quote:

Plunge Protection Team
"Plunge Protection Team" was originally the headline for an article in The Washington Post on February 23, 1997,[2] and has since become a colloquial term used by some mainstream publications to refer to the Working Group.[3][4] Initially, the term was used to express the opinion that the Working Group was being used to prop up the markets during downturns.[5][6] Financial writers for British newspapers The Observer and The Daily Telegraph, along with U.S. Congressman Ron Paul and writers Kevin Phillips (who claims “no personal firsthand knowledge” and is “not interested in becoming a conspiracy investigator”) [7] and John Crudele,[8] have charged the Working Group with going beyond their legal mandate. Claims about the Working Group, which are labeled conspiracy theories by some writers, generally include that it is an orchestrated mechanism that attempts to manipulate U.S. stock markets in the event of a market crash by using government funds to buy stocks, or other instruments such as stock index futures—acts which are forbidden by law. However, these articles usually refer to the Working Group using moral suasion to attempt to convince banks to buy stock index futures. [9]

Former Federal Reserve Board member Robert Heller, in the Wall Street Journal, opined that "Instead of flooding the entire economy with liquidity, and thereby increasing the danger of inflation, the Fed could support the stock market directly by buying market averages in the futures market, thereby stabilizing the market as a whole." His statement has been used to claim that the Fed actually did act in that way. Mainstream analysts call those claims a conspiracy theory, explaining that such claims are simplistic and unworkable.[10][11]

Market Crisis of 2008
On 06 October 2008, the working group issued a statement indicating that it was taking multiple actions available to it in order to attempt to stabilize the financial system, although purchase of stock shares was not part of the statement.[12] The government may wind up owning shares in the firms to which it has provided loans, as they will receive warrants as collateral for these loans.

quote:

Daanspeak: Met diezelfde Kirby zat ik te emailen over de geldhoeveelheid (de M3-gegevens) die exponentieel toeneemt en over het feit dat de Fed gaat stoppen met het publiceren van die gegevens, vanaf maart 2006. Is het niet zo dat Amerika na maart 2006 dan misschien nog veel meer dollars gaat drukken, dus virtueel de drukpersen laat rollen?

Willem Middelkoop: 'Dat gebeurt al. Dat is duidelijk zichtbaar door de M3-geldgroeicijfers. M3 is de definitie waaraan je kunt zien hoeveel geld er wordt gedrukt door een land. Het vermoeden is dat Amerika de boel aan de gang wil houden door steeds meer dollars te drukken om daarmee ook steeds meer dingen op te kopen om zodoende markten overeind te houden. Greenspan [de voorzitter van de Federale Bank van de VS] heeft daar al eens op gewezen in een congres, dat Amerika ingrijpt op valutamarkten, op rentemarkten. Maar ze kunnen ook ingrijpen op aandelenmarkten, ze kunnen ook ingrijpen op onroerend-goedmarkten. Er is een aantal bubbels in de Amerikaanse economie, zoals die van het vastgoed bijvoorbeeld; Amerika kan zich niet permiteren dat die bubbels met geweld leeglopen, zoals we dat met beurzen in Europa hebben gezien. En het is in dit verband heel opvallend dat de Dow Jones, de belangrijkse beurs in Amerika, nog nooit zo is gedaald als de Europese beurzen. Er zijn daarom heel sterke vermoedens dat de beurs hoog wordt gehouden in Amerika, met de dollars die Amerika zelf drukt, en er zijn erg sterke vermoedens dat Amerika haar eigen financiering verzorgt via de u-bocht van de Caribbean Banking Centers. Hierover had ik contact met Rob Kirby. Zo zijn er heel veel aanwijzingen en vermoedens die erop wijzen dat het steeds spannender gaat worden om het economisch aan de gang te blijven houden, waarbij Amerika een toevlucht neemt tot steeds creatievere en meer onorthodoxe manieren om de boel draaiende te houden en dat voor een groot deel wil verbergen voor het grote publiek.'


