De Gulenbeweging als politieke organisatie.

quote:

Op dinsdag 1 september 2020 15:52 schreef Hexagon het volgende:
In hoeverre is die beweging eigenlijk futureproof als Gulen wegvalt? Blijven ze dan bij elkaar of brokkelt het dan uiteen? Gezien zijn gammele gezondheid kan dat iedere dag gebeuren.

Ze zijn nu al aan het afbrokkelen.
Veel Gulenisten willen een verklaring voor waarom de hoogste Gulenistische imams van het leger op de basis waren van waar de coup werd geleid. Ze willen weten wat twee van die imams in het wooncomplex van Gulen deden van 11-13 juli 2016 (twee dagen voor de coup).

Ze willen weten waarom Gulen niks gedaan heeft om de coup te stoppen terwijl hij van tevoren van de coup wist.

Ook zijn ze woedend nu naar buiten komt dat er examens zijn gestolen.

Een goed Engelstalig artikel.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36920535


They were painted as a "parallel state", who had also struck years earlier, when the movement was widely believed to have fabricated evidence in the so-called "Ergenekon" and "Sledgehammer" cases: two sham trials accusing hundreds of military officers of plotting a coup.

The convictions were eventually overturned.

Naval captain Ali Yasin Turker was among those sentenced during Sledgehammer.

This navy captain blames the Gulen network for his wrongful conviction
He spent 33 months in prison before the conviction was crushed.

"The media close to Fethullah Gulen carried out an operation against us, violating our right to a free trial", he says.

"His followers were in the police and judiciary but they didn't have enough in the military so they were trying to replace us with their own."

So did the military purge during Ergenekon and Sledgehammer pave the way for this latest coup?

"Certainly. If they hadn't been able to get rid of us then and put their own followers in the military, they wouldn't have been able even to think about a coup, let alone carry it out."

Ik had eerder aangegeven dat Gulenistische politieagenten, militaire officieren, officieren van justitie en rechters bevelen krijgen en rapporteren aan imams. In heel veel westerse landen zullen mensen die dergelijke activiteiten ondernemen veroordeeld worden voor spionage. Stel je voor, een rechter of politieagent die moet rapporteren over hun werk aan een imam of dat hij bevelen aanneemt.


"The imam was supposed to be the superior of all Gülenists in that organisation. For example, a senior Gülenist in the police force would report to his “imam” and regularly update him on what was happening in the institution – and, in some cases, receive instructions for various internal policies. "


https://www.ecfr.eu/publi(...)nd_the_gulenists7131

"In some institutions, complaints started piling up starting in 2009 that non-Gülenists were removed from positions by unsigned letters of complaint or investigations. Both grievances towards, and fear of, the movement built up throughout Anatolia.

At the height of its power, in 2012, and as an ally of Turkey’s ruling AKP, the Gülen network was the single most cohesive force within the Turkish bureaucracy, judiciary, and law enforcement, providing many of the human resources in key institutions, ranging from the tax authority to the Banking Board or the High Committee of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). Judicial appointments to anti-terrorism courts during these years entirely favoured Gülenists, who then prosecuted opponents of the movement as well as opponents of the AKP. By the end of 2013, 77 out of 81 provincial police commissioners were Gülenist sympathisers, according to Turkey’s Minister of Interior. "


https://www.ecfr.eu/publi(...)nd_the_gulenists7131

Nog een lange quote uit hetzelfde artikel.


"Details of the intricacies, practices, and reach of this organisation set the stage for understanding what the movement is, but in order to understand its power within the Turkish state and the possible role of Gülenists in the July 15 coup attempt, it is important to revisit the trials of 2009–2013 that were led by Gülenists and that involved a number of controversial practices.

Complicated as they sound, these trials reveal a troubling aspect of the movement’s modus operandi within the state system. These trials, and particularly the so-called Ergenekon probe, started out as an investigation into an alleged network of nationalists (from ex-military to journalists) who the police claimed were conspiring to kill minorities, Kurds, Alawites, and religious leaders, and even plan a coup. The case was largely led by Gülenist police officers and prosecutors. By mid-2009, Ergenekon had already spiralled into a witch-hunt for hard-line secularists and Kemalists within the state apparatus, and even the broader civil society. Many of the accused often had no proven connection to each other or to any particular acts of violence but still served time in prison.

