WGR Werk, Geldzaken, Recht en de Beurs
Hier kun je alles kwijt over sollicitaties, werksituaties, belastingen, (handelen op) de beurs, hypotheken, beleggingen en salarissen, arbeidscontracten of geschillen met je (huis)baas. Alles over werk, geldzaken en recht dus.
Zoals in dat filmpje ook al is uitgelegd, er zijn duizendeneen manieren om via via je eigen assets te kopen. Dit is een fundamentele fout in het plan, en niet met extra wetgeving op te lossen...quote:Op vrijdag 3 april 2009 14:51 schreef Dinosaur_Sr het volgende:
niet echt verrassend:
http://www.cnbc.com/id/30024730
toelichting: banken mogen onder het Geitner plan niet hun eigen assets kopen, maar wel assets van andere banken. Als ik als bank nou een dealtje maak met een andere bank dat we over en weer 'investeren' in elkanders rommel tegen astromische marked to myth prijzen, komt de rekening simpelweg bij de belastingbetaler.
Ik kan niet geloven dat ze dat in de US zo liggen te slapen. Congress, pers, anyone?
Nicht ärgern, nur wundern!
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04032009/watch.html
Ene William K. Black laat weinig van Geithner heel. Een duidelijk gesprek met weinige technische termen zodat het ook voor een leek (zoals ik) goed te volgen is.
Ene William K. Black laat weinig van Geithner heel. Een duidelijk gesprek met weinige technische termen zodat het ook voor een leek (zoals ik) goed te volgen is.
kick
Big fund firms such as BlackRock, Pimco seen on short list for PPIP
But red tape may lead some managers to opt out, observers say
By David Hoffman
June 14, 2009, 6:01 AM EST
BlackRock Inc., Franklin Templeton Investments, Invesco Ltd., Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC and Western Asset Management Co. are among the leading candidates whose selection may come as early as this week to run funds for the Legacy Securities portion of the government's Public-Private Investment Program, according to observers.
But some industry watchers said that though many firms may have expressed interest in the program initially, some could be having second thoughts now.
“Based on my own experience to date, asset managers have an interest in the program, but I'm not sure how many have said they will go forward with it,” said Barry Barbash, a partner in the Washington office of New York law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. He is a former director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Division of Investment Management.
“The degree of red tape and intrusive regulation is a stumbling block,” Mr. Barbash said.
Judging by the amount of interest expressed by asset managers in PPIP, it appears at least initially not to be much of a worry.
Vincent Ricardel
Barry Barbash: Red tape and "intrusive regulation" are stumbling blocks.
The Department of the Treasury on April 29 announced the receipt of more than 100 applications from potential fund managers interested in participating in the Legacy Securities portion of PPIP.
Under the Legacy Securities program, institutional investors that have $10 billion of comparable assets will purchase pools of mortgage-backed and mortgage-related securities from banks and other financial institutions.
The program is potentially appealing to asset managers because they would be able to put together products — most likely closed-end funds, hedge funds and private-equity funds, and to a smaller extent, mutual funds — that have the potential to deliver huge returns.
Once a fund manager is pre-qualified, it can begin raising the expected minimum of $500 million in private capital that would serve as the investment that, pending further approval, would be matched with taxpayer funds.
Fund managers may then choose to use leverage pursuant to the Legacy Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility.
Several high-profile individuals at the firms have made clear their interest in the program.
Bill Gross, co-chief investment manager at Pimco of Newport Beach, Calif., has been particularly vocal about his support of PPIP, calling it a “win-win-win” policy.
Laurence Fink, chairman and chief executive of New York-based BlackRock, has also been a staunch supporter of the program, and so has Martin L. Flanagan, president and chief executive of Invesco in Atlanta.
“We strongly believe that [PPIP] will help stimulate the mortgage market and provide individual and institutional investors globally with compelling investment opportunities in the Legacy Securities and Legacy Loan programs,” Mr. Flanagan said in an April 27 statement.
The Legacy Loan program calls for banks to sell pools of residential mortgages to individuals and institutions through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
That part of PPIP appears to be on hold, partly as a result of banks' reluctance to take part out of concern that they wouldn't be getting what the loans were worth, attorneys familiar with PPIP said.
"PRICING PROBLEM'
There are similar concerns, however, over the Legacy Securities program.
“It's always been a pricing problem,” said Donald G. Ogilvie, independent chairman of the Center for Banking Solutions at Deloitte LLP of New York. “The people that own these assets think their value is higher than the people that want to buy them.”
As a result, there are a number of potential buyers but few sellers, Mr. Ogilvie said.
Even the buyers, however, may be getting cold feet, according to several securities attorneys.
After asset managers applied to run PPIP funds, President Obama signed into law the Helping Families Save their Homes Act of 2009, which was aimed principally at stemming home loan foreclosures.
But the act also has various provisions related to PPIP participants.
Among other facets, the act requires consultation with the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program to impose strict conflict-of-interest rules on PPIP fund managers; allows the special inspector general access to all PPIP fund books and records, including all records of financial transactions in machine-readable form; and requires each fund manager to acknowledge, in writing, a fiduciary duty to both the public and private investors in a PPIP fund.
“I don't think it's going to stop the program,” said Jeff Taft, a Washington-based partner with Mayer Brown LLP of Chicago.
But the new rules and regulations could prove to be a “speed bump” warning some asset managers of the difficulties of doing business with the government, he said.
None of the asset managers that are potential Legacy Securities program participants would comment on the problems that they could face as a PPIP fund manager.
Firms under consideration are in a “quiet period” until the Treasury Department announces the names of the asset managers it selects, said one company spokeswoman, who asked that neither she nor her firm be identified.
She did express skepticism, however, about the notion that asset managers who have expressed interest in managing funds for PPIP are thinking twice about it.
“A lot of naysayers are stirring a big pot of what-ifs,” the spokeswoman said.
Fund watchers, however, said that asset managers should be asking themselves if it is a good idea to get in bed with the government.
“A lot of financial firms have been shocked by what they thought was a good thing,” said Reuben Gregg Brewer, director of mutual fund research at Value Line Inc. of New York.
New York-based JPMorgan Chase & Co. is one of those firms.
During the company's first-quarter earnings call in April, James Dimon, the firm's chairman, president and chief executive, said: “We're certainly not going to borrow from the federal government, because we've learned our lesson about that.”
JPMorgan Chase received $25 billion from TARP last year — money that comes with strings attached concerning issues such as compensation.
In terms of PPIP, Mr. Dimon said that JPMorgan Chase would participate neither as either a buyer nor a seller of the mortgage-backed securities.
A potential buyer has reason to be leery of participating in PPIP for another reason: bad public relations.
“If you do participate and you do well, will you be chastised?” Steve Kandarian, chief investment officer of MetLife Inc. of New York, reportedly said this month at a conference, referring to the potential image problem of a fund manager's making a killing on toxic assets.
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Het plan leeft nog steeds.... lijst met kandidaten is wel erg dun. Maar dat PIMCO hier bij zit zal nauwelijks een verrassing zijn.
Big fund firms such as BlackRock, Pimco seen on short list for PPIP
But red tape may lead some managers to opt out, observers say
By David Hoffman
June 14, 2009, 6:01 AM EST
BlackRock Inc., Franklin Templeton Investments, Invesco Ltd., Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC and Western Asset Management Co. are among the leading candidates whose selection may come as early as this week to run funds for the Legacy Securities portion of the government's Public-Private Investment Program, according to observers.
But some industry watchers said that though many firms may have expressed interest in the program initially, some could be having second thoughts now.
“Based on my own experience to date, asset managers have an interest in the program, but I'm not sure how many have said they will go forward with it,” said Barry Barbash, a partner in the Washington office of New York law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. He is a former director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Division of Investment Management.
“The degree of red tape and intrusive regulation is a stumbling block,” Mr. Barbash said.
Judging by the amount of interest expressed by asset managers in PPIP, it appears at least initially not to be much of a worry.
Vincent Ricardel
Barry Barbash: Red tape and "intrusive regulation" are stumbling blocks.
The Department of the Treasury on April 29 announced the receipt of more than 100 applications from potential fund managers interested in participating in the Legacy Securities portion of PPIP.
Under the Legacy Securities program, institutional investors that have $10 billion of comparable assets will purchase pools of mortgage-backed and mortgage-related securities from banks and other financial institutions.
The program is potentially appealing to asset managers because they would be able to put together products — most likely closed-end funds, hedge funds and private-equity funds, and to a smaller extent, mutual funds — that have the potential to deliver huge returns.
Once a fund manager is pre-qualified, it can begin raising the expected minimum of $500 million in private capital that would serve as the investment that, pending further approval, would be matched with taxpayer funds.
Fund managers may then choose to use leverage pursuant to the Legacy Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility.
Several high-profile individuals at the firms have made clear their interest in the program.
Bill Gross, co-chief investment manager at Pimco of Newport Beach, Calif., has been particularly vocal about his support of PPIP, calling it a “win-win-win” policy.
Laurence Fink, chairman and chief executive of New York-based BlackRock, has also been a staunch supporter of the program, and so has Martin L. Flanagan, president and chief executive of Invesco in Atlanta.
“We strongly believe that [PPIP] will help stimulate the mortgage market and provide individual and institutional investors globally with compelling investment opportunities in the Legacy Securities and Legacy Loan programs,” Mr. Flanagan said in an April 27 statement.
The Legacy Loan program calls for banks to sell pools of residential mortgages to individuals and institutions through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
That part of PPIP appears to be on hold, partly as a result of banks' reluctance to take part out of concern that they wouldn't be getting what the loans were worth, attorneys familiar with PPIP said.
"PRICING PROBLEM'
There are similar concerns, however, over the Legacy Securities program.
“It's always been a pricing problem,” said Donald G. Ogilvie, independent chairman of the Center for Banking Solutions at Deloitte LLP of New York. “The people that own these assets think their value is higher than the people that want to buy them.”
As a result, there are a number of potential buyers but few sellers, Mr. Ogilvie said.
Even the buyers, however, may be getting cold feet, according to several securities attorneys.
After asset managers applied to run PPIP funds, President Obama signed into law the Helping Families Save their Homes Act of 2009, which was aimed principally at stemming home loan foreclosures.
But the act also has various provisions related to PPIP participants.
Among other facets, the act requires consultation with the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program to impose strict conflict-of-interest rules on PPIP fund managers; allows the special inspector general access to all PPIP fund books and records, including all records of financial transactions in machine-readable form; and requires each fund manager to acknowledge, in writing, a fiduciary duty to both the public and private investors in a PPIP fund.
“I don't think it's going to stop the program,” said Jeff Taft, a Washington-based partner with Mayer Brown LLP of Chicago.
But the new rules and regulations could prove to be a “speed bump” warning some asset managers of the difficulties of doing business with the government, he said.
None of the asset managers that are potential Legacy Securities program participants would comment on the problems that they could face as a PPIP fund manager.
Firms under consideration are in a “quiet period” until the Treasury Department announces the names of the asset managers it selects, said one company spokeswoman, who asked that neither she nor her firm be identified.
She did express skepticism, however, about the notion that asset managers who have expressed interest in managing funds for PPIP are thinking twice about it.
“A lot of naysayers are stirring a big pot of what-ifs,” the spokeswoman said.
Fund watchers, however, said that asset managers should be asking themselves if it is a good idea to get in bed with the government.
“A lot of financial firms have been shocked by what they thought was a good thing,” said Reuben Gregg Brewer, director of mutual fund research at Value Line Inc. of New York.
New York-based JPMorgan Chase & Co. is one of those firms.
During the company's first-quarter earnings call in April, James Dimon, the firm's chairman, president and chief executive, said: “We're certainly not going to borrow from the federal government, because we've learned our lesson about that.”
JPMorgan Chase received $25 billion from TARP last year — money that comes with strings attached concerning issues such as compensation.
In terms of PPIP, Mr. Dimon said that JPMorgan Chase would participate neither as either a buyer nor a seller of the mortgage-backed securities.
A potential buyer has reason to be leery of participating in PPIP for another reason: bad public relations.
“If you do participate and you do well, will you be chastised?” Steve Kandarian, chief investment officer of MetLife Inc. of New York, reportedly said this month at a conference, referring to the potential image problem of a fund manager's making a killing on toxic assets.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Het plan leeft nog steeds.... lijst met kandidaten is wel erg dun. Maar dat PIMCO hier bij zit zal nauwelijks een verrassing zijn.
Obamaquote:From the NY Times: Treasury’s Got Bill Gross on Speed Dial
[Bill Gross'] mood brightens when he talks about how much money Pimco could reap by participating in the Geithner [PPIP] plan. No wonder: the terms are deliciously favorable for participants selected as fund managers. Money managers like Pimco would be expected to raise at least $500 million from their clients. The Treasury would match that with taxpayer dollars. Then Pimco and the Treasury would create a jointly owned fund of at least $1 billion that would buy distressed mortgage bonds.
Government largess doesn’t stop there. The fund will be eligible for low-interest financing from both the Treasury and the Fed that analysts at Credit Suisse First Boston estimate could be as high as four times the total equity in the fund. So if Pimco ponied up $500 million, the fund that it manages could borrow $4 billion.
Pimco would then negotiate with banks to buy their wobbly mortgage-backed securities. Mr. Gross says that some of these securities pay an interest rate as high as 14 percent and that even if default rates were 70 percent, Pimco and the government would still make a 5 percent return after covering their negligible borrowing costs. That means the government-Pimco partnership could make at least $250 million in a year on a $5 billion investment fund. Of that amount, Pimco would get $125 million — a 25 percent return on its original investment.
But here’s the part that makes Mr. Gross salivate. If things go badly, the government is responsible for repaying all that debt.
"If you want to make God laugh, tell him about your plans"
Mijn reisverslagen
Mijn reisverslagen
"All great truths begin as blasphemies" - George Bernard Shaw, Ierse vrijdenker (1856 - 1950)
"Religion is regarded by common people as true, by the wise as false, and by rulers as useful" - Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Romeinse filosoof (4 BC - 65 AD)
"Religion is regarded by common people as true, by the wise as false, and by rulers as useful" - Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Romeinse filosoof (4 BC - 65 AD)
Ahum...... story continues.
Different name same wine.
"Loss-Share": FDIC Offers Billions In Guarantees For Buyers Of Failed Banks
As the Wall Street Journal reports this morning, in what are called a "loss-share" agreements, buyers of failed banks are getting billions of dollars in government guarantees to snatch up the bank's bad assets. To entice buyers, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is offering to cover around 80 percent of the losses associated with buying a bank. The result, the WSJ points out, is a massive subsidy to the private equity industry, and a huge risk to the American taxpayer.
As bank failures have mounted this year, much has been made of the FDIC's dwindling Deposit Insurance Fund. But, as the WSJ reports, the FDIC's potential risk through loss-share agreements "is about six times the amount remaining in its fund that guarantees consumers' deposits."
Though the WSJ doesn't go so far as to say the enormous guarantees are, in fact, sweetheart deals, it's hard to imagine a better scenario for bank buyers. (Except maybe the FDIC offering to guarantee 100 percent of the total losses associated with buying a failed bank.)
The FDIC, which first turned to loss share agreements during the S&L crisis in the early 1990s, maintains that the guarantees are much less costly than liquidating a failed bank's assets. Still, examine the WSJ's accounting of the sale of Alabama's Colonial Bank earlier this month:
"The FDIC, assuming its traditional role, brokered a sale of the bank's deposits to BB&T Corp., ensuring that customers wouldn't see any interruption. It also agreed to help BB&T buy a $15 billion portfolio of Colonial's loans and other assets by agreeing to absorb more than 80% of future losses. Under the deal, the most BB&T can lose is $500 million, the bank says, and that is only in the unlikely event that the entire portfolio becomes worthless. The FDIC is on the hook to cover the rest."
That's right, BB&T can only lose $500 million on a $15 billion investment. Which is why many buyers of failed banks are ecstatic over the details of these deals, even if it means taking on shoddy mortgages, commercial loans and other under-performing assets. To wit, this testimonial from Wilshire State Bank CEO Joanne Kim: "After we understood how [the loss-share] works, we were literally overjoyed."
At Credit Writedowns, Edward Harrison argued earlier this month that loss-share agreements socialize the banking industry's losses, while privatizing the gains. Here's Harrison:
"In my opinion, Sheila Bair, the head of the FDIC, is the best regulator in government these days (although not everyone feels that way). Her agency has taken on the workman's regulatory role in this crisis of identifying undercapitalized institutions, seizing them and putting their assets in new hands. These actions are a necessary part of capitalism. When a bank is reckless, it must suffer the consequences. However, it is the distribution of the losses from failed institutions which I would like to discuss. Much of the loss falls on the FDIC and, hence, taxpayers. In effect, what is a necessary part of capitalism, the extinction of failed institutions, may in effect be a redistribution of wealth in disguise.
"It's what's known as a sweetheart deal," writes Harrison.
Different name same wine.
"Loss-Share": FDIC Offers Billions In Guarantees For Buyers Of Failed Banks
As the Wall Street Journal reports this morning, in what are called a "loss-share" agreements, buyers of failed banks are getting billions of dollars in government guarantees to snatch up the bank's bad assets. To entice buyers, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is offering to cover around 80 percent of the losses associated with buying a bank. The result, the WSJ points out, is a massive subsidy to the private equity industry, and a huge risk to the American taxpayer.
As bank failures have mounted this year, much has been made of the FDIC's dwindling Deposit Insurance Fund. But, as the WSJ reports, the FDIC's potential risk through loss-share agreements "is about six times the amount remaining in its fund that guarantees consumers' deposits."
Though the WSJ doesn't go so far as to say the enormous guarantees are, in fact, sweetheart deals, it's hard to imagine a better scenario for bank buyers. (Except maybe the FDIC offering to guarantee 100 percent of the total losses associated with buying a failed bank.)
The FDIC, which first turned to loss share agreements during the S&L crisis in the early 1990s, maintains that the guarantees are much less costly than liquidating a failed bank's assets. Still, examine the WSJ's accounting of the sale of Alabama's Colonial Bank earlier this month:
"The FDIC, assuming its traditional role, brokered a sale of the bank's deposits to BB&T Corp., ensuring that customers wouldn't see any interruption. It also agreed to help BB&T buy a $15 billion portfolio of Colonial's loans and other assets by agreeing to absorb more than 80% of future losses. Under the deal, the most BB&T can lose is $500 million, the bank says, and that is only in the unlikely event that the entire portfolio becomes worthless. The FDIC is on the hook to cover the rest."
That's right, BB&T can only lose $500 million on a $15 billion investment. Which is why many buyers of failed banks are ecstatic over the details of these deals, even if it means taking on shoddy mortgages, commercial loans and other under-performing assets. To wit, this testimonial from Wilshire State Bank CEO Joanne Kim: "After we understood how [the loss-share] works, we were literally overjoyed."
At Credit Writedowns, Edward Harrison argued earlier this month that loss-share agreements socialize the banking industry's losses, while privatizing the gains. Here's Harrison:
"In my opinion, Sheila Bair, the head of the FDIC, is the best regulator in government these days (although not everyone feels that way). Her agency has taken on the workman's regulatory role in this crisis of identifying undercapitalized institutions, seizing them and putting their assets in new hands. These actions are a necessary part of capitalism. When a bank is reckless, it must suffer the consequences. However, it is the distribution of the losses from failed institutions which I would like to discuss. Much of the loss falls on the FDIC and, hence, taxpayers. In effect, what is a necessary part of capitalism, the extinction of failed institutions, may in effect be a redistribution of wealth in disguise.
"It's what's known as a sweetheart deal," writes Harrison.
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