quote:

Op donderdag 8 april 2004 17:39 schreef Sidekick het volgende:
En volgens mij zijn er constant dreigingen over aanslagen; achteraf praten is makkelijk.

quote:

Claim vs. Fact: Condoleezza Rice's Opening Statement

CLAIM: "We decided immediately to continue pursuing the Clinton Administration's covert action authorities and other efforts to fight the network."

FACT: Newsweek reported that "In the months before 9/11, the U.S. Justice Department curtailed a highly classified program called 'Catcher's Mitt' to monitor al-Qaida suspects in the United States." Additionally, AP reported "though Predator drones spotted Osama bin Laden as many as three times in late 2000, the Bush administration did not fly the unmanned planes over Afghanistan during its first eight months," thus terminating the reconnaissance missions started during the Clinton Administration. [Sources: Newsweek, 3/21/04; AP, 6/25/03]

CLAIM: "The strategy set as its goal the elimination of the al-Qaida network. It ordered the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make the elimination of al-Qaida a high priority and to use all aspects of our national power -- intelligence, financial, diplomatic, and military -- to meet this goal."

FACT: 9/11 Comissioner Jamie Gorelick: "Is it true, as Dr. Rice said, 'Our plan called for military options to attack Al Qaida and Taliban leadership'?" Armitage: "No, I think that was amended after the horror of 9/11." [Source: 9/11 Commission testimony, 3/24/04]

CLAIM: "We bolstered the Treasury Department's activities to track and seize terrorist assets."

FACT: The new Bush Treasury Department "disapproved of the Clinton Administration's approach to money laundering issues, which had been an important part of the drive to cut off the money flow to bin Laden." Specifically, the Bush Administration opposed Clinton Administration-backed efforts by the G-7 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that targeted countries with "loose banking regulations" being abused by terrorist financiers. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration provided "no funding for the new National Terrorist Asset Tracking Center." [Source: "The Age of Sacred Terror," 2003]

CLAIM: "We moved quickly to arm Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against al-Qaida."

FACT: According to AP, "the military successfully tested an armed Predator throughout the first half of 2001" but the White House "failed to resolve a debate over whether the CIA or Pentagon should operate the armed Predators" and the armed Predator never got off the ground before 9/11. [Source: AP, 6/25/03]

CLAIM: "We increased funding for counterterrorism activities across several agencies."

FACT: Upon taking office, the 2002 Bush budget proposed to slash more than half a billion dollars out of funding for counterterrorism at the Justice Department. In preparing the 2003 budget, the New York Times reported that the Bush White House "did not endorse F.B.I. requests for $58 million for 149 new counterterrorism field agents, 200 intelligence analysts and 54 additional translators" and "proposed a $65 million cut for the program that gives state and local counterterrorism grants." Newsweek noted the Administration "vetoed a request to divert $800 million from missile defense into counterterrorism." [Sources: 2001 vs. 2002 Budget Analysis; NY Times, 2/28/02; Newsweek, 5/27/02]

CLAIM: "While we were developing this new strategy to deal with al-Qaida, we also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke."

FACT: Rice's statement finally confirms what she previously – and inaccurately – denied. She falsely claimed on 3/22/04 that "No al-Qaida plan was turned over to the new administration." [Washington Post, 3/22/04]

CLAIM: "When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001, we moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity."

FACT: Documents indicate that before Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush Administration "did not give terrorism top billing in their strategic plans for the Justice Department, which includes the FBI." Gen. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until Oct. 1, 2001, said during the summer, terrorism had moved "farther to the back burner" and recounted how the Bush Administration's top two Pentagon appointees, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, "shut down" a plan to weaken the Taliban. Similarly, Gen. Don Kerrick, who served in the Bush White House, sent a memo to the new Administration saying "We are going to be struck again" by al Qaeda, but he never heard back. He said terrorism was not "above the waterline. They were gambling nothing would happen." [Sources: Washington Post, 3/22/04; LA Times, 3/30/04]

CLAIM: "The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to...manner of attack."

FACT: ABC News reported, Bush Administration "officials acknowledged that U.S. intelligence officials informed President Bush weeks before the Sept. 11 attacks that bin Laden's terrorist network might try to hijack American planes." Dateline NBC reported that on August 6, 2001, the President personally "received a one-and-a-half page briefing advising him that Osama bin Laden was capable of a major strike against the US, and that the plot could include the hijacking of an American airplane." Rice herself actually admitted this herself, saying the Aug. 6 briefing the President received said "terrorists might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft." [Sources: ABC News, 5/16/02; NBC, 9/10/02]

quote:

Claim vs. Fact: Rice's Q&A Testimony Before the 9/11 Commission

Planes as Weapons

CLAIM: "I do not remember any reports to us, a kind of strategic warning, that planes might be used as weapons." [responding to Kean]

FACT: Condoleezza Rice was the top National Security official with President Bush at the July 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa. There, "U.S. officials were warned that Islamic terrorists might attempt to crash an airliner" into the summit, prompting officials to "close the airspace over Genoa and station antiaircraft guns at the city's airport." [Sources: Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01; White House release, 7/22/01]

