[Centraal] Crisis in Syri� en Irak #382 Strijd om Aleppo.

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QalaatAlMudiq twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 16:54:10 While 1st Rebel gains reported on Jamiyah Az-Zahra fornt, Jaish Al-Fateh started preemptive shelling on Huways in S. https://t.co/pTKo3a214M reageer retweet

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QalaatAlMudiq twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 19:07:19 Breaking. The Cement Factory is under full control of Jaish Al-Fateh, S. #Aleppo. https://t.co/uDq1s84vVk reageer retweet

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leithfadel twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 19:47:48 Tiger Forces source denies losing the Cement Factory. Claims situation there is "stable" - we will see. reageer retweet

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Ahrar_lens twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 18:51:42 نسف مراكز المليشيات الطائفية في حي جمعية الزهراء بسيارة مفخخة مسيرة#أحرار_الشام#عدسة_أحرار_الشام#حلب https://t.co/KumFpj3LqD reageer retweet

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 20:09 schreef haags_kwartiertje het volgende:
[ afbeelding ]
Is deze kaart uit de OP actueel?

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 20:10 schreef haags_kwartiertje het volgende:

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Oh wauw, dat IS gebied is wel echt flink uitgedund zeg.

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Buzzriet twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 20:06:03 JAF have taken the first goodies drom Cement factory in south #Aleppo https://t.co/YdM9yFGT4L reageer retweet

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ahlalsham1 twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 20:23:14 Reinforcements from both regime and JaF at Cement Factory arrived. Fierce battle still ongoing to capture the remaining parts. reageer retweet

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RamiAILoIah twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 20:06:41 Massive explosion rocked Atme border crossing with #Turkey. Ambulances rushing to the site.. #Syria reageer retweet

twitter:

RamiAILoIah twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 20:14:16 Eyewitnesses: Fierce gun fire reported after the massive explosion rocked Atme border crossing with #Turkey. Causalities unknown yet #Syria reageer retweet

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 21:35 schreef UpsideDown het volgende:
Sws moet het ISIS zijn geweest, vanuit Al-Rai

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sterion75 twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 21:23:51 It appears the suicide bomber struck a bus loaded with #FSA recruits #Atmah crossing #Syria https://t.co/IU4httooc2 reageer retweet

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sayed_ridha twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 21:05:19 30+ militants from 3 FSA groups and reportedly Faylaq al-Sham killed including several civilians at Atmeh bordercrossing reageer retweet

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 21:44 schreef Szura het volgende:

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Lood om oud ijzer
FSA-honden

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 21:48 schreef Richestorags het volgende:

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Ja. Als ze realistisch waren hadden ze zichzelf allang overgegeven aan de SAA of de YPG. Doorvechten in dat kleine stukje land getuigt van weinig respect voor mensenlevens en van een extremistische instelling.

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 21:53 schreef Richestorags het volgende:

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Dan moet Rusland eerst een fiat hebben gegeven daarvoor.

twitter:

leithfadel twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 22:14:53 VBIED just hit the Cement Factory. reageer retweet

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 22:55 schreef zarGon het volgende:
Iemand had ooit een plaatje gepost met daarop de gouvernementen van Syri� en hoeveel procent elke partij in bezit had.

Is daar nog een update van?

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 23:13 schreef UpsideDown het volgende:

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EzidiPress twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 21:22:10 Two members of #Ezidi Special Force Ezidkhan (YT�) secure the road to a refugee camp on Mt #Shingalphoto: Ali Pir https://t.co/6uV8KAgLFM reageer retweet

[ afbeelding ]

Die hebben ook snel progressie gemaakt

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 23:17 schreef UpsideDown het volgende:

[..]

Gebaseerd op?

نسف مراكز الميليشيات في حي جمعية الزهراء بحلب بسيارة مفخخة مسيرة عن بعد

twitter:

Conflicts twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 23:44:40 VIDEO: Drone footage of a regime artillery strike on a rebel truck in Ramouseh area in SW. Aleppo - @miladvisor https://t.co/zYvJCAr0RN reageer retweet

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Op zondag 14 augustus 2016 23:22 schreef Adrie072 het volgende:
Wie schiet er hier op wie in dat filmpje?

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Nrg8000 twitterde op maandag 15-08-2016 om 08:04:37 The JaF/FH offensive on the Cement Factory in S #Aleppo has been repelled after offensive forces withdrew this morning. reageer retweet

twitter:

BosnjoBoy twitterde op maandag 15-08-2016 om 11:48:27 (1) Rebels massing troops to storm Al Rai town in N.#Aleppo, on the #Turkey border. #Syria, fighting started. reageer retweet

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Turkish PM suggests three-step road map for Syria

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım has suggested a three-pronged road map for a solution to the five-year-old war in Syria, which has not only affected neighboring countries but also many parts of the world with the flight of more than 4 million refugees.

Stating that he was optimistic that a solution was at hand due to the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy, in which Ankara aims to make more friends and decrease its number of enemies, Yıldırım said the time had come for Turkey to mend relations with Syria after taking steps for rapprochement with Israel and Russia, adding that they would overcome the Syrian problem together with regional actors.

“It will be a solution that will absolutely preserve Syria’s territorial integrity,” Yıldırım told Turkish daily Karar in an interview published on Aug. 15.

“Therefore, a state structure like the PYD [the Democratic Union Party] in this country [Syria] will be out of the question,” said Yıldırım, referring to Turkey’s objection to the PYD and its military wing, the People’s Protection Unit (YPG), which has created a federation for the peoples of northern Syria.

Turkey considers the PYD and YPG to be offshoots of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been fighting the Turkish state since 1984.

Turkey differs with the United States with regards to the PYD and YPG. The U.S. sees the two groups as its most reliable and effective partners in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The U.S., on the other hand, designates the PKK as a terror organization.

In the second stage, Yıldırım said the new era would not feature a state structure in which any of Syria’s sectarian, ethnic or regional formations has supremacy over the others.

“Namely, a structure will be formed that will eliminate the main defect of the current bloody problem in Syria,” he said. “As there will be no sectarian structure, this also means that [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad will not be there in the long-run.”

Turkey opposes the rule of al-Assad and blames him for many of the 290,000 deaths in the civil war and the creation of 4 million refugees.

