quote:
Op woensdag 29 maart 2017 11:26 schreef GSbrder het volgende:[..]
Gek genoeg is er weinig neoliberaal aan de Nederlandse schuldbehandeling. In Anglo-Saksische landen zijn ze vaak veel coulanter met het wegstrepen van schulden. Daar zijn hypotheken bijvoorbeeld ook af te lossen door de bank de sleutels van het onderpand te geven. Het is eerder continentaal-Europees (niet neoliberaal) dat we mensen hier aan hun schulden en sanering houden.
Ik denk dat ook daar de trend is geweest naar steeds hardvochtiger wetgeving. Voor zover je dat kan generaliseren.
Zeker, de Britse wet uit 1986 versoepelde ook het één en ander, vooral voor bepaalde typen bedrijven en sectoren (wat weer een weerslag had op acquisitiefraude e.d.). Echter, deze wet creëerde in ieder geval een hele industrie eromheen ('insolvency practicioners'), iets dat we ook in Nederland hebben gezien.
Voor de ideologische basis achter het scheppen van deze industrie:
https://books.google.nl/b(...)#v=onepage&q&f=falseVoeg dit samen met de andere trends (toegenomen langdurige armoede) en men blijft soms jarenlang in de overlevingsmodus rondhangen, waar een hele groep roofdieren van profiteren. Waarbij de incentives niet in het voordeel van de schuldenaar werken.
In de Verenigde Staten hebben de neocons van Bush in 2005 hun kans gegrepen.
http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/20/pf/bankruptcy_bill/Een wetswijziging die mogelijk ook nog een rol had bij de implosie van de huizenmarkt.
http://www.huffingtonpost(...)osures_n_820491.htmlhttp://www.washingtonfres(...)nkruptcy-Law-He.htmlquote:
That homeowners would default on the unaffordable mortgages was a foregone conclusion. Indeed, it was the desired result of the business model. The preferred marketed loans tell it all: Subprimes! NINJAs! Liar’s loans! Washington helpfully changed bankruptcy law to make it more difficult for a homeowner to get out of mortgage debt in preparation for the wave of defaults that everyone knew would result. Wall Street would get the homes, and homeowners would still have to pay on the debts. Then the foreclosed property would be resold, with more fees for everyone in the finance food chain, and the whole process through to default would begin again — a nice virtuous cycle.
It might seem strange that banks would actually want default. But that is the beauty of a casino — the house always wins, and homebuyers were gambling against the casino. On the way up, fees are collected, and on the way down fees are still collected on the foreclosures and as houses are resold. And if anything should go wrong, Washington backstops the casinos.
But it was necessary to streamline foreclosure to make it as fast and cheap as possible. Enter MERS — another link in the food chain — created by the banks in 1997 in preparation for the boom and bust. MERS was set up to be a foreclosure mill. It would break the centuries-old custom that protected property rights by requiring every sale of property to be publicly recorded, and requiring that any creditor claiming a right to foreclose to demonstrate clear title, with an endorsed note in the creditor’s name and a record at the county office showing transfer of the property.
The banksters did not want to go through all that paperwork, and needed to subvert the transparency that would shine light on their crimes. Hence, they set up a fraudulent shell corporation that claimed to be the mortgagee; while the original sale would be recorded at the county office, subsequent sales and purchases of the mortgage would be recorded only by an “electronic handshake” between two “members” of MERS. Even that record was considered by the banksters to be purely voluntary — MERS did not require members to actually record transactions. If they found it more convenient to conceal the transfers, that was permitted.
http://www.huffingtonpost(...)t_1440_b_797563.htmlquote:
One law for the rich, one law for the poor
Joseph Stiglitz
[...]
When it became clear that people could not pay back what was owed, the rules of the game changed. Bankruptcy laws were amended in 2005 to introduce a system of "partial indentured servitude." An individual with, say, debts equal to 100 percent of his income could be forced to hand over to the bank 25 percent of his gross, pre-tax income for the rest of his life, because the bank could add on, say, 30 percent interest each year to what a person owed. In the end, a mortgage holder would owe far more than the bank ever received, even though the debtor had worked, in effect, one-quarter time for the bank.
When this new bankruptcy law was passed, no one complained that it interfered with the sanctity of contracts: At the time borrowers incurred their debt, a more humane—and economically rational—bankruptcy law gave them a chance for a fresh start if the burden of debt repayment became too onerous.
That knowledge should have given lenders incentives to make loans only to those who could repay them. But lenders perhaps knew that, with the Republicans in control of government, they could make bad loans and then change the law to ensure that they could squeeze the poor.
[...]
Lenders complain that such a law would violate their property rights. But almost all changes in laws and regulations benefit some at the expense of others. When the 2005 bankruptcy law was passed, lenders were the beneficiaries—they didn't worry about how the law affected the rights of debtors.
Growing inequality, combined with a flawed system of campaign finance, risks turning America's legal system into a travesty of justice. Some may still call it the "rule of law," but it would not be a rule of law that protects the weak against the powerful. Rather, it would enable the powerful to exploit the weak.
http://www.slate.com/arti(...)aw_for_the_poor.htmlEr zijn economen en historici die claimen dat Jimmy Carter de eerste "neoliberale" president was. Wat dan altijd langs komt in de beschouwing is de 1978 Bankruptcy Law wijziging.
Om een lang verhaal kort te maken (en terug te komen tot de essentie) ik denk dat dezelfde trend zich ook in de Verenigde Staten en Verenigd Koninkrijk heeft afgespeeld, en nog wel eerder begon dan de Nederlandse wetswijziging van 1998. In de VS heeft dit een 'third party debt collection' industrie geschapen van tenminste 50 miljard dollar... puur en alleen de consumenten tak.
Graag een oprecht antwoord... als jij denkt dat sinds pakweg ~1980 de relevante wetten soepeler zijn geworden - soepeler voor de schuldenaar - dan moet je dat zeggen en graag beargumenteren. Ik denk zoals gezegd van niet, en de 2005 wetswijziging door de neocons is het duidelijkste voorbeeld (inclusief het ophogen van incassokosten en rente - zie het treffende stuk van Stiglitz).
N.B. dit gaat over huiseigenaren, consumenten en personen. Niet zozeer bedrijven of de in de wet verankerde rechtspersonen, en zoals Stiglitz aan geeft gelden voor de vermogenden wéér andere regels.
[ Bericht 1% gewijzigd door Klopkoek op 29-03-2017 13:16:39 ]