the northern Gulf, in mostly Shiite regions. The possibility of a tacit Shiite alliance has been a nightmare for planners for a long time.

In states lacking major hydrocarbon reserves, tactics vary, typically keeping to a standard game plan when a favored dictator is in trouble: support him as long as possible, and when that cannot be done, issue ringing declarations of love of democracy and human rights -- and then try to salvage as much of the regime as possible.

The scenario is boringly familiar: Marcos, Duvalier, Chun, Ceauescu, Mobutu, Suharto, and many others. And today, Tunisia and Egypt. Syria is a tough nut to crack and there is no clear alternative to the dictatorship that would support US goals. Yemen is a morass where direct intervention would probably create even greater problems for Washington. So there state violence elicits only pious declarations.

Libya is a different case. Libya is rich in oil, and though the US and UK have often given quite remarkable support to its cruel dictator, right to the present, he is not reliable. They would much prefer a more obedient client. Furthermore, the vast territory of Libya is mostly unexplored, and oil specialists believe it may have rich untapped resources, which a more dependable government might open to Western exploitation.

When a non-violent uprising began, Qaddafi crushed it violently, and a rebellion broke out that liberated Benghazi, Libya's second largest city, and seemed about to move on to Qaddafi's stronghold in the West. His forces, however, reversed the course of the conflict and were at the gates of Benghazi. A slaughter in Benghazi was likely, and as Obama's Middle East adviser Dennis Ross pointed out, "everyone would blame us for it." then joined in UN Security Council resolution 1973 calling for a no-fly zone, to be implemented by France, the UK, and the US, with the US supposed to move to a supporting role.

There was no effort to institute a no-fly zone. The triumvirate at once interpreted the resolution as authorizing direct participation on the side of the rebels. A ceasefire was imposed by force on Qaddafi's forces, but not on the rebels. On the contrary, they were given military support as they advanced to the West, soon securing the major sources of Libya's oil production, and poised to move on.

The blatant disregard of UN 1973, from the start began to cause some difficulties for the press as it became too glaring to ignore. In the New York Times, for example, Karim Fahim and David Kirkpatrick (March 29) wondered "how the allies could justify airstrikes on Colonel Qaddafi's forces around [his tribal center] Surt if, as seems to be the case, they enjoy widespread support in the city and pose no threat to civilians." Another technical difficulty is that UNSC 1973 "called for an arms embargo that applies to the entire territory of Libya, which means that any outside supply of arms to the opposition would have to be covert" (but otherwise unproblematic).

Some argue that oil cannot be a motive because Western companies were granted access to the prize under Qaddafi. That misconstrues US concerns. The same could have been said about Iraq under Saddam, or Iran and Cuba for many years, still today. What Washington seeks is what Bush announced: control, or at least dependable clients. US and British internal documents stress that "the virus of nationalism" is their greatest fear, not just in the Middle East but everywhere. Nationalist regimes might conduct illegitimate exercises of sovereignty, violating Grand Area principles. And they might seek to direct resources to popular needs, as Nasser sometimes threatened.

It is worth noting that the three traditional imperial powers -- France, UK, US -- are almost isolated in carrying out these operations. The two major states in the region, Turkey and Egypt, could probably have imposed a no-fly zone but are at most offering tepid support to the triumvirate military campaign. The Gulf dictatorships would be happy to see the erratic Libyan dictator disappear, but although loaded with advanced military hardware (poured in by the US and UK to recycle petrodollars and ensure obedience), they are willing to offer no more than token participation (by Qatar).

While supporting UNSC 1973, Africa -- apart from US ally Rwanda -- is generally opposed to the way it was instantly interpreted by the triumvirate, in some cases strongly so. For review of policies of individual states, see Charles Onyango-Obbo in the Kenyan journal East African (http://allafrica.com/stories/201103280142.html).

Beyond the region there is little support. Like Russia and China, Brazil abstained from UNSC 1973, calling instead for a full cease-fire and dialogue. India too abstained from the UN resolution on grounds that the proposed measures were likely to "exacerbate an already difficult situation for the people of Libya," and also called for political measures rather than use of force. Even Germany abstained from the resolution.

Italy too was reluctant, in part presumably because it is highly dependent on its oil contracts with Qaddafi -- and we may recall that the first post-World War I genocide was conducted by Italy, in Eastern Libya, now liberated, and perhaps retaining some memories.