“When a solution is put in place, Syrians who had to flee and seek refuge in regional countries including Turkey, will return to their country within the scope of a plan,” said Yıldırım, defining this last stage as the most important step for Turkey, which hosts around 3 million refugees, most of whom are from Syria.

http://www.hurriyetdailyn(...)102851&NewsCatID=510
August/15/2016

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Op maandag 15 augustus 2016 17:21 schreef Zahreddine het volgende:
Ooh, gaan we de Amerikanen aan de kant van de SAA krijgen?

twitter:

Reuters twitterde op maandag 15-08-2016 om 15:08:31 Russia says close to starting joint military action with USA in Aleppo: RIA https://t.co/uT5NPdnHaL reageer retweet

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Op maandag 15 augustus 2016 23:07 schreef Zahreddine het volgende:
Ik verwacht er niet teveel van.

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MIG29_ twitterde op maandag 15-08-2016 om 22:26:00 #Breaking #SAA Advancing now in 1070 area #Aleppo reageer retweet

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Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 10:40 schreef Zahreddine het volgende:

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Souria4Syrians twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 02:00:07 Battle Map: Syrian Army & Allies CAPTURE more than half of 1070 projects in ongoing counteroffensive. #Aleppo https://t.co/9AN2aLaXyI reageer retweet

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QalaatAlMudiq twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 11:20:14 Amidst 1st reports of #RuAF Tu-22M bombing Rebel-held territory, activists say very high nbr of airstrikes last 12 hrs in Aleppo-Idlib Prov. reageer retweet

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ahlalsham1 twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 09:34:09 This is getting ridiculous. 200 RuAF bombings from last nidnight till now (10am) at South Aleppo. At this rate, they will level everything. reageer retweet

twitter:

QalaatAlMudiq twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 08:40:39 @QalaatAlMudiq Forthcoming arrival of Russian AircraftCarrier in Oct. shows clear increase of #RuAF capabilities after recent Assad setbacks reageer retweet

twitter:

QalaatAlMudiq twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 09:06:01 @QalaatAlMudiq Also reports Russia asked Iran & Iraq to use their airspace to strike Syria with cruise missiles (fired from Caspian Sea). reageer retweet

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raytheonunited twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 09:30:47 @QalaatAlMudiq Desperate to give Assad an advantage before January 2017. However they have done all of these last year. reageer retweet

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GissiSim twitterde op zondag 14-08-2016 om 17:04:39 SDF just announced they will take al-Bab next and not Jarabulus. What does this mean? Here is my short hot take /1 https://t.co/9kglnnAKlU reageer retweet

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Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 11:53 schreef Roffa123 het volgende:

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Is Rusland niet juist voor de Syrische regering?

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Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 11:55 schreef UpsideDown het volgende:

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Zijn analyse klopt imo

twitter:

ShirazMaher twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 11:58:02 Amazing news. The @SyriaCivilDef have been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Help them win by signing here: https://t.co/mchNv2R78F reageer retweet

twitter:

bm21_grad twitterde op dinsdag 16-08-2016 om 15:28:52 Tu-22M3s flying from Mozdok could only carry 5-8 tons of bombs, now flying from Hamedan they can carry 22 tons says expert Konstantin Sivkov reageer retweet

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Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 16:09 schreef HSG het volgende:
Duitse overheid: Turkije werkt samen met terroristen.

Bron.

Zou het moddergooien zijn begonnen?

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Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 16:52 schreef HSG het volgende:

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Maar steunt Rusland Hezbollah door wapens, munitie en andere voorraden te leveren? Turkije doet dat namelijk wel met terroristische organisaties.

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Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 16:54 schreef HSG het volgende:

[..]

Misschien via via gekregen.

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Present At the Creation

The never-told-before story of the meeting that led to the creation of ISIS, as explained by an Islamic State insider.

By Harald Doornbos, Jenan Moussa
August 16, 2016

Since its creation, we have learned about the Islamic State from its enemies. Its story has largely been told by those fighting the group in Iraq and Syria, traumatized civilians who have escaped its brutal rule, and the occasional defector. That is about to change. This is the story of Abu Ahmad, a Syrian operative for the Islamic State who witnessed the group’s lightning expansion firsthand and spent months among its most notorious foreign fighters.

In this series of three articles, he provides unique insight into how Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s political scheming paved the way for the Islamic State’s expansion into Syria, al Qaeda’s efforts to stem the group’s rise, and the terrifying weapons in the arsenal of the self-proclaimed “caliphate.” Some names and details have been omitted to protect Abu Ahmad.

Abu Ahmad never hesitated in his embrace of the Syrian uprising. Born in a northern Syrian city to a conservative and religious Sunni Arab family, he was a student when the revolt began in March 2011, and joined the protests against President Bashar al-Assad from day one.

“With excitement in our hearts we saw [the uprising in] Egypt happening, followed by the revolution in Libya,” he said. “We hoped the wind of change would not pass our country.”

When the uprising became a full-fledged civil war by mid-2012, Abu Ahmad decided to take up arms and fight. He joined a jihadi-leaning rebel group, whose members were mostly Syrians but also included some foreign fighters from Europe and Central Asia. The composition of the brigades was in flux then — every couple of months, Abu Ahmad’s group would either change its name or unite with other jihadi rebels. But then the groups began to consolidate: In Spring 2013, Abu Ahmad chose to side with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant when it officially expanded into Syria, as tensions escalated between the jihadi group and the Nusra Front. The group would go on to proclaim itself a worldwide caliphate in June 2014, assuming the name “Islamic State” to reflect its global ambitions. To this day, Abu Ahmad is a serving member in the organization, with unique insight into the group’s behavior and its history.

Over the course of our more than 15 meetings with Abu Ahmad, we questioned him intensively about his knowledge of the jihadi group and his bona fides as one of the “soldiers of the caliphate.” Over a period of 10 months, we spent more than 100 hours with him. He patiently answered our questions on everything from how he ended up with the Islamic State, how the organization is organized, and the identity of the European foreign fighters within the group. Our interviews would go on for six hours a day, in week-long stretches.

Abu Ahmad took a great personal risk in talking to us. Because he is still with the Islamic State, we had to deliberately obscure some details about his life to protect his identity.

Abu Ahmad agreed to speak to us, he explained, for several reasons. Although he is still with the Islamic State, he doesn’t agree with everything the outfit does. He is attracted to the organization because he views it as the strongest Sunni group in the region. However, he is disappointed that it “has become too extreme,” blaming it for doing such things as crucifying, burning, and drowning its opponents and those who violate its rules.