CLAIM: "I was certainly not aware of [intelligence reports about planes as missiles] at the time that I spoke" in 2002. [responding to Kean]

FACT: While Rice may not have been aware of the 12 separate and explicit warnings about terrorists using planes as weapons when she made her denial in 2002, she did know about them when she wrote her March 22, 2004 Washington Post op-ed. In that piece, she once again repeated the claim there was no indication "that terrorists were preparing to attack the homeland using airplanes as missiles." [Source: Washington Post, 3/22/04]

August 6 P(residential) D(aily) B(riefing)

CLAIM: There was "nothing about the threat of attack in the U.S." in the Presidential Daily Briefing the President received on August 6th. [responding to Ben Veniste]

FACT: Rice herself confirmed that "the title [of the PDB] was, 'Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.'" [Source: Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04]

Domestic Threat

CLAIM: "One of the problems was there was really nothing that look like was going to happen inside the United States...Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States, especially in the Middle East and North Africa...We did not have...threat information that was in any way specific enough to suggest something was coming in the United States." [responding to Gorelick]

FACT: Page 204 of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 noted that "In May 2001, the intelligence community obtained a report that Bin Laden supporters were planning to infiltrate the United States" to "carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives." The report "was included in an intelligence report for senior government officials in August [2001]." In the same month, the Pentagon "acquired and shared with other elements of the Intelligence Community information suggesting that seven persons associated with Bin Laden had departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States." [Sources: Joint Congressional Report, 12/02]

CLAIM: "If we had known an attack was coming against the United States...we would have moved heaven and earth to stop it." [responding to Roemer]

FACT: Rice admits that she was told that "an attack was coming." She said, "Let me read you some of the actual chatter that was picked up in that spring and summer: Unbelievable news coming in weeks, said one. Big event -- there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar. There will be attacks in the near future." [Source: Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04]

Cheney Counterterrorism Task Force

CLAIM: "The Vice President was, a little later in, I think, in May, tasked by the President to put together a group to look at all of the recommendations that had been made about domestic preparedness and all of the questions associated with that." [responding to Fielding]

FACT: The Vice President's task force never once convened a meeting. In the same time period, the Vice President convened at least 10 meetings of his energy task force, and six meetings with Enron executives. [Source: Washington Post, 1/20/02; GAO Report, 8/03]

Principals Meetings

CLAIM: "The CSG (Counterterrorism Security Group) was made up of not junior people, but the top level of counterterrorism experts. Now, they were in contact with their principals." [responding to Fielding]

FACT: "Many of the other people at the CSG-level, and the people who were brought to the table from the domestic agencies, were not telling their principals. Secretary Mineta, the secretary of transportation, had no idea of the threat. The administrator of the FAA, responsible for security on our airlines, had no idea." [Source: 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, 4/8/04]

Previous Administration

CLAIM: "The decision that we made was to, first of all, have no drop-off in what the Clinton administration was doing, because clearly they had done a lot of work to deal with this very important priority." [responding to Kean]

FACT: Internal government documents show that while the Clinton Administration officially prioritized counterterrorism as a "Tier One" priority, but when the Bush Administration took office, top officials downgraded counterterrorism. As the Washington Post reported, these documents show that before Sept. 11 the Bush Administration "did not give terrorism top billing." Rice admitted that "we decided to take a different track" than the Clinton Administration in protecting America. [Source: Internal government documents, 1998-2001; Washington Post, 3/22/04; Rice testimony, 4/8/04]

FBI

CLAIM: The Bush Administration has been committed to the "transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting terror." [responding to Kean]

FACT: Before 9/11, Attorney General John Ashcroft de-emphasized counterterrorism at the FBI, in favor of more traditional law enforcement. And according to the Washington Post, "in the early days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush White House cut by nearly two-thirds an emergency request for counterterrorism funds by the FBI, an internal administration budget document shows." And according to a new report by the Congressional Research Service, "numerous confidential law enforcement and intelligence sources who challenge the FBI's claim that it has successfully retooled itself to gather critical intelligence on terrorists as well as fight crime." [Source: Washington Post, 3/22/04; Congressional Quarterly, 4/6/04]

CLAIM: "The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to federal, state and law enforcement agencies and specifically stated that, although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI tasked all 56 of its U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of known suspects of terrorists and to reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities." [responding to Gorelick]

FACT: The warnings are "feckless. They don't tell anybody anything. They don't bring anyone to battle stations." [Source: 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, 4/8/04]

Homeland Security

CLAIM: "I think that having a Homeland Security Department that can bring together the FAA and the INS and Customs and all of the various agencies is a very important step." [responding to Hamilton]

FACT: The White House vehemently opposed the creation of the Department of Homeland security. Its opposition to the concept delayed the creation of the department by months.