2. Can an anti-interventionist who believes in self determination of nations and people ever legitimately support an intervention, either by the UN or particular countries?

There are two cases to consider: (1) UN intervention and (2) intervention without UN authorization. Unless we believe that states are sacrosanct in the form that has been established in the modern world (typically by extreme violence), with rights that override all other imaginable considerations, then the answer is the same in both cases: Yes, in principle at least. I see no point in discussing that belief, so will dismiss it.

With regard to the first case, the Charter and subsequent resolutions grant the Security Council considerable latitude for intervention, and it has been undertaken, with regard to South Africa, for example. That of course does not entail that every Security Council decision should be approved by "an anti-interventionist who believes in self-determination"; other considerations enter in individual cases, but again, unless contemporary states are assigned the status of virtually holy entities, the principle is the same.

As for the second case -- the one that arises with regard to the triumvirate interpretation of UN 1973, and many other examples -- then the answer is again Yes, in principle at least, unless we take the global state system to be sacrosanct in the form established in the UN Charter and other treaties.

There is, of course, always a very heavy burden of proof that must be met to justify forceful intervention, or any use of force. The burden is particularly high in case (2), in violation of the Charter, at least for states that profess to be law-abiding. We should bear in mind, however, that the global hegemon rejects that stance, and is self-exempted from the UN and OAS Charters, and other international treaties. In accepting ICJ jurisdiction when the Court was established (under US initiative) in 1946, Washington excluded itself from charges of violation of international treaties, and later ratified the Genocide Convention with similar reservations -- all positions that have been upheld by international tribunals, since their procedures require acceptance of jurisdiction. More generally, US practice is to add crucial reservations to the international treaties it ratifies, effectively exempting itself.

Can the burden of proof be met? There is little point in abstract discussion, but there are some real cases that might qualify. In the post-World War II period, there are two cases of resort to force which -- though not qualifying as humanitarian intervention -- might legitimately be supported: India's invasion of East Pakistan in 1971, and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, in both cases, ending massive atrocities. These examples, however, do not enter the Western canon of "humanitarian intervention" because they suffer from the fallacy of wrong agency: they were not carried out by the West. What is more, the US bitterly opposed them and severely punished the miscreants who ended the slaughters in today's Bangladesh and who drove Pol Pot out of Cambodia just as his atrocities were peaking. Vietnam was not only bitterly condemned but also punished by a US-supported Chinese invasion, and by US-UK military and diplomatic support for the Khmer Rouge attacking Cambodia from Thai bases.

While the burden of proof might be met in these cases, it is not easy to think of others. In the case of intervention by the triumvirate of imperial powers that are currently violating UN 1973 in Libya, the burden is particularly heavy, given their horrifying records. Nonetheless, it would be too strong to hold that it can never be satisfied in principle -- unless, of course, we regard nation-states in their current form as essentially holy. Preventing a likely massacre in Benghazi is no small matter, whatever one thinks of the motives.

3. Can a person concerned that a country's dissidents not be massacred so they remain able to seek self determination ever legitimately oppose an intervention that is intended, whatever else it intends, to avert such a massacre?

Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that the intent is genuine, meeting the simple criterion I mentioned at the outset, I don't see how to answer at this level of abstraction: it depends on circumstances. Intervention might be opposed, for example, if it is likely to lead to a much worse massacre. Suppose, for example, that US leaders genuinely and honestly intended to avert a slaughter in Hungary in 1956 by bombing Moscow. Or that the Kremlin genuinely and honestly intended to avert a slaughter in El Salvador in the 1980s by bombing the US. Given the predictable consequences, we would all agree that those (inconceivable) actions could be legitimately opposed.

4. Many people see an analogy between the Kosovo intervention of 1999 and the current intervention in Libya. Can you explain both the significant similarities, first, and then the major differences, second?

Many people do indeed see such an analogy, a tribute to the incredible power of the Western propaganda systems. The background for the Kosovo intervention happens to be unusually well documented. That includes two detailed State Department compilations, extensive reports from the ground by Kosovo Verification Mission (Western) monitors, rich sources from NATO and the UN, a British Parliamentary Inquiry, and much else. The reports and studies coincide very closely on the facts.

