Hele verhaal: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7001937.stmquote:Jordan jihadis vow fight to the end
Life is dusty and bleak in the downtrodden townships around Jordan's capital, Amman.
You see boredom, resentment and frustration everywhere. This is fertile ground for spreading radicalism.
Some of al-Qaeda's biggest names grew up in these streets, like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Possibly the most notorious insurgent in Iraq, he is blamed for bombings, assassinations and beheading foreign hostages in Iraq, including Briton Ken Bigley.
American troops killed Zarqawi a year ago but we came to meet his friends and followers back home in Jordan.
They are recruiting waves of new warriors - self-styled holy fighters against the West in Iraq.
It was not easy to get into contact with Jordan's jihadis. Crackdowns by the secret police here make getting to Iraq extremely difficult.
Veteran jihadi's story
So, they only agreed to meet us at night. We were told at the very last minute who we were seeing, without being given anyone's real names, of course, and where.
Abu Abdel Rahman is a veteran jihadi. He told us he had been to Iraq from Jordan five times.
"When I am in Iraq I feel calm, happy and comfortable. There is a lot of blood, killing and carnage but I know I am there in God's name," he says.
He was keen to point out that he and his fellow mujahideen were not blood-thirsty, just on the defensive. He said, that is why he and other Jordanian jihadis agreed to meet the BBC. They wanted us to understand their point of view.
"You infidel countries. You came to fight us, in Muslim lands. What do you expect: that we greet you with roses? Muslims don't kill for the sake of killing. America and its allies have dug their own graves in Iraq," he says.
also asked Abu Abdel Rahman about Muslims killing Muslims in Iraq in what seems to be an increasingly vicious vengeful power struggle between radical Sunni and Shia Muslims there.
He agreed the phenomenon was regretful but said, as a Sunni, it was his duty to continue fighting against what he described as the Shia crescent. But, he insisted, his prime concern, remained ridding Muslim lands of non-Muslims.
Back home from Iraq, Abu Abdel Rahman now actively recruits other Jordanians to fight. He says it is not difficult to persuade them.
quote:Sunni tribes seek unity
By Maher Al-Jasem in Ramadi, Iraq
Sunni tribal leaders are pushing for a national tribal organisation to end violence [AFP]
Following the assassination of a tribal chief who opposed al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni tribes in the country are now pushing for the creation of a national tribal organisation as a means to end the violence in Iraq.
Tribal chiefs from the west, south and north of Iraq will first set up a system of cohesive nationwide salvation councils to support local police forces in their efforts to combat crime and terrorism.
The councils are expected to adopt a model first applied in al-Anbar in which local tribes and former Baathists worked to restore order and security following the US attacks on Falluja in 2004.
Abu Omar al-Mahalawi, a senior figure in the Abu Mahal tribe, told Al Jazeera that the tribes of al-Anbar are trying to reach out to the southern Shia Arab counterparts.
He said: "Shia tribes are being attacked by al-Qaeda just like we are, so now is the time for all of us Shia and Sunni to unite; after all we all belong to one tribal community in Iraq."
Rather than rely on Iraqi army and police units from other provinces or the use of US forces, the tribes urged local militia to create a new police force, patrol the streets, establish detention facilities and work on a provincial court system.
The council received assurances from the Iraqi government that it would apply an autonomous approach to maintaining security.
The al-Anbar councils also empowered the Sunni tribal militias to remove foreign fighters from the province, a key step, they believed, to maintaining security.
Ramadi success
Since its inception in mid-2006, the council has managed to restore
order in several Anbar cities including Hiyt, where a security presence was re-established for the first time in April 2007, after the police headquarters was blown up in 2005.
"We discovered their (al-Qaeda's) real agenda... they were working to destroy Iraq. They did not come to liberate Iraq. The tribes know this now. They are our most dangerous enemy"
Abu Mazen al-Obaidi, a former army officer and a Sunni tribal leader
The council has also been successful in reducing the level of violence in Ramadi, al-Anbar's capital, after it had been transformed into a battleground between al-Qaeda, various insurgent groups, and US forces.
Abu Mazen al-Obaidi, a former officer in the Iraqi security establishment and a member of the al-Obaidi tribe in Ramadi, said US forces had been trying for years to dislodge al-Qaeda's influence from the area but never succeeded.
Only when local tribes turned on al-Qaeda and convinced local resistance groups to break ties with al-Qaeda fighters did that influence begin to wane.
"We discovered their [al-Qaeda's] real agenda ... they were working to destroy Iraq. They did not come to liberate Iraq. The tribes know this now. They are our most dangerous enemy," he said.