DaanSpeak: Wordt hierbij een rol gespeeld door het Plunge Protection Team, waarover ik eerder schreef?
Willem Middelkoop: 'Het Plunge Protection Team is de populaire benaming voor een officiële organisatie die sinds 1987 bestaat in Amerika. In 1987 crashten de beurzen voor het laatst echt heel heftig op Wall Street. Toen is er in overleg tussen het Witte Huis en de Federal Reserve besloten dat er een organisatie moest komen die in tijden van crisis en paniek de rust op de financiële markten kon terugbrengen, en dat zouden ze dan doen door bijvoorbeeld steunaankopen te doen. Daar zijn wetten voor, dat is formeel afgesproken. In de volksmond heet dat het Plunge Protection Team, dus het team dat ervoor moet zorgen dat de aandelenkoersen niet in elkaar storten. Er is een rapport geschreven door een Canadese vermogensbeheerder, met grote naam en faam, John Embry van Sprott Asset Management, en hij legt in dat rapport, The Visible Hand of Uncle Sam [PDF], uit hoeveel aanwijzingen er zijn dat dat Plunge Protection Team niet alleen maar optreedt als de beurs in elkaar dreigt te sodemieteren, maar dat er bijna structureel sprake is van ondersteuning. En ook, als je de dagelijkse bewegingen van de Dow Jones analiseert, dan zie dat het sinds het begin van de oorlog in Irak, sinds april 2003, niet meer is voorgekomen dat de Dow Jones op een dag met meer dan twee procent daalt. Dat is heel erg a-typisch, dat komt eigenlijk nooit voor, is nog nooit voorgekomen. In goede en slechte beursjaren heb je altijd dagen met verliezen van meer dan twee procent. Die dagen komen nog wel voor in Europa, komen nog wel voor in Azië, maar komen op Wall Street gewoon niet meer voor.'


DaanSpeak: Is het geld dat het Plunge Protection Team daarvoor gebruikt virtueel geld, dus laten ze daarvoor gewoon de drukpersen rollen?
Willem Middelkoop: 'Al het geld is in zekere zin virtueel geworden. Want geld kan uit het niets worden gecreëerd omdat we geen gouddekking meer hebben. De centrale banken kunnen eigenlijk uit het niets geld creëren, net als de commerciële banken: als je bijvoorbeeld een hypotheek neemt bij een bank wordt er terplekke geld gecreëerd wat er daarvoor nog niet was. Dat is dus niet het spaargeld van je buurman. Dat geld wordt vaak niet eens in bankbiljetten aan je gegeven. Als je een huis koopt, wordt dat gewoon overgemaakt naar de vorige eigenaar van dat huis. Dus dat is een transactie die alleen digitaal bestaat, een vorm van virtueel geld. Op deze manier kunnen centrale banken geld creëren. De Wall-Streetbanken zijn onderdeel en eigenaar van de Amerikaanse Centrale Bank, de Federal Reserve. Die bank is niet van de staat, maar is van de grote Wall-Streetbanken. En in principe hebben ze onbeperkte mogelijkheden, onbeperkte diepe zakken om te kunnen kopen wat ze willen kopen en te ondersteunen wat ze willen ondersteunen. En nu ze de geldgroeicijfers met ingang van eind maart niet meer zullen publiceren, valt er voor de mensen die dit volgen eigenlijk een heel belangrijke aanwijzing weg, het bewijs wordt verwijderd.

Als je kijkt naar de afgelopen tien, twintig jaar, dan zie je dat er zo'n ontiegelijke hoeveelheid geld uit het niets gecreëerd. Dat doen we in Europa ook hè, het totaal aantal uitstaande hypotheken in Europa stijgt met 10 procent per jaar, het totaal aantal uitstaande persoonlijke leningen stijgt 10 procent per jaar, de totale hoeveelheid geld in omloop stijgt met 8,5 procent per jaar, maar de economie groeit slechts 1 procent per jaar. Dus dat moet tot geldontwaarding leiden, dat moet tot inflatie leiden, en dat leidt natuurlijk ook tot geldontwaarding. Alleen in de officiële cijfers is dat niet erg zichtbaar. Maar je hoeft maar te kijken wat je voor een biertje betaalt of een patat mèt: je betaal nu twee Euro, en een aantal jaren geleden was het twee gulden. Dat laat die geldontwaarding wel zien en dat verklaart ook waarom zoveel mensen, vooral middengroepen, in grote problemen komen, omdat je in feite niet wordt gecompenseerd voor het koopkrachtverlies.'

