Palestina en Israel #165

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:00 schreef Yasmin23 het volgende:
Staat op nos

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:03 schreef Yasmin23 het volgende:

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Zit op mijn tel. Gaat een beetje lastig.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 21:19 schreef IsaacCuenca het volgende:
Interessant artikel dat de standaard onzin argumenten/mythes van pro-israel mensen 'debunkt'
http://www.huffingtonpost(...)srael_b_5624401.html

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 21:57 schreef Yasmin23 het volgende:
Hadden jullie het bericht gelezen dat de staak het vuren afspraak dubbelzinnig was ?

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:07 schreef Ceberut het volgende:

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Dat was natuurlijk direct al te voorspellen. Zoals zo vaak hanteert Israël een dubbele standaard. Israël trekt haar grondtroepen niet terug, sterker nog die gaan door met hun acties en Hamas mag niets doen. Dat is voor Israël de definitie van een staakt-het-vuren. Wat zou een normaal mens verstaan onder een staakt-het-vuren? Dat beide partijen hun acties staken.

Zou Hamas tijdens het vuren dan ook in Israël de lanceerinstallaties van Israël mogen ontmantelen ivm de burgerdoden? Natuurlijk niet.

Het is onzin dat Hamas niets mag doen terwijl Israël gewoon haar gang gaat.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:08 schreef JayDeeNow het volgende:

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Dit is jou waarheid en is nergens op gebasseerd.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:06 schreef truthortruth het volgende:

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Aldus Mehdi Hasan bekend van zijn quote uit de koran dat ongelovigen minder intelligent zijn. Flikker toch op met dat soort mafkezen.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:08 schreef JayDeeNow het volgende:

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Dit is jou waarheid en is nergens op gebasseerd.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:08 schreef Ceberut het volgende:

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*Jouw en *gebaseerd. JIDF much?

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:08 schreef Ceberut het volgende:

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*Jouw en *gebaseerd. JIDF much?

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:09 schreef theunderdog het volgende:

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Nee, dat is gewoon aantoonbaar.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:18 schreef Twentsche_Ros het volgende:
http://www.tvuitzendingge(...)an-31-juli-2014.html
Na 22:42 minuten komt het geval schutting (zoals meestal) tussen meneer Fransen en meneer Mossel.
Die schutting is niet interessant, wel de emoties van meneer de postbode Fransen en de arrogante gallicismen van meneer Mossel.

Ik vond deze burenruzie eigenlijk heel vergelijkbaar met het Israel Palestijnen conflict mbt bijvoorbeeld de Gaza.
Maar eigenlijk voor heel veel andere conflicten.
Palestijnen/moslims hebben een minderwaardigheidsconflict tov Israel.
Israel is redelijk succesvol op bv gebied van infrastructuur, irrigatie, militaire techniek e.d.
Niet in de laatste plaats omdat ze door de VS en Europa decennia lang in de watten zijn gelegd en werden voorzien van alle middelen. Dit natuurlijk nav het schuldgevoel vanwege eeuwenlang anti-semitisme met als apotheose de holocaust. Hierdoor is Israel het verwende jochie van de buurt geworden. Altijd in de mooiste kleertjes e.d.. De beste I-phone avant la lettre, de snelste laptop avant la lettre.
En die arabieren er om heen kregen hierdoor natuurlijk een Calimero-syndroom.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:27 schreef Ceberut het volgende:

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Je laat wat minor details weg. Palestijnen hebben hun land zien worden overgenomen, worden al 60 jaar onderdrukt, kunnen niet zelf vrij beschikken en regeren over hun gebieden, worden om de paar jaar platgebombardeerd en middels blokkades gehinderd in het treffen van eigen voorzieningen.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:32 schreef oksel12 het volgende:
En als ze vrede willen is dat allemaal voorbij, Israël heeft goede vredesvoorstellen gedaan.

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:34 schreef Twentsche_Ros het volgende:
Zonder jaloezie zouden de Palestijnen erg succesvol kunnen zijn.

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Gaza kan een tweede Singapore worden.

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Zonder de raketten richting Israel hebben de Palestijnen een enorme goodwill bij het westen.

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Gaza myths and facts: what American Jewish leaders won't tell you
Myth: Gaza is free. Fact: it has been under Israeli occupation since 1967 to this very day.

If you’ve been anywhere near the American Jewish community over the past few weeks, you’ve heard the following morality tale: Israel left the Gaza Strip in 2005, hoping the newly independent country would become the Singapore of the Middle East. Instead, Hamas seized power, ransacked greenhouses, threw its opponents off rooftops and began launching thousands of rockets at Israel.