Iraqi fighters in Ramadi began to pursue and kill some of al-Qaeda's commanders; some were caught, put on trial and executed.
Al-Qaeda responded by attacking police recruitment centres, police officials, and local tribal elders.
He added: "They are killing everyone now. They came to fight the US occupation, they told us, but they have been unable to do that, so now they are killing all Iraqis – Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. And all Iraqis will fight back. These are the last days of al-Qaeda."
The US military has lauded the al-Anbar Salvation Council's efforts as one of the few successes to emerge over the past four years.
Combating al-Qaeda
Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who headed the Al-Anbar Salvation Council and
spearheaded efforts to rout out al-Qaeda forces from western Iraq, was killed on September 14 by a roadside bomb near his farm.
US expressed concern that Abu Risha's death
could derail their efforts [AFP]
US forces, who had been helping the al-Anbar Council against al-Qaeda, expressed concern that Abu Risha's death could derail their efforts.
But al-Mahalawi dismissed these concerns saying that Abu Risha's death has been a wake up call for Iraqi tribes.
"We now understand two things; firstly, al-Qaeda has been implementing the same strategy as the Iranian militias, which is to target Sunnis, destroy Arab unity and create chaos in Iraq," he said.
"The second is that all the tribes, from al-Anbar to Salahadin to Diyala, are seeking unity to combat al-Qaeda. We are uniting now."
Mosul Salvation Council
On September 15, tribal leaders from al-Anbar met their counterparts in the northern Nineveh province and a day later, Sheikh Fawaz al-Jarba, head of Mosul's Shamar tribe, announced the formation of the Mosul Salvation Council.
The Mosul Salvation Council seeks to use the same approach - recruiting local tribesmen and militia for police and security - to pacify Mosul, Tal Afar and the surrounding villages where the Islamic State of Iraq, an al-Qaeda offshoot, maintains a large presence.
Al-Jarba told Al Jazeera that several of the most prominent northern tribes had signed on to the Mosul Salvation Council, including the al-Jubor, al-Ttay, al-Nuaim, Albu Badran, Kirkeah, Shamar, as well as a number of Yazidi tribes.
"We are determined to clean Mosul from al-Qaeda's evil net," he said.
Al-Jarba did not comment on whether he had received US assurances of assistance.
US help?
Working with US forces is still considered a taboo subject among many of the Sunni tribes, particularly because many blame the invasion for their situation.
Working with US forces is considered a taboo
among many Sunni tribes [GALLO/GETTY]
Al-Mahlawi told Al Jazeera that some Anbari tribes regard the US military with suspicion.
He said: "They have to be careful ... they believe Americans have double faces.
"In the beginning they sided with the victorious side, the Shia militias, and now they are siding with the Sunni tribes. This makes it appear that the US presence here is not for Iraq's national interests but for theirs only."
Abu Mohannad, an al-Anbar provincial official, said the lack of Sunni political unity in Baghdad could also prove to be an obstacle to tribal aims against fight al-Qaeda.
"There is no agreement between Sunni politicians in the Iraqi government and Parliament," he said.
"Some of them selected to side with the Iraqi resistance while others sided with the government."
Abu Mohannad believes seeking US help may be one of the few remaining options, but offered a warning to the US military.
"If the US refuses to respond to Sunni requests for help, we may resort to asking the help of neighbouring Arab Sunni countries."
In previous years, Sunni tribes have lobbied for support in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
In December, the Saudi monarchy indicated it was willing to arm and finance Sunni factions if the US failed to do or would prematurely withdraw its forces from Iraq.
Dissent
But not all Sunni tribal leaders agree with the objectives of the salvation councils.
Jamal Hadahda, a tribal official in al-Anbar, had previously voiced opposition to Abu Risha's role in the al-Anbar Salvation Council.
"I think the old sheikhs of the Dulaim tribes haven't agreed that someone as young as Abdul Sattar [Abu Risha] lead them," he said.
He predicted dissent among Sunni tribes if they did not all agree on Abu Risha's successor and a new platform for the council's aims.
"The new leader of the council needs to focus on the unity of the tribes and not to work with the Americans on reconstruction projects and how to increase his political leverage through them."
Mustafa al-Heeti, a member of a Hiyt tribe, said the US was pushing too quickly to merge the tribes into a national front to combat al-Qaeda and that this could backfire.
He said the first step is to rehabilitate Iraqi tribesmen who were working with al-Qaeda before taking up arms against them.