The trials were considered in Europe as a Turkish effort to reckon with its dark past, and were described in successive EU progress reports on Turkey’s accession process as investigations into “illegal networks” inside Turkey. But they were deeply controversial within Turkey itself. Indeed, anyone who read the thousands of pages of the indictment could not miss the hyperbolic nature of the prosecutors’ claims. The case essentially rewrote the last 30 years of Turkey’s political history as a series of behind-the-scenes manoeuvres by a dark, secretive organisation called Ergenekon.

Most of the people who were rounded up or investigated during the probe – ranging from retired generals and former university deans, to senior military intelligence officers and mafia leaders – were the types who may have welcomed attempts by the Turkish military to “rein in” the AKP government. But beyond that ideological affinity, it was difficult to establish a hierarchical structure or the existence of a real organisation, let alone any real connection among all the suspects. The prosecutors overcame this problem by pointing out that one does not necessarily have to be aware of the existence of an organisation in order to be a member of it, and that the suspects were helping create a fertile psychological environment for a military coup.

Türkan Saylan, whose funeral served as an opportunity to protest against Gülen – see the beginning of this paper – was one of those caught up in these investigations. As a doctor and a crusader for secular education, Saylan had a dedication that made her a household name across Turkey. At the time of her death from cancer, her philanthropic network, which gives scholarships for girls’ education and raises funds to build schools, was one of the largest NGOs in Turkey. But notwithstanding her good work, her hard-line Kemalist positions made her a suspect.

A month before her death from cancer, police raided Saylan’s home in the middle of the night. Saylan’s organisation was accused of aiding the Ergenekon network by creating an educational institution that secretly encouraged and trained young girls to prostitute themselves to military officers. The purpose, the police claimed, was to create a link between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — a listed terrorist organisation in Turkey — and the Turkish army"

https://www.ecfr.eu/publi(...)nd_the_gulenists7131

Nog een quote uit hetzelfde artikel

"Over the next couple of years, dozens of trials, all launched by an increasingly bold Gülen apparatus within the security bureaucracy, hundreds of military officers, generals, journalists, writers, and bureaucrats were imprisoned. Gülenists and Gülen-friendly cadres often filled the vacuum they left behind as the AKP did not have enough of its own educated people to replace the departing secularists.

Their efforts, as well as the wide-scale use of wiretappings of public figures to humiliate or discredit the suspects, had a chilling effect on the public. If one visited Istanbul or Ankara during those years and wanted to have a political conversation, one would notice that most Turks would take the battery out of their cell phones or put the phone in another room. The public, as well as the mainstream media, was in awe of the “faceless” Gülenist-power within law enforcement. "

Uit hetzelfde artikel. Een bizar stuk.


The following list is just a sample of some of the more bizarre and tragic circumstances of the various trials in this period:

- Hundreds of military officers and several admirals – many in succession for leadership roles within the Turkish military – were jailed in 2010–2011 in another coup trial called “Sledgehammer” for having their names on electronic documents ostensibly related to a 2002 coup plot. The incriminating documents were forensically proven to have been fabricated after 2008 but the judges nonetheless sentenced the officers.

- A senior police chief (Hanefi Avci) who wrote an exposé of the Gülen movement’s power within the police was arrested for being a member of an unknown leftist terrorist organisation – Revolutionary Headquarters – in 2010. His book became a best-seller but he remained in jail for five years.

- A middle-aged crusader for secular education was accused of helping the PKK and her non-profit organisation was humiliated for having been in possession of “animal porn” after a police raid. Dozens of Ergenekon suspects were similarly accused of possession of “animal porn” or “child pornography” by police officers – thereby also facing additional charges from local courts in addition to being tried in connection with Ergenekon.

- A small-sized business owner was described as the “financier” of Ergenekon (Kuddusi Okkir) and eventually died in custody from cancer. At the time of his death, he was so poor that the local municipality had to take care of the funeral.

- A promising young Alawite navy officer (Ali Tatar) committed suicide when he was about to be detained for the second time on accusations of indoctrinating the military cadets with PKK ideology and selling them drugs.
Another navy colonel (Berk Erdem) killed himself when leaked pictures of his wife leaving a building were published as proof of adultery in a publication close to the Ergenekon prosecutors. Several navy officers committed suicide due to instances of public humiliation.

- A journalist (Ahmet Şık) who wrote a book about Gülen’s influence within the police force had his manuscript confiscated before it was published. He was put on trial for forming an organisation with the purpose of tarnishing the Ergenekon trials with a bunch of other journalists, one police chief, two academics, and one senior intelligence officer – who all met in prison and whose only common denominator was their criticism of the Gülen movement within the judiciary and the police.