For example, Abu Ahmad objected to a punishment that the Islamic State implemented in the northern Syrian city of al-Bab, where it put a cage in the middle of the city center, known as Freedom Square, to punish Syrian civilians guilty of minor crimes, such as selling cigarettes. The group, Abu Ahmad said, imprisoned Syrians in the cage for three days at a time, hanging a sign around their neck stating the crime that they had committed.

“Now the square is known as the Punishment Square,” he said. “I think this kind of harsh punishment is bad for us. It is making ISIS more feared than liked by Sunnis, which is not good at all.”

In the past, Abu Ahmad said, he had hoped the Islamic State would become “jihadi unifiers,” capable of bringing Sunni jihadis together under one banner. He admired the foreign fighters whom he knew, mainly young men from Belgium and the Netherlands who had traveled to Syria to fight jihad. They had all lived in rich and peaceful countries, and while tens of thousands of Syrians had paid large sums of money to be smuggled to Europe to escape the war, these jihadis voluntarily traveled in the exact opposite direction.

“These foreigners left their families, their houses, their lands and traveled all the way to help us here in Syria,” Abu Ahmad said. “So to support us they are truly sacrificing everything they have.”

But Abu Ahmad would soon sour on aspects of the jihadi group. First, the Islamic State has not brought jihadis together; on the contrary, tensions have risen with other groups, and he worried that “the rise of ISIS led to the breakup with the Nusra Front and the weakening of unified jihadi forces in Syria.”

Secondly, while some of the foreign fighters were men who led truly religious lives in Europe, he discovered another group that he took to thinking of as the “crazies.” These were mostly young Belgian and Dutch criminals of Moroccan descent, unemployed and from broken homes, who lived marginal lives in marginal suburbs of marginal cities. Most of these crazies had no idea about religion, and hardly any of them ever read the Quran. To them, fighting in Syria was either an adventure or a way to repent for their “sinful lives” in Europe’s bars and discos.

There was Abu Sayyaf, a jihadi from Belgium, who often talked about beheadings. He once asked his emir, Abu al-Atheer al Absi, if he could slaughter somebody. “I just want to carry a head,” Abu Sayyaf said. Locally he was known as al-thabah, or “the slayer.”

In war, the first victim is often the truth. The stories Abu Ahmad told us were so incredible, and so close to the seat of the Islamic State’s power, that we were determined to put his assertions to the test.

In order to do so, we set up a quiz for Abu Ahmad. He said that he knew many of the Dutch and Belgian fighters who had joined the Islamic State, so we prepared a list with roughly 50 photographs of jihadis from those countries who are known to have left for Syria. During a meeting with Abu Ahmad, we asked him to identify the men in the pictures.

Abu Ahmad’s answers confirmed that he had extensive knowledge about the European jihadis fighting for the Islamic State. In front of us — without access to the internet and with no outside help — Abu Ahmad went through the images, and correctly identified roughly 30 of the jihadis by name. In most cases, he would add some anecdotes about the fighter. For the other pictures, he said that he had not seen the people and did not know their names.

A behind-the-scenes photograph supplied by Abu Ahmad showing an Islamic State execution in the city of Palmyra.

Abu Ahmad showed us private photos and videos on his laptop of some Dutch, Belgian, and Central Asian fighters in Syria, which are not posted online. The only way that he could have had these images was through deep, personal experience within the jihadi community.

Abu Ahmad also proved that he had behind-the-scenes access to some of the Islamic State’s most spectacular acts of violence. After the jihadi group captured Palmyra in 2015, Abu Ahmad paid a visit to the desert city to witness a Game of Thrones-like setting for executions of the group’s opponents. One day in July 2015, two Islamic State members from Austria and Germany executed two people who they claimed were Syrian Army soldiers on the ancient city’s great colonnade. This was one of many executions in Palmyra; on July 4, the Islamic State released a video showing the bloody spectacle of teenage fighters executing 25 alleged Syrian soldiers in the city’s amphitheater.

Weeks before the official Islamic State video of the gruesome executions by the German and Austrian fighters went online, Abu Ahmad supplied us with a picture of the execution. The photograph not only shows the two prisoners moments before they are killed, but also shows two members of the Islamic State’s media unit capturing the horror scene. Never has the group published such a “behind-the-scenes” picture of one of its executions; it is not available online. The picture supplied by Abu Ahmad is truly unique — secretly taken by an insider.

Remarkably, one of the two cameramen in the photograph is Harry Sarfo, a German citizen who traveled to Syria to join the Islamic State. He said he subsequently became disillusioned with the group and fled back to Germany, where he is currently imprisoned. The New York Times profile of Sarfo claims that Islamic State members told Sarfo “to hold the group’s black flag and to walk again and again in front of the camera” as they filmed a propaganda video. The photograph supplied by Abu Ahmad, however, contradicts the narrative that Sarfo played a passive role in this production: While the video only shows him holding the black flag, the photograph shows that he was one of the two cameramen filming the killers who are about to execute the two Syrians.

Abu Ahmad has not just watched the growing war between Syria’s jihadis from afar — he witnessed its beginning up close. The split between the Nusra Front and the Islamic State was one of the most epochal events of the Syrian war; it resulted in a massive divide within the anti-Assad ranks and signaled the rise of a new jihadi force, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, that has come to overshadow al Qaeda.

Abu Ahmad had a front-row seat to how the jihadi world’s biggest divorce unfolded.

Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi delivers a sermon during Friday prayer at a mosque in Mosul on July 5, 2014. (Photo by Al-Furqan Media/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

The caravan of the caliphate

In mid-April 2013, Abu Ahmad noticed a dark red-brown car pull up in front of the headquarters of Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (MSM), a Syrian jihadi group led by Abu al-Atheer, in the northern Syrian town of Kafr Hamra.

One of Abu Ahmad’s friends, a jihadi commander, walked up to him and whispered in his ear: “Look carefully inside the vehicle.”

The car was nothing special: not new enough to attract attention but not a jalopy, either. It wasn’t armored and it did not have a license plate.

Inside the vehicle sat four men. Abu Ahmad recognized none of them. The man sitting behind the driver wore a folded black balaclava like a cap. On top of it was a black shawl, falling over his shoulders. He had a long beard. Except for the driver, all occupants held small machine guns on their laps.

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Abu Ahmad could see that there was no extra security at the gate of the headquarters. As usual, just two armed fighters stood guard in front of the entrance. The internet connection at the headquarters was working normally. To him, there didn’t seem to be any sign that today was different from any other day.

But after the four men got out of the car and disappeared into the headquarters, the same jihadi commander walked up to him again and whispered “You have just seen Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.”