quote:

Een argument tegen het mogelijke ingrijpen van de club is dat het PPT vooral bestaat uit investeringsbanken, en die hebben nu niet de middelen om te interveniëren. Zoals je jezelf niet kunt optillen, kun je ook niet jezelf uit de put kopen.

quote:

John Crudele: Ben, come clean about the PPT!
By John Crudele
New York Post

http://www.nypost.com/bus(...)ss_john_crudele.html

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke revealed that the secretive Plunge Protection Team meets several times a year, but he dodged a congressman's inquiries about what the group does and whether minutes are kept of those meetings.

So the Post has filed a Freedom of Information Act request for those minutes -- specifically for the meetings that likely occurred immediately after the terrorist attacks in 2001.

I wrote about the Plunge Protection Team in a article earlier this month. Formally called the Working Group on Financial Markets, it was formed in 1988 by President Reagan to advise Wall Street.

Orginially headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, it also has top regulators and the chairman of the Fed as members in 1989.

But in addition to giving Wall Street advice, I suspect -- and former White House adviser George Stephanopoulos seems to have confirmed -- that the Plunge Protection team has morphed into something more active.

And Wall Street firms may have been invited to join.

What's clear from answers to questions posed by Rep. Ron Paul, R-Texas, is that new Fed chief Bernanke either doesn't know much about the role of the working group or preferred not to discuss the matter.

And, I think, it's time we found out a little more about an organization that could afford some Wall Street firms an opportunity to reap massive profits at the expense of ordinary investors.

Here's some of the exchange that occurred between Bernanke and Rep. Paul last Thursday at the House Financial Committee hearings.

* * *

Rep. Paul: Good afternoon, Chairman Bernanke. I have a question dealing with the Working Group on Financial Markets. I want to learn more about that group and exactly what authority they have and what they do.

Could you tell me how often they meet and how often they have actions? And have they done something recently? And are there reports sent out by this particular group?

Bernanke: Yes, congressman. The president's working group was convened by the president, I believe, after the 1987 stock market crash. It meets irregularly. And its primary function is advisory, to prepare reports.

Rep. Paul: In the media you'll find articles that will claim, at least, that it's a lot more than advisory. You know, if there is a stock market crash, that you literally have a lot of authority, you know, to impose restrictions. And we're talking about many trillions of dollars slushing around in all the financial markets. And this involves the Treasury and, of course, the Fed as well as the SEC (Securities & Exchange Commission) and the CFTC (Commodities Futures Trading Commission) And the reason this came to my attention was just recently there was an article that actually made a charge that out of this group came a position that interfered with the price of General Motors stock. Have you read that? Or do you know anything about that?

Bernanke: No sir. I don't know.

Rep. Paul: But back to the issue of meeting. You tell me it meets irregularly. But are there minutes kept, or are there reports made on this group?

Bernanke: I don't know. I believe there are records kept by other agencies. But I don't know which agencies.

Rep. Paul: And they would be available to us in the committee?

Bernanke: I don't know. I'm sorry. I don't know.

* * *

Rep. Paul obviously doesn't have a reporter's knack for the follow-up question, so here's what I would have asked next.

Crudele: Well, Mr. Bernanke, how about you find out? Someone in your position should know if, as former White House adviser Stephanopoulos has claimed, the Working Group on Financial Markets -- the Plunge Protection Team -- has the authority to interfere with the free market for stocks. And we'd also like to know who makes decision for the group, politicians or guys on Wall Street. Don't misunderstand, Mr. Bernanke. I'm not saying what the group is doing is wrong. But why should firms like Goldman Sachs -- from which two of the last four Treasury secretaries have come -- be in a better position than anyone else who gambles in the stock market?

See, that's why I'll never be in Congress.