- One of the leading critics of the Ergenekon trial, the secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader, Deniz Baykal, had a secret recording of his rendezvous with his mistress leaked to the internet in 2010, ending his long career in politics.

- A string of sex tapes of senior members of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) were released just before the 2011 elections, following strong anti-Gülenist statements by its leader Devlet Bahçeli, leading to the resignation of nine party officials.


None of this changed the narrative of a “reformist” Turkey in Europe, and if any attention was paid to the excesses of these trials

Uit hetzelfde artikel. Nu gaat het over de bertrokkenheid van de Gulenisten bij de couppoging.


THE COUP DE GRACE: 15 JULY
The Turkish government’s assertion that followers of Fethullah Gülen within the military are responsible for the coup has merit – although, legally speaking, evidence linking Gülen himself to the 15 July attempt remains scant.

The nerve centre of the coup attempt was Akincilar air base, in Ankara, where a close confidant of Gülen, a softly spoken professor of theology who was reportedly the Gülen movement’s civilian “imam” in charge of the air force, was present on the night of the coup. The professor, Adil Öksüz, was detained along with all the officers who were at the base that night, but was subsequently released by a judge within 15 minutes after claiming that he happened to be in the area looking to purchase land. He was escorted out of the court house by a Gülenist TV reporter and has since been at large. The theology professor, despite his rather meagre salary, had travelled abroad 109 times over the past couple of years, according to Turkish news reports, and had just returned from the US, where he had stayed for two days. According to the government, he is one of the key figures linking the coup attempt to Gülen himself.

No one in Turkey doubts that there are Gülenist fingerprints on the 15 July coup, even though non-Gülenist generals were also involved.

However, sympathisers of the movement outside the military and public service have also faced a massive crackdown since the coup.

Western media stories and the widespread belief that the coup was orchestrated by the Turkish government in order for Erdoğan to consolidate his power have no basis in reality.

The 15 July attempt is the most serious coup plot in Turkey since military takeover in 1980, and involved the mobilisation of hundreds of officers and up to 10,000 soldiers from the army, air force, navy, and gendarmerie.

The coup nearly succeeded. It failed because the putschists panicked when Turkish intelligence identified unusual activity among military cadets the afternoon before the coup, forcing the plotters to initiate the coup at the rather inconvenient hour of 9pm (as opposed to the planned 3am).

How do we know that this coup involved Gülenists or was directed by them? Government sources and Gülen experts close to the investigations have told ECFR that the planning was largely carried out by “civilians” who provided the coordination between different units. “A Gülenist within the military doesn’t necessarily know who the other Gülenists are”, said a senior police intelligence officer close to the movement for many years. The fact that the putschists relied on outsiders to coordinate the coup was ingenious. But it was also its downfall when things started going south and the civilian coordinators were no longer around. Army units could not talk to one another. Investigators also claim that non-Gülenists were not involved at the planning stages of the coup nor were they present at the Ankara air base headquarters.

It is not easy to identify the Gülenists within the military – especially when a hyped-up media mixes propaganda with facts. This is where it gets confusing both for the public and for the investigators. With the exception of a dozen high-profile media figures and people around Gülen, no Gülenist ever calls himself one. The movement prefers the term “community” (“camia”) or “Service” (“Hizmet”) to refer to itself. Even the loyalist members usually begin each sentence with “I am not a Gülenist myself…” Within the army, none who have come through the system acknowledge their affiliation.

But there are interesting coincidences that point in the direction of Gülenists. According to the Turkish government, many of the senior-level putschists had one-dollar bills with them, allegedly given by Gülen as a lucky charm. While the nerve-centre of the coup was the air force, generals who took part were overwhelmingly from the ranks of those who were promoted into the vacuum created by the imprisonment of secularists in the Sledgehammer trials in 2010–2013.

Several “known” Gülenists within the armed forces – such as the senior members of the military judiciary and personnel departments who rose to prominence after Sledgehammer – were involved in the attempt. Senior defectors from the Gülen movement, such as Latif Erdoğan, claimed on Turkish television that he recognised the detained officers lined up with the former head of the air force, four-star general Akin Öztürk, who took part in the events on the night of the coup.

Moreover, according to Turkish government sources, hundreds of officers and judges were discovered to have membership and passwords to a communication program called ByLock that Turkish intelligence claims is used by Gülenists to avoid detection. It had 39,000 active members, including state employees and members of the judiciary. Although there isn’t evidence implicating all 39,000 users in the coup, the Turkish government uses membership of ByLock as an indicator of membership in what is now referred to by Turkish law enforcement as the Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETÖ).