American Jewish leaders use this narrative to justify their skepticism of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. But in crucial ways, it’s wrong. And without understanding why it’s wrong, you can’t understand why this war is wrong too.

Let’s take the claims in turn.

Israel Left Gaza

It’s true that in 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon withdrew Israel’s more than 8,000 settlers from Gaza. (At America’s urging, he also dismantled four small settlements in the West Bank). But at no point did Gaza become its own country. Had Gaza become its own country, it would have gained control over its borders. It never did. As the Israeli human rights group Gisha has detailed, even before the election of Hamas, Israel controlled whether Gazans could enter or exit the Strip (In conjunction with Egypt, which controlled the Rafah checkpoint in Gaza's south). Israel controlled the population registry through which Gazans were issued identification cards. Upon evacuating its settlers and soldiers from Gaza, Israel even created a security perimeter inside the Strip from which Gazans were barred from entry. (Unfortunately for Gazans, this perimeter included some of the Strip’s best farmland).

“Pro-Israel” commentators claim Israel had legitimate security reasons for all this. But that concedes the point. A necessary occupation is still an occupation. That’s why it’s silly to analogize Hamas’ rockets—repugnant as they are—to Mexico or Canada attacking the United States. The United States is not occupying Mexico or Canada. Israel — according to the United States government — has been occupying Gaza without interruption since 1967.

To grasp the perversity of using Gaza as an explanation for why Israel can’t risk a Palestinian state, it helps to realize that Sharon withdrew Gaza’s settlers in large measure because he didn’t want a Palestinian state. By 2004, when Sharon announced the Gaza withdrawal, the Road Map for Peace that he had signed with Mahmoud Abbas was going nowhere. Into the void came two international proposals for a two state solution. The first was the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, in which every member of the Arab League offered to recognize Israel if it returned to the 1967 lines and found a “just” and “agreed upon” solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. The second was the 2003 Geneva Initiative, in which former Israeli and Palestinian negotiators publicly agreed upon the details of a two state plan. As the political scientists Jonathan Rynhold and Dov Waxman have detailed, Sharon feared the United States would get behind one or both plans, and pressure Israel to accept a Palestinian state near the 1967 lines. “Only an Israeli initiative,” Sharon argued, “will keep us from being dragged into dangerous initiatives like the Geneva and Saudi initiatives.”

Sharon saw several advantages to withdrawing settlers from Gaza. First, it would save money, since in Gaza Israel was deploying a disproportionately high number of soldiers to protect a relatively small number of settlers. Second, by (supposedly) ridding Israel of its responsibility for millions of Palestinians, the withdrawal would leave Israel and the West Bank with a larger Jewish majority. Third, the withdrawal would prevent the administration of George W. Bush from embracing the Saudi or Geneva plans, and pushing hard—as Bill Clinton had done—for a Palestinian state. Sharon’s chief of staff, Dov Weisglass, put it bluntly: “The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process. And when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with authority and permission. All with a presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress.”

It’s no surprise, therefore, that the Gaza withdrawal did not meet minimal Palestinian demands. Not even the most moderate Palestinian leader would have accepted a long-term arrangement in which Israel withdrew its settlers from Gaza while maintaining control of the Strip’s borders and deepening Israeli control of the West Bank. (Even in the 2005, the year Sharon withdrew from Gaza, the overall settler population rose, in part because some Gazan settlers relocated to the West Bank).

In fact, Sharon’s advisors did not expect withdrawing Gaza’s settlers to satisfy the Palestinians. Nor did not they expect it to end Palestinian terrorism. Ehud Olmert, a key figure in the disengagement plan (and someone who himself later embraced Palestinian statehood), acknowledged that “terror will continue” after the removal of Gaza’s settlers. The key word is “continue.” Contrary to the American Jewish narrative, militants in Gaza didn’t start launching rockets at Israel after the settlers left. They began a half-decade earlier, at the start of the second intifada. The Gaza disengagement did not stop this rocket fire. But it did not cause it either.

Hamas Seized Power

I can already hear the objections. Even if withdrawing settlers from Gaza didn’t give the Palestinians a state, it might have made Israelis more willing to support one in the future - if only Hamas had not seized power and turned Gaza into a citadel of terror.

But Hamas didn’t seize power. It won an election. In January 2006, four months after the last settlers left, Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem chose representatives to the Palestinian Authority’s parliament. (The previous year, they had separately elected Abbas to be the Palestinian Authority’s President). Hamas won a plurality of the vote - forty-five percent - but because of the PA’s voting system, and Fatah’s idiotic decision to run more than one candidate in several districts, Hamas garnered 58 percent of the seats in parliament.