----------

John Crudele is business columnist for the New York Post.

quote:

Op zondag 22 februari 2009 00:50 schreef PlungeStock het volgende:
Waarom zijn de namen achter de transacties niet gewoon bekend?

quote:

Op zondag 22 februari 2009 01:15 schreef PlungeStock het volgende:
http://www.rtl.nl/(/finan(...)_protection_team.xml

Wie aan het bestaan van een geoliede organisatie als de PPT twijfelt, hoe verklaar je het gegeven link dan?Zo wordt de DJ van verlies van -8% teruggebracht naar -3,5% in een uurtje.

quote:

Op zondag 22 februari 2009 00:50 schreef PlungeStock het volgende:
[ afbeelding ]

De olifant (zo heb ik hem genoemd, omdat het telkens een kenmerkend verschijnsel) is ook een interessant geval. Die koopt altijd flink bij AEGON, en verkoopt ze de volgende dag. Allemaal om 17:35. Hij heeft al in bijna alle gevallen flink verlies geleden, en duikt toch bijna iedere dag op. Alleen vrijdag is-ie er nooit. Laatste keer:

[ afbeelding ]

De volgende ochtend stond AEGON dik in verlies. De olifant verkocht vervolgens weer om 17:35 1.2 miljoen aandelen met verlies (-8,4%). Hoogste transactie dat ik van de olifant gezien heb, was 4,7 miljoen aandelen boven 5 euro en nog wat. Ook met verlies verkocht om 17:35.
De olifant dook pas op in medio oktober. Daarvoor bestond-ie nog niet. Waarom zijn de namen achter de transacties niet gewoon bekend?

[ afbeelding ]

Olifant pwned.

Waarschijnlijk een miljardair ofzo die handelt, in ieder geval géén hedgefund (die zijn niet zo stom bezig). Maar waarom alleen AEGON, en dat tijdstip

Het blijft lachen, iedere keer wordt ie gepwnd. In 8 van 10 gevallen maakt de olifant alleen maar verlies. En toch blijft-ie doorgaan. .

quote:

Op zondag 22 februari 2009 11:33 schreef Zero2Nine het volgende:

[..]

Dit vind ik een vreemd verhaal, waarom met zulke verliezen verkopen? Als je AEGON overeind wil houden dan verkoop je niet zoveel zou ik zeggen. Wat zou de motivatie van "de olifant" zijn om zo te handelen?

quote:

Plunge Protection Team

By Brett D. Fromson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, February 23, 1997; Page H01
The Washington Post

It is 2 o'clock on a hypothetical Monday afternoon, and the Dow Jones industrial average has plummeted 664 points, on top of a 847-point slide the previous week.

The chairman of the New York Stock Exchange has called the White House chief of staff and asked permission to close the world's most important stock market. By law, only the president can authorize a shutdown of U.S. financial markets.

In the Oval Office, the president confers with the members of his Working Group on Financial Markets -- the secretary of the treasury and the chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

The officials conclude that a presidential order to close the NYSE would only add to the market's panic, so they decide to ride out the storm. The Working Group struggles to keep financial markets open so that trading can continue. By the closing bell, a modest rally is underway.

This is one of the nightmare scenarios that Washington's top financial policymakers have reviewed since Oct. 19, 1987, when the Dow Jones industrial average dropped 508 points, or 22.6 percent, in the biggest one-day loss in history. Like defense planners in the Cold War period, central bankers and financial regulators have been thinking carefully about how they would respond to the unthinkable.

An outline of the government's plans emerges in interviews with more than a dozen current and former officials who have participated in meetings of the Working Group. The group, established after the 1987 stock drop, is the government's high-level forum for discussion of financial policy.

Just last Tuesday afternoon, for example, Working Group officials gathered in a conference room at the Treasury Building. They discussed, among other topics, the risks of a stock market decline in the wake of the Dow's sudden surge past 7000, according to sources familiar with the meeting. The officials pondered whether prices in the stock market reflect a greater appetite for risk-taking by investors. Some expressed concern that the higher the stock market goes, the closer it could be to a correction, according to the sources.

These quiet meetings of the Working Group are the financial world's equivalent of the war room. The officials gather regularly to discuss options and review crisis scenarios because they know that the government's reaction to a crumbling stock market would have a critical impact on investor confidence around the world.

"The government has a real role to play to make a 1987-style sudden market break less likely. That is an issue we all spent a lot of time thinking about and planning for," said a former government official who attended Working Group meetings. "You go through lots of fire drills and scenarios. You make sure you have thought ahead of time of what kind of information you will need and what you have the legal authority to do."