Since 2010, Baghdadi had been the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al Qaeda’s affiliate in that war-torn country. According to Baghdadi’s own account, he sent Abu Muhammad al-Jolani as his representative to Syria in 2011, instructing him to set up the Nusra Front to wage jihad there. Until the beginning of 2013, ISI and Nusra worked together. But Baghdadi wasn’t satisfied. He wanted to combine al Qaeda’s Iraqi and Syrian affiliates to create one outfit that stretched across both countries — with him, of course, as the leader.

Every morning, for five days in a row, the red-brown car dropped off Baghdadi and his deputy, Haji Bakr, at the headquarters of MSM in Kafr Hamra. Before sunset, the same car with the same driver would pick them up from the headquarters and take Baghdadi to a secret location for the night. The next morning, the car would come back to drop off Baghdadi and Bakr.





Over the course of those five days, inside the headquarters of MSM, Baghdadi talked extensively to a group of important jihadi leaders in Syria. These were some of the world’s most wanted men, all gathered in one room, sitting on mattresses and pillows on the ground. They were served breakfast and lunch: roasted or grilled chicken and french fries, tea, and soft drinks to wash it down. Baghdadi, the most wanted man in the world, drank either Pepsi or Mirinda, an orange-flavored soda.

In addition to Baghdadi, the participants included Abu al-Atheer, the emir of MSM; Abu Mesaab al-Masri, an Egyptian jihadi commander; Omar al Shishani, a leading Chechen jihadi who had come to Syria from Georgia; Abu al-Waleed al-Libi, a jihadi leader from Libya who had come to Syria; Abed al-Libi, an emir in the Libyan Katibat al-Battar group; two Nusra intelligence chiefs; and Haji Bakr, Baghdadi’s second in command.

Abu Ahmad was fascinated by the congregation of so many senior commanders. During breaks in the talks, he would walk around the headquarters, speaking to people who attended the meeting. Abu Ahmad was full of questions: Why did Baghdadi come from Iraq to Syria? Why did all these commanders and emirs meet with him? And what was so important that Baghdadi himself discussed for days on end?

The answer to Abu Ahmad’s questions could be found in a speech made by Baghdadi, shortly before the Kafr Hamra meeting. On April 8, 2013, Baghdadi announced that his organization had expanded into Syria. All jihadi factions there — including Nusra — had to submit to his control. “So we declare while relying on Allah: The cancellation of the name Islamic State of Iraq and the cancellation of the name Jabhat al-Nusra, and gathering them under one name, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham,” he intoned.

“The sheikh is here to convince everybody to abandon Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Jolani,” one of the participants in the talks told Abu Ahmad. “Instead, everybody should join him and unite under the banner of ISIS, which soon will become a state.”

The Islamic State's fighters in Syria (from left to right): Abu al-Atheer, Abu Ahmad’s “emir”; Abu Shishan al-Belgiki, a Belgian citizen of Chechen origin; Abu Tamima, a French jihadist; and Omar al-Shishani, an infamous Chechen jihadist who rose to be one of the top commanders in the organization.

The al Qaeda allegiance lie

Baghdadi, however, faced one big problem in realizing his goal. The assembled emirs explained to the ISI chief that most of them had sworn allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s chosen successor and the leader of al Qaeda. How could they suddenly abandon Zawahiri and al Qaeda and switch to Baghdadi?

According to Abu Ahmad, they asked Baghdadi during the meeting: Have you pledged allegiance to Zawahiri?

Baghdadi told them that he had indeed pledged allegiance, but hadn’t declared it publicly, per Zawahiri’s request. But Baghdadi assured the men that he was acting under the command of the al Qaeda leader.

The jihadi leaders had no way to check if this claim was true. Zawahiri was perhaps the most difficult person in the world to contact — he had not been seen in public in years, and is still in hiding, most probably somewhere in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

With Zawahiri unable to mediate the dispute himself, the jihadi leaders had to make up their own minds. If Baghdadi acted on behalf of Zawahiri, there was no doubt they had to follow the order to join ISIS. But if Baghdadi was freelancing, his plan to take over Nusra and other groups was an act of mutiny. It would divide al Qaeda and create fitna, or strife, between all the jihadi armies.

So the commanders gave Baghdadi a conditional allegiance. “They said to him: ‘If it is true what you are saying, then we will support you,’” Abu Ahmad told us.

Baghdadi also spoke about the creation of an Islamic state in Syria. It was important, he said, because Muslims needed to have a dawla, or state. Baghdadi wanted Muslims to have their own territory, from where they could work and eventually conquer the world.

The participants differed greatly about the idea of creating a state in Syria. Throughout its existence, al Qaeda had worked in the shadows as a nonstate actor. It did not openly control any territory, instead committing acts of violence from undisclosed locations. Remaining a clandestine organization had a huge advantage: It was very difficult for the enemy to find, attack, or destroy them. But by creating a state, the jihadi leaders argued during the meeting, it would be extremely easy for the enemy to find and attack them. A state with a defined territory and institutions was a sitting duck.

Abu al-Atheer, the MSM emir, had already told his fighters before the arrival of Baghdadi that he was very much against declaring a state. “Some people are talking about this unwise idea,” Atheer told his men. “What kind of madman declares a state during this time of war?!”

Omar al-Shishani, the leader of the Chechen jihadis, was equally hesitant about the idea of creating a state, said Abu Ahmad. There was a reason why Osama bin Laden had been hiding all these years — to avoid getting killed by the Americans. Declaring a state would be an open invitation to the enemy to attack them.

Despite the hesitation of many, Baghdadi persisted. Creating and running a state was of paramount importance to him. Up to this point, jihadis ran around without controlling their own territory. Baghdadi argued for borders, a citizenry, institutions, and a functioning bureaucracy. Abu Ahmad summed up Baghdadi’s pitch: “If such an Islamic state could survive its initial phase, it was there to stay forever.”

Baghdadi had another persuasive argument: A state would offer a home to Muslims from all over the world. Because al Qaeda had always lurked in the shadows, it was difficult for ordinary Muslims to sign up. But an Islamic state, Baghdadi argued, could attract thousands, even millions, of like-minded jihadis. It would be a magnet. “Baghdadi and other jihadi leaders,” said Abu Ahmad, “would compare this to Prophet Muhammad’s migration, or hijrah, from Mecca to Medina to escape prosecution.”

The assembled jihadi leaders extensively discussed how a state would function, how it would deal with its population, what its aim would be, and its stance toward religious minorities.