To the extent American Jewish leaders acknowledge that Hamas won an election (as opposed to taking power by force), they usually chalk its victory up to Palestinian enthusiasm for the organization’s 1988 charter, which calls for Israel’s destruction (The president of the New York board of rabbis said recently that anyone who voted for Hamas should be considered a combatant, not a civilian). But that’s almost certainly not the reason Hamas won. For starters, Hamas didn’t make Israel’s destruction a major theme of its election campaign. In its 2006 campaign manifesto, the group actually fudged the question by saying only that it wanted an “independent state whose capital is Jerusalem” plus fulfillment of the right of return.

Don’t get me wrong. I’m not suggesting that by 2006 Hamas had embraced the two state solution. Only that Hamas recognized that running against the two state solution was not the best way to win Palestinian votes. The polling bears this out. According to exit polls conducted by the prominent Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki, 75 percent of Palestinian voters—and a remarkable 60 percent of Hamas voters—said they supported a Palestinian unity government dedicated to achieving a two state solution.

So why did Hamas win? Because, according to Shikaki, only fifteen percent of voters called the peace process their most important issue. A full two-thirds cited either corruption or law and order. It’s vital to remember that 2006 was the first Palestinian election in more than ten years. During the previous decade, Palestinians had grown increasingly frustrated by Fatah’s unaccountable, lawless and incompetent rule. According to exit polls, 85 percent of voters called Fatah corrupt. Hamas, by contrast, because it had never wielded power and because its charitable arm effectively delivered social services, enjoyed a reputation for competence and honesty.

Hamas won, in other words, for the same reason voters all across the world boot out parties that have grown unresponsive and self-interested after years in power. That’s not just Shikaki’s judgment. It’s also Bill Clinton’s. As Clinton explained in 2009, “a lot of Palestinians were upset that they [Fatah] were not delivering the services. They didn’t think it [Fatah] was an entirely honest operation and a lot of people were going to vote for Hamas not because they wanted terrorist tactics…but because they thought they might get better service, better government…They [also] won because Fatah carelessly and foolishly ran both its slates in too many parliamentary seats.”

This doesn’t change the fact that Hamas’ election confronted Israel and the United States with a serious problem. After its victory, Hamas called for a national unity government with Fatah “for the purpose of ending the occupation and settlements and achieving a complete withdrawal from the lands occupied [by Israel] in 1967, including Jerusalem, so that the region enjoys calm and stability during this phase.” But those final words—“this phase”—made Israelis understandably skeptical that Hamas had changed its long-term goals. The organization still refused to recognize Israel, and given that Israel had refused to talk to the PLO until it formally accepted Israel’s right to exist in 1993, it’s not surprising that Israel demanded Hamas meet the same standard.

Still, Israel and the U.S. would have been wiser to follow the counsel of former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy, who called for Sharon to try to forge a long-term truce with Hamas. Israel could also have pushed Hamas to pledge that if Abbas—who remained PA president—negotiated a deal with Israel, Hamas would accept the will of the Palestinian people as expressed in a referendum, something the group’s leaders have subsequently promised to do.

Haaretz

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:45 schreef Aloulou het volgende:
"Israel de Gaza verlaten en zie wat je ervoor terugkrijgt", "Gaza had een Singapore kunnen zijn als Hamas er niet zat?" Even de feiten van de veelal herhaalde mythen (ook in dit topic) onderscheiden. Een goed artikel in de linkse Israelische krant Haaretz.

Zullen Israelische nationalisten (zijn er nogal wat) wel weer schuimbekkend eisen dat deze krant moet worden gesloten omdat het "landverraders zijn die maar bij de Pallies in Gaza moeten gaan wonen als ze zo van hen houden":

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 21:19 schreef IsaacCuenca het volgende:
Interessant artikel dat de standaard onzin argumenten/mythes van pro-israel mensen 'debunkt'
http://www.huffingtonpost(...)srael_b_5624401.html

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:34 schreef Aloulou het volgende:

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Welk voorstel dat jij als goed bestempelt?

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Op vrijdag 1 augustus 2014 22:34 schreef Twentsche_Ros het volgende:
Zonder jaloezie zouden de Palestijnen erg succesvol kunnen zijn. Gaza kan een tweede Singapore worden. Zonder de raketten richting Israel hebben de Palestijnen een enorme goodwill bij het westen. (van Agt, Gretta Duysenberg, veel (katholieke) EU-leiders). Dan zouden ze de Gaza verder kunnen opbouwen, en zou Israel flink onder druk worden gezet om de vele resoluties te accepteren. Je hebt natuurlijk wel iets gelijk. Maar trots en eerzucht zijn wel elementen die een oplossing voor een groot deel in de weg staan.