Al-Heeti said: "The US is trying to create a new melting pot of Iraqi society in order to build a new post-war community, in much the same way they did in Japan and Germany in 1945.
"We haven't found stability in Iraq in the past four years of these efforts ... I am afraid the immediate future won't be much different."
http://www.wereldomroep.nl/actua/middenoosten/070920_koerdenquote:Geweld verdrijft Iraakse Koerden
door correspondent Hans Jaap Melissen
20-09-2007
Reportage over gevluchte Iraakse Koerden
Iran voert al enkele weken aanvallen uit op het grensgebied tussen Turkije, Iran en Irak. Doelwit is de Koerdische afscheidingsbeweging PKK, maar gewone burgers zijn vaak het slachtoffer.
"Kijk, hier gebeurt het allemaal." Bahram Areef Yaseen buigt zich over een kaart van Koerdistan. De lokale commandant van de Peshmerga, de Koerdische strijders, ziet met lede ogen aan dat 'zijn' gebied de afgelopen weken regelmatig is bestookt vanuit Iran.
Lukraak schieten
"Iran schiet onder andere met Katjoesja-raketten en Houwitzers." Die komen nogal lukraak binnen en raken ook de burgerbevolking. Terwijl het eigenlijke doelwit de Koerdische afscheidingsbeweging PKK is.
In dit gebied, een drielandenpunt tussen Turkije, Iran en Irak, moeten enkele duizenden leden van de Koerdische beweging rondlopen. Het geweld heeft al honderden Iraaks-Koerdische families uit hun huizen verdreven. "Tachtig procent van de aanvallen gebeurt in gebieden waar geen PKK-strijders zijn", zegt Yaseen.
Dichterbij de grens kom je de vluchtelingen al gauw tegen: er staan tenten langs de weg en in het veld. Vrouwen en mannen hangen rond terwijl kinderen bij een beekje spelen. Overal liggen bergen huisraad. Geiten en kippen snuffelen er rond op zoek naar iets eetbaars.
"Kijk wat we weer moeten meemaken", zegt een oudere vrouw. "De tenten zijn gescheurd en we hebben weinig eten. Iran wil schieten op de PKK, maar wij wonen er ook." Sommige vluchtelingen zeggen de PKK nog nooit te hebben gezien. "Ze zitten heel erg afgelegen."
Schijnheilig
Commandant Yaseen denkt dat de officiële protesten van de Iraakse regering tegen de beschietingen een beetje schijnheilig zijn. Hij ziet zelfs een verband tussen het geweld en de bezoeken van de Iraakse premier Maliki aan Turkije en Iran. "Volgens mij heeft Maliki groen licht gegeven om de PKK stevig aan te pakken."
Yaseen gelooft niet dat er een militaire oplossing is voor het probleem van de PKK. "Turkije moet met hen om de tafel gaan zitten. Militair begin je weinig tegen ze. Wij doen er zelf ook niet veel tegen."
Het is al een aantal dagen stil rond de grens. Maar de vluchtelingen vertrouwen de rust niet. "Het kan zo weer beginnen." Een man laat zien waar hij onlangs met zijn kinderen liep: een tiental meters verder landde een Iraanse raket.
Veel vertrouwen in een vreedzame toekomst heeft hij niet. "We moeten het zeker hebben van premier Maliki? Die doet niets voor ons. Die vindt het al lang best als de Koerden weer een probleem hebben." En hij kijkt naar de verbrande heuvel en verder omhoog naar de Iraanse bunkers die op de bergrug liggen.
Waarom heet dit topic eigenlijk na de oorlog?quote:Op donderdag 20 september 2007 21:36 schreef Yildiz het volgende:
Op zich is deze oorlog wel succesvol.
Okay, er zijn een paar doden gevallen, flink wat verdragen hebben flinke justitiele deuken opgelopen, het terrorisme is gegroeid en de haat is hier en daar wat toegenomen, maar toch.
Het is succesvol. Voor bedrijven. Voor de economie, en dat is genoeg.
Volgens Bushquote:Op vrijdag 21 september 2007 08:35 schreef GreyHeron het volgende:
Omdat de oorlog officeel al sinds mei 2003 is afgelopen
http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=6449quote:Iraq and the Politics of Withdrawal: Lessons from U.S. Occupations in Latin America
By Alan McPherson | Monday, September 17, 2007
As U.S. politicians of every political stripe seek to find ways to extricate their nation from Iraq, historian Alan McPherson provides some keen insights from another era — and theater — of U.S. history. He explores previous U.S. “entanglements” and shows how hard it is to leave behind the morass of presumed tin cup dictatorships.