After days of talking, every participant — including initial skeptics Atheer, Shishani, and the two Nusra Front intelligence officials — agreed with Baghdadi’s plan. The only condition they wanted from him was this: The newly created state must be declared in full cooperation with Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, another jihadi rebel group. Baghdadi agreed to these terms.

The next step was, on the spot, to pledge allegiance.

One by one they stood in front of Baghdadi, shaking his hand and repeating the following words: “I pledge my allegiance to the Emir of the Faithful, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Qurashi, for compliance and obedience, in vigor and impulsion, abjectness and abundance, and in favoring his preference to mine, and not contending the orders of his trustees, unless I witness manifest disbelief.”

Then Baghdadi asked each commander to bring in some of his fighters. Abu al-Atheer, the MSM commander, invited Belgian, Dutch, and French fighters who were under his command to the occasion. Among the foreigners who personally met Baghdadi and pledged allegiance were Abu Sayyaf, known as “the slayer”; Abu Zubair, a Belgian jihadi; Abu Tameema al-Fransi, a French jihadi killed in July 2014; and Abu Shishan-al-Belgiki, a handsome blond jihadi with a Chechen background wanted in Belgium, his home country, for possible participation in beheadings.

Later that day, the Europeans — who until recently mostly had been small-time criminals in Amsterdam, Brussels, or Paris — enthusiastically told everybody how they pledged bayah to Baghdadi.

Many others followed suit. Our narrator, Abu Ahmad, would offer bayah two days later to Abu al-Atheer.

comingtuesday2

The switch from ISI to ISIS meant that all groups or factions who had joined ISIS would cease to exist in name. For the Nusra Front and its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, this development was a potential disaster; it could mean the end of their influence in the world’s most important jihadi battleground. Jolani ordered Nusra fighters not to join ISIS but wait until al-Zawahiri published a ruling on who should lead the jihad in Syria.

A large majority of Nusra commanders and fighters in Syria didn’t listen. When Abu Ahmad visited Aleppo only weeks later, some 90 percent of the Nusra fighters in the city had already joined ISIS.

Baghdadi’s new soldiers ordered the few remaining Nusra Front loyalists out of the al-Oyoun Hospital, which had been until then the main Nusra base in the city. “You must leave; we are from al-dawla [the state] and we hold a clear majority among the fighters,” they told the Nusra men, according to Abu Ahmad. “So this headquarters now belongs to us.”

Everywhere in northern Syria, ISIS seized Nusra headquarters, ammunition caches, and weapons stores. Amazingly, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria was suddenly fighting for its existence. A new age had begun — the age of the Islamic State.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/16/present-at-the-creation/

quote:

Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 22:32 schreef HSG het volgende:

[..]

Als die nou ook even meehelpen met bombarderen....

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Op dinsdag 16 augustus 2016 21:01 schreef Aloulu het volgende:

[..]

Interessante shit. Deel 2 ook posten hier!

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Op woensdag 17 augustus 2016 09:17 schreef HSG het volgende:

[..]

Denk het wel want een ding is zeker.... China heeft geld.

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Op woensdag 17 augustus 2016 09:38 schreef Charleville het volgende:

[..]

Raar dat Turkije IS steunt de bevolking van Turkije leek mij op vakantie in Alanya en Bodrum vrij modern, turkse meisjes met rokjes, mannen met tatoeages. Vond eerder de Egyptenaren radicaler tijdens mijn vakantie in Ca�ro. Blijkbaar vergist.

quote:

Op woensdag 17 augustus 2016 12:32 schreef zarGon het volgende:

[..]

Vraag me af wat SAA daar nou zou van vinden. Dat Al-Bab wordt ingenomen en de kantons met elkaar zijn verbonden.

quote:

Op woensdag 17 augustus 2016 13:29 schreef Richestorags het volgende:

[..]

Hoe is de uiteindelijke breuk met de Nusra Front dan weer gebeurd?

quote:

Die knakker speelde trouwens wel hoog spel. No way dat hij onder de autoriteit van AQ handelde, dit was zijn eigen spelletje. Ze hadden hem ook kunnen vermoorden.

quote:

How the Islamic State Seized a Chemical Weapons Stockpile
When jihadists captured a Syrian military base, they found a cache of some of the world’s most dangerous weapons buried in its bunkers. In Part II of an exclusive series, an Islamic State member explains how they eventually fell into the hands of the self-styled “caliphate.”

By Harald Doornbos, Jenan Moussa
August 17, 2016

Since its creation, we have learned about the Islamic State from its enemies. Its story has largely been told by those fighting the group in Iraq and Syria, traumatized civilians who have escaped its brutal rule, and the occasional defector. That is about to change. This is the story of Abu Ahmad, a Syrian operative for the Islamic State who witnessed the group’s lightning expansion firsthand and spent months among its most notorious foreign fighters.

In this series of three articles, he provides unique insight into how Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s political scheming paved the way for its expansion into Syria, al Qaeda’s efforts to stem the group’s rise, and the terrifying weapons in the arsenal of the self-proclaimed “caliphate.” Some names and details have been omitted to protect Abu Ahmad. Read part one here.

Abu Ahmed told us how the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) came to acquire some of the world’s most fearsome weapons, which were claimed as spoils of war from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces months before its creation.

Roughly four months before the split between the Nusra Front and ISIS, in December 2012, dozens of Syrian jihadi fighters climbed a hill toward Regiment 111 — a large army base near the town of Darat Izza, in northern Syria. That town had been taken roughly five months earlier by a coalition of rebel groups. But while they had besieged Regiment 111 since the summer of 2012, they still had not succeeded in capturing the base from the troops loyal to President Assad.

The weather had turned bad in winter, however, making it more difficult for the Syrian Air Force to hold off the rebels with airstrikes. Moreover, the base was huge, sprawling over almost 500 acres, and difficult to protect from all approaches.

Syrian Army soldiers inside Regiment 111 successfully defended their base during the first rebel attack in early November 2012, killing 18 Nusra fighters in the process. But the cold December wind only fortified the rebels’ resolve. The base was a goldmine: home to guns, artillery, ammunition, and vehicles. And deep inside Regiment 111’s bunkers lay something even more valuable — a cache of chemical weapons.

Jihadists looting the weapons stockpiles in the Syrian army base known as Regiment 111, shown here in a still shot taken from a video posted online.

The attack was led by the Nusra Front and supported mainly by Kataib Muhajiri al-Sham, a unit within Liwa al-Islam; Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen; and Katibat al-Battar, which consisted largely of Libyan jihadis. The fighters knew that the base possessed ammunition and other weapons, but did not know in advance it contained chemical weapons.