The coup plotters were exceptional in their ability to hide their plans. The aide-de-camps of all the force commanders and of the chief of staff of the armed forces, Hulusi Akar, took part in the coup. The government alleges that they were Gülenist sleeper cells hiding their identity for decades. Akar’s aide-de-camp confessed to being a closet Gülenist, albeit under ill-treatment as evidenced by photos of his badly beaten body. He is also reported to have confessed to having a civilian contact — an “older brother” — that he met on some weekends and of having planted a listening device on the previous chief of staff, Necdet Özel.

In his testimony to the police, Hulusi Akar, chief of staff of the Turkish armed forces, who remained hostage throughout the night of the coup, claimed that one of the generals in charge of the coup at the air base suggested putting him in touch with Fethullah Gülen, according to Turkey’s semi-official Anadolu Agency. Akar himself has not spoken about this to the public.

Five out of the six military liaison officers attached to the presidency also took part in the plot – but failed to pinpoint Erdoğan’s exact location because his staff were suspicious of their questions. A police officer who was purged by the government for being a Gülenist after the corruption cases of late 2013 was captured inside one of the tanks on the night of the coup wearing military camouflage.

Professor Danny Rodrik had het volgende geschreven.


In addressing Gülen’s possible role in the coup plot Rodrik wrote, “The Gülen movement is a highly hierarchical organization. People who have followed it closely over the years report that very few important decisions take place without Gülen’s blessing. There is certainly no tradition of autonomous, independent decision-making or dissent in the movement. It would be surprising if Gülenist officers had planned this on their own, without seeking at least the assent of their spiritual leader.”

Is er nog iemand die gelooft dat Gulen een goede gast is? Dat zijn Gulen-beweging een leuk onschuldig clubje is?

Gülenistische prof dr Elvan Aktaş wijst erop dat volgens Duitse rapporten de Gülen organisatie doet denken aan een criminele organisatie. Volgens hem komt dat door een aantal foute figuren binnen de organisatie.

Er is nu ook sprake van een verkrachtingsschandaal die Gulenisten zelf aan het licht hebben gebracht.

De verkrachtingen hebben zich in de VS voorgedaan. 30 Gulenistische vrouwen zijn verkracht door een Gulenistische arts. De arts heeft hooggeplaatste Gulenistische vrienden. Gulenisten in het complex van Gulen in Pennsylvania hebben geprobeerd de zaak in de doofpot te stoppen.

https://twitter.com/Hurriyet/status/1308648838295629829?s=20

De voormalig Gulenistische journalist Ahmet Dönmez die naar Zweden is gevlucht heeft nu een artikel geschreven dat aantoont dat Gülen zelf achter de coup zat. Ahmet Dönmez heeft bronnen binnen het kamp van Gülen.

De bronnen van Dönmez hebben bevestigd dat Gülen tijdens de couppoging telefonisch heeft gesproken met een Gülenistische imam die op dat moment op een luchtmachtbasis de coup leidde. De imam is opgepakt en zit een levenslange gevangenisstraf uit.

Toen de coup mislukte waren heel veel mensen in het kamp van Gülen aan het huilen. Gülen heeft gezegd dat het allemaal zijn eigen schuld was.

Personen die Gulen hebben overtuigd deel te nemen aan deze coup zoals Ismail Kokuroğlu en Mustafa Özcan zitten nog altijd in de top van de Gülenbeweging.

In de Gülenbeweging is er een grote discussie losgebarsten sinds dit artikel eergisteren is gepubliceerd.



[ Bericht 16% gewijzigd door polderturk op 17-10-2021 17:31:22 ]

quote:

Op zondag 17 oktober 2021 21:50 schreef trein2000 het volgende:

[..]
En dan ook nog op een of ander dubieus blogje. Ik heb hier echt heel weinig zin in.

TS, kom gewoon met leesbare en op betrouwbaarheid te verifiëren artikelen, dit heeft geen zin zo.

Hij publiceert die artikelen op zijn eigen site. In de twitter link staat een link naar Patreon. Daar staat weer een link naar zijn site. Hier een directe link. Je kan het met google translate vertalen. Maar jullie hebben opzich gelijk. Ik plaats een link die niemand kan plaatsen.

Mijn doel was vooral om te laten zien wat er nu gaande is.

https://www.ahmetdonmez.net/15-temmuz-ve-bazi-olumcul-gercekler/