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Op zaterdag 2 februari 2019 14:56 schreef crystal_meth het volgende:Maar de VS en de NAVO doen net hetzelfde, ze wijzen elke beschuldiging van de hand, ook al zijn er wel degelijk goede argumenten dat ook zij het verdrag overtreden.
- Z overtreden minstens de letter van het verdrag: de VS gebruikt raketten met verboden bereik als "dummy targets" om hun anti-missile systemen te testen.
Welke dan? Ik weet dat bv. met het schieten met de THAAD dat ding in een bewuste kurkentrekker manoeuvre wordt gedwongen omdat hij anders te ver komt.
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- Het rakettenschild gebruikt dezelfde Mk-41 launchers waarmee hun schepen Tomahawk kruisraketten lanceren. het verdrag verbiedt launchers die ooit gebruikt of getest werden voor het lanceren van missiles met verboden reikwijdte.
Geplaatst pak hem beet 5 jaar nadat Rusland zijn eerste testen aan doen was met de SSC-8, ergo een direct gevolg van dus... En even los van het feit wat er in die VLS gestopt kan worden is het initieel een systeem wat tegen ballistic/ cruise missiles bedoeld is in dit geval. Putin kan wel een grote broek aantrekken en beginnen te wijzen maar als oa hij (feitelijk is het tegen Iran gericht) zich koest gehouden had was dat raketschild er nooit gekomen.
En verder, voor
wat het waard is uiteraard:
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The INF Treaty defines a GLCM launcher as "a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM." A GLCM is defined "as a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle." These definitions are somewhat circular: if a missile has been launched from a ground-based launcher, it is a ground-launched missile, and if a launcher has launched a ground-launched missile, it is a GLCM launcher. One could argue that a sea-based missile, such as the Tomahawk, could be launched from land if its launcher were deployed on land. In that case, the launcher could be considered a ground-based launcher, even if it had never been tested with a ground-launched missile. This seems to be the source of Russia's complaint. However, even if it seems somewhat logical, it is not consistent with the INF Treaty's definition. The treaty specifies that the launcher must launch an intermediate-range GLCM, not any intermediate-range cruise missile, to qualify as a system banned by the treaty.
Moreover, U.S. officials have asserted that the version of the MK-41 system to be based in Romania and Poland will not be the same as the shipboard version that has been used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, even though it will use "some of the same structural components as the sea-based system."109 According to some reports, the "electronics and software of the Aegis Ashore Mk-41 launcher are different than the ship-borne variant."110 The Trump Administration reiterated this point in a fact sheet released by the State Department in December 2017. It noted that the Aegis Ashore system "is only capable of launching defensive interceptor missiles." The system uses "some of the same structural components as the sea-based Mk-41 Vertical Launch System" but it "is not the same launcher as the sea-based MK-41 Vertical Launch System." The system "lacks the software, fire control hardware, support equipment, and other infrastructure needed to launch offensive ballistic or cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk."111
This distinction would seem to undercut the Russian view that the launcher used in Aegis Ashore "can be used to launch intermediate-range cruise missiles." However, convincing Russia of this difference may be difficult. In past arms control agreements, the parties have mandated that similar systems with different purposes possess functionally related, observable differences. This is not required under the INF Treaty, and it is not clear at this time whether this will be the case for the land-based MK-41 launchers. As a result, even though the treaty definitions may not capture the system unless it actually launches a cruise missile from land, the United States may find it helpful, for political reasons, to take additional steps to address Russia's concerns and convince Russia that the system does not violate the INF Treaty.
[ Bericht 22% gewijzigd door AchJa op 02-02-2019 15:43:29 ]