In brief, there had been no substantial change on the ground in the months prior to the bombing. Atrocities were committed both by Serbian forces and by the KLA guerrillas mostly attacking from neighboring Albania -- primarily the latter during the relevant period, at least according to high British authorities (Britain was the most hawkish member of the alliance). The major atrocities in Kosovo were not the cause of the NATO bombing of Serbia, but rather its consequence, and a fully anticipated consequence. NATO commander General Wesley Clark had informed the White House weeks before the bombing that it would elicit a brutal response by Serbian forces on the ground, and as the bombing began, told the press that such a response was "predictable."

The first UN-registered refugees outside Kosovo were well after the bombing began. The indictment of Milosevic during the bombing, based largely on US-UK intelligence, confined itself to crimes after the bombing, with one exception, which we know could not be taken seriously by US-UK leaders, who at the same moment were actively supporting even worse crimes. Furthermore, there was good reason to believe that a diplomatic solution might have been in reach: in fact, the UN resolution imposed after 78 days of bombing was pretty much a compromise between the Serbian and NATO position as it began.

All of this, including these impeccable western sources, is reviewed in some detail in my book A New Generation Draws the Line. Corroborating information has appeared since. Thus Diana Johnstone reports a letter to German Chancellor Angela Merkel on October 26, 2007 by Dietmar Hartwig, who had been head of the European mission in Kosovo before it was withdrawn on March 20 as the bombing was announced, and was in a very good position to know what was happening. He wrote:

"Not a single report submitted in the period from late November 1998 up to the evacuation on the eve of the war mentioned that Serbs had committed any major or systematic crimes against Albanians, nor there was a single case referring to genocide or genocide-like incidents or crimes. Quite the opposite, in my reports I have repeatedly informed that, considering the increasingly more frequent KLA attacks against the Serbian executive, their law enforcement demonstrated remarkable restraint and discipline. The clear and often cited goal of the Serbian administration was to observe the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement [of October 1998] to the letter so not to provide any excuse to the international community to intervene. ... There were huge 'discrepancies in perception' between what the missions in Kosovo have been reporting to their respective governments and capitals, and what the latter thereafter released to the media and the public. This discrepancy can only be viewed as input to long-term preparation for war against Yugoslavia. Until the time I left Kosovo, there never happened what the media and, with no less intensity the politicians, were relentlessly claiming. Accordingly, until 20 March 1999 there was no reason for military intervention, which renders illegitimate measures undertaken thereafter by the international community. The collective behavior of EU Member States prior to, and after the war broke out, gives rise to serious concerns, because the truth was killed, and the EU lost reliability."

History is not quantum physics, and there is always ample room for doubt. But it is rare for conclusions to be so firmly backed as they are in this case. Very revealingly, it is all totally irrelevant. The prevailing doctrine is that NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing -- though supporters of the bombing who tolerate at least a nod to the rich factual evidence qualify their support by saying the bombing was necessary to stop potential atrocities: we must therefore act to elicit large-scale atrocities to stop ones that might occur if we do not bomb. And there are even more shocking justifications.

The reasons for this virtual unanimity and passion are fairly clear. The bombing came after a virtual orgy of self-glorification and awe of power that might have impressed Kim Il-Sung. I've reviewed it elsewhere, and this remarkable moment of intellectual history should not be allowed to remain in the oblivion to which it has been consigned. After this performance, there simply had to be a glorious denouement. The noble Kosovo intervention provided it, and the fiction must be zealously guarded.

Returning to the question, there is an analogy between the self-serving depictions of Kosovo and Libya, both interventions animated by noble intent in the fictionalized version. The unacceptable real world suggests rather different analogies. 5. Similarly, many people see an analogy between the ongoing Iraq intervention and the current intervention in Libya. In this case too, can you explain both the similarities, and differences?

I don't see meaningful analogies here either, except that two of the same states are involved. In the case of Iraq, the goals were those that were finally conceded. In the case of Libya, it is likely that the goal is similar in at least one respect: the hope that a reliable client regime will reliably supported Western goals and provide Western investors with privileged access to Libya's rich oil wealth -- which, as noted, may go well beyond what is currently known.