As the rebels climbed the hills near Regiment 111, intense fighting erupted. “That day, all of us were full of excitement and revenge,” Abu Ahmad told us. “Everybody wanted to avenge the 18 Nusra brothers who were martyred during the first attack. People were screaming: ‘This time we will conquer it!’”

Within a day, the combined jihadi forces had broken through the lines of the Syrian Army. Shortly after, Regiment 111 was fully under jihadi control. They found large stocks of weapons, ammunition and, to their surprise, chemical agents. They were, according to Abu Ahmad, mainly barrels filled with chlorine, sarin, and mustard gas.

What followed was the distribution of the war spoils. Everybody took some ammunition and weapons. But only the Nusra Front seized the chemical weapons. Abu Ahmad watched as the al Qaeda affiliate called in 10 large cargo trucks, loaded 15 containers with chlorine and sarin gas, and drove them away to an unknown destination. He did not see what happened to the mustard gas.

Three months later, both the Syrian government and rebel groups reported an attack in Khan al-Assal, near Aleppo. The international media said that 26 people had been killed, among them 16 regime soldiers and 10 civilians. Both the Syrian regime and opposition claimed that chemical weapons had been used — and both accused the other of having carried out one of the first chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian war.

Abu Ahmad kept his mouth shut in public, but privately he and some of his Syrian jihadi comrades discussed the matter. Although they did not have any evidence, they wondered whether the material used in the Khan al-Assal attack had been taken from Regiment 111. He knew he couldn’t ask Abu al-Atheer for clarification. By now he had learned one of the golden rules of the secretive jihadi movement: When it’s none of your business, keep quiet.

“Among our people, it is not done to ask,” Abu Ahmad told us.

Dutch-Turkish jihadi Salih Yilmaz justifies the use of chemical weapons in response to a question posed to him on his blog and responds to a critique of the Islamic State by saying the jihadist group seized its chemical weapons stockpiles from its opponents.

That would be the end of the issue for the next eight months. Beginning in April 2013, Abu Ahmad and his comrades would be preoccupied with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s expansion into Syria, and the escalating tensions between the newly-created ISIS and the Nusra Front. It was a confused time in the Syrian jihadi world: Many factions within the Nusra Front were breaking off to join ISIS, while the al Qaeda affiliate worked feverishly to maintain loyalty within its ranks. Territory, bases, and weapons were up for grabs like never before.

But in mid-August 2013, Abu Ahmed received news that made him think that ISIS had emerged from the split with the Nusra Front in possession of the chemical weapons seized at Regiment 111 — and that it was now using them against its enemies.

Out of the blue, Abu al-Atheer, the man to whom Abu Ahmed had pledged loyalty — and who had in turn pledged loyalty directly to Baghdadi — told his own commanders that ISIS had twice used chemicals during attacks against the Syrian Army. The announcement came during a normal conversation between Abu al-Atheer and his men; the ISIS commander told the story happily and proudly.

“The brothers sent a car bomb with chemicals to a [Syrian Army] checkpoint near al-Hamra village in Hama,” Abu al-Atheer claimed, as they sat in their headquarters.

Al-Hamra is located roughly 20 miles northeast of the city of Hama. It is still controlled by forces loyal to the Syrian government.

Abu al-Atheer spoke of another ISIS chemical attack. “We also used one car bomb filled with chemicals against regime forces near to Menagh Airbase,” he said. Menagh Airbase is located roughly 20 miles north of Aleppo. After a year-long siege, on Aug. 5, 2013, Menagh Airbase was eventually overrun by jihadis led by ISIS.

Again, Abu Ahmed thought back to that cold December day when jihadi fighters overran Regiment 111. Were these the same chemical weapons that he and his comrades had found stockpiled in the base back then?

Whether they are or not, the Islamic State appears to still have these weapons in their arsenal. More than two years later, on Oct. 6, 2015, the New York Times published an article describing how the Islamic State used chemical weapons against moderate rebel fighters in the northern town of Marea. According to the Times, the group fired projectiles that delivered “sulfur mustard.” This substance is more commonly known as mustard gas.

The Dutch-Turkish jihadi Salih Yilmaz, a former soldier in the Dutch Army who has joined IS, admitted on Aug. 31, 2015, on his now defunct blog that Islamic State indeed used chemical weapons there. Yilmaz was asked by a reader of his blog “why did they accuse [the Islamic State] of recently using chemical weapons in Aleppo province?”

Yilmaz responded by writing: “Where do you think IS got their chemical weapons from? From our enemies — and thus we use their own weapons against them.”
http://foreignpolicy.com/(...)&utm_campaign=buffer

quote:

Op woensdag 17 augustus 2016 17:12 schreef Richestorags het volgende:
Meanwhile in Egypt:

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https://www.almasdarnews.(...)ttack-egyptian-army/

Altijd die moffen weer.

twitter:

BosnjoBoy twitterde op woensdag 17-08-2016 om 17:52:07 @BosnjoBoy (24) After Khanaser, a new front about to open, 5 groups (4 FSA) will participate. Attack is 5x larger https://t.co/ZhEh0fBN6e reageer retweet

quote:

The Boy in the Ambulance

Silent and in shock, a child rescued after a reported airstrike becomes the face of Aleppo
Hitting the play button begins a scene that has played out in Syria thousands of times over the past five years. It’s dark and men are frantically yelling. A young child in shorts is passed between the arms of his rescuers from a building. He’s caked in dust. The left side of his face is smeared with blood.

He doesn’t make a sound.

The man on the ground, in a yellow vest, holds him tight as he walks away. The boy wraps his right arm around the man’s shoulder as he’s whisked into a waiting ambulance. He looks back outside as he’s placed on an orange seat, alone, next to orange cabinets and an orange first aid kit.

He doesn’t make a sound.

The man who carried him in bends down to get a walkie talkie and then leaves. Another man with a camera focuses on the boy. He’s wearing shorts and a t-shirt with a cartoon character. His hands are placed calmly on his thighs. His right eye is wide open, the other eye less so. He looks to the doors of the ambulance, toward the voices. He blinks and looks away.

In a moment of pure horror, the boy lifts his left hand to his face, runs his fingers through his hair and then back down the side of his face before dropping it down. He looks at the palm of his hand and, unsure what to do, turns it over and wipes it on the seat. He feels the seat from front to back, front to back.

He doesn’t make a sound.