In the event of a financial crisis, each federal agency with a seat at the table of the Working Group has a confidential plan. At the SEC, for example, the plan is called the "red book" because of the color of its cover. It is officially known as the Executive Directory for Market Contingencies. The major U.S. stock markets have copies of the commission's plan as well as the CFTC's.

Going to Plan A

The red book is intended to make sure that no matter what the time of day, SEC officials can reach their opposite numbers at other agencies of the U.S. government, with foreign governments, at the various stock, bond and commodity futures and options exchanges, as well as executives of the many payment and settlement systems underlying the financial markets.

"We all have everybody's home and weekend numbers," said a former Working Group staff member.

The Working Group's main goal, officials say, would be to keep the markets operating in the event of a sudden, stomach-churning plunge in stock prices -- and to prevent a panicky run on banks, brokerage firms and mutual funds. Officials worry that if investors all tried to head for the exit at the same time, there wouldn't be enough room -- or in financial terms, liquidity -- for them all to get through. In that event, the smoothly running global financial machine would begin to lock up.

This sort of liquidity crisis could imperil even healthy financial institutions that are temporarily short of cash or tradable assets such as U.S. Treasury securities. And worries about the financial strength of a major trader could cascade and cause other players to stop making payments to one another, in which case the system would seize up like an engine without oil. Even a temporary loss of liquidity would intensify financial pressure on already stressed institutions. In the 1987 crash, government officials worked feverishly -- and, ultimately, successfully -- to avoid precisely that bleak scenario.

Officials say they are confident that the conditions that led to the slide a decade ago are not present today. They cite low interest rates and a healthy economy as key differences between now and 1987. Officials also point to SEC-approved "circuit breakers" that were introduced after 1987 to give investors timeouts to calm down.

Under the SEC's rules, a drop of 350 points in the Dow would bring a 30-minute halt in NYSE trading. If the Dow declined another 200 points, trading would cease for one hour. No additional circuit breakers would operate that day, but a new set would apply the next trading day.

Despite these precautions, today's high stock market worries officials such as Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, who in a speech in early December raised questions about "irrational exuberance" in the markets. Because the market declined following Greenspan's speech, government officials have become even more reluctant to comment on these issues for fear of triggering the very event they wish to forestall, according to policymakers.

A Brewing Concern

Greenspan had expressed similar thoughts a year ago at a confidential meeting of the Working Group. Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt Jr. also are concerned about the stock market's vulnerability, according to sources familiar with their views.

The four principals of the group -- Rubin, Greenspan, Levitt and CFTC Chairwoman Brooksley Born -- meet every few months, and senior staff get together more often to work on specific agenda items.

In addition to the permanent members, the head of the President's National Economic Council, the chairman of his Council of Economic Advisers, the comptroller of the currency and the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank frequently attend Working Group sessions.

The Working Group has studied a variety of possible threats to the financial system that could ensue if stock prices go into free fall. They include: a panicky flight by mutual fund shareholders; chaos in the global payment, settlement and clearance systems; and a breakdown in international coordination among central banks, finance ministries and securities regulators, the sources said.

As chairman of the Working Group, Rubin would have overall responsibility for the U.S. response, but Greenspan probably would be the government's most important player.

"In a crisis, a lot of deference is paid to the Fed," a former member of the Working Group said. "They are the only ones with any money."

"The first and most important question for the central bank is always, 'Do you have credit problems?' " said E. Gerald Corrigan, former president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and now an executive at Goldman Sachs & Co. "The minute some bank or investment firm says, 'Hey, maybe I'm not going to get paid -- maybe I ought to wait before I transfer these securities or make that payment,' then things get tricky. The central bank has to sense that before it happens and take steps to prevent it."

1987: A Case Study

The Fed's reaction to the 1987 market slide, which Corrigan helped oversee, is a case study in how to do it right. The Fed kept the markets going by flooding the banking system with reserves and stating publicly that it was ready to extend loans to important financial institutions, if needed.

The Fed's actions in October 1987 read like a financial war story.