6. What do you expect, in coming weeks, to see happening in Libya and, in that context, what do you think ought to be the aims of an anti-interventionist and antiwar movement in the US regarding US policies?

It is of course uncertain, but the likely prospects now (March 29) are either a break-up of Libya into an oil-rich Eastern region heavily dependent on the Western imperial powers and an impoverished West under the control of a brutal tyrant with fading capacity, or a victory by the Western-backed forces. In either case, so the triumvirate presumably hopes, a less troublesome and more dependent regime will be in place. The likely outcome is described fairly accurately, I think by the London-based Arab journal al-Quds al-Arabi (March 28). While recognizing the uncertainty of prediction, it anticipates that the intervention may leave Libya with "two states, a rebel-held oil-rich East and a poverty-stricken, Qadhafi-led West ... Given that the oil wells have been secured, we may find ourselves facing a new Libyan oil emirate, sparsely inhabited, protected by the West and very similar to the Gulf's emirate states." Or the Western-backed rebellion might proceed all the way to eliminate the irritating dictator.

Those concerned for peace, justice, freedom and democracy should try to find ways to lend support and assistance to Libyans who seek to shape their own future, free from constraints imposed by external powers. We can have hopes about the directions they should pursue, but their future should be in their hands.

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 11:49 schreef zoefbust het volgende:
Rebel op de fiets ha ha

[ afbeelding ]

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 12:13 schreef Hans_van_Baalen het volgende:
Lange tekst zonder spoiler; Chomsky;

[..]

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Libya is a different case. Libya is rich in oil, and though the US and UK have often given quite remarkable support to its cruel dictator, right to the present, he is not reliable. They would much prefer a more obedient client. Furthermore, the vast territory of Libya is mostly unexplored, and oil specialists believe it may have rich untapped resources, which a more dependable government might open to Western exploitation.

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"two states, a rebel-held oil-rich East and a poverty-stricken, Qadhafi-led West ... Given that the oil wells have been secured, we may find ourselves facing a new Libyan oil emirate, sparsely inhabited, protected by the West and very similar to the Gulf's emirate states."

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Western-backed rebellion might proceed all the way to eliminate the irritating dictator.

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 11:49 schreef zoefbust het volgende:
Rebel op de fiets ha ha

[ afbeelding ]

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 12:55 schreef Apache4U het volgende:
@fmcnl
Currently Nomad Aviation flight Cessna 525 CitationJet tail nr HB-VWM at FL390 (!) heading Tunisia Djerba, more defections to come?

Ben benieuwd :-).

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Libyan defector 'has secrets to tell,' analyst says

London (CNN) -- The surprise arrival Wednesday of a tall, gray-haired man at a small airport outside of London raised eyebrows -- and it also raised hopes of a breakthrough on many fronts.

The man on the plane was Moussa Koussa, Libya's foreign minister and former intelligence chief, and he was defecting from the regime of Moammar Gadhafi, the highest-ranking official yet to do so.

Koussa was a stalwart defender of the government as recently as a month ago. But in recent weeks, his demeanor visibly changed. At one recent media briefing, he kept his head down as he read a statement and left early.

The British Foreign Office announced late Wednesday night that Koussa had resigned and come willingly to the United Kingdom.

There's debate about whether his departure from Tripoli will weaken Gadhafi, with some saying it will be a signal to other doubters around Libya's leader that it's time to jump ship.

"It could potentially have a devastating impact on morale within the Gadhafi regime," said Noman Benotman, a former Libyan militant now with the Quilliam Foundation, a counter-extremism think tank.

"Strategically, this move attacks the center of gravity within the regime," Benotman said. "I hope other senior figures within the regime now realise that they too need to be part of the solution and not remain part of the problem."

But others argue that Koussa was never one in Gadhafi's innermost circle, and that his departure is a significant blow, but not a critical loss to the regime.

Whether his defection precipitates further crumbling of the government in Tripoli or not, Koussa may be able to shed light on Libya's exact role in events like the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 and the killing of a British policewoman in 1984.

"Let's remember, Moussa Koussa is the single most important Libyan official who was responsible for the intelligence service, the planning and execution of (the bombing of) Pan Am 103," CNN national security contributor Frances Fragos Townsend said.

He was also a key player in Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction program, said Townsend, a former homeland security adviser in the George W. Bush administration.