CLAIM: "We have created a threat terrorism information center, the TTIC, which does bring together all of the sources of information from all of the intelligence agencies -- the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security and the INS and the CIA and the DIA -- so that there's one place where all of this is coming together." [responding to Fielding]

FACT: "Knowledgeable sources complain that the president's new Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which reports to CIA Director George Tenet rather than to Ridge, has created more of a moat than a bridge. The ability to spot the nation's weakest points was going to make Homeland Security different, recalled one person involved in the decision to set up TTIC. But now, the person said, 'that whole effort has been gutted by the White House creation of TTIC, [which] has served little more than to give the appearance of progress.'" [Source: National Journal, 3/6/04]
IRAQ-9/11

CLAIM: "There was a discussion of Iraq. I think it was raised by Don Rumsfeld. It was pressed a bit by Paul Wolfowitz."

FACT: Rice's statement confirms previous proof that the Administration was focusing on Iraq immediately after 9/11, despite having no proof that Iraq was involved in the attack. Rice's statement also contradicts her previous denials in which she claimed "Iraq was to the side" immediately after 9/11. She made this denial despite the President signing "a 2-and-a-half-page document marked 'TOP SECRET'" six days after 9/11 that "directed the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq." [Source: Condoleezza Rice, 3/22/04, 3/22/04; Washington Post, 1/12/03]

CLAIM: "Given that this was a global war on terror, should we look not just at Afghanistan but should we look at doing something against Iraq?"

FACT: The Administration has not produced one shred of evidence that Iraq had an operational relationship with Al Qaeda, or that Iraq had anything to do with the 9/11 attacks on America. In fact, a U.S. Army War College report said that the war in Iraq has been a diversion that has drained key resources from the more imminent War on Terror. Just this week, USA Today reported that "in 2002, troops from the 5th Special Forces Group who specialize in the Middle East were pulled out of the hunt for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to prepare for their next assignment: Iraq." Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) confirmed this, noting in February of 2002, a senior military commander told him "We are moving military and intelligence personnel and resources out of Afghanistan to get ready for a future war in Iraq." [Sources: CNN, 1/13/04; USA Today, 3/28/04; Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), 3/26/04]

War on Terror

CLAIM: After 9/11, "the President put states on notice if they were sponsoring terrorists."

FACT: The President continues to say Saudi Arabia is "our friend" despite their potential ties to terrorists. As the LA Times reported, "the 27 classified pages of a congressional report about Sept. 11 depict a Saudi government that not only provided significant money and aid to the suicide hijackers but also allowed potentially hundreds of millions of dollars to flow to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups through suspect charities and other fronts." Just this week, Newsweek reported "within weeks of the September 11 terror attacks, security officers at the Fleet National Bank in Boston had identified 'suspicious' wire transfers from the Saudi Embassy in Washington that eventually led to the discovery of an active Al Qaeda 'sleeper cell' that may have been planning follow-up attacks inside the United States." [Source: LA Times, 8/2/03; CNN, 11/23/02; Newsweek, 4/7/04]

quote:

Op donderdag 8 april 2004 14:17 schreef Verbal het volgende:

Maar al in januari 2001 werd het Hart-Rudman Report on Terrorism (klik hier voor volledig rapport) gepubliceerd met conclusies en aanbevelingen.
Quote:
A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the
next quarter century.

quote:

Op vrijdag 9 april 2004 01:57 schreef sooty het volgende:

[..]

Met een dergelijke accuratesse (25 jaar! ) zou ik me als regering ook niet al te druk maken.

quote:

Op vrijdag 9 april 2004 13:20 schreef Lithion het volgende:
Ik heb gisteren een deel van de ondervraging van Rice gevolgd, maar ik was bepaald niet onder de indruk van de vraagstelling. Opvallend was ook het laatste commissielid dat wat vragen stelde (ben de naam kwijt), die begon met een twee minuten durende opsomming dat hij het zeer waardeerde van Rice dat ze was gekomen, dat ze tijd had vrijgemaakt, dat ze zo open was etc. etc.

quote:

Bush naar verwachting bereid tot vrijgave memo 11/9

WASHINGTON - Het Witte Huis zal naar verwachting zwichten voor de druk vanuit de commissie die de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 onderzoekt om een geheim memo vrij te geven. Dat berichtten de Amerikaanse media vrijdag.

Het memo kan mogelijk meer licht kan werpen op het optreden van de regering en de inlichtingendiensten voorafgaande aan de aanslagen. President George Bush ontving het memo op 6 augustus 2001, ruim een maand voor de aanslagen.

Het zou volgens de commissieleden, die het document wel hebben mogen inzien, passages bevatten waaruit blijkt dat de federale politie (FBI) al in de zomer van 2001 verdachte activiteiten signaleerde van 'slapende cellen' van al-Qaeda binnen de VS. Ook zouden er verwijzingen in voorkomen naar de mogelijkheid van op handen zijnde vliegtuigkapingen.

Het memo speelde donderdag een prominente rol tijdens het verhoor door de onderzoekscommissie van de Nationale Veiligheidsadviseur Condoleezza Rice. Zij hield vol dat het een geschiedkundig document betrof, bedoeld om de president inzicht te geven in eerdere aanslagen waarvan al-Qaeda werd verdacht, maar zeker geen actuele dreigingsanalyse.