That was just the first 37 seconds of footage shared on Aug. 17 by the Aleppo Media Center, reportedly showing the immediate aftermath of an apparent airstrike in a neighborhood of the northern city of Aleppo, which for years has been a battleground between government and rebel forces. The footage and a picture of the boy were shared widely online in the hours that followed. A name and age of the boy began to circulate. Suspicions about the perpetrator did, too. A lot of details were unclear.

His silence instantly resonates with those who watch the footage. His daze is enough to reduce a viewer to tears. The realizations begin to set in that he should be crying. That he should be surrounded by someone he knows. That he is a survivor, saved by brave first-responders. That he should be anywhere else than in the back of an ambulance by himself.

The video comes just days after more than a dozen doctors who remain in the rebel-held side of Aleppo wrote a letter to President Obama, asking for aid for the civilians who are trapped. “We do not need tears or sympathy or even prayers,” the letter reads. “We need your action.”

After focusing on the boy, the footage then shows a girl wearing pink who had been placed in the ambulance. Another boy is carried in to join them. Later, a bloodied man in a white tank top is helped from the building, with blood all over his face. He is lead into the ambulance before the doors close. In the video’s final moments, a body is removed from the rubble on an orange stretcher as men shout Allahu Akhbar. It’s not clear whether that person was dead or alive.

Devastating pictures and footage from Syria are common now. Bloodied children are pulled out from underneath a sea of rubble. Men and women are hurried from the scene. Ambulances arrive empty and leave full. Bodies pile up. The next day brings the same thing.

But this is unique. It’s that he is alive. It’s that he is, to a point, aware. It’s his face. It cannot be unseen.
http://time.com/4456905/aleppo-syria-boy-ambulance/

twitter:

QalaatAlMudiq twitterde op donderdag 18-08-2016 om 13:00:18 Airstrikes reported for the first time on Kurdish positions in #Hasakah during clashes with Regime forces. https://t.co/fGJQxax3Sc reageer retweet

quote:

Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 13:05 schreef zarGon het volgende:

[..]

Wat denkt SAA hiermee te winnen?

Snap niet waarom ze elkaar aanvallen in die regio.

quote:

Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 13:19 schreef HSG het volgende:

twitter:

sayed_ridha twitterde op donderdag 18-08-2016 om 11:30:41 Syrian Army repelled large assault by IS on Nasrallah axis north of Kweires Airbase east of Aleppo reageer retweet

Je gaat opent een offensief terwijl je elders van alle kanten wordt afgeslacht. Typisch IS weer.

quote:

The Greatest Divorce In the Jihadi World

Al Qaeda wasn't about to take ISIS's defection from its ranks lying down. In Part III of an exclusive series, an Islamic State insider describes the events that led to civil war within the anti-Assad ranks.

By Harald Doornbos, Jenan Moussa
August 18, 2016

Since its creation, we have learned about the Islamic State from its enemies. Its story has largely been told by those fighting the group in Iraq and Syria, traumatized civilians who have escaped its brutal rule, and the occasional defector. That is about to change. This is the story of Abu Ahmad, a Syrian operative for the Islamic State who witnessed the group's lightning expansion firsthand and spent months among its most notorious foreign fighters.

In this series of three articles, he provides unique insight into how Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's political scheming paved the way for its expansion into Syria, al Qaeda's efforts to stem the group's rise, and the terrifying weapons in the arsenal of the self-proclaimed "caliphate." Some names and details have been omitted to protect Abu Ahmad. Read part one here and two here.

It was May 2013, and the newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was intent on cementing its status as the world's most fearsome jihadi force. But before it could do so -- or use the new cache of chemical weapons it had obtained -- it would have to contend with a new challenge from senior al Qaeda figures.

Al Qaeda's senior leadership was not about to accept Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's claim to authority -- particularly in light of his brazen lie that he had been instructed to do so by al Qaeda leader Ayman-al Zawahiri. One month after the historic meeting between the ISIS chief and other jihadi leaders in Kafr Hamra, a small group of men, including a few armed guards, secretly traveled in a couple of vehicles through Syria. Fearing that they might be discovered by Baghdadi's loyalists or targeted by the Syrian regime, they moved quietly and carefully.

This group was called Lajnat Khorasan, or the "Khorasan Committee." Its members had emerged from their underground lairs in Afghanistan and Pakistan and come to Syria on behalf of Zawahiri, who remained in hiding.

One of the Khorasan Committee members, a Syrian by the name of Abu Osama al-Shahabi, told his associates to be extremely cautious during their travels. "I have information [Baghdadi] was planning to assassinate [Nusra] emir Abu Mariya al-Qahtani," Shahabi said to the others, according to Abu Ahmad. "So we too should be careful."

The mission of the Khorasan Committee was to investigate Baghdadi's expansion into Syria. Their findings were to be given to Zawahiri, who would then decide al Qaeda's response to the situation in Iraq and Syria, where the rivalry between ISIS and the al Qaeda-affiliate Nusra Front clearly had gotten out of control.

The Khorasan Committee's existence would only become public knowledge in September 2014, when the U.S.-led coalition targeted its members in the first airstrikes in Syria. By then, the al Qaeda veterans who made up the committee had moved on from investigating Baghdadi's maneuvering to planning attacks abroad. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said about the group, "in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as the Islamic State."

But back in summer 2013, the Khorasan Committee was directing its attention not to the United States, but its jihadi rival. The task could not have been more urgent: Each day, it seemed, another jihadi opposition group switched loyalty from al Qaeda to ISIS. If Zawahiri couldn't regain the loyalty of some groups in Syria, or at least stop this mutiny in its tracks, the al Qaeda leader ran the risk of becoming a general without soldiers.

Six members of the Khorasan Committee visited the headquarters of ISIS in Kafr Hamra, which previously served as the headquarters of the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen. Abu Ahmad personally met four of them: Abu Osama al-Shahabi; the Kuwaiti Muhsen al-Fadhli, born in Kuwait (killed in a U.S. airstrike on July 8, 2015, in the Syrian town of Sarmada); Sanafi al-Nasr, a Saudi also known as Abu Yasser al-Jazrawi (killed by a U.S. drone in the northern Syrian town of al-Dana on Oct. 15, 2015); and Abu Abdel Malek, another Saudi national (killed in the same October strike in al-Dana).
U.S_State_Department_photo_of_Muhsin_al-Fadhli

Muhsen al-Fadhli

Abu Ahmad said that the members of the Khorasan Committee were all friendly and had good knowledge of the Quran. All of them had spent years with bin Laden or Zawahiri in "Khorasan," an old Islamic historical term for a region covering parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.