"He was the single individual who had to approve or disapprove my going forward to meet with Gadhafi. And so he really does have secrets to tell," she said, adding that Libya's leader confided in Moussa and relied on him.

British intelligence will be questioning him and passing information to the Americans, she anticipated.

And she's certain he will have arranged everything carefully before he boarded the plane for Britain.

"His finances, his immunity from prosecution and his freedom from extradition process -- he would have worked that all before he left," she said.

British Foreign Secretary William Hague said Wednesday that Koussa had not been offered any immunity.

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Kusa: Shamed Diplomat To Gaddafi Defector

Musa Kusa, Libya's foreign minister and the shamed ex-ambassador to the UK, is back in Britain after defecting - but his arrival presents the UK government with huge diplomatic and political challenges.

His departure from Britain in 1980 was heralded by cheers in the House of Commons - following a newspaper interview in The Times which he said he "approved" of the killing of two political opponents.

So Mr Kusa's return must be treated with care by the government, not least because Mr Kusa could have high-profile blood on his hands.

A close confidant of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi for 30 years, he was the man named by intelligence sources as the mastermind behind the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, Britain's worst terrorist atrocity.

The 61-year-old was also instrumental in securing the deeply controversial release of Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi in August 2009.

On his first al Megrahi-related visit to meet British and Scottish government officials in October 2008, he was listed only as an interpreter.

By the second visit in January 2009, he was named as minister of security, and by a third visit in March 2009 he was listed as foreign minister.

Educated at Michigan State University, Mr Kusa graduated with a degree in sociology in 1978.

His early career saw him working as a security specialist for Libyan embassies in Europe, before being appointed as Libya's ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1980.

Mr Kusa's diplomatic career was short-lived, however, coming to an abrupt end with an extraordinary interview in The Times that same year.

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Undisciplined Libyan rebels no match for Gaddafi's forces



On the road to Ras Lanuf: rebel soldiers move forward before having to retreat past Brega. Photograph: Sean Smith/The Guardian

If there's an ammunition shortage, no one has told Khalif Saed. He was firing off a large machine gun welded to the back of a pick up truck, sending the contents of the heavy belt of bullets darting through the weapon and in to an empty sky.

It's a regular enough occurrence on the open desert road along which Libya's conflict has swung back and forth through this month. Sometimes the stream of fire is celebratory, as earlier this week when it was falsely claimed that Muammar Gaddafi's hometown of Sirte had fallen.

In recent days it seems to be more out of frustration as the rebels were forced back in the face of Gaddafi's attack. What it was not was aimed at was the enemy.

Asked why he was shooting when the revolution's military leadership has appealed for discipline and its fighters not to waste ammunition, Saed said simply: "It's my gun."

It isn't. He concedes that he seized it from a military base in Benghazi as Gaddafi's forces fled at the beginning of the revolution. But it says much about the state of the loosely organised rebel militia which foreign governments are now considering arming.

The revolutionary leadership is pleading for the west to send heavier weapons so that it can compete with Gaddafi's better armed forces amid reports that both sides in the conflict are running short of ammunition.

On the ground, rebels appeal for bigger rocket launchers, artillery and more air strikes. They are less concerned about claims of an ammunition shortage, which they do not necessarily see after seizing piles of rockets and shells from Gaddafi's army when it was retreating earlier this week. "We need what Gaddafi has," said Ghanem Barsi at a rebel checkpoint. Like many revolutionaries, he blamed their difficulties on weaponry rather than training and tactics. "We need Grads [rockets] like Gaddafi has. We need tanks like Gaddafi has. We need weapons that can kill his rockets and tanks."

The rebels' military spokesman, Colonel Ahmed Omar Bani, has claimed that "countries across the world" have offered weapons. He declined to reveal which governments and what kind of arms although he did say there was a desperate need for anti-tank weapons and radios because of chronic communications problems.

However, Bani did admit that no arms or ammunition have arrived as yet, including from neighbouring Egypt, which the rebels initially looked to as a source of practical support in part because of geography but also because there was a sense of revolutionary solidarity.

The Egyptians' reluctance may be shared by other governments as the rebel leadership faces some difficult issues that are likely to cause even the most sympathetic countries to pause.