Gore

De voormalige Amerikaanse vice-president Al Gore is gehoord door de Amerikaanse commissie die de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 onderzoekt. Het panel liet niets los over de inhoud van de drie uur durende zitting, die achter gesloten deuren werd gehouden.

In een korte verklaring zei de commissie dat de voormalig vice-president zich coöperatief had opgesteld. Hij was bereid geweest antwoorden te geven op de gestelde vragen.

ANP

Bron: LC

quote:

AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY: washington, april 9, 2004. A hush fell over the city as George W. Bush today became the first president of the United States ever to be removed from office by impeachment. Meeting late into the night, the Senate unanimously voted to convict Bush following a trial on his bill of impeachment from the House.

Moments after being sworn in as the 44th president, Dick Cheney said that disgraced former national security adviser Condoleezza Rice would be turned over to the Hague for trial in the International Court of Justice as a war criminal. Cheney said Washington would "firmly resist" international demands that Bush be extradited for prosecution as well.

On August 7, 2001, Bush had ordered the United States military to stage an all-out attack on alleged terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Thousands of U.S. special forces units parachuted into this neutral country, while air strikes targeted the Afghan government and its supporting military. Pentagon units seized abandoned Soviet air bases throughout Afghanistan, while establishing support bases in nearby nations such as Uzbekistan. Simultaneously, FBI agents throughout the United States staged raids in which dozens of men accused of terrorism were taken prisoner.

Reaction was swift and furious. Florida Senator Bob Graham said Bush had "brought shame to the United States with his paranoid delusions about so-called terror networks." British Prime Minister Tony Blair accused the United States of "an inexcusable act of conquest in plain violation of international law." White House chief counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke immediately resigned in protest of "a disgusting exercise in over-kill."

When dozens of U.S. soldiers were slain in gun battles with fighters in the Afghan mountains, public opinion polls showed the nation overwhelmingly opposed to Bush's action. Political leaders of both parties called on Bush to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan immediately. "We are supposed to believe that attacking people in caves in some place called Tora Bora is worth the life of even one single U.S. soldier?" former Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey asked.

When an off-target U.S. bomb killed scores of Afghan civilians who had taken refuge in a mosque, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Aznar announced a global boycott of American products. The United Nations General Assembly voted to condemn the United States, and Washington was forced into the humiliating position of vetoing a Security Council resolution declaring America guilty of "criminal acts of aggression."

Bush justified his attack on Afghanistan, and the detention of 19 men of Arab descent who had entered the country legally, on grounds of intelligence reports suggesting an imminent, devastating attack on the United States. But no such attack ever occurred, leading to widespread ridicule of Bush's claims. Speaking before a special commission created by Congress to investigate Bush's anti-terrorism actions, former national security adviser Rice shocked and horrified listeners when she admitted, "We had no actionable warnings of any specific threat, just good reason to believe something really bad was about to happen."

The president fired Rice immediately after her admission, but this did little to quell public anger regarding the war in Afghanistan. When it was revealed that U.S. special forces were also carrying out attacks against suspected terrorist bases in Indonesia and Pakistan, fury against the United States became universal, with even Israel condemning American action as "totally unjustified."

Speaking briefly to reporters on the South Lawn of the White House before a helicopter carried him out of Washington as the first-ever president removed by impeachment, Bush seemed bitter. "I was given bad advice," he insisted. "My advisers told me that unless we took decisive action, thousands of innocent Americans might die. Obviously I should not have listened."

Announcing his candidacy for the 2004 Republican presidential nomination, Senator John McCain said today that "George W. Bush was very foolish and naïve; he didn't realize he was being pushed into this needless conflict by oil interests that wanted to seize Afghanistan to run a pipeline across it." McCain spoke at a campaign rally at the World Trade Center in New York City.

quote:

Op vrijdag 9 april 2004 21:22 schreef Sidekick het volgende:

[Bush naar verwachting bereid tot vrijgave memo 11/9]

quote:

Op donderdag 8 april 2004 17:39 schreef Sidekick het volgende:
Ik verwacht eigenlijk niets van deze commissie.

quote:

Op zaterdag 10 april 2004 19:27 schreef Verbal het volgende:
Zulke onbelangrijke oude informatie, dat Bush het onder ogen kreeg terwijl hij net bezig was aan de langste vakantie die een Amerikaanse president ooit heeft gehouden.

V.

quote:

Op woensdag 14 april 2004 07:11 schreef CeeJee het volgende:
Het hele "Ashcroft wist van de aanslagen want hij vloog niet meer commercieel" verhaal is nu hopelijk ook ontzenuwd, hij verklaarde gisteren op 3 september prive nog met een lijnvlucht naar Washington te zijn gevlogen.

quote:

Op woensdag 14 april 2004 07:14 schreef FritsVanEgters het volgende:

[..]

Ik tel 8 dagen verschil. Het is maar wat je weten noemt natuurlijk.

quote:

Op woensdag 14 april 2004 07:38 schreef CeeJee het volgende:
125z

quote:

Ashcroft vloog sinds juli 2001 niet meer commercieel voor officiele (en dus aangekondigde) trips. Ongeveer 2500000 conspiracy-sites noemen dit als bewijs dat het de regering van de VS dus wist wat er zou gaan gebeuren. En over een maand zullen nog steeds al die sites precies hetzelfde verhaal vertellen.

quote:

Op woensdag 14 april 2004 07:45 schreef FritsVanEgters het volgende:

[..]