The September 2007 Congressional hearings featuring General David Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker have highlighted one salient fact of the mess in Mesopotamia.
That is the crying need for a political solution among Iraqis that could foster a decent mix of stability and democracy. Turns out, after all, it’s the politics, stupid.
Closer to home
That should not have come as any news to U.S. strategists, diplomats and military leaders worth their salt. Much closer to home than is the case with Iraq, U.S. military occupations in Latin America taught us the same lesson.
Unfortunately, that ancient lesson has evidently been completely forgotten — even though it is most salient. What is Iraq now was Latin America then, a time and place where the force of the United States as an invading power was considered at least as powerful as it is today.
Whether in Haiti or elsewhere, Americans back then believed that they were top dog — and, after invading, could fix up a place like that rather quickly. Little did they know then… Little do we know now…
Same mistakes
In particular, the long occupations — Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) and Nicaragua (1912-1933) — demonstrated amply a basic miscalculation on the part of the United States.
Then as now, U.S. policymakers believed that politicians under occupation were a highly pliable force — to be used on behalf of the good intentions of the intervening United States to remake that country — and extinguish all evil from its soil.
Destruction by politicians
Alas, politicians — even when under occupation (and therefore seemingly powerless) — remained politicians. No matter how deprived, abused, exhausted or otherwise starved for stability ordinary people were under occupation, Haitian, Dominican and Nicaraguan politicians were of another breed.
All too often, they proved willing to go on fighting with each other, to be uncompromising with either the U.S. Marines or the State Department — and to play the infamous “waiting game” until the troops left and the destructive politics of old could return.
And were those politics ever destructive. The Marines landed in all three countries in part to keep away dreaded European gunboats, but they stayed to try to right a far more fearsome wrong: internecine — or, as we say today of Iraq, sectarian — politics.
Decentralized governments
Similarly, the small countries of Latin America in the 1910s were radically decentralized places, where capital cities barely communicated with outlying towns and roads were nonexistent or impassable. (Did somebody say Afghanistan?)
As a result, political parties were personal fiefdoms and every local caudillo or strongman had his own armed force that the central government could not possibly hope to tame. The clash between these mini-armies was what led to each U.S. occupation.
Repeating history
As in Iraq, soon after achieving regime change, U.S. forces found themselves opposing political cultures
completely unwilling to adopt U.S. ways.
Then as now, proud Marines — deployed and trained solely as a strike force, but now turned into administrators — replaced corrupt and incompetent local politicians with others who pledged some loyalty to Port-au-Prince, Santo Domingo or Managua — but never forgot their party affiliations.
Then as now, Marines also put together quasi-professional security forces that could wipe out the mini-armies — but which never quite internalized their apolitical mission.
Leaving a mess
Eventually, the Marines had to go. Yes, some roads had been built, internal security was restored to a degree — and U.S. Senators back home, as well as Latin Americans everywhere, clamored for the withdrawal of the Yankees.
But there was a sense of “good riddance” among the departing Marines, who suddenly abandoned the pretense that they would teach occupied peoples to cheerfully accept the values of bipartisanship, transparency and fiscal responsibility.
Foundations for dictators
When the Marines left, one of two disasters typically befell post-occupation societies. In the Dominican
Republic and Nicaragua, the newly nationalized security forces or National Guards soon dominated all parties.
They thus took ruthless advantage of the structure left behind by the Marines — and soon enough elevated to the rank of dictators men such as the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo and Nicaragua’s Anastazio Somoza.
In Haiti, meanwhile, U.S. and Haitian racism had prevented even the training of an effective security force, so the old politics returned. For a few decades, dishonest presidents divided the populace along familiar lines of race and region, until in the 1950s “Papa Doc” Duvalier climbed atop them all.
The same problem in Iraq
The fatal flaw of these occupations is alive again in Iraq. Despite Ambassador Crocker’s recent mutterings, the United States is again building up an apparatus of repression — without paying due respect to the political culture of Iraq.
Too much centralization is taking place, leaving scant room for the natural evolution of indigenous political institutions.
No understanding
The Iraq of today is, of course, very different from Latin America almost a century ago. Mostly, the endgame is a lot more serious. But the occupations of the past show one constant: Local loyalties — family, kin, religion, race, patronage — are far more powerful than national ones.
The consequence is clear: The center of Iraq will not hold unless either a dictator arises — or the regions have significant authority.
So far, only Senator Joe Biden, Jr. (D-DE) — who himself had a circuitous route of insights and policy positions before he arrived at this wisdom — seems to have gotten the message.