The revolution lacks an organised military structure in spite of several attempts to stamp its authority on the volunteer army. Discipline is bad. Few of the fighters have proper military experience and they would need training in the use of weapons such as artillery. But the revolutionaries have made a strong point of saying they do not want foreign troops on Libyan soil.

The revolution's de facto finance minister, Ali Tarhouni, claims that there are 1,000 trained fighters among the rebels but there is little evidence of it on the battlefield where the anti-Gaddafi forces appear capable of advancing only when the way is cleared by foreign air strikes.

The problem is not solely the rebels' lack of more powerful weapons. In the past two days their disorganisation has shown as they have been badly outmanoeuvred by better-trained forces that have outflanked them with sweeps through the desert. The revolutionaries lack any cohesive defensive plan. Instead they fire wildly at the enemy and argue among themselves about what to do next and who should be giving orders before turning and fleeing.

Indeed, the rebels have seized a significant number of large weapons abandoned by retreating Gadaffi forces including a handful or more tanks this week after air strikes around Ajdabiya sent the government's army fleeing. But the tanks have yet to be put to use on the battlefield in part because of a lack of expertise in fighting with them.

The lack of control over Libya's rebel army also raises questions about how it might behave as an occupying force were it to take over a town such as Sirte which has not risen up in support of the revolution and where the Libyan leader is believed to retain some support.

Killings of alleged mercenaries in Benghazi, the rebels' de facto capital, as well as the large numbers of young men who have assumed an authority over ordinary citizens apparently only granted by their guns, will raise questions about how an ill disciplined and unaccountable force will behave on taking control of a potentially less welcoming city.

It would be embarrassing, to say the least, if even some of the rebels armed by Britain or the US were to carry out the kind of atrocities the west says it is intervening in Libya to prevent.

There must be an additional concern that any weapons sent to the revolutionaries could end up arming Gaddafi.

The rebel performance in recent weeks has amounted to rapid advances followed by almost as speedy retreats. It is one thing for the revolutionaries to jump in to their cars and pick-up trucks and race back tens of miles through the desert.

But large guns or armour cannot move at that speed, as has been demonstrated by the rebel capture of Gaddafi's abandoned tanks. It might take only one concerted push by government forces of the kind seen over the past two days for them to swallow up any new foreign weapon shipments and then turn them on the revolutionaries.

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 13:17 schreef Hans_van_Baalen het volgende:
Die Koussa is dus zeker overgelopen, en dat is bevestigd? (lijkt me wel though, gezien ie daar is, maar even ongeacht wat ik denk)

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 13:21 schreef Ulpianus het volgende:

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Ja. "UK Foreign Secretary William Hague said Mr Koussa had resigned"

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 13:26 schreef Hans_van_Baalen het volgende:

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Daar ben ik blij om. Dan loopt het regime ten einde

Als dergelijke vertrouwenspersonen gaan overlopen, zal hij alleen nog zijn meest directe familie (degene met voorkeursbehandeling) en de mensen (huurlingen) op de payroll behouden. Meerdere Libiërs gaan deze Koussa ongetwijfeld volgen.

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ksnavarra Karl Stagno-Navarra

FULL LIST : Abu Al-Qassim Al-Zawi, Al-Ubaidi (Foreign Min EU senior official) Rafiq Al Zawi (London Emb) Ahmed Shalih (Wshington embassy)
Abu-Zayd Dordah (cheif intel) Dr. Shukri Ghanim (chief petroleum Comp)
12 hours ago

SPOILER

Om spoilers te kunnen lezen moet je zijn ingelogd. Je moet je daarvoor eerst gratis Registreren. Ook kun je spoilers niet lezen als je een ban hebt.

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BBC Global News
Ex-Libyan foreign minister appointed as UN Ambassador Ali Abdussalm Treki refuses to take up position after condemning 'spilling of blood'

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Sultan Al Qassemi
Al Jazeera: US Defense Secretary: deposing Gaddafi is not part of the military operations. US expects Libyan people to depose him with time.

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Gaddafi forces sow landmines in east Libya
Thu Mar 31, 2011 8:28am GMT

By Angus MacSwan

BENGHAZI, Libya (Reuters) - Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's forces have sown land mines in areas around the city of Ajdabiyah, adding a dangerous new element to the war on the eastern front, human rights and mine experts said on Thursday.