Abu Ahmad didn't spend much time with Fadhli. They spoke briefly during a meeting in the northern Syrian town of Sarmada; at the time, Abu Ahmad did not know that he was such a senior figure in al Qaeda. But two years later, after the airstrike killed Fadhli, Abu Ahmad saw a picture online of the man he had met. The photo was part of a Reuters article that quoted a Pentagon spokesman describing him as "among the few trusted al Qaeda leaders that received advanced notification of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks." In 2012, the U.S. State Department had even issued a $7 million reward for information leading to finding Fadhli.

Abu Ahmad knew the two Saudi members of the Khorasan Committee better. He once traveled in a car with both men, and knew Malek rented a house in the northern Syrian town of al-Bab. Jazrawi, meanwhile, was the head of the Nusra Front's political bureau. He was based in Latakia countryside, in northwestern Syria.

When Abu Ahmad heard the news that the duo was killed by an American strike, he felt sad. "They looked and behaved like normal guys," said Abu Ahmad. "Although they were leaders, they did not behave in an arrogant fashion."

Among all the Khorasan Committee members, Abu Ahmad was closest to Shahabi, a Syrian in his forties from al-Bab. Shahabi was in direct contact with Zawahiri, al Qaeda's commander in chief. It had taken him one and a half months to move unnoticed from Afghanistan to Syria. He traveled with his pregnant wife, which made the trip even harder. He said to Abu Ahmad: "I'm already 20 years in jihad, so hardship is nothing new to me."

The Khorasan Committee's goal was fundamentally political. They were tasked with convincing jihadi commanders who had already pledged allegiance to Baghdadi during the five-day meeting in Kafr Hamra to change their minds.

Baghdadi's claims were nonsense, they told everyone. Zawahiri had never sent Baghdadi from Iraq into Syria. Zawahiri had never said that other commanders could pledge allegiance to ISIS and to Baghdadi himself.

But the Khorasan Committee had a tough sell ahead of them. Shahabi managed to convince an important commander who had recently joined ISIS to meet in a town close to the Turkish border.

"It is very clear," Shahabi told him, "that Baghdadi only created ISIS because he felt Nusra was becoming very powerful. He knew that [Nusra chief] Julani was becoming too big of a leader."

"We thought Baghdadi was acting on orders from Zawahiri," replied the commander. "What you are telling me comes as a shock."

Shahabi suggested that he should immediately rescind his allegiance to ISIS. But the commander wasn't ready to do that. "I pledged my allegiance to him [Baghdadi]," the commander said. "Give me time to think and discuss this with others. But I just cannot undo this all of a sudden."

"Anyhow, we have sent most of the messages and letters [about the investigation] already to al-Zawahiri," replied Shahabi, according to Abu Ahmad's recounting of the conversation. "He will rule in favor of Nusra, not ISIS."

http://foreignpolicy.com/(...)in-the-jihadi-world/

twitter:

joshua_landis twitterde op donderdag 18-08-2016 om 14:05:55 Confirmed from private sources inside Jarabulus: ISIS starts abandoning its positions inside Jarabulus https://t.co/FNUkRt8sDu reageer retweet

quote:

Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 15:41 schreef drexciya het volgende:

Dat is toch de standaard procedure, om het maar niet over wat er werkelijk gaande is, te hoeven hebben? Je zou het eens hebben over het feit dat er geen gematigde rebellen bestaan, dat de VS verschillende partijen steunt, en ga zo maar door.

De recente actie van gematigde koppensnellers krijgt minder aandacht dan dit; dat geeft ook wel weer te denken. Wat dat aangaat, kots ik van de manier waarop dit conflict door de reguliere media wordt belicht.

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 16:17 schreef Adrie072 het volgende:
Is dat 3e deel compleet of gaat het nog verder? Beetje vreemd einde indien, zo ja.

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 20:09 schreef JubaUrbicus het volgende:
[ afbeelding ]

Turkije heeft een deal denk ik, Assad slacht koerden af in Hasakah!

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 20:20 schreef JubaUrbicus het volgende:

[..]

Turkije (Erdogan) heeft vandaag nog gedreigd dat hij zal binnentreden om de YPG te vernietigen.

quote:

Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 20:55 schreef zarGon het volgende:
SAA overleeft het toch helemaal niet als de Koerden/SDF terugslaan in Hasakah en Qamasli?!

Alsof ze te veel aan strijders hebben en die met gemak kunnen missen of zo... Que?

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 20:58 schreef zarGon het volgende:

[..]

.

Van dat verhaal dat je hebt gepost... Driedelig, Doornbos endezo.

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 21:15 schreef Straatcommando. het volgende:

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Eerder wens is de vader van de gedachte..

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 21:30 schreef BEFEM het volgende:
Van ruzie tussen IS en Turkije merk je ook niet zoveel meer. Wanneer zijn er voor het laatst raketten in Turkije beland?

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 21:40 schreef BEFEM het volgende:

[..]

Dat derde deel is maar vaag. Gaat eigenlijk nergens over en lijkt inderdaad abrupt te stoppen

'Paar luitjes reden naar Syrie om anderen te overtuigen toch bij Al Qaeda te blijven'. Dat is het enige wat er staat.

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 21:45 schreef JubaUrbicus het volgende:

[..]

twitter:

AJABreaking twitterde op donderdag 18-08-2016 om 16:28:46 عاجل | #أردوغان: وحدات حماية الشعب الكردية شمال #سوريا تهدد أمننا القومي وسنتدخل إذا لزم الأمر reageer retweet

twitter:

Mr_Ghostly twitterde op donderdag 18-08-2016 om 13:11:09 "Shhhh" -@UN, regarding #Syria. https://t.co/6mnMwr6orw reageer retweet

quote:

Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 17:22 schreef marsan het volgende:

[..]

Het kiezen van beelden is echter weldegelijk propaganda.

twitter:

CNN twitterde op donderdag 18-08-2016 om 18:14:00 His name is Omran. The heartbreaking image that brought @KateBolduan to tears https://t.co/Mlg2f13Pw1 https://t.co/MMAV3jNinu reageer retweet

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Op donderdag 18 augustus 2016 22:27 schreef ClapClapYourHands het volgende:

[..]

twitter:

DailySabah twitterde op donderdag 18-08-2016 om 16:23:58 LIVE — Erdoğan: YPG's actions in Syria's north threaten national security in south, if necessary Turkey will intervene there as well reageer retweet

Erdogan moet gewoon met Assad samenwerken in YPG gebied, de rest zoekt Assad zelf maar uit.