Het vlucht-nummer?
[..]

quote:

Panel Says Bush Saw Repeated Warnings
Reports Preceded August 2001 Memo

By the time a CIA briefer gave President Bush the Aug. 6, 2001, President's Daily Brief headlined "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US," the president had seen a stream of alarming reports on al Qaeda's intentions. So had Vice President Cheney and Bush's top national security team, according to newly declassified information released yesterday by the commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

In April and May 2001, for example, the intelligence community headlined some of those reports "Bin Laden planning multiple operations," "Bin Laden network's plans advancing" and "Bin Laden threats are real."

The intelligence included reports of a hostage plot against Americans. It noted that operatives might choose to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. Without knowing when, where or how the terrorists would strike, the CIA "consistently described the upcoming attacks as occurring on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil," according to one of two staff reports released by the panel yesterday.

"Reports similar to these were made available to President Bush in the morning meetings with [Director of Central Intelligence George J.] Tenet," the commission staff said.

The information offers the most detailed account to date of the warnings the intelligence community gave top Bush administration officials, and it provides the context in which a CIA briefer put together a memo on Osama bin Laden's activities in the Aug. 6 brief for Bush.

The government moved on several fronts to counter the threats. The CIA launched "disruption operations" in 20 countries. Tenet met or phoned 20 foreign intelligence officials. Units of the 5th Fleet were redeployed. Embassies went on alert. Cheney called Crown Prince Adbullah of Saudi Arabia to ask for help. National security adviser Condoleezza Rice asked the CIA to brief Attorney General John D. Ashcroft about an "imminent" terrorist attack whose location was unknown.

"The system was blinking red," Tenet told the commission in private testimony, the panel's report noted.

In this context, Bush "had occasionally asked his briefers whether any of the threats pointed to the United States," the report said. Or, as one U.S. senior official more intimately involved in the summer reporting paraphrased the president's question to the CIA: "This guy going to strike here?"

A partial answer was contained in the very first sentence of the Aug. 6 President's Daily Brief: "Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US."

The document ended with two paragraphs of circumstantial evidence that al Qaeda operatives might already be in the United States preparing "for hijackings or other types of attacks" and said that the FBI and the CIA were investigating a call to the U.S. Embassy in the United Arab Emirates in May "saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives."

The commission also released new details showing how the CIA and FBI failures to track the movements of two hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, and share information foiled what now appears to have been the best chance to disrupt the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The CIA knew Almihdhar had attended a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in January 2000 where, officials later learned, he had helped plan the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Aden, Yemen. After the meeting, Almihdhar and others went to Bangkok, but the CIA station in Malaysia did not inform the CIA station in Bangkok in a timely manner.

Only two months later, in March, did the CIA learn that Almihdhar had left Bangkok with a visa to the United States.

In January 2001, two surveillance photographs from the Kuala Lumpur meeting were shown to an informant who was helping both the CIA and the FBI. He helped them understand that Almihdhar was at the meeting with a man identified as "Khallad" -- who by then was known to have planned the Cole bombing. But "we found no effort by the CIA to renew the long-abandoned search for [Almihdhar] or his traveling companions," the staff report noted.

Also, contrary to the previous testimony of Tenet, the CIA did not tell the FBI about this discovery until late August 2001, according to the report.

Almihdhar had left the United States in June 2000 but had plans to return.

"It is possible that if, in January 2001, agencies had resumed their search for him" or had placed him on a terrorist watch list, "they might have found him" before he applied for a new visa in June 2001, the report said. "Or they might have been alerted to him when he returned to the United States the following month. We cannot know."

In mid-May 2001, during the height of threat reporting, a CIA official went back through the Almihdhar files and discovered that he had a U.S. visa and that Alhazmi had come to Los Angeles on Jan. 15, 2000. The official concluded "something bad was definitely up," the staff report said, but he did not alert his FBI counterparts. "He was focused on Malaysia."

But the report said he did ask an FBI analyst detailed to the CIA to review the Kuala Lumpur material again -- "in her free time." She began on July 24, 2001, and learned from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the two might be in the country. She drafted a cable asking that Almihdhar and Alhazmi be put on a terrorist watch list. The FBI analyst, meanwhile, "took responsibility for the search effort inside the United States."

The analyst thought Almihdhar was in New York and informed the FBI's New York field office. But she labeled her first e-mail to the office "routine," which gave the FBI 30 days to respond.

"No one apparently felt they needed to inform higher levels of management in either the FBI or CIA about the case," the commission staff said.

The search was assigned to an FBI agent who had never before handled a counterterrorism lead.

"Many witnesses have suggested that even if [Almihdhar] had been found, there was nothing the agents could have done except follow him onto the planes," the report said. "We believe this is incorrect.