The mines include Brazilian-made anti-personnel mines and Egyptian-made anti-tank mines.

Two minefields were discovered by monitors in the days following last Saturday's retreat from Ajdabiyah by Gaddafi's troops and appear to be have been laid during their 10-day occupation of the crossroads town 150 km (90 miles) south of the rebel capital Benghazi.

His forces have since reversed the retreat with a counter-attack and were at the gates of Ajdabiyah once again on Thursday.

The first field was sown around electricity pylons a few yards off the Ajdabiyah-Benghazi road in an area of sand near the town's Eastern Gate, Peter Bouckaert, a Human Rights Watch monitor in Benghazi, told Reuters.

An electrical repair truck hit a mine there on Monday and then another as men tried to pull it out, he said. There were no casualties.

Mine clearers marked out 24 anti-tank mines and 30 to 40 anti-personnel mines, he said, adding that many vehicles and people on foot pass by the area.

A second field with a similar number of mines was found near a clutch of buildings about a kilometre away.

The use of landmines brings a dangerous new dimension to the conflict that has been fought over 100s of kilometres up and down Libya's main coastal highway linking the east and the west.

The rebel army, made up largely of untrained volunteers and a cavalcade of supporters, is highly undisciplined and is scattered over a wide area behind the vanguard.

Bouckaert said his team had also found stocks of mines abandoned by Gaddafi's forces.

"We found 12 warehouses of anti-vehicle mines in Benghazi, tens of thousands of them," he said.

They also came across 35 warehouses full of munitions in Ajdabiyah. They held no stocks of landmines but had vast quantities of artillery shells, mortar bombs and anti-tank missiles.

Libya has not signed the 1997 Mines Ban Treaty, which in any case does not prohibit the use of anti-vehicle mines.

"The only mines that are banned are the anti-personnel mines so they can put as many anti-tank mines as they like. It's part of the game," said an international mines expert, who asked not to be identified to protect the confidentiality of his mission.

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Nic Robertson
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libihorr Libi Horr
retweeted by ChangeInLibya
@NicRobertsonCNN What gains?Braiga already back in the hands of pro-democracy forces. Soon they will retake Ras Lanof & Ben Jawad then Sirte

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NATO takes over air operations as CIA works the ground in Libya

Tripoli, Libya (CNN) -- NATO took sole command of air operations in Libya on Thursday as CIA operatives worked the field to connect with rebel fighters who have seen their surge toward Tripoli impeded.

A U.S. intelligence source said the CIA is operating in the country to help increase U.S. "military and political understanding" of the situation. "Yes, we are gathering intel firsthand and we are in contact with some opposition entities," the source told CNN.

Adm. Giampaolo Di Paola, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, indicated Thursday that in his view, the presence of foreign intelligence personnel would not violate the U.N. resolution authorizing action in Libya. The resolution prohibits "occupation forces," a term that "has a quite clear meaning," Di Paola said at a news conference in response to a question from CNN.

He also said NATO receives and uses intelligence from allies and does not judge the sources.

The CIA has had a presence in Libya for some time, a U.S. official told CNN earlier this month. "The intelligence community is aggressively pursuing information on the ground," the official said.

The CIA sent additional personnel to Libya to augment officers on the ground after the anti-government protests erupted, a U.S. official told CNN. The official did not give details.

CIA officers assisted with the rescue of one of two U.S. airmen whose fighter jet crashed in Libya on March 21, a knowledgeable U.S. source said.

The NATO mission -- called Operation Unified Protector -- includes an arms embargo, a no-fly zone and "actions to protect civilians and civilian centers," the alliance said Thursday.

It follows U.N. Security Council resolution 1973 allowing member states to take all necessary measures -- "while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form" -- to protect civilians under the threat of attack in Libya.

Over the weekend, CNN reported that rebels had taken al-Brega, Ras Lanuf and Bin Jawad and reached a town just east of Sirte. But in the last three days, opposition fighters have been pushed back eastward.

Rebel forces -- hampered by a lack of organization, training and military know-how when compared to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's troops -- have been demanding an end to Gadhafi's almost 42-year rule in Libya.

But they have been facing sustained attacks and have called for the international community to supply them with better and more powerful equipment.

Saddoun El-Misurati, a spokesman for the Libyan opposition in Misrata, described intense fighting and casualties in the city.