The morning after the 508-point drop on Black Monday, the market began another sickening slide. Corrigan and other Fed officials strongly discouraged New York Stock Exchange Chairman John Phelan from requesting government permission to close the market. Phelan was concerned that if the market continued to erode, the capital of the NYSE member firms would disappear. Corrigan feared a shutdown would cause more panic.

"It was extraordinarily difficult around 11 o'clock," Corrigan recalled. "The market was at one point down another 250 points, and that's when the debate with Phelan took place."

Simultaneously, Corrigan and other central bank officials spoke privately with the big banks and urged them not to call loans they had made to Wall Street houses, which were collateralized by securities that could no longer be traded and whose value was in question.

A final critical moment came that day when the Fed decided not to shut down a subsidiary of the Continental Illinois Bank that was the largest lender to the commodity futures and options trading houses in Chicago. The subsidiary had run out of capital to provide financing to that market.

"Closing it would have drained all the liquidity out of the futures and options markets," said one former top Fed official involved in the decision. Investors use stock futures and options to hedge positions in the underlying stock market.

Recognizing the crucial role of banks if another financial crisis should strike, the Office of the Comptroller recently conducted an internal study of what damage a market decline would inflict on U.S. banks. The OCC declined to discuss the study or its conclusions.

At the SEC, one big worry is how to cope with an international financial crisis that begins abroad but quickly rolls into U.S. markets.

"We worry about a U.S. brokerage firm that is dealing with a Japanese insurance company, where we don't know how they are run or regulated," a SEC source said. To improve its ability to react in a crisis, the SEC and the Fed have begun joint inspections with their British counterparts of U.S. and British financial institutions with global reach.

The most drastic -- and probably unlikely -- move the SEC could take in a crisis would be to propose a market shutdown to the president. That would require a majority vote of the commission. If a quorum couldn't be mustered, the chairman could designate himself "duty officer" and go to the president or his staff.

"Closing the market is, of course, the last thing the commission wants to do," said a source familiar with the SEC's planning. "During a time when people are extremely worried about their investments, you are cutting them off from taking any action. . . . The philosophy of the commission is that markets should stay open."

Just the Facts

Gathering accurate information would be the first order of business for federal regulators.

"Intelligence gathering is critical," Corrigan said. "It depends on the willingness of major market participants to volunteer problems when they see them and to respond honestly to central bank questions."

The SEC, CFTC and Treasury have market surveillance units. They monitor not only the overall markets, but also the cash positions of all the major stock and commodity brokerages and large traders.

The regulators also are hooked into the "hoot-and-holler" system used to notify participants in all financial markets of trading halts. The hoot-and-holler system alerts traders and regulators when a halt is coming.

Relying on Quick Action

In the event of a sharp market decline, the SEC and CFTC would be in constant contact with brokerage and commodity firms to spot early signs of financial failure. If they concluded that a firm was going down, they would try to move customer positions from that firm to solvent institutions.

At least this team of crisis managers already has been through the Wall Street wars. Greenspan was Fed chairman in October 1987. Rubin has served as the co-head of investment bank Goldman Sachs & Co. Levitt has been both a Wall Street executive and president of the American Stock Exchange.

"I think the government is in good shape to handle a crisis," said Scott Pardee, senior adviser to Yamaichi International (America) Inc., a Japanese brokerage subsidiary, and former senior vice president at the New York Fed. "A lot depends on personal relationships. You have a number of seasoned people who have gone through a number of crises. So if something happens, things can be handled quickly on the phone without having to introduce people to each other."

Consider what happened at 11:30 p.m. Dec. 5, when Greenspan made his comments about irrational exuberance. Alton Harvey, head of the SEC's Market Watch unit, was called at home by officials of Globex, a futures trading system owned by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. U.S. stock futures trading in Asia had fallen to their 12-point limit, they said.

Harvey immediately alerted his direct superior as well as his opposite number at the CFTC. More senior SEC and CFTC officials were informed as well. But there wasn't much to be done until the morning. So Harvey went back to sleep.

REACTING TO A PLUNGE

After the market crashed on Oct. 29, 1929:

* The Federal Reserve provided loans and credit to financial systems.

* President Hoover met with business, labor and farm organizations to encourage capital spending and discourage layoffs; he also promised higher tariffs.