"Both [Alhazmi] and [Almihdhar] could have been held for immigration violations, or as material witnesses in the Cole bombing case," the commission report said. Interrogations "also may have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot. In any case, the opportunity did not arise."

quote:

The Out-of-Towner
While Bush vacationed, 9/11 warnings went unheard.
By Fred Kaplan

Meanwhile, back at the ranch ...

In an otherwise dry day of hearings before the 9/11 commission, one brief bit of dialogue set off a sudden flash of clarity on the basic question of how our government let disaster happen.

The revelation came this morning, when CIA Director George Tenet was on the stand. Timothy Roemer, a former Democratic congressman, asked him when he first found out about the report from the FBI's Minnesota field office that Zacarias Moussaoui, an Islamic jihadist, had been taking lessons on how to fly a 747. Tenet replied that he was briefed about the case on Aug. 23 or 24, 2001.

Roemer then asked Tenet if he mentioned Moussaoui to President Bush at one of their frequent morning briefings. Tenet replied, "I was not in briefings at this time." Bush, he noted, "was on vacation." He added that he didn't see the president at all in August 2001. During the entire month, Bush was at his ranch in Texas. "You never talked with him?" Roemer asked. "No," Tenet replied. By the way, for much of August, Tenet too was, as he put it, "on leave."

And there you have it. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has made a big point of the fact that Tenet briefed the president nearly every day. Yet at the peak moment of threat, the two didn't talk at all. At a time when action was needed, and orders for action had to come from the top, the man at the top was resting undisturbed.

quote:

Bush begon plan Irak in najaar 2001

Door onze correspondent Marc Chavannes

WASHINGTON, 17 APRIL. De Amerikaanse president Bush gaf in december 2001, twee maanden na het begin van de oorlog in Afghanistan, opdracht een oorlogsplan tegen Irak op te stellen. Hij hield dat geheim omdat hij bang was er uit te zien als een oorlogszuchtige president.

Dat schrijft Bob Woodward, adjunct-hoofdredacteur van The Washington Post, in het boek Plan of Attack dat maandag verschijnt. Volgens eerste berichten over de inhoud van het boek zegt de president: ,,Ik wist wat er zou gebeuren als de mensen wisten dat wij een mogelijk oorlogsplan tegen Irak ontwikkelden. Het was zo'n geladen moment... het zou lijken of ik stond te trappelen om weer een oorlog te beginnen. Maar zo was het niet. Ik ben niet oorlogszuchtig.''

De president zei gisteren zich niet precies meer te kunnen herinneren wanneer hij de voorbereidingen voor de oorlog tegen Irak had laten beginnen. Tijdens een gemeenschappelijke persconferentie met premier Blair zei Bush dat hij in het najaar van 2001 hoogstens had gevraagd te kijken wat de 'noodplannen' rond Irak waren. Maar zijn volledige aandacht ging uit naar Afghanistan, verzekerde hij.

Stafleden van het Witte Huis zeiden later dat de president bij minister van Defensie Rumsfeld had geïnformeerd wat de plannen waren voor het geval Saddam Hussein zich zou mengen in het lopende conflict in Afghanistan. Overigens schrijft Woodward dat Bush zelfs Nationale Veiligheidsadviseur Condoleezza Rice niet volledig op de hoogte had gesteld van de mate van gedetailleerdheid van de voorbereiding van een Irak-oorlog in het najaar van 2001.

De lezing die Woodward geeft van de aanloop naar de oorlog tegen Irak geeft een sleutelrol aan CIA-directeur George Tenet. Volgens Woodward was de president niet erg onder de indruk van de bewijzen die de veiligheidsdienst aandroeg voor Saddams bezit van massavernietigingswapens. Maar tot twee keer toe verzekerde Tenet dat het een uitgemaakte zaak was dat Irak over verboden wapens beschikte.

Woodward maakte naam in de jaren '70 toen hij als jong verslaggever van The Washington Post, samen met zijn collega Bernstein, het Watergate-schandaal onthulde. Dat schandaal, over de inbraak door medewerkers van de Republikeinse president Nixon in het hoofdkantoor van de Democratische presidentskandidaat in het Watergate-hotel in Washington, leidde tot het aftreden van Nixon.

Het voorlaatste boek van Woodward, Bush at War, gaf een inkijk in de reacties binnen de inner circle van de huidige president in de uren, dagen en weken volgend op de aanslagen van 11 september 2001.

De medewerking aan Bush at War door president Bush en verschillende van zijn naasten leidde tot een beeld van de presidentiële vastberadenheid dat door latere boeken van insiders aanzienlijk is gerelativeerd.

Over dit nieuwe boek van de meester-onthuller van de Amerikaanse journalistiek is een aanzienlijke voorpubliciteit losgebroken. Met ingang van vandaag zou de website van de Post (www.washingtonpost.com) uittreksels uit het boek publiceren. Zondagochtend geeft Woodward zijn eerste van een lange reeks vraaggesprekken op televisie en maandag komt het boek in de winkel. Waarschijnlijk gaat het nog iets langer duren voordat duidelijk wordt of ook dit boek lijdt onder de voor- en nadelen van nauwe medewerking van bepaalde bronnen ten koste van andere nauw betrokken bronnen bij het verhaal. Aan het 9/11-boek had minister van Defensie Rumsfeld kennelijk niet willen meewerken; hij kwam er nogal slecht vanaf.