"We managed to get two shipments so far of badly needed medical supplies to the hospitals. But obviously we still need more supplies in dealing with the day-to-day casualties and the situation on the ground," he said.

"Our greatest hope will rely mainly on the support of the international coalition forces in the form of change of tactics from the air to (not only) target tanks and heavy artillery of Gadhafi's forces but also take out groups of snipers positioned on buildings and in the city."

Rebel forces have lost Bin Jawad and the key oil town of Ras Lanuf and are backed up to the al-Brega area, opposition member Col. Ahmed Bani said Wednesday.

Ajdabiya, which is east of al-Brega, will be prepared as a "defense point" if the withdrawal continues farther east, he said.

Weather conditions prevented a NATO-led coalition from launching more airstrikes in an attempt to weaken Gadhafi's ability to attack civilians, a U.S. representative said Wednesday.

U.S. and British officials say no decision has been made about whether to arm the opposition.

"We're not ruling it out or ruling it in," White House press secretary Jay Carney said in a statement Wednesday. "We're assessing and reviewing options for all types of assistance that we could provide to the Libyan people, and have consulted directly with the opposition and our international partners about these matters."

Robert Baer, a former CIA operative, said the CIA's effectiveness might be limited.

"I would rather see the Defense Department on the ground, if you have to be there, training," Baer said. "The CIA hates covert action. It rarely works. It worked in Afghanistan, but other times it's almost impossible to do."

Paul Wolfowitz, a former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, said he thinks "we should be doing everything we possibly can to support the opposition," and a prolonged stalemate would be bad for both Libyans who continue to suffer and for the United States.

"It's true we don't know what the opposition would be like when they do take over, but there are actually some promising signs," Wolfowitz said. "But the important thing is we should be in there, we should be working with them."

Amid the setbacks faced by rebels Wednesday, a significant crack in Gadhafi's armor surfaced when Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa fled to London and told the government there that he has resigned, the UK Foreign Office said.

Koussa -- a former head of Libyan intelligence -- was a stalwart defender of the government as recently as a month ago. But in recent weeks, his demeanor visibly changed. At one recent media briefing, he kept his head down as he read a statement and left early.

The UK Foreign Office called on other members of the regime to follow Koussa's example and "embrace a better future for Libya."

As the battles in Libya continue unfolding, the end game in the North African nation -- and whether a negotiated exit for Gadhafi would be possible or desirable -- remains uncertain.

The InternationalCriminal Court, at the request of the United Nations Security Council, is investigating alleged "crimes against humanity" by Gadhafi.

Last week, Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said he was certain his investigation would lead to charges against Gadhafi and members of his inner circle. That could complicate any efforts to reach a negotiated exit for the Libyan leader.

Baer said a more drastic approach could be the most effective course.

"I hate to say it, but right now our best chance of ending this conflict is eliminating Gadhafi," he said. "I'm not advocating -- I'm just saying this is the quickest solution. He is the problem. We're doing these stop-gap measures like bombing. It's stopping a massacre, but on the other hand ... we're getting pulled into a quagmire."

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 16:56 schreef Hans_van_Baalen het volgende:
Onze F16's mogen zich niet verdedigen Wat doen ze daar

SPOILER

Om spoilers te kunnen lezen moet je zijn ingelogd. Je moet je daarvoor eerst gratis Registreren. Ook kun je spoilers niet lezen als je een ban hebt.

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Onze F16's mogen zich niet verdedigen Wat doen ze daar

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 19:46 schreef Chooselife het volgende:
Kijk eens aan. Wat een snelle en handige jongens die rebellen. Ze hebben in rap tempo zowel een nieuwe centrale Libische bank opgericht, als een nieuwe centrale Libische oliemaatschappij.

http://theeconomiccollaps(...)entral-bank-of-libya

http://www.bloomberg.com/(...)place-qaddafi-s.html

Zouden ze er ongeluk hulp hebben gekregen?

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Op donderdag 31 maart 2011 19:54 schreef Apache4U het volgende:

[..]

Ziet dit eruit als iemand die hulp nodig heeft? Dacht het niet.. zo te zien heeft ie ook de avondvierdaagse gelopen, dus een bank en oliemaatschappij moeten geen probleem zijn .

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