Learning from mistakes
As he said during the Petraeus/Crocker hearings, “We have to give the Iraqi warring factions breathing room in regions with local control over the fabric of their daily lives — police, education, jobs, marriage, religion.”
To make this a reality, a partition of Iraq in three might not be necessary. But at the very least, U.S. officials need to embrace the “Iraqization” of politics and not just security.
Jezus man. Die lui zijn gestoord.quote:Op zondag 23 september 2007 19:04 schreef Jelle88 het volgende:
Damn dit is zwaar ziek: http://youtube.com/watch?v=gJUEUhsImf0
Hier zie je hoe "personeel van blackwater" mensen "voor de lol" doodschieten![]()
Dat filmpje. Ik kan er niet naar kijken zonder heel hard te gaan schelden.quote:Op zondag 23 september 2007 19:04 schreef Jelle88 het volgende:
Damn dit is zwaar ziek: http://youtube.com/watch?v=gJUEUhsImf0
Hier zie je hoe "personeel van blackwater" mensen "voor de lol" doodschieten![]()
Klopt ja. En inderdaad, in het commentaar van youtube zijn er mensen die dit soort acties verdedigen 'want die paupers kunnuh toch lezuh dat ze afstand moeten houden'. Re-gels zijn re-gels.quote:Op zondag 23 september 2007 19:29 schreef Caesu het volgende:
behoorlijk ziek filmpje.
het kunnen natuurlijk ook bomauto's zijn.
maar geen enkele bestuurder zonder verrekijker kan van die afstand lezen dat ze afstand moeten houden.
dit filmpje komt trouwens van Aegis, een andere groep huurlingen.
Dat is toch ook wat er nu gebeurd?quote:Op zondag 23 september 2007 19:31 schreef gronk het volgende:
[..]
Klopt ja. En inderdaad, in het commentaar van youtube zijn er mensen die dit soort acties verdedigen 'want die paupers kunnuh toch lezuh dat ze afstand moeten houden'. Re-gels zijn re-gels.
Overigens, iedere irakees, of what-the-heck, ieder mens kan een potentiele terrorist zijn. Zullen we daarom maar de hele bevolking van Irak uitmoorden, dan weten we tenminste *zeker* dat er a) geen terroristen meer in irak zijn en b) dat de terroristen in irak geen slachtoffers meer kunnen maken.
![]()
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Maargoed dat ze wettelijk beschermd zijn. Nouja, eigenlijk juist niet, wat is dan het wettelijke verschil tussen een 'vijandelijk strijder' (zoals iemand genoemd wordt die blijkbaar geen rechten meer heeft) of een huurling; welke onder geen enkele wet in Irak leeft?quote:Op zondag 23 september 2007 19:04 schreef Jelle88 het volgende:
Damn dit is zwaar ziek: http://youtube.com/watch?v=gJUEUhsImf0
Hier zie je hoe "personeel van blackwater" mensen "voor de lol" doodschieten![]()
IOC in den haag.quote:
Toestemming van de betrokken overheden, dat is het verschil. Wat nu dus in gevaar is gekomen overigens.quote:Op maandag 24 september 2007 08:10 schreef Yildiz het volgende:
Waarom vallen huurlingen onder internationaal recht, als 'illegale strijders' dat niet doen? Wat is het verschil?
Beiden zitten niet in een staatsleger. Beiden opereren onafhankelijk, beiden hebben geen centraal aan te spreken opdrachtgever, beiden nemen het niet zo nou met mensenrechten van de ander.
Het juridische verschil is amper te zien.
Mensen die in Afghanistan in opdracht van de Taliban opereren zijn dus ook huurlingen.quote:Op maandag 24 september 2007 08:12 schreef Evil_Jur het volgende:
[..]
Toestemming van de betrokken overheden, dat is het verschil. Wat nu dus in gevaar is gekomen overigens.
Dus de fouten die alle koloniale landen in het verleden heeft gemaakt, doet de VS nu in zijn eentje?quote:Op donderdag 27 september 2007 10:49 schreef Perrin het volgende:
knip
Senaat VS keurt plan goed om Irak op te splitsen
http://link.brightcove.co(...)4084/bctid1209589880quote:The book and film argue that the free market polices of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics have risen to prominence in countries such as Chile under Pinochet, Russia under Yeltsin, the United States (for example in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, and the privatization of Iraq's economy under the Coalition Provisional Authority not because they were democratically popular, but because they were pushed through while the citizens of these countries were in shock from disasters or upheavals.
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