Voor dit nieuwe boek heeft president Bush drieëneenhalf uur met Woodward gesproken, maar de eerste snipper nieuws die gistermiddag naar buiten kwam, leek de president in verlegenheid te brengen. Het Witte Huis zit niet te wachten op berichten die de indruk wekken dat de president al vlak na de ramp van 9/11 aan oorlog tegen Irak droomde terwijl hij militair ingreep in Afghanistan.

Wat de president ook niet goed uitkomt zijn verhalen over de oorlogsbevorderende rol van vice-president Dick Cheney. Volgens de eerste berichten had hij bijna ‘koorts' als het ging om afrekenen met Saddam Hussein. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Colin Powell zou zo langdurig en hardnekkig met hem over de beschikbare bewijzen hebben geknokt, dat de twee nauwelijks meer met elkaar praten. Dat ondanks het feit dat de een opperbevelhebber was ten tijde van het ministerschap van defensie van de ander.

De lezing van de aanloop naar oorlog weerspreekt de uitspraken van president Bush die nog in augustus 2002 verzekerde dat hij een geduldig man was. Wat toen wel opviel was dat vice-president Cheney een aanzienlijk oorlogszuchtiger lezing gaf. Als de versie van Woodward klopt, sprak Cheney meer in overeenkomst met de werkelijke stand van zaken. De woordvoerder van Powell ontkende gister dat er spanning tussen hem en de vice-president zou bestaan.

Afgaande op de eerste berichten zou vooral CIA-directeur Tenet slachtoffer van het boek van Woodward kunnen zijn. Het nadrukkelijke groene licht dat hij volgens deze lezing gaf op het punt van de massavernietigingswapens geeft hem een grote verantwoordelijkheid voor wat volgde.

De onderzoekingen van de commissie die ‘11 september' onderzoekt tonen de laatste weken steeds meer voorbeelden van incompetentie en bureaucratische aderverkalking binnen de FBI en de CIA. Nu president Bush neigt naar de instelling van één superdirecteur inlichtingendiensten, is het nauwelijks denkbaar dat zijn naam George Tenet zou zijn.

17 april 2004

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Rice: Bush vroeg in 2001 om militaire opties Irak

WASHINGTON - De Amerikaanse president George Bush vroeg al in november 2001 om de militaire ,,opties'' voor Irak. Dat heeft de Amerikaanse nationale veiligheidsadviseur Condoleezza Rice zondag gezegd.

Ze bevestigde daarmee beweringen die de befaamde journalist van The Washington Post, Bob Woodward, doet in zijn nieuwe boek 'Plan of Attack'. Bush vroeg minister van Defensie Donald Rumsfeld twee maanden na de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 om de mogelijke acties tegen Irak in kaart te brengen. De Verenigde Staten waren op dat moment verwikkeld in een oorlog tegen Afghanistan.

,,We hadden Afghanistan gepland, we vochten de oorlog in Afghanistan. Eind november begon de rust in Afghanistan terug te keren en ik denk dat de president begon na te denken over wat hij nog meer kon doen als reactie op de klap en de dreiging die voortkwam uit 11 september'', aldus Rice in een interview met de Amerikaanse nieuwszender Fox.

ANP

Bron: LC

quote:

Powell ontkent buiten oorlogsplanning te zijn gehouden 19-04-2004

Ook president George Bush zag gewapend ingrijpen als een laatste middel om het regime van Saddam Hussein ten val te brengen, mocht dat langs diplomatieke weg niet lukken. De Amerikaanse minister van buitenlandse zaken Colin Powell heeft dat maandag verklaard tegenover het persbureau Associated Press.

Powell reageerde op het deze week verschenen boek Plan of Attack over de aanloop naar de oorlog in Irak. Daarin schrijft de onderzoeksjournalist Bob Woodward dat Bush en zijn veiligheidsteam (waarvan Powell geen deel uitmaakt) al op 11 januari 2003 het besluit namen om Irak binnen te vallen en daarvan wel de Saudische ambassadeur in Washington op de hoogte stelden, maar Powell niet.

De laatste ontkent dat. Hij stelt volledig op de hoogte te zijn geweest en bovendien te hebben geweten dat de ambassadeur, prins Bandar, werd geïnformeerd. Ik wist net zoveel als ieder ander. De uiteindelijke beslissing om Irak aan te vallen viel volgens Powell pas in maart, nadat diplomatieke inspanningen in VN-verband waren stukgelopen. Net als ieder ander streefde ik naar de val van dit regime, de verwoesting van dit regime dat mensen in massagraven dumpte, zei Powell over zijn betrokkenheid bij de oorlog in Irak.

Woodward schrijft dat de verhouding tussen Powell en vice-president Dick Cheney zeer slecht is. De twee zouden nauwelijks met elkaar communiceren. Powell zelf omschrijft de relatie als uitstekend.
[Copyright 2004, Novum Nieuws / Associated Press]

quote:

Op maandag 19 april 2004 17:38 schreef Sidekick het volgende:

Het is verbazingwekkend, maar ligt er iemand wakker van. Het is hopeloos hoe de regering Bush hiermee wegkomt.

quote:

UNANSWERED – DID THE WHITE HOUSE VIOLATE THE LAW?: Woodward reveals that in July 2002, Bush secretly approved diverting $700 million meant for operations in Afghanistan into war planning for Iraq. Bush kept Congress "totally in the dark on this," which raises serious legal questions reminiscent of Iran-Contra: Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution vests the power of the purse with Congress, and statutes bar the executive from unilaterally moving money out of areas explicitly mandated by spending bills. On CBS's Face the Nation, Rice tried to defend the move, claiming "resources were not taken from Afghanistan." Not only did this response contradict the fact that special forces were pulled out of Afghanistan in 2002 and moved to Iraq, but it did not address legal questions. As CBS anchor Bob Schieffer said, "Dr. Rice, you cannot take money that Congress has appropriated for one purpose and spend it on something else. That's against the law."

quote:

Op dinsdag 20 april 2004 00:45 schreef Verbal het volgende:

[..]

Als het aan Bob Woodward ligt niet:

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Op dinsdag 20 april 2004 15:22 schreef sp3c het volgende:
ach laat ook eigenlijk maar

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Bush noemt rapport 11/9 ,,constructief''

WASHINGTON - De Amerikaanse president George Bush heeft donderdag het eindrapport in ontvangst genomen van de onafhankelijke commissie die de aanslagen in New York en Washington op 11 september 2001 heeft onderzocht. Volgens CNN sprak Bush van een ,,constructief'' rapport.

De commissie pleit in het rapport onder meer voor het aanstellen van een nationale inlichtingendirecteur. Ook moet er een landelijk centrum voor de bestrijding van terrorisme komen. Deze maatregelen moeten herhaling voorkomen van de blunders van de inlichtingendiensten rondom de aanslagen in de VS, die bijna 3000 slachtoffers eisten.

Volgens Thomas Kean, de voorzitter van de 9/11-commissie, was ,,het niet ons doel schuld toe te wijzen. Wij kijken terug om vooruit te kunnen kijken''. Kean: ,,Wij zijn vandaag veiliger, maar wij zijn niet veilig.'' Hij voegde eraan toe dat Irak niets te maken had met de aanslagen van 11 september. ,,Wij hebben geen, absoluut geen verband gevonden'', aldus Kean tijdens een persconferentie.

_ANP

Bron: LC

quote:

Rapport commissie 11/9: ernst dreiging onderschat

_{ANP, AP}

WASHINGTON - De Amerikaanse regering was zich onvoldoende bewust van de ernst van de terroristische dreiging voorafgaande aan de aanslagen in New York en Washington op 11 september 2001. Dat stelde de onafhankelijke commissie die deze aanslagen heeft onderzocht donderdag in haar eindrapport.

' De belangrijkste fout was een gebrek aan voorstellingsvermogen' , aldus de commissieleden in hun rapport. 'We geloven niet dat de regering doordrongen was van de ernst van de dreiging. Het terroristische gevaar speelde geen hoofdrol in het publieke debat', aldus het rapport.

Volgens de commissie was dit zowel tijdens de regeerperiode van Bush als die van zijn voorganger Clinton het geval. Ook het publiek, de media en het Congres onderschatten de urgentie van de dreiging die uitging van al-Qa'ida, het terroristennetwerk van Osama bin Laden.

Ook de veiligheidsdiensten kregen zware kritiek in het eindrapport van de commissie. De federale recherchedienst FBI en de inlichtingendienst CIA maakten te veel fouten en communiceerden veel te weinig met elkaar. Daardoor werden belangrijke signalen die wezen op een op handen zijnde terroristische aanval op de VS over het hoofd gezien, aldus het rapport.

Volgens de commissie zaten er in de voorbereidingen op de aanslagen negen zwakke punten die de Amerikaanse regering had kunnen benutten om het complot te ontwrichten of de aanslagen te voorkomen. De regering merkte echter geen van de kwetsbaarheden tijdig op.

In het 567 pagina's tellende rapport wordt gesteld dat er om aanslagen in de toekomst te voorkomen een nationaal centrum voor de verzameling van inlichtingen moet worden gevormd. Zo'n centrum zou de werkzaamheden van de huidige twaalf Amerikaanse diensten die wereldwijd inlichtingen verzamelen, kunnen verenigen.

Aan het hoofd van het centrum moet een door de Amerikaanse Senaat goedgekeurde directeur komen te staan met rechtstreekse toegang tot de president en de 'rang' van vice-minister. Die inlichtingendirecteur zou ook invloed moeten krijgen op de leiding en de begroting van de CIA, de FBI, het ministerie voor binnenlandse veiligheid en het ministerie van defensie.

De Amerikaanse president George Bush nam het rapport in ontvangst op het Witte Huis. Volgens CNN sprak Bush van een ' constructief' rapport.

Bron: de Volkskrant