* Federal income taxes were reduced by 1 percent by the end of the year.

After the market dropped 22.6 percent on Oct. 19, 1987, the Federal Reserve:

* Encouraged the New York Stock Exchange to stay open.

* Encouraged big commercial banks not to pull loans to major Wall Street houses.

* Kept open a subsidiary of Continental Illinois Bank that was the largest lender to the commodity trading houses in Chicago.

* Flooded the banking system with money to meet financial obligations.

* Announced it was ready to extend loans to important financial institutions.

What would happen today during a stock drop would depend on the particulars. Here are current guidelines:

* If the Dow Jones industrial average falls 350 points within a trading day, NYSE trading would be halted for 30 minutes.

* If the DJIA falls another 200 points that day, trading would stop for one hour.

* If the market declines more than 550 points in a day, no further restrictions would be applied.

SOURCE: The New York Stock Exchange, "The Crash and the Aftermath" by Barrie A. Wigmore

© Copyright 1997 The Washington Post Company

quote:

Op zondag 22 februari 2009 00:50 schreef PlungeStock het volgende:
De olifant (zo heb ik hem genoemd, omdat het telkens een kenmerkend verschijnsel) is ook een interessant geval. Die koopt altijd flink bij AEGON, en verkoopt ze de volgende dag. Allemaal om 17:35.

quote:

Op zondag 22 februari 2009 17:42 schreef Gremen het volgende:
Hoeveel dollar kost het je eigenlijk om de DJ laat zeggen zo een 100 punten te laten stijgen?

quote:

Op zondag 22 februari 2009 12:33 schreef LXIV het volgende:
Ik denk dat het olifantje van Aegon een marktpartij is die bezig is een significant aandeel in het bedrijf te verwerven. Dat die verkopen ook van het olifantje zijn maakt niet zoveel uit.

En of dit olifantje het laatboek op het einde van de dag tegen gemiddeld 1% boven de beurskoers van die dag opkoopt maakt ook niet zo heel veel uit. Als het allemaal voor de hele lange termijn is dan is die paar procent ook niet zo relevant.

quote:

This Office helps formulate Treasury policy on financial markets, including economic matters regarding, and the regulation of, government securities, credit, equity, and derivatives markets and their structures and participants. Issues include financing initiatives, bankruptcy and financial contract netting, risk management, trading and clearing systems, systemic risk, financial modernization, financial accounting, corporate governance, disclosure requirements, energy derivatives markets, inflation-indexed securities, savings bond rates and terms, and tax policy relating to financial markets. The Office develops and prepares policy options, testimony and briefings, and analyzes legislation, regulatory rulemakings, and tax regulations.

The Office often collaborates with staff of other financial markets agencies, particularly those of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets. Chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Working Group includes the Chairs of the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

quote:

Op donderdag 5 maart 2009 21:33 schreef pberends het volgende:
Je zou bijna niet meer in de PPT geloven, na deze laatste weken.

quote:

Op donderdag 5 maart 2009 22:08 schreef Perrin het volgende:
Volgens mij zijn ze een tijdje geleden al 'all in' gegaan..

quote:

The Visible Hand of Uncle Sam

This report examines information indicating that the U.S. government has surreptitiously intervened in the American stock market.

quote:

brokerage firms that last week staged a concerted effort to manipulate the price of the Major Market Index – an index that trades on the Chicago Board of Trade and is made up of just 20 stock futures. By “buying the hell out of the MMI,” as one of my sources put it, these firms were able to push the similarly-constructed Dow Jones Industrial Average higher at minimum expense
.
16
[Emphasis added.]

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Meet The Latest Member Of The Plunge Protection Team: The European Central Ban
The long-debated topic of whether the ECB intervenes on behalf of the euro can now be put to rest. 120 pip move in a minute is not a short cover. It is, and always has been, forced central bank intervention. Bernanke is so happy Trichet is doing his work for him for the time being. Be very wary of buying stocks on this intervention, as Central Bank involvement now at best leads to a 12 hour temporary "fix" to the market that Bernanke et al want to sustain.

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Op donderdag 20 mei 2010 21:52 schreef PietjePuk007 het